Renewing our cycle on the current state of the Russian Navy, we cannot ignore such an important component of it as its Coastal Forces (BV of the Navy). In this article, we do not set ourselves the goal of making a comprehensive analysis of the development of the Coastal Forces of the USSR and the Russian Federation, since, unfortunately, the author of this article does not have the necessary statistical material for this. We will only pay attention to some aspects of the current tasks, state and development prospects of the military forces of the Russian Navy.
A short list of the main tasks of these troops can be characterized as:
1. Protection of naval bases and other important objects, naval forces, troops, as well as civilians from the impact of the enemy's naval forces, primarily by destroying its surface ships and landing craft, as well as antiamphibious defense.
2. Defense of key coastal targets from land attacks.
3. Landing and actions in sea, airborne assault forces.
4. Anti-sabotage fight.
BV of the Navy include:
1. Coastal missile and artillery troops (BRAV).
2. Marine Corps.
Let's start with BRAV. During the years of the USSR, it was based on missile and missile-artillery brigades, and separate divisions and regiments, which were armed with both missile and artillery systems.
The first missile system that entered service with the domestic BRAV was the 4K87 Sopka.
For its time (and the complex was put into service on December 19, 1958), it was a rather formidable weapon, but nevertheless, as a coastal missile system, it had significant drawbacks, the main of which should be recognized as a semi-active guidance system. Theoretically, the missile firing range of this complex reached 95 km, but, of course, only on condition that the target illumination radar can provide guidance at such a distance. The launch mass of the rocket was 3,419 kg, the weight of the warhead was 860 kg, the speed was 0.9M, and the cruising altitude was 400 m. launch from missile carriers and there was an attempt to turn it into a universal one, that is, used by aviation, ships, and coastal units. Beginning, no doubt, good, but then it did not work. Nevertheless, despite significant shortcomings, the "Sopka" was in service with the BRAV until the early 80s.
Of course, it was clear to the leadership of the USSR that the coastal troops needed much more advanced weapons, and they received it. In 1966, the USSR BRAV adopted the 4K44B Redut coastal missile system (BRK).
We can say that it was then for the first (and, alas, the last) time that the BRAV of the USSR was armed with a modern one that fully meets the tasks of the BRK. For the late 60s, this was the real pinnacle of this technique.
DBK "Redut" was built on the basis of the anti-ship missile P-35, which armed the first Soviet missile cruisers of projects 58 ("Grozny") and 1134 ("Admiral Zozulya"). The length of its land modification P-35B reached 9.5 m, the launch weight was 4 400 kg, the cruising speed was 1.5 m, that is, it was supersonic. The firing range of the DBK, according to various sources, was 270-300 km, the mass of the warhead, again, according to various sources, 800-1000 kg or a 350-kiloton "special munition".
The missile seeker worked very interestingly. On the marching site, an inertial guidance system was used, and after the missile exited the target area, a radar sight was turned on. The latter transmitted the radar "picture" to the missile operator, and he assigned each missile its target for attack, after which the anti-ship missile attacked the ship assigned to it using the radar seeker. Another interesting feature of the complex was the ability to use the P-35B not only in the strike, but also in the reconnaissance version - the author of this article does not have a detailed description, but it can be assumed that such a missile was, in fact, a disposable UAV, which, due to the removal the warhead significantly increased the flight range. As far as can be understood, there were three flight profiles of the rocket, however, the indications of the range on them differ. Probably, the numbers were close to the following - 55 km at an altitude of 400 m, 200 km at an altitude of 4,000 m, and 300 km at an altitude of 7,000 m. In the reconnaissance version, the missile's range was increased to 450 km. At the same time, in the last segment of the trajectory, the rocket descended to a height of 100 m and attacked from it.
Subsequently, at the end of the 70s, the DBK received the upgraded 3M44 Progress missile, whose range (in the strike version) reached 460 km, while the missile's seeker became more jam-resistant. Also, the height at the final section has been reduced from 100 m to 25 m, while the section itself has been increased from 20 to 50 km.
The mass of the self-propelled launcher (SPU-35B) reached 21 tons, while only one rocket was placed on the vehicle. As part of the complex, in addition to launchers and vehicles with a control system ("Skala"), there was also a mobile radar, but, of course, the main means of guiding missiles of the Redut missile was external target designation, which the complex could receive from specialized aircraft and reconnaissance helicopters Tu- 95D, Tu-16D and Ka-25Ts.
