We left "Askold" when the latter, bypassing the Russian battleships and cutting through the formation of destroyers between the 1st and 2nd squads, turned south. "Novik" followed him, but the opinions of the destroyer commanders about whether to follow N. K. Reitenstein, were divided. The head of the 1st destroyer detachment, who was driving the "Enduring" at the head of the 1st squad, considered himself obliged to carry out the last order of V. K. Vitgefta ("Torpedo boats stay at the battleships at night"). But the destroyers of the 2nd squad - "Silent", "Fearless", "Merciless" and "Stormy" - nevertheless tried to follow the "Askold" and "Novik", but almost immediately fell behind hopelessly. Taking into account the fact that after turning to the south the Russian cruisers held 20 knots, this fact irrefutably testifies to the very poor condition of the power plants of these ships. However, having failed to catch up with the Askold and Novik, the 2nd squad did not turn back to Port Arthur - all four components of its destroyer moved to break through on their own.
To intercept the Russian cruisers, two Japanese combat detachments, the 3rd and 6th, as well as the armored cruiser Yakumo moved forward: in total there were seven Japanese cruisers against two Russians, although, according to some reports, they also managed to shoot at Askold. Nissin . However, not even counting the latter, the forces, of course, were not equal. But unfortunately, the author of this article was unable to accurately determine the degree of combat participation of the 6th detachment in this episode of the battle.
Apparently, the main battle was fought between "Askold" and "Novik" on our side, and "Yakumo", "Chitose", "Takasago" and "Kasagi" on the other. The most fierce he was during 20 minutes, when the opponents approached at a distance of 20-25 cables - the commander of "Askold" K. A. Grammatchikov even indicated less than 20 cables. Judging by the descriptions, it was at this time that the Japanese inflicted the bulk of the damage to Askold during the breakthrough.
Probably, this was the case - soon after turning to the south, the cruisers of the 3rd detachment opened fire on the Russian ships, and, probably somewhere at 19.10-19.15, but no later than 19.20, they approached the distance indicated above. A fierce short battle between the cruisers took place here. Then N. K. Reitsenstein, and K. A. The grammarians were indicated in the reports on the destroyer attack, during which four mines were fired at Askold. The author was unable to find confirmation of this attack in Japanese sources, and it is generally unclear whether it took place. There is information that the 2nd squadron of fighters met with "Askold" and "Novik", but this happened much earlier, around 19.00-19.05, when the Russian cruisers had not yet pulled away from the destroyers following them - at least the Japanese commanders perceived them as one detachment. At the same time, the Japanese destroyers did not even try to go into the attack, but avoided meeting, saving torpedoes for the Russian battleships. There is no information that they were seen on the Askold, let alone fired upon. It is also interesting that no torpedo attack was seen on the Novik following the Askld, at least in the report of its commander Maksimillian Fedorovich Schultz there was no mention of it.
Nevertheless, the author of this article would be careful not to rush to accuse N. K. Reitenstein and K. A. Grammatchikova in a lie - in a battle in the twilight, something else could have been imagined, and besides, it cannot be ruled out that from "Askold" some destroyers were fired upon, which did not attack them. True, in fairness, we note that the author of this article was unable to find out whether there were any destroyers near the place of the collision of the cruisers at the specified time (about 19.40 or a little later).
At 19.40 "Askold" and "Novik" broke through the cruisers of the 3rd detachment, and they began to pursue: at this time, the 6th detachment, consisting of the weak Japanese cruisers Suma, Akashi and Akitsushima, was approaching the battle site. …
Perhaps they fired at Askold (this is especially true of Suma), but in general, according to N. K. Reitsenstein: “This ring was broken (talking about the 3rd combat detachment - author's note), but behind him appeared four more cruisers of the 3rd rank of the "Suma" type, which did not block the roads, and did not represent anything for "Askold" at all. " Only the Suma, which was going separately from the rest of the detachment, managed to cross the Askold (or rather, as N. K. Reitsenstein points out, this small Japanese cruiser found itself in the way of the Russians after Askold changed course). "Askold" fired at "Suma", and as soon as the Japanese discovered that a large Russian cruiser was heading straight for them, they immediately turned aside. In general, it can be assumed that the cruisers of the 6th detachment (not counting the "Suma") did not manage to intercept the "Askold" and "Novik", and although at some point they opened fire, trying to pursue the Russian cruisers, they quickly fell behind …
Nevertheless, the ships of the 3rd and 6th combat detachments continued to pursue the Russian cruisers: according to the Novik commander, the dogs, that is, Chitose, Kasagi, and Takasago, did the best. gradually lagged behind. According to K. A. Grammatchikov, the "Askold" ceased fire at 20.30.
