Surprisingly, the fact is that the naval battle that took place in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, to this day remains relatively little known to a wide range of readers. This is rather strange, because in the Russian-Japanese war there were only four large-scale clashes of armored squadrons:
Fight January 27, 1904 (hereinafter, the dating is indicated according to the old style). On the night of the specified date, an attack by Japanese destroyers took place, with which, in fact, the Russian-Japanese war began. The next morning, the commander of the United Fleet Heihachiro Togo brought almost all his main forces to Port Arthur - six squadron battleships and five armored cruisers (the Kassuga and Nissin had not yet entered the Japanese fleet, and the Asama was guarding the Varyag in Chemulpo). The plan of the Japanese admiral was quite obvious - assuming that the destroyers would be able to sink a part of the Russian squadron stationed in the outer roadstead, with one decisive blow to finish off the rest. The destroyers of the United Fleet were indeed able to achieve considerable success, having blown up the best Russian squadron battleships Retvizan and Tsesarevich, as well as the armored cruiser Pallada. The weakened Russian squadron could not give a decisive battle with the hope of success. However, the Russian commander, Admiral O. V. Stark, having built the ships in a wake column, led them towards the Japanese, and then turned, diverging from the latter on the counter-courses (i.e., the Russian and Japanese columns moved in parallel, but in opposite directions). The Pacific squadron did not shy away from the battle, but took it in view of the coast, using the support of coastal batteries, while ships damaged by torpedoes also fired at the Japanese. As a result, Heihachiro Togo did not receive the advantage he had hoped for, and after 35-40 minutes (according to Japanese data, after 50) he withdrew his fleet from the battle. This time the battle did not work, we can only talk about a short collision that did not give significant results - not a single ship was sunk or seriously damaged.
The battle on July 28, 1904, which occurred as a result of an attempt to break through the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, and to which, in fact, this series of articles is devoted.
The battle in the Korea Strait, which took place on August 1, 1904, when the Vladivostok cruiser squadron was intercepted by the squadron of Vice Admiral Kamimura. The Russians and the Japanese showed perseverance and fought hard, but still it was a battle of the cruising forces, the squadron battleships did not take part in it.
And, finally, the grandiose Battle of Tsushima, which became the most ambitious battle between the steam armored pre-dreadnought fleets and ended with the death of the Russian fleet.
In the author's opinion, the battle of July 28, 1904 was, as it were, "in the shadow" of the Tsushima massacre - primarily due to a completely incomparable result. Tsushima ended with the death of the main forces of the Russian fleet and the capture of its remnants, and in the Yellow Sea, despite the fact that the Russian battleships under the command of V. K. Vitgefta fought fiercely with the main forces of the United Fleet for several hours, not a single ship was sunk or captured. But at the same time, it was the battle of July 28 that predetermined the fate of the 1st Squadron of the Pacific Fleet, and in terms of the composition of the forces involved, it occupies an honorable second place among the battles of the armored fleets of the pre-dreadnought era. Both the Japanese-Chinese battle at the Yalu estuary and the Spanish-American battle at Santiago de Cuba are much more modest. At the same time, the battle in the Yellow Sea was distinguished by very complex tactical maneuvering, it is well documented on both sides and therefore is of great interest to all lovers of the history of the navy.
In the cycle of articles offered to your attention, we will try to describe in detail the course of the battle itself and the effectiveness of the efforts of the Russian and Japanese fleets, but, in addition, we will capture the events preceding the battle. We will compare the life experience of the Russian and Japanese commanders of the fleets and try to understand how it influenced certain decisions they made. How well did the admirals prepare the forces entrusted to them for battle? How well did they do it? A very widespread point of view is that the battle was almost won by the Russians - it seemed that the Japanese were about to retreat, and if it were not for the accidental death of Vitgeft … Let's try to understand if this is so, and try to answer the question: could the Russian squadron pass to Vladivostok July 28, 1904? What was not enough for the success of the Russian sailors?
We'll start with brief biographical notes.
Nakagoro Togo was born on January 27, 1848 in the city of Kagoshima, Satsuma province. At the age of 13, Togo changed his name to Heihachiro. Interestingly, the first battle that the future admiral could see took place when he was only 15 years old. As a result of the incident in Namamugi, during which the samurai hacked one and seriously wounded two Englishmen who violated Japanese etiquette, a British squadron of seven British ships arrived in Kagoshima. However, the provincial leadership refused to pay them compensation and extradite those responsible. Then the British captured three Japanese ships standing in the harbor and bombarded Togo's hometown, destroying about 10% of its buildings. The Japanese batteries responded with multiple hits on British ships. The skirmish lasted two days, after which the British left. Who can say how these events influenced the choice of the life path of the young Heihachiro Togo? We only know that at the age of 19 the young man, along with two brothers, entered the navy.
