Sadly, but in this article we will have to distract ourselves from the description of the battle between Varyag and Koreyets on January 27, 1904 and move a little forward in time, and specifically to the reports of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, written by him after the battle. This must be done, since not paying attention to some of the features of these documents and the Varyag logbook, we, alas, run the risk of not understanding the true causes and consequences of the events that occurred after the Russian cruiser crossed the traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi).
Almost everyone interested in the history of the navy notes a lot of oddities in the report of the Varyag commander: many of them did not look like that before the Japanese documents were made public, but after that … one gets the feeling that Vsevolod Fedorovich literally lied every step.
In fact, the final point on many issues cannot be put even today, at least on the information that was revealed to us by historians in Russian-language publications. But first things first.
So, the first very big oddity is the record of the Varyag logbook, which was later quoted almost verbatim in the report of V. F. Rudnev on the damage to the cruiser steering control: "12h 5m. Having passed the traverse of the island" Yo-dol-mi ", a pipe in which the steering gears passed was broken on the cruiser." In addition, the report to the Governor also contains the following phrase "Control of the cruiser was immediately transferred to the manual helm in the tiller compartment, since the steam pipe to the steering gear was also interrupted."
Everything would be fine, but the same A. V. Polutov writes: “The Varyag was raised on August 8, 1905, and on August 12, anchored at about. Sovolmido, after which all devices and mechanisms of the power plant, propeller-steering group, etc. were examined in detail on the cruiser, no combat damage was found. On October 10, 1905, Rear Admiral Arai sent a telegram to the Minister of the Navy, in which he said:
“The steam engine, boilers and steering gear have been tested and it has been established that the ship is able to make the transition on its own. The pipes of the boilers under pressure were not tested, but their external examination showed that they are in working order."
It seems that it turns out that V. F. Rudnev rubs his glasses on to his superiors, but in fact the steering gears remained intact. But is it?
Unfortunately, it is completely unclear on the basis of what data respected A. V. Polutov concluded that there was no combat damage to the propeller-rudder group. Indeed, there is nothing of the kind in the telegram of Rear Admiral Arai he quoted. Arai writes only that the steering device allows the ship to make an independent transition - and nothing more. But the information indicated in Vsevolod Fedorovich's report does not contradict this at all! V. F. Rudnev does not say anywhere that the cruiser has completely lost steering control, he only writes about the loss of the ability to control the steering wheel from the conning tower. Let us recall the description of V. Kataev: “The steering was carried out either from the combat or from the wheelhouse; in the event of their failure, control was transferred to the steering compartment, located under the armored deck. This is exactly what happened, according to the report of the Varyag commander, - the control was transferred to the tiller compartment, but of course, it was inconvenient to use it in battle. The control post was inside the hull of the ship, and even in the stern, it was, of course, very difficult to shout out from there from the conning tower: obviously, the communication was provided, but in the roar of the battle, the orders were very difficult to make out. “With the thunder of shots, orders to the tiller compartment were hard to hear, it was necessary to be controlled by machines” - this is how V. F. Rudnev.
However, in peacetime, when nothing prevented the transmission of orders to the helmsmen in the steering compartment, it is obvious that control of the cruiser was not a problem, and could be carried out even from the combat, albeit from the wheelhouse. That is, the absence of a steering column in the conning tower could in no way interfere with the independent transition of the cruiser after it was raised. Thus, we see that in the words of Rear Admiral Arai and V. F. Rudnev, there is no contradiction.
In addition, we must not forget that, according to the cruiser commander's report, the damage occurred after a shell hit near the Varyag's wheelhouse. It is possible that the shock from the explosion led to some minor malfunction of the steering column, at the level of the detached contact, which would have been relatively easy to eliminate (if you knew what it was, because, generally speaking, communications stretched through the entire ship), but which led to the inoperability of the column in battle. It is unlikely that such damage could be regarded by Japanese engineers as combat damage. And you need to understand that the words of the Japanese about the serviceability of mechanisms are very relative. It is very difficult, for example, to imagine how the Varyag's electric steering column could be fully operational after the cruiser spent more than a year and a half in sea water.