There are three big oddities in this episode of the Russian cruiser breakout. We have already mentioned the first - this is an attack by Japanese destroyers. It is unlikely that such was the case; moreover, there are some doubts that at that time there were at least some destroyers next to Askold that he could have fired at. On the other hand, outright lies in the reports are highly questionable. The fact is that in the event of a battle in Chemulpo, regarding the information presented in the reports, one can at least theoretically assume a conspiracy between the commanders of the cruiser and the gunboat. But how can one suspect the chief of the cruiser detachment and the commander of the "Askold" in this, because they had absolutely no opportunity to negotiate with the commander of the "Novik". As you know, the latter lagged behind the flagship and then broke through on its own!
A breakthrough past the superior forces of the enemy, in pursuance of the order of the Sovereign Emperor, in itself was an extraordinary and outstanding act. However, if some strange details, inconsistencies in the reports and N. K. Reitenstein would have been accused of lying, this would have "blurred" the entire effect: according to the author of this article, the Rear Admiral did not gain anything by coming up with non-existent details, but he could have lost a lot. It is precisely the fact that the circumstances of the breakthrough were perfectly visible both from "Askold" and "Novik", with the commander of which N. K. Reitenstein did not have any opportunity to "come to an agreement," suggesting not a deliberate lie, but a conscientious delusion of the chief of the cruiser squadron and the commander of the "Askold".
The second oddity lies in the strange difference in the descriptions of the battle - while on the Askold they fought from both sides, the Novik commander indicated in the report that both Japanese detachments were to the left of the breaking Russian ships.
And, finally, the third oddity is the completely incomprehensible lag of the "dogs".
The commander of "Novik" M. F. Schultz in his report referred to them as the fastest cruisers of all pursuing Russian ships: "except for the cruisers Kasagi, Chitose and Takasago, the rest fell behind quite quickly."As we know from the reports, "Askold" was sailing at 20 knots. Taking into account the fact that in peacetime the cruiser showed stable 22.5 knots, for six months of the war and in the presence of combat damage, such a speed looks quite adequate. It is known that on acceptance tests the cruiser showed 21, 85 knots at 121 rpm, while in the battle on July 28, 1904, the "Askold" obviously had a larger displacement, and the car, according to the chief ship mechanic of the cruiser, was able to give out only 112 rpm. The main reason for this was damage to the nasal tube, into which an enemy 305-mm projectile fell and practically blocked it, which caused one of the nine boilers to be taken out of work. True, at about 19.00, following the order “Have the fullest speed”, we managed to bring the number of revolutions to 132, but for a very short time, no more than 10 minutes, after which the speed was reduced. And, finally, it should be noted that, if you can still try to speculate about what maximum speed Askold could have given at the beginning of the breakthrough, then after it, when the ship received additional damage during the battle with the third combat detachment, 20 knots look perfect limiting figure.
And yet, "Kasagi", "Chitose" and "Takasago" failed to catch up with him.
Let's remember what these armored Japanese cruisers were like. In terms of their size, they occupied an intermediate position between Askold and Novik - if the first had a normal displacement of about 6,000 tons, and the second - within 3,100 tons, then the Japanese cruisers had 4,160 (Takasago) - 4,900 tons ("Kasagi"). "Dogs" were inferior to Russian cruisers in speed, but not fatally - on acceptance tests they showed 21-22, 5 knots. on natural draft, and 22, 87-22, 9 knots when forcing boilers. Accordingly, it would be quite possible to expect that, having received the command "the most complete forward", these cruisers would be quite capable of catching up with the 20-knot "Askold".
At the same time, "Kasagi", "Chitose" and "Takasago" were distinguished by very strong weapons. Each of them had 2 * 203-mm / 40, 10 * 120-mm / 40, 12 * 76-mm / 40, as well as 6 * 47-mm modern guns, in addition, each of them had five torpedo tubes. In other words, 6 * 203-mm and 15 * 120-mm, not counting smaller calibers, could participate in the onboard salvo of the "dogs", while "Askold" and "Novik" could only respond to them with 7 * 152-mm (in fact - 6 * 152-mm, so two of these guns were removed from "Askold", and he went into battle, having only 10 six-inch guns) and 4 * 120-mm, that is, only 10 barrels against the 21st. In addition, during the breakthrough on "Askold" 6 six-inch guns were out of order, and a weakening of the intensity of its fire should have been noticed on the Japanese ships.