To date, the complex is certainly outdated, but it still poses a certain threat and usefulness (at least due to the diversion of air defense when used in conjunction with more modern anti-ship missiles) and is still in service with the Coastal Forces of the Russian Navy. The exact number of the surviving launchers is unknown, possibly 18 units. (the staffing of one division, 18 missiles in a salvo).
As we said above, for its time, the 4K44B Redut DBK was a very perfect complex, basically meeting the tasks facing the USSR BRAV, but this cannot be said about the next (and, alas, the last) Soviet DBK. DBK 4K51 "Rubezh"
was created to replace the "Sopka", and was considered not an operational-tactical (like "Redut") but a tactical complex. In addition, it was assumed (and actually carried out) export deliveries of this complex to the allies in the ATS - the export of "Rubezh" was prohibited.
In essence, there are 2 key disadvantages of Rubezh. First, it was created on the basis of the obviously outdated P-15 Termit missile, which was put into service in 1960, which is still nonsense for a complex that began to be developed ten years later. Of course, the rocket was modernized - the Rubezh received a P-15M, on which there were improved GOS (active radar "DS-M" instead of "DS" or thermal "Snegir-M" instead of "Condor"), the maximum range increased from 40 to 80 km, the flight altitude, on the contrary, decreased from 100-200 to 25-50 m (although, apparently, it strongly depended on the firing range), the mass of the warhead increased from 480 to 513 kg, while the P-15M could carry a tactical nuclear warhead with a capacity of 15 kilotons.
Nevertheless, it was a large (2,523 kg) subsonic (0.9M) missile with a homing system, which can hardly be called adequate for the 70s, and after all, the Rubezh DBK was put into service on October 22, 1978, then is already on the eve of the 80s. According to the author of this article, the creation of such a complex could be justified only by the principle "On you, God, what is useless for us" - that is, the implementation of a purely export weapon system, in which combat effectiveness was sacrificed to the cost and ease of maintenance, however, the Rubezh "Entered service with the BRAV of the USSR and is in service to this day.
The second disadvantage of the complex was the concept of a "land missile boat" - taking advantage of the fact that the mass of the P-15M anti-ship missile system was almost half that of the P-35B, and that this complex, by and large, was intended to attack targets within the radio horizon, it was decided to install car chassis not only 2 launchers, but also fire control radar. This was done, but the mass of the 3S51M self-propelled launcher was 41 tons, with all the ensuing consequences for the mobility and maneuverability of the DBK. In all fairness, we should note that the "Tiger" tank from the "Rubezh" still did not work - according to those who served on it, the launcher could still move not only on asphalt, but also on dirt roads, and even in the forest (although there were already significant restrictions).
But, in any case, the Rubezh DBK cannot be attributed to the successes of the domestic rocketry. Nevertheless, it is still in service with the BRAV Navy. There is no exact data on the number, presumably - 16-24 launchers of 2 missiles on each, more or less evenly distributed among the four fleets.
It is noteworthy that equipping the BRAV with modern missiles, it seems, in the 70-80s. was not a priority of the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces. So, for example, in 1975, the P-500 "Basalt" anti-ship missile system was adopted, which significantly surpassed both the P-35B and the future 3M44 "Progress" Anti-missile defense missile system "Redut". The same applies to the Moskit anti-ship missile system, which was quite perfect for its time.
On the other hand, according to some reports, in the USSR, a "long arm" was designed specifically for the BRAV - an anti-ship missile with a range of up to 1,500 km. But it is obvious that its design was curtailed after the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987, when the United States and the USSR committed themselves to completely abandon land-based ballistic and cruise missiles in nuclear and non-nuclear versions. In the future, work on the creation of new complexes did not involve the use of anti-ship missiles with a range of 500 km or more. And the following DBKs entered the Navy's BV already in the Russian Federation.
The first was adopted by the DBK "Ball"
This joyous event for the Coastal Forces took place in 2008. The complex is being built "around" the Kh-35 anti-ship missile and its longer-range version, the Kh-35U. Apparently, "Ball" is not a Soviet groundwork, but was developed already in the Russian Federation.
It was like this - work on the X-35 began in the 80s of the last century, and, although the missile itself was created in 1987, the identified problems with its seeker were eliminated only by 1992. But in the “wild 90s” work on the Kh-35 they stopped and were reanimated thanks to the export offer of the Kh-35E, which interested the Indians (in the period 2000-2007, they were supplied with 222 such missiles). Only after that the development of the coastal complex for this missile began, and, as we said earlier, the Bal ballistic missile system was put into service in 2008.