The author of this article assumes that the Japanese specialists were completely indifferent to the torment of the historians who will live long after them. They probably approached the matter in a simpler way: if there is obvious physical damage caused by the impact of a projectile, or its fragment, rupture, or fire, then they considered such damage to be combat damage. If a certain unit did not have such, then such damage was not considered combat. And could it not have happened that the same steering column, which did not work in combat, was corrected in the course of those listed by A. V. Polutov works: “The steering device was checked and adjusted. Communication facilities have been repaired … ?
In general, in order to put an end to this issue, it is still necessary to work very seriously with Japanese documents: to date, in Russian-language sources there is no exhaustive information that allows one to unambiguously catch V. F. Rudnev in a lie regarding the damage to the steering of the cruiser.
But with artillery, things are much more interesting. So, in the cruiser's logbook, we read: “The next shots knocked out 6” gun No. 3”and further:“The fire occurred from a shell that exploded on the deck while knocked out: 6-dm guns No. VIII and No. IX and 75-mm gun No. 21, 47-mm guns No. 27 and 28. In total, according to the reports, 3 six-inch guns, one 75-mm and four 47-mm guns were knocked out by the enemy, and then the logbook and reports of V. F. Rudnev indicate:
“Upon examination of the cruiser, in addition to the listed damage, there were also the following:
1. All 47-mm guns are unusable
2. Another 5 6-inch caliber guns received various serious damage
3. Seven 75-mm guns were damaged in knurls and compressors."
But this is not all, because in his memoirs Vsevolod Fedorovich additionally indicated among the 6-inch guns knocked out No. 4 and 5, as well as 4 75-mm guns No. 17, 19, 20 and 22. In total, according to the testimony of B. F. Rudnev, the Japanese destroyed 5 152-mm and 75-mm guns and 4 47-mm guns, and in addition, 5 152-mm, 7 75-mm and 4 47-mm artillery systems were damaged.
And everything would be fine, if not for one "but": the Japanese, after the death of the "Varyag" and in the process of ship-lifting operations, removed all the artillery from it. All 12 152-mm guns of the cruiser were sent first to Sasebo, and then to the Kure naval arsenal. At the same time, the artillery plant, which inspected the guns, recognized all of them as fit for use.
So it turns out that V. F. Did Rudnev lie? It is quite possible, but let us recall the state of the artillery of the cruiser "Askold" after the battle and breakthrough on July 28, 1904.
During the battle, 6 152-mm guns out of 10 on the cruiser were out of order (two more were left on the forts of Port Arthur). At the same time, three guns had bent lifting arcs, while at the lifting gear of each gun, 2 to 5 teeth were broken. The fourth gun also had a bent lifting arc, but besides that, the balls of the turning mechanism were damaged, the flywheels of the lifting and turning mechanisms were interrupted, the sight was damaged, and a piece of metal was knocked out from the sighting box. Two more guns were completely intact, however, as a result of close explosions of shells, reinforcements and, at least in one case, the deck under the gun were out of order. However, reinforcements for one of these guns were quickly restored, but it was commissioned on the night of July 29.
Thus, we can state that at the end of the battle the cruiser had four six-inch guns out of ten available. This is an indisputable fact.
And now let's imagine for a second that, for some reason, mystical properties, "Askold" immediately after the battle was at the disposal of the Japanese, and they removed six-inch artillery from it, sending it to an artillery plant for examination. What will be his verdict?
Oddly enough, most likely, all six guns that were disabled in battle will be recognized as fit for further use. As you can see, the two guns are completely intact, so nothing prevents their use. Three more guns, with bent lifting arcs and crumbling teeth of the lifting gear, have non-combat damage to the gun machine, but not to the gun itself: at the same time, the Japanese in the documents distinguished between “gun”, “gun machine”, “gun turning mechanisms” (at least for 152 mm guns). In other words, oddly enough, the absence of any serious damage to the gun, recorded in Japanese documents, does not at all mean that the gun mount was serviceable and could be used in battle. And even for the sixth gun, which, in addition to the bent lifting arc, also damaged the rotary mechanisms and the sight, the Japanese hardly passed a "guilty" verdict, because, strictly speaking, the sight is also not part of the weapon. But there is still an ambiguity, perhaps the Japanese would recognize this one single gun as damaged in battle (just because of the sight).