In view of the above, there was absolutely no reason for the "dogs" to avoid continuing the battle. Obviously, this was the opinion of N. K. Reitenstein, who indicated in the report: "The quick fire of" Askold "on the enemy cruisers apparently caused damage to three cruisers of the" Takasago "class …". In other words, the head of the cruiser squad could not imagine any other reasons why the "dogs" could not catch up with the "Askold". However, today we know that none of these Japanese ships received any damage in the battle on July 28, 1904.
Accordingly, the reason is not in combat damage - there remains either cowardice and open neglect of their duties as the commander of the 3rd combat detachment, or the insufficient speed of the Japanese cruisers. The latter looks the most likely, but if so, then it should be assumed that the maximum speed of armored cruisers of the Takasago class at the time of the battle did not exceed 18-18, 5, hardly 19 knots.
If this assumption is correct, then it may make sense to reassess the fighting qualities of domestic "goddesses" - armored cruisers of the "Diana" type. In combat conditions, these ships could hold for a long time (that is, without forcing) 17, 5 knots: of course, against the background of the actual speed that the undamaged Askold and Novik could develop, as well as the passport speeds of Japanese armored cruisers, this was very small …But if we compare this speed with that which was actually developed by Japanese ships of the same class, it turns out that "Diana" and "Pallada" were somewhere in the middle of the list, yielding in speed to the "dogs" and, possibly, "Niitake" and "Tsushima", but surpassing, or at least not inferior in speed to ships such as "Suma", "Naniwa", "Itsukushima", "Izumi", and the latter were very intensively involved in combat operations … True, here one should take into account that, that the Japanese "armored decks" usually operated under the cover of armored cruisers. The Pacific squadron had nothing to form such a cover for the "goddesses" from.
But back to "Askold" and "Novik". Both cruisers received damage of varying severity during the breakthrough, but most of them, of course, went to Askold. Oddly enough, but to understand the damage received by the cruiser is very, very difficult - on the one hand, they seem to be documented in detail and mentioned in various sources, but on the other … sheer confusion. To begin with, we once again note two hits that "Askold" received before the start of the breakthrough:
1. At 13.09 the 305th shell hit the base of the first chimney, flattened it, disabled boiler No.1, interrupted telephone wires, communication pipes, fire mains, destroyed the wireless telegraph cabin, ladder to the bow superstructure and the upper bridge. Caused a small fire (was quickly extinguished). As a result of the damage, the speed dropped to 20 knots.
2. A projectile of unknown caliber pierced the side 3 meters above the waterline directly under gun no. 10 (six-inch in the aft superstructure on the starboard side). The chief navigator's cabin was destroyed.
Here you need to do a little work on the errors - when writing the previous articles of this series, the author assumed that this is the list of damages from this hit. However, most likely, it was this shell that damaged the reinforcements of the six-inch gun # 10, as a result of which the fully serviceable gun still went out of order, since it could no longer shoot. Accordingly, "Askold" went on a breakthrough not with 10, but only with 9 serviceable 152-mm guns.
Damage received by "Askold" during the breakthrough
1. Hit into the fifth chimney (the side from which the hit was received is not installed). According to various descriptions, one or three shells hit it, it is only known for certain that as a result of combat damage, the pipe was shortened by a third. The upper part of the pipe collapsed onto the deck, interfering with the supply of shells and charges to the guns. Boiler # 8 is damaged. It is usually indicated that the boiler, nevertheless, remained operational, but this is not entirely true: it really was not taken out of action until the end of the battle and further, so as not to lose progress, but then, after midnight, it was still taken out of work. The fact is that as a result of the fact that the shell of the boiler was broken by fragments and several pipes were damaged, it quickly lost fresh water (22 tons per hour), which could still be tolerated in battle, but only for a short time. Thus, although the boiler worked all the time of the breakthrough, on the morning of July 29 it was already incapable of combat.
Starboard
1. As a result of the hit (or close burst) of a projectile of an unknown caliber, a shot of an anti-mine net was pressed into the side, the bow superstructure and bulwarks in the area of the nose 152-mm gun were cut through.
2. The hit of a projectile of unknown caliber in the starboard bulwark in the area of the 5th chimney (the bulwark was destroyed between frames 53-56)
Left side
1. The shell pierced the bulwark and exploded near gun # 9 (the last openly standing six-inch cruiser on the port side), interrupting his crew.