At that time, Japan was a very interesting sight - despite the fact that formally the supreme power in the country belonged to the Emperor, the Tokugawa shogunate actually ruled Japan. Without going into the details of that historical period, we note that the shogunate was committed to the traditional feudal way of life, while the emperor strove for innovations along the western model. In addition, the shogunate practically usurped foreign trade: only the provinces of Tsushima and Satsuma were allowed to conduct trade with foreigners on their own. It is clear that such negotiations could only be carried out by sea, and therefore the rulers of the Satsuma province from the Shimazu clan built their own fleet: it was in it that the young Heihachiro Togo entered.
And almost immediately the Boshin war broke out, the result of which was the restoration of Meiji: it began with the fact that the emperor issued a decree that from now on all power over the country would return to him. But the shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu declared the imperial declaration illegal, and showed no desire to obey. In the course of hostilities, which lasted from January 1868 to May 1869, the Tokugawa shogunate was defeated, and the supreme power in Japan passed to the emperor. Interestingly, in addition to land battles, three naval battles also took place in this war: moreover, the Kasuga wheeled frigate, on which Heihachiro Togo served, participated in all three.
In the first battle (at Ave), "Kasuga" did not show itself - the ship had to escort the transport "Hohoi", on which the troops were to be loaded and transported to Kagoshima. However, the ships were ambushed - they were attacked by ships of the shogunate's fleet. After a short firefight, the Kasuga fled, and the Hohoi, which did not have sufficient speed for this, flooded near the coast.
The war developed unsuccessfully for the supporters of the Tokugawa shogunate, on the battlefield they suffered defeat after defeat. As a result, several thousand soldiers and French advisers who helped the shogunate retreated to the island of Hokkaido, where they announced the creation of the Ezo Republic. Part of the shogunate's fleet followed with them, and now, in order to return Hokkaido to the rule of the emperor, his supporters needed warships. The emperor's supporters did not have so many of them, and in principle the Ezo Republic could count on victory in a naval battle, if not for the flagship of the imperial fleet, the battleship-ram "Kotetsu". Ezo had nothing of the kind, and covered with 152 mm armor, "Kotetsu" was invulnerable to the artillery of the shogunate's supporters, and his powerful 300-pound (136 kg) battleship cannon could send any ship of the republic to the bottom with literally one shell.
Therefore, when the imperial fleet (including "Kasuga") moved from Tokyo to Miyako Bay and prepared for battle, the sailors of the republic conceived a sabotage - three of their ships under foreign flags were to enter the harbor where the imperial fleet was stationed and take " Kotetsu "on boarding. The weather prevented the execution of this daring plan - the separatist ships were caught in a storm, and as a result, at the agreed time, only the flagship of the Republic of Ezo, Kaiten, appeared in front of the harbor. He single-handedly tried to accomplish what the three Separatist ships were supposed to do: the Kaiten entered the harbor unrecognized, and then raised the flag of the Ezo Republic and fought, but was unable to capture the Kotetsu and was forced to retreat. But at this time, the second separatist ship, "Takao", approached the entrance to the harbor, his car was damaged as a result of the storm, and he lost speed, which is why he could not arrive on time. Now he could not follow the Kaiten and escape, and as a result was captured by the imperial fleet.
The third battle, in which the frigate Kasuga participated, was the largest naval battle of the entire Boshin War. Eight ships of the Imperial Navy under the command of Toranosuke Masuda destroyed the coastal fortifications covering the entrance to Hakodate Bay and attacked five Separatist ships led by Iconosuke Arai. The battle lasted for three days and ended with the complete defeat of the fleet of the Ezo Republic - two of their ships were destroyed, two more were captured, and the flagship Kaiten washed ashore and was burned by the crew. The Imperial Navy lost the frigate Choyo, which exploded as a result of a direct hit on the cruise chamber.
In 1871, Heihachiro Togo entered the naval school in Tokyo and showed exemplary diligence and academic performance there, as a result of which in February 1872 he, along with 11 other cadets, was sent to study in England. There the future admiral undergoes an excellent school: studying mathematics at Cambridge, naval education at the Royal Naval Academy in Portsmouth, and around the world on the ship Hampshire. After completing his education, Togo was appointed supervisor of the construction of the battleship "Fuso" and then, seven years after arriving in England, returns to Japan on the coastal defense ship "Hiei", as well as "Fuso" built by the British for the Japanese.