This DBK can be described in two words: "cheap" and "cheerful". The mass of the "coastal" X-35 reaches 670 kg, which is several times less than that previously received by domestic BRAVs. The flight range is 120 km for the Kh-35 and 260 km for the Kh-35U. Warhead weight - 145 kg. The missile homing is carried out using an inertial guidance system (plus satellite correction) on the cruising section and an active-passive radar seeker (that is, capable of being guided both by the "light" of the onboard radar and at the source of radar radiation). The target acquisition range for the original version of the Gran-K seeker was 20 km, for the more modern one - 50 km. The advantages of the rocket also include a small RCS (unfortunately, the data were not disclosed), as well as a low-altitude flight profile: 10-15 m in the marching section, and 3-4 m in the attack area.
The disadvantage of the Kh-35 is usually the subsonic speed of its flight (0.8-0.85M), but in fairness, we note that "according to Senka and the hat" - there is no point in planting expensive and heavy supersonic anti-ship missiles on small or relatively weakly protected surface combat enemy ships. As for large and well-protected ones, for example, such as the American destroyers of the Arleigh Burke class, here, too, a massive attack by subsonic anti-ship missiles has a very good chance of success. Despite the seemingly low speed that emerged from under the radio horizon (that is, 25-30 km from the destroyer), the X-35 missile will hit the target in just 1.5-2 minutes - and this is very little, even by the standards of modern combat information systems. Of course, one or several of these missiles Aegis is quite capable of intercepting, but two or three dozen …
The DBK Bal division includes up to 4 mobile launchers, each with 8 containers for missiles, which allows a 32-missile salvo to be fired within 21 seconds or less (the interval between missile launches is up to 3 seconds). Some surprise, however, is caused by photographs of four-rocket launchers.
But here already one of two things - either our Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has once again saved on its own armed forces, or (which, according to the author, is closer to the truth), the launcher is modular, consisting of two blocks of 4 missiles in each, and of course that in day-to-day operation (including exercises with the actual use of weapons) one unit is quite sufficient.
In addition to launchers, the division's staff also includes up to two control vehicles, and up to 4 transport and handling vehicles (obviously, their number corresponds to the number of launchers), allowing, if necessary, to form a repeated salvo.
In general, it can be stated that the Bal ballistic missile system is a very successful tactical missile system (and with the Kh-35U anti-ship missile system - and operational-tactical), which, of course, does not solve all the tasks facing the RF BRAV, but successfully complements the capabilities of their more powerful and long-range "brothers" in the near sea zone.
Unfortunately, the author of this article does not know the exact number of ballistic missile systems "Ball" currently in service with the BRAV RF, but a few years ago they were equipped with at least 4 formations in the Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic fleets, as well as the Caspian Flotilla. which suggests that no later than 2015, the Russian Navy had at least 4 such divisions (that is, 16 launchers of 8 missiles each). There is also information (possibly overstated, source - "The Military Balance 2017"), then as of last year the number of mobile launchers reached 44 units.
The next DBK - "Bastion", apparently, began to be developed back in the USSR, but entered service later than "Bala" - in 2010.
Its creation began in the late 70s, early 80s, because, judging by some information, the P-800 Onyx rocket (export name - Yakhont) was originally intended, among other things, for the use of the USSR BRAV, so to replace the gradually aging Redoubt.
In general, the P-800 missile is a much more formidable weapon than the Kh-35 or Kh-35U. The mass of the warhead reaches 200 kg, while the rocket is supersonic - the same 120 km it can overcome, following the low-altitude flight profile, that is, at an altitude of 10-15 m, while developing a speed twice the speed of sound. But, unlike the Kh-35, the P-800 has a combined trajectory, when the missile will cover a significant part of the path at a high altitude (up to 14,000 m) and only after capturing an active radar target seeker will correct the flight direction and go to low altitudes. GOS "Onyx" is considered jam-proof, that is, it is designed to operate in conditions of active and passive jamming, while, according to the developers, the target acquisition range is at least 50 km. This is a very important caveat - usually for advertising purposes, the maximum capture range of the seeker is indicated, which, of course, is achieved under ideal weather conditions and in the absence of electronic countermeasures. Apparently, the concern "Granit-Electron", which is the creator and manufacturer of the specified GOS, indicates a much more realistic value. And then - what does 50 km mean without specifying the target EPR? According to some reports, a target the size of a missile cruiser is "caught" by the "Granite-Electron" brainchild at a distance of 80 km … By the way, the GOS is active-passive, that is, it is quite capable of aiming at an emitting object. Apparently - including the jammer, at least in aviation this issue has been resolved a long time ago, and in fact, on air-to-air missiles, the dimensions of the seeker are much more modest.