2. The hit of a projectile of unknown caliber in the bulwark on the port side between the 3rd and 4th chimneys.
3. A projectile of an unknown caliber hit the stern, port side, next to the casemate of the 75-mm gun.
4. A shell hit in the stern, under the upper deck in the area of the aft casemate of six-inches, under the gun No. 11 - it was he who, apparently, "handed over" reinforcements, as well as at the "neighboring" six-inch starboard (No. 10) - in the future, on the night after the breakthrough, the gun was re-commissioned. The caliber of the projectile is estimated at 152-203 mm. Hole area 0.75 sq. M.
5. "A list of damage received by the 1st rank cruiser" Askold "in the battle on July 28, 1904" (annex to the report of N. K. Reitenstein) note the presence of two holes in the side - in the cabin No. 8 of the midshipman Rklitsky and the cabin No. 4 of the midshipman Abarmovich. Apparently, one of these hits was described above (damage to reinforcements under gun # 11), but as for the second, it is unclear whether it was a shell hit or a shell fragment.
The holes that caused the flooding. Starboard
1. The hole that caused the flooding of the coal pit of the stoker # 2. The description of this damage in “Vedomosti”) looks extremely strange: “The outer board was pierced into the coal pit of the 2nd stoker, above the waterline by 2, 24 m (indicated in feet and inches, for the convenience of readers, the author translated into the metric system), and the sheet of the outer board along the waterline below the hole, the coal pit of the 2nd stoker gave a leak into the coal pit. , caused deformation of the sheet at the waterline, and a shell fragment pierced the side at a height of 2, 24 m.
2. The close rupture of the shell near frames 82-83 (the area of the second pipe) led to the fact that 8 rivets were cut off and water began to flow into the stoker.
3. The close burst of the projectile left 8 fragmentation holes in the area of frames 7-10 (under the aft casemate of the 75-mm gun), one of them was at the waterline level.
Left side
Perhaps the most "mysterious" in terms of damage received. Presumably, they were as follows:
1. The explosion of a shell in the water opposite frames 32-33 (ie in the area of the main mast) led to the fact that both of these frames were broken, and the hull plating received 4 shrapnel holes, as a result of which water entered the skipper's storeroom.
2. A hit (or a close gap) in the area of frames 45-46-47, giving a hole 155 cm below the waterline. Two frames are broken, beams are loosened. The Damage List describes it as follows:
“The side was pierced below the waterline by 1.55 m near the compartment of underwater mine vehicles at a distance of 3.3 m from the hole received on January 27 and only temporarily repaired. All the rivets of the sheets near this hole were removed and a leak occurred."
So, strictly speaking, it is not even clear from here, around which hole the rivets were handed over - the old one, received on January 27, or the new one that damaged the frames? However, further description seems to clarify this issue.
“Frames No. 46 and 47 near the compartment of underwater mine vehicles were broken, and 8 rivets above the hole fell out, the cofferdam is riddled; the rupture of the same projectile loosened the fastening of the beams with frames in the compartment of underwater mine vehicles (frames No. 345, 46 and 47) so much that the fastenings moved away from the beams by 1 inch (25, 4 mm), rivets of both the armored deck and the outer skin the sides in this compartment allowed up to 3 tons of water to flow per day, and during the course a creak was heard in this place. The frames damaged by this projectile were 3, 3 m away from the hole received in the battle on January 27 of this year, which was sealed with a sheet with a rubber gasket on the bolts, but the frames broken then, number three (nos. 50, 51, 52) were not were replaced by new ones, which is why in this place the cruiser received a significant weakening of the hull, and this resulted in a rather significant vibration at a relatively low number of revolutions of the machine (60-75 rpm)."
Apparently, this was the case - a shell that fell near the side exploded under water in the indicated area. The force of the explosion was sufficient to make a hole in the side, but not enough to critically damage the cofferdam, as a result of which the inflow of water through the hole was localized. However, as a result of concomitant damage (destruction of frames, loosening of fasteners and rivets), water filtration into the hull occurred (at the level of 3 tons / day). The damage received earlier, on January 27, did not show itself, the sheet laid on the hole retained its tightness, but as a result of the breakdown of five frames located in the immediate vicinity (Nos. 46, 47, 50, 51, 52) the hull received a strong weakening.
Despite the fact that a number of sources indicate the formation of a hole with a size of 0.75 square meters, it is not entirely clear where this figure came from. But in any case, even if it is correct, it is extremely doubtful that the shell hit directly on the side, and did not explode next to it. Usually, when a shell exploded on the cofferdam casing, it received serious damage and could not prevent water from entering the body - meanwhile, in this case, we see exactly the opposite.