In 1882, Lieutenant Commander Heihachiro Togo was appointed senior officer of the gunboat Amagi, and in 1885 he became its commander. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of captain of the first rank, and for some time was in command of the Kure naval base, and the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war (1894) was met by the commander of the armored cruiser Naniwa.
The uprising in Korea became a pretext for the war - according to treaties between the countries, both China and Japan had the right to send their troops to Korea to suppress the uprising, but they were obliged to remove them from there when it ended. Both Chinese and Japanese troops could only be delivered to Korea by sea, and therefore it is not surprising that the first shell of this war was fired in naval combat: but it is interesting that the ship that fired this shell was the "Naniwa" of the 1st rank captain Togo. Subsequently, the article "Japanese and Chinese fleets in the last Sino-Japanese war" will describe this event as follows:
“The Chinese continued to transport troops, and on July 25, a detachment of five transports headed for the shores of Korea under various European flags and escorted by the cruisers Tsi-Yuen and Kuang-Y and the messenger ship Tsao-Kiang, on which there was a military treasury up to 300,000 tel.
On the transport under the English flag "Kowshing" were two Chinese generals, 1200 officers and soldiers, 12 guns and the chief military adviser to the Chinese, a former German artillery officer Ganeken. Among the soldiers were 200 of the best, European trained gunners.
The Japanese sent the cruiser "Naniwa", "Yoshino" to the landing site to intimidate the Chinese and destroy this elite detachment of troops. Akitsushima, who first captured the straggler Tsao-Kiang, and then mined the Kowshing transport that did not want to follow Naniwa, drowning up to 1,000 of its troops. According to newspaper reports, Kowshing was fired by two volleys from Naniwa after being missed by a mine. However, former German officer Hahnequin, who was on the Kowshing, reports that a mine hit and exploded under the center of the ship.
In the ensuing battle between the cruisers of the Chinese convoy and the Japanese "Kuang-Yi" was beaten by shells and then thrown into shallow water, and "Tsi-Yuen" fled with two holes in the tower and one in the wheelhouse. The shells that hit killed two officers, while 13 people from the gun service were killed and another 19 were wounded."
Interestingly, the author of this article was none other than Captain 1st Rank Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft!
So, the cruiser under the command of Heihachiro Togo from the first days of the war began active operations, he also participated in the battle at Yalu, which actually decided the outcome of the Japanese-Chinese confrontation. In it, "Naniwa" acted as part of the "flying squadron" of high-speed ships Kozo Tsubai, which, in addition to the Togo ship, also included "Yoshino", "Takachiho" and "Akitsushima", and the latter was commanded by the notorious Hikonojo Kamimura, in the future - the commander of armored cruisers of the United Fleet …
Interestingly, on a formal basis, it was not the Japanese who won the battle at Yalu, but the Chinese. The Chinese warships had their task to protect the transport convoy and fulfilled it. The Japanese tried to destroy the convoy, but did not succeed - the Chinese admiral Ding Zhuchan was able to tie them up in battle and prevent them from reaching the transports. In addition, the battlefield remained with the Chinese - after almost five hours of battle, the Japanese fleet retreated. Nevertheless, in fact, the Japanese won the battle - they destroyed five Chinese cruisers, which greatly frightened their command, as a result of which Ding Zhuchan was forbidden to go to sea. Thus, the Japanese fleet henceforth had complete freedom of action and could, without fear, transfer reinforcements to Korea, which decided the outcome of the campaign.
At the Battle of Yalu, Admiral Kozo Tsubai's Japanese Flying Squadron defeated the Chinese cruisers and, if necessary, supported Admiral Ito's main forces fighting the Chinese battleships with fire. "Naniwa" under the command of Togo fought flawlessly, although it suffered almost no damage (one person was injured on the ship).
In 1895, the Sino-Japanese War ended, and the next year Heihachiro Togo became the head of the Higher Naval School in Sasebo, in 1898 he received the rank of Vice Admiral, and in 1900 he commanded a Japanese expeditionary squadron sent to China (there was a boxing uprising). Then - the leadership of the naval base in Maizuru and, finally, on December 28, 1903, Heihachiro Togo takes command of the United Fleet.