There is an opinion on the Internet that due to its high-altitude trajectory section, the P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile system is an easy target for the latest air defense systems, such as, for example, the American SM-6 missile defense system. In fact, this is a rather controversial statement, since, unfortunately, we do not know many parameters of the American Aegis system and the Onyx EPR when flying at high altitude. In other words, at the "household" level, it is impossible even to determine at what distance the radar station of the same Arleigh Burke will be able to detect the attacking Onyxes. Nevertheless, assessing the current level of technology in general, it can be assumed that there are certain grounds for such fears. The fact is that the Americans initially "sharpened" their naval air defense precisely to repel high-altitude threats, which for them were Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M3 regiments with their anti-ship missiles up to and including the Kh-22, and it would be strange to expect that they have not had any success here. Nevertheless, a massive attack of missiles flying at a speed of 750 meters per second, even at high altitudes, is quite capable of "breaking through" almost any defense, the only question is the density of the volley, that is, the number of missiles launched simultaneously.
Separately, I would like to say about the firing range of the BRK "Bastion". As you know, the export modification of the Onyx-Yakhont missiles has a “conventional” firing range of 300 km, but what range the Onyxes themselves have is, unfortunately, unknown. Some analysts suggest that it can reach 800 km, however, according to the author of this article, the range of the P-800 missiles, at least in their "land" version, does not exceed 500 km, since it is extremely doubtful, or rather, almost unbelievable. so that Russia, on its own initiative, violates the INF Treaty, which is very beneficial for it, and starts deploying ground-based cruise missiles with a range of over 500 km.
Apparently, the composition of the Bastion DBK division has a structure similar to the Ball - 4 mobile launchers with 2 missiles each, one or two control vehicles and 4 transport and handling vehicles. Strictly speaking, the correct name of the DBK is "Bastion-P", since there is also its immobile, mine "variation" - "Bastion-S".
Unfortunately, it is also impossible to establish the exact number of "Bastions" in service with the Russian Navy. The use of “non-normative” terminology by officials brings in a lot of confusion. So, for example, "Intefax" at the end of 2015 quoted the words of the Minister of Defense S. Shoigu that: "By the end of the year, two complexes" Bastion "will be delivered to the Northern and Pacific fleets," while he specified that in 2016 The Navy will receive five such complexes, and "in the future, the fleets will receive four complexes annually," and "As a result, by 2021 we will be able to completely re-equip coastal missile units with modern weapons." However, what is meant by a "complex" in this case?
If the "complex" is understood as a division of the previously described composition (that is, 4 mobile launchers with support equipment) and taking into account the fact that at the time of S. Shoigu's announcement from one to three Bastion battalions were already in service with the Black Sea Fleet, then 2020 inclusive, the fleet was supposed to receive, neither more nor less, as many as 23 divisions, not counting the 1-3 available. This is too good to be true - even in the USSR, the BRAVs had 4-5 divisions per fleet, both operational-tactical and tactical missiles. And here - so many "Bastions" alone! However, if we are talking not about divisions, but about the number of mobile installations, then, counting 4 launchers per division, we get almost 6 divisions until 2020 - taking into account the need to re-equip at least four BRAV brigades (one for each fleet), each of which has 3 divisions in its composition, it turns out somehow regrettably little, and does not correspond to the terms of rearmament declared by S. Shoigu.
The data given by The Military Balance on the availability of 48 launchers (that is, 12 divisions) as of 2017 looks more or less realistic.
What can you say today about BRAV missile weapons in general? On the one hand, the most positive tendencies are evident - judging by the information at our disposal, the rearmament of the BRAV is in full swing, and the newest Bastion and Bal complexes in their combat capabilities significantly surpass their predecessors, and perhaps for the first time, domestic coastal troops will receive a range of missile armaments that are in no way inferior to those deployed on our warships. But on the other hand, it must be admitted that the capabilities of our missile systems are limited to a certain extent.