In addition to the above, the cruiser received multiple shrapnel damage to the freeboard, deck, pipes and superstructures, too numerous to list them in detail.
In general, during the breakthrough, the cruiser received, in all likelihood, 7-9 direct hits in the hull and 1-3 hits in the pipes, while one hit caused a leak into the coal pit of the 2nd stoker. There were no hits on the mast and the superstructure. In addition, 4 shells exploded in the water directly near the hull and damaged it - as a result, leaks were recorded in at least three cases.
Taking into account the two hits received by "Askold" even before the breakthrough, we can say that the cruiser was hit by 10-14 shells, mostly of unknown caliber, and another 4 shells exploded near the hull. As a result, the cruiser received very heavy damage, excluding the possibility of a breakthrough to Vladivostok.
Of the nine boilers, one was completely out of order, and the second had to be “shut down” in order not to use up fresh water supplies. Theoretically, due to the enemy, it could be launched, but, naturally, it would take a lot of time and work for a long time, consuming 22 tons of water per hour, he could not all the same. In addition, the loss of a third of the fifth pipe and numerous shrapnel damage to the other two also could not but affect the thrust of the seven remaining operational boilers of the ship.
Thus, the speed of "Askold" has obviously decreased. Usually, sources indicate that on the morning of July 29, Askold could not give more than 15 knots, but here, obviously, it was not about the boilers - even on seven operational units and taking into account the damage to the pipes, the cruiser, most likely, could have given more … The key role was played by damage to the corps, Rear Admiral N. K. Reitenstein pointed out in the report:
“Broken seams and chimneys did not allow a long stroke, and the consumption of coal increased greatly. The vibration of the cruiser changed completely during the course of the broken frames and the dispersed seams, and the course could hold no more than 15 knots."
That is, in the opinion of the author of this article, "Askold" on the morning of July 29, briefly could give more than 15 knots, but constantly could not go faster than 15 knots. At a higher speed, there was a risk that the seams in the area of the damaged frames will completely disperse, and thus cause large-scale flooding. Thus, it was the condition of the cruiser hull that became the main reason for Askold's inability to go to Vladivostok.
It is noteworthy that the ship's booking has not suffered at all. The armored deck of the ship was not pierced in any place - nevertheless, as a result of tremors from explosions that did not even hit the cruiser, but only exploded near the side of the shells, the cruiser was flooded four rooms, received 100 tons of water, and the overall strength hull decreased so much that even fresh weather became dangerous for the ship at a speed of over 15 knots. The storm generally threatened the ship with a serious accident, if not death. Thus, it can be stated that the armored "carapace" deck (the bevels of which went below the waterline) still did not cope with the task of ensuring the combat stability of the ship. It is interesting that if in place of "Askold" "Bayan", which had an armor belt along the waterline, he, most likely, simply "would not have noticed" most of the damage to the hull of "Askold". Only one single hit (apparently not direct), when the shell exploded at a depth of 1.55 m below the waterline, could have caused water to penetrate into the Bayan's compartments.
As for the artillery, then, as we said earlier, on the morning of July 29, the cruiser had only five combat-ready 152-mm guns out of ten available. Complete list of damages:
The lifting arc of the 152-mm gun # 7 is bent, 2 teeth of the lifting gear are broken, a piece of the wooden base was broken off by a splinter.
The sight of 152 mm gun # 8 is damaged, a piece of metal is knocked out at the sighting box, the lifting arc is bent, the balls of the turning mechanism are damaged, and the flywheels from the turning and lifting mechanisms are broken, the box of the lifting mechanism and the gun shield are slightly beaten by shrapnel.
The lifting arc of 152 mm gun # 9 is bent, 2 teeth of the lifting gear are broken.
Although everything was in order for 152-mm gun # 10, the shell broke the mount and the deck under the gun.
The 152 mm cannon has a bent lifting arc, and 5 teeth are broken on the lifting gear.
On the port side of 75-mm gun # 10, the air knurled cylinder is dented by shrapnel, and both compressor cylinders are dented and punctured by shrapnel in several places, and the compressor piston in the left cylinder is badly bent and bent. The sight and the pressure gauge with a copper tube are also interrupted.
In 47-mm gun # 15, the pedestal was pierced by shrapnel (unlike all the above-mentioned "barrels", this gun, most likely, could have worked).