Already at the head of the latter, Togo plans the start of hostilities, and they turn out to be successful for Japan - thanks to the undermining of two newest Russian battleships, the Russian squadron is blocked in Arthur and cannot give a general battle to the United Fleet, the detachment of Admiral Uriu is blocking the Varyag and Koreets in Chemulpo, and after the death of the Russian ships, the landing of ground forces in Korea was organized. Immediately after the night torpedo attack, Togo is trying to finish off the Russian ships on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, and, despite the failure that has befallen him, in the future he constantly demonstrates his presence, conducts artillery shelling, organizes mine laying and generally tries in every possible way to press and act actively, preventing Russian ships to stick their noses out of the inner Arthurian raid. In retrospect, however, we can say that Togo is not very good at it - he is too careful. So, in the night attack on the Port Arthur squadron, for some reason, he breaks his destroyers into several detachments and orders them to attack in succession. Although it is obvious that such an attack can be successful only due to the surprise and surprise of the attack, and after the impact of the first destroyer detachment, both of them will be lost by the Japanese. The morning battle of January 27 Togo did not bring it to an end, although the chances of victory were quite high - despite O. Stark's attempt to fight under the cover of coastal batteries, the overwhelming majority of their guns could not "reach" the Japanese ships.
For the Japanese admiral, this war is already the third in a row. Heihachiro Togo has fought in at least four naval battles of varying intensity and in two major naval battles, one of which (at Yalu) was the largest naval battle since Lissa. He managed to fight as a junior officer and ship commander. He had experience in managing fleet formations (the same expeditionary squadron during the Boxing uprising), by the time of the battle in the Yellow Sea he had commanded the United Fleet for more than six months and, of course, was one of the most experienced sailors in Japan.
And what about the Russian commander?
Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft was born in 1847 in Odessa. In 1868 he graduated from the Naval Corps, after which he made a round-the-world trip on the clipper "Horseman", and then again studied at the courses of rifle and military gymnastics schools. In 1873 he became a lieutenant, in this rank he went on a clipper "Gaydamak" on a voyage abroad. In the period 1875-1878 he graduated from the course of sciences in the Training-artillery detachment and the Mine officer class, and then served as a mine officer on the ships of the Training-artillery and Training-mine detachments of the Baltic Sea. In 1885 he became a captain of the 2nd rank and was given command of the gunboat "Groza", however, apparently, he continued to be very interested in mine and torpedo business. Therefore, he soon changed the ship to the position of inspector of works in the ports of the Marine Technical Committee, and from there he returned to his favorite pastime - becoming an assistant to the chief inspector of mine affairs, experimenting in the Black Sea, and also testing Whitehead and Hovel mines abroad. He was a member of the explosives commission at the Ministry of Railways, as a representative of the Ministry of the Navy in the railway council. I must say that according to the results of many years of work in the field of mine work, Wilhelm Karlovich was considered one of the largest professionals in this field. He translated foreign articles on mines and wrote his own.
In 1892 he was appointed commander of the mine cruiser Voyevoda, two years later he was given command of the 2nd rank cruiser Rider. In 1895 he was promoted to captain of the 1st rank and commanded destroyers and their teams in the Baltic Sea, but not for long, since in the same year V. K. Vitgeft was assigned to the armored frigate Dmitry Donskoy. Under his command in February 1896, the cruiser left for the Far East and remained there for six years.
In 1898 V. K. Vitgeft was assigned to the newest battleship Oslyabya. But this appointment was very formal - having received the crew under his command, the captain of the 1st rank did not have the battleship himself, which became part of the Russian Imperial Navy only in 1903. V. K. Vitgeft already in the next year, 1899, was appointed acting chief of the naval department of the headquarters of the chief chief and commander of the troops of the Kwantung region and the naval forces of the Pacific Ocean and was promoted "for distinction" to rear admiral. In 1900, during the boxing uprising, he was involved in organizing the transport of troops from Port Arthur to Beijing, for which he was awarded the Order of St. Stanislaus, 1st class with swords, as well as the Prussian and Japanese orders. Starting in 1901, he was engaged in plans in case of hostilities with Japan. Since 1903 - Chief of the Naval Staff of the Governor in the Far East.