The first is, in fact, technical limitations, the range of our anti-ship missiles does not exceed 300, and if to be an optimist, then 500 km. This range provides very good, reliable protection of the coast from enemy assault forces. But nevertheless, first of all, we should not be afraid of landings, but AUG, and here the range of 300 km, and even 500 km is no longer enough, and it was not enough even in the 80s of the last century. In addition, questions arise about the power of typical domestic BRAV connections.
Currently, the brigade is the highest unit of the BRAV, and it usually includes 3 divisions. Taking into account the fact that in one Bastion division there are 4 launchers (that is, 8 missiles in a salvo), the brigade's total salvo is 24 missiles, which, in principle, is equivalent to the strike of one Project 949A Antey SSGN (in the version of the Granit ", Of course). However, a volley of such density could be considered sufficient to break through the AUG air defense and disable or destroy an aircraft carrier only in the 80s of the last century, today it obviously will not be enough (although … the author of this article would not at all want to be in place American admiral, whose compound was attacked by 24 "Onyxes"). It would be a different matter if it would be possible to coordinate the strikes of two brigades against an enemy warrant, but where to get for this 6 battalions of "Bastions" for each fleet? On the other hand, there is some suspicion based on the fact that for the hypersonic anti-ship missiles "Zircon", on which our scientists are working with might and main, full compatibility with the UKSK, capable of firing "Onyxes" and "Calibers", has been declared. And will it not turn out that after a certain number of years, not supersonic Onyxes, but hypersonic Zircons will appear in service with the Bastions divisions? A salvo of 24 hypersonic missiles … I do not know who is able to stop this, even being warned in advance about the time of the raid.
So, it is quite possible that the problem of the power of the salvo will be solved in the near future - as for the too "short hand", then, alas, nothing can be done - at least until the dearly beloved Mr. Trump is not will finally break the INF Treaty.
But the story about the main armament of the BRAV of the Russian Navy will be incomplete without mentioning its artillery component - the 130-mm coastal self-propelled artillery complex A-222 "Bereg"
Perhaps someone is now grinning maliciously - well, well, in the age of missiles, someone else remembers about barrel artillery! And it will be categorically wrong: because today, tomorrow and for a very long time, in full accordance with the expression of Napoleon, it is the guns that will kill people. Perhaps someday, in the era of space blasters and Death Stars, cannon artillery will lose its key positions in the armed forces, but this is clearly very, very long time ago.
Development of the A-222 "Bereg" began in the late 70s, but its performance characteristics inspire respect even today. The installation is semi-automatic and is capable of sending 14 130 mm rounds in flight per minute at a distance of up to 23 km (at an initial speed of 850 m / s). As far as can be understood from the descriptions of this gun, it is possible to fire with an enhanced combat charge, at which the initial speed increases to 930 m / s, and the range - up to 27,150 m. In addition to high-explosive, the A-222 ammunition also includes armor-piercing and anti-aircraft shells.
Six such guns form a division capable of unleashing more than 2.8 tons of shells containing almost 300 kg of explosives on the enemy in a minute. But the main advantage of this artillery system is the fire control system, which is largely unified with the one used on the AK-130 ship installations. The fire control system uses two channels - radar and optical-electronic, which allows detecting the enemy at a distance of up to 35 km and capable of operating in a difficult jamming environment. The MSA provides target designation for small-sized sea targets (up to a tank or armored personnel carrier) moving at a speed of up to 200 knots (such, in general, have not yet been invented) and provides tracking of four targets, while simultaneously firing at two of them and instantaneous movement of fire to the rest two.
The mass of the self-propelled artillery unit is 43.7 tons with a full ammunition load of 40 rounds.
Of course, in terms of its anti-ship capabilities, the A-222 is significantly inferior to the Bastion and Bal missile systems, but the Bereg is much more versatile. It is an extremely formidable anti-amphibious assault weapon capable of "working" not only on ships and watercraft, but also directly on the landing force, on which the use of anti-ship missiles is irrational (despite the fact that the Bal ballistic missiles are not intended to attack ground targets at all). But after all, the threat to domestic naval (and not only) facilities near the coast can come not only from the sea, but also from land, and against the ground forces of the enemy, the "Coast" is able to "work out" no worse, and perhaps even better than the army large-caliber artillery. Therefore, the A-222 should be considered an extremely important addition to the BRAV, and one can only hope that in the future, the developers of domestic ACS will not forget about the specific needs of the Coastal Forces.
To date, the BRAV of the Russian Navy probably has 36 A-223 artillery systems, that is, six divisions.