Broken micrometer of Lyuzhol-Myakishev, 3 combat, 2 rangefinder, 1 tower (where did it come from, if there were “no” towers on Askold? sights lighting devices. At the same time, it follows from the reports of the Askold officers that the possibility of centralized fire control was lost even before the breakthrough began - probably as a result of damage to communications as a result of a 305-mm projectile hitting the base of the nasal tube. Thus, we can state that the cruiser has lost over 50% of its firepower.
Losses in the crew were: 1 officer and 10 sailors killed, 4 officers and 44 sailors wounded.
As for the "Novik", it can be said that he was lucky - he was not a priority target for the Japanese gunners. As a result, during the breakthrough, the cruiser received direct hits from only two shells of unknown caliber. One, apparently 120-152-mm, pierced the left side under the forecastle near the bow bridge and exploded, as a result of which the gunner of the tank gun and the signalman's apprentice were killed, as well as the ship's doctor was wounded. The second shell exploded in the middle of the cruiser without causing significant damage. The third shell exploded not far from the side, and struck him with shrapnel in the vicinity of the dynamo. On the whole, it can be stated that Novik had no serious damage.
Nevertheless, two Russian cruisers received direct hits from 12-16 shells during their breakthrough, and at least 5 more exploded in the immediate vicinity of their sides. Were they able to inflict similar damage to the Japanese in response?
Unfortunately no.
"Askold" used up 226 high-explosive 152-mm shells, 155 steel and 65 cast-iron 75-mm shells, as well as 160 47-mm shells in battle. Unfortunately, the author of this article does not know the consumption of Novik's shells, but, of course, his guns were not silent in this battle. Nevertheless, as is known today, of all the ships that fought with Askold and Novik, only the battleship Chin-Yen received damage during the breakthrough.
According to Soviet historiography, "Askold" managed to damage and cause fires on "Asam" and "Yakumo", but in reality, unfortunately, nothing of the kind happened. Not a single Russian shell hit the armored cruiser Asama for the entire battle on July 28, 1904. As for the Yakumo, it received a rather unpleasant hit of a 305-mm projectile in the coal throat in the central part of the upper deck of the ship, as a result of which 8 people died on the spot, and subsequently four more died from their wounds: 10 more people were injured, three of them were subsequently dismissed upon leaving the hospital. However, this hit happened in the interval between the 1st and 2nd phase of the battle, not during the breakthrough of "Askold". And the Russian cruiser did not have twelve-inch guns, and the existing six-inch guns could not give such an effect. And that was the only hit in Yakumo. Not a single hit was achieved on the remaining cruisers of the 3rd and 6th Combat Detachments, as well as on the Matsushima and Hasidate. In the battle on July 28, 1904, not a single Japanese destroyer was killed, and there is not a single reason to believe that at least one of them received any damage from the fire of "Askold" or "Novik".
Thus, the only success that could at least theoretically be attributed to the results of the Askold firing was two hits on the Chin-Yen. But the fact is that at that time not only Askold, but also at least four Russian battleships, as well as Diana and Pallada fired at the ships of the Japanese 5th Detachment and Asame: find out who exactly achieved hits on this Japanese ship is now absolutely impossible. Of course, there are chances that it was exactly "Askold" - after all, he walked between the Russian battleships and the Japanese 5th combat detachment, that is, it is possible that he was the closest to the "Chin-Yen", but of course, this does not guarantee or prove anything.
It is possible that the Askold's shells did cause some damage, but not to the ships, but to individual members of their crews. "Surgical and medical description of the naval war between Japan and Russia" through the table "Killed and wounded on ships in the battle in the Yellow Sea, indicating the outcome of their wounds" reports that on "Asama" "recovered on ships" - 1 person (probably about the commander of the ship, and then it is unlikely to be related to "Askold"), and on "Chitose" - two more of the same. Perhaps this was the result of shrapnel or a shell shock caused by the shooting of Askold or Novik, but that was all.
Thus, we can state a certain similarity between the results of the battles that gave the "Askold" and "Varyag" superior Japanese forces. Both cruisers entered the battle, both were seriously damaged, on both, a significant part of the artillery lost its combat effectiveness. Both of them, alas, could not inflict at least some noticeable damage to the enemy opposing them. However, "Askold" was in open water, and the state of his machines allowed him to confidently hold 20 knots, while the “Varyag” could hardly keep at least 17 knots at all times, and was locked in the narrowness of Chemulpo. This, in fact, led to a different result: "Askold" managed to break, and "Varyag" had to be drowned in a formally neutral Korean raid.