Certainly, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft is an extremely controversial figure. By nature, he was an armchair worker: apparently, he felt in the best way, doing research on his favorite mine business. It can be assumed that it was there that his service could bring maximum benefit to the Fatherland, but his career brought him under the arm of the Chief Chief and Commander of the Kwantung Region and the Pacific Naval Forces E. I. Alekseeva. The latter was an extremely influential figure, and in addition, he was distinguished by considerable personal charisma. E. I. Alekseev, who later became the governor of His Imperial Majesty in the Far East, was, of course, a strong and self-confident person, but, unfortunately, a completely mediocre military leader. VC. He liked Vitgeft. As Nikolai Ottovich von Essen wrote:
“Vitgeft enjoyed great confidence in Admiral Alekseev due to his hard work and tirelessness; but the same Admiral Alekseev constantly argued with him and was angry for his views and judgments, and Vitgeft was stubborn and intractable, and these two qualities, I think, were the main reason for his influence on the governor."
Probably, this was the case - the governor was pleased to have a technically competent specialist next to him, and that this specialist also dared to contradict the almost omnipotent Alekseev, impressed the latter even more. But Alekseev would not have tolerated a truly free-thinking admiral next to him, such objections to the governor were completely unnecessary. And from V. K. Vitgeft and one should not have expected any such initiative - being a technically competent armchair worker by the mindset and not a very experienced naval commander, he, unlike Alekseev, was not ambitious and was ready to obey - he contradicted, rather, in trifles, without encroaching on " strategic genius "of the governor. Thus, V. K. Vitgeft as chief of staff was quite convenient for Alekseev.
It can be assumed that the long service under the leadership of the governor could not but affect V. K. Witgefta - he “got involved”, imbued with the style of leadership and his role as a “cog man”, got used to strictly follow the orders given to him and, if he had some rudiments of initiative before, he completely lost them. But with all this, it would be wrong to see in Wilhelm Karlovich a weak-willed and indecisive amoeba, incapable of any actions. He certainly was not like that - he knew how to stand firm, show character and achieve what he considered necessary. It is interesting that the people who served under his leadership gave Wilhelm Karlovich far from the worst marks. For example, the commander of the battleship Pobeda Zatsarenny informed the Investigative Committee about V. K. Witgefta:
“… He gave the impression of a boss who was fully aware of the magnitude and responsibility of his task and was firm in fulfilling the duty that had fallen to him. It seems to me that in Port Arthur at that time he [the governor] could not have chosen another deputy for himself … the squadron was not at all distrustful of him as a chief."
And here are the words of the 1st rank captain Schensnovich, who commanded the battleship Retvizan:
“… There was no occasion to come to the conclusion about Vitgeft's inability to command the squadron. Vitgeft was firm in his decisions. Not the slightest cowardice was noticed. With the adopted Witgeft fleet - ships, weapons and personnel, I do not know who would have managed better …"
But one cannot but take into account that in Russia it is either good or nothing about the dead … And it was impossible to say nothing to the Investigative Committee about the temporarily acting commander of the squadron.
To evaluate the almost five-year service of V. K. Vitgeft in the headquarters of the governor is rather difficult - of course, he was for the most part a conductor of the ideas of Admiral Alekseev, although it cannot be ruled out that he himself proposed some useful things. Organization of troop transportation from Port Arthur to Beijing, which was carried out by K. V. Vitgeft, nevertheless, is too insignificant a matter to judge by its implementation whether the Rear Admiral has organizational talent. Witgeft's plan in case of war with the Japanese called for the division of the Pacific Squadron forces between Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Some analysts later considered such a division of forces to be incorrect and believed that on the eve of the war, all cruisers and battleships should be gathered into a single fist in order to be able to give the general battle to the Japanese with full force. However, the entire course of the Russian-Japanese war suggests that V. K. Vitgeft made a completely fair decision: the basis of the forces of the Vladivostok detachment was made up of three armored cruisers designed for raider operations in the Pacific Ocean and of little use in squadron combat. However, in order to fend off the threat that these ships posed to Japanese communications, the Japanese had to distract four Kamimura armored cruisers. The Japanese designed their armored cruisers for squadron combat, and any of them in battle was at least as strong as (but rather superior) in strength to the best Russian cruiser of the Vladivostok detachment - "Thunderbolt". Other armored cruisers: "Russia" and, in particular, "Rurik" were individual weaker than the ships of Admiral Kamimura. Thus, the Vladivostok detachment diverted significantly more forces than it had itself, and reduced the main forces of Admiral Togo to a greater extent than the absence of Vladivostok cruisers weakened the Port Arthur squadron.
On the other hand, Nikolai Ottovich Essen noted:
“Everyone knew that it was only thanks to Vitgeft's stubbornness and thoughtlessness that our hospitals in Korea and Shanghai were not promptly warned and recalled, and with the beginning of the war, thus, we lost the Varyag and Koreets and lost our participation in the Mandzhur war, and also lost a transport with combat and other supplies ("Manjuria"), which was going to Arthur before the start of the war and taken by a Japanese cruiser. Vitgeft, stubbornly denying the possibility of declaring war, did nothing to promptly recall the hospital and warn transport about the political state of affairs. Finally, the unfortunate attack by Japanese destroyers on the night of January 26-27 can also, in part, be attributed to the fault of Admiral Vitgeft."
The author of this article believes that both the merits of the pre-war plan and the untimely recall of the hospital should rather be attributed to the governor - it is doubtful that Vitgeft could act without Alekseev's instructions. In any case, it should be admitted that the squadron was not well prepared for the war with the Japanese, and this is undoubtedly the fault of V. K. Vitgeft.
So, what can we say about the admirals - the commanders of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the battle on July 28, 1904?
Admiral Heihachiro Togo honorably passed through the fire of many battles, proved to be an experienced commander, a talented organizer, and had quite adequate experience for commanding the United Fleet. At the same time, in all honesty, it should be admitted that V. K. Vitgeft did not fully meet even the position of chief of staff. He knew mine business well, but did not serve enough on ships and never commanded the 1st rank ship formations. The last five years of service before the appointment of the rear admiral as acting commander of the 1st Pacific Squadron could not at all give Wilhelm Karlovich the necessary experience. Admiral Alekseev commanded the fleet entrusted to him from the shore and, it seems, did not quite understand why others could not do the same. In itself, the appointment of Wilhelm Karlovich as commander of the Port Arthur squadron turned out to be rather accidental, and was dictated not so much by the fact that there was no one else to be appointed to this position, but by the political games of the governor.
The fact is that Admiral Alekseev held the post of commander-in-chief of all land and naval forces in the Far East and the fleet commander, of course, had to obey him, but to what extent? In the Naval Regulations, the rights and duties of the Commander-in-Chief and the Commander of the Fleet were not delimited. Alekseev, being a very despotic nature, strove for absolute power, so he simply usurped the rights of the commander of the fleet, to which the head of the Pacific squadron, Vice Admiral Oscar Viktorovich Stark, could not resist. However, after the start of the war, Stepan Osipovich Makarov was appointed to this position, who successfully ignored Alekseev's opinion on many issues, and prepared the squadron for battle at his own discretion. The governor could not remove Makarov from the command, but he decidedly did not like such "self-will", and he wanted to insure himself against such insubordination in the future.
After the death of S. O. Makarov, Admiral Alekseev briefly arrived in Port Arthur and made attempts to somehow raise the morale of the squadron - he personally awarded the distinguished sailors, talked with the commanders of the ships, announced in the order an encouraging telegram from the Sovereign Emperor. But all this, of course, was not enough - the elation that people experienced under Stepan Osipovich was caused primarily by the active actions of the squadron, while with the arrival of the governor, everything returned to the hateful “Take care and not risk it”. Alekseev, on the other hand, considered this line of behavior to be the only correct one, at least until the time when the battleships Tsesarevich and Retvizan, torpedoed by the Japanese, returned to service. But the governor himself did not want to stay in Arthur - while the Japanese began landing only 90 km from Port Arthur, and the squadron did not have enough strength to fight the Japanese fleet in a decisive battle.
A description of the reasons why the governor left Arthur is beyond the scope of this article, but it is obvious that Admiral Alekseev needed to entrust the command of the squadron to someone who would be completely obedient to him. And from this point of view, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft seemed to be the person who needed the governor - to expect Makarov's initiative and self-will from him certainly was not worth it. And besides … it must be admitted that Alekseev, experienced in intrigues, very successfully insured himself: if Vitgeft, following the orders of the governor, succeeds in something, then this success can be appropriated to himself. In the same case, if the rear admiral is defeated somewhere, then it is quite easy to make Wilhelm Karlovich the scapegoat for failure. VC. Vitgeft again turned out to be convenient for the governor …
… But Wilhelm Karlovich, being not a stupid person, was well aware of the duality of his position. He quite soberly assessed his own forces, and understood that he was not ready to command the fleet. Almost the first words he said when he took office were:
“I expect from you gentlemen not only assistance, but also advice. I am not a naval commander …"
But to abandon the responsibility of V. K. Vitgeft, of course, could not. Having received the most detailed orders from Alekseev, he proceeded to control the forces entrusted to him - and what the rear admiral succeeded and failed in this field will be discussed in the next article.