And now let's evaluate the damage to the Askold's artillery by the standards of VF Rudnev, who, alas, did not find the opportunity to describe the exact damage to the artillery of the cruiser entrusted to him, limiting himself only to the “terms” “knocked out” (that is, the weapon was disabled as a result of enemy fire) or "received damage", and in the latter case, it could mean both combat damage caused by Japanese fire, and failure as a result of breakdowns of individual mechanisms due to the weakness or ill-conceivedness of their design.
So, if Vsevolod Fyodorovich described the damage to Askold immediately after the battle, then three six-inch guns would be called downed by him (two unharmed cannons that were damaged by reinforcements, and one, with damage to the sight and turning mechanisms, lost the ability to fight from Japanese fire) and three more were damaged (those in which the arcs were bent and the teeth of the lifting gears were crumbled). And he would be right. N. K. Reitenstein pointed out in his report that during the battle on the "Askold" six 152-mm guns were out of order - and he was also right. And the Japanese artillery factory, having examined these guns, most likely would have considered that all six are fit for further operation (although there are doubts about one), and, surprisingly, it would also be right, and this despite the fact that 60% of the available six-inch artillery "Askold" at the end of the battle was not capable of fighting!
Another question arises - how did the Japanese assess the guns that received minor damage and did not require spare parts for repair? Let us recall the description of one of such damage, received during the battle of the Russian armored cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment with the ships of Kamimura (quoted from R. M. Melnikov, “Rurik was the first”):
M. V. Obakevich recalled how, full of the excitement of the battle, not noticing his open wound, gunman Vasily Kholmansky ran up to him and in an interrupted voice addressed: "Your Honor, give me a man with a chisel and a handbrake - the gun won't roll." Machine quartermaster Ivan Bryntsev, who went with him, busily knocked out the interfering piece of metal under a hail of shrapnel, and the cannon (aft 203-mm) immediately opened fire."
That is, in some cases, the weapon was "knocked out", disabled by the impact of enemy fire, but, nevertheless, it was possible to put it into operation sometimes even directly during the battle, sometimes after the battle. Naturally, at an artillery plant, this would be a completely nonsense business.
So, the author of this article has some suspicion (alas, not sufficiently supported by the facts, so I urge you to take it only as a hypothesis) that the Japanese nevertheless corrected some relatively minor damage to the guns before handing them over to the arsenals. The situation with the 75-mm guns of the cruiser "Varyag" indirectly testifies to this, and the point is this.
It is reliably known that the Japanese removed all the guns of this caliber from the cruiser. However, in the available Russian-language copies of the "Assessment Sheets of Arms and Ammunition", on the basis of which the guns were transferred to the arsenals, only two 75-mm guns are indicated. Where did the ten more go? As we know, only those guns and ammunition that were suitable for use were included in the "Appraisal Gazette": but this means that 10 of the 12 75-mm guns of the cruiser were unsuitable for further operation!
An extremely strange picture turns out. Japanese shells hit the Varyag mainly at the extremity - two 203-mm shells hit behind the six-inch stern of the ship, one more - between the bow tube and the bridge, two 152-mm shells hit the bridge, one - the mainsail Mars, and so on (damage to the Varyag We will describe in detail later, but for now I ask you to take the author's word for it). And now - in a strange way, the six-inch guns, just concentrated at the ends of the ship, did not seem to receive any damage, but the 75-mm cannons, which were mainly in the middle of the Varyag's hull, almost all went out of order!
I must say that, according to A. V. Polutova, the Japanese considered the domestic 75-mm guns unsuitable for their fleet due to their low performance characteristics. A respected historian wrote that the auxiliary cruiser Hachiman-maru was supposed to receive, according to the order, 2 six-inch, four 75-mm and two 47-mm guns removed from the Varyag, but the 75-mm and 47-mm guns were declared unsuitable on performance characteristics and replaced them with 76-mm Armstrong artillery systems and 47-mm Yamauchi cannon. At the same time, the Kane's 152-mm cannons were nevertheless arranged for the Japanese, and the Hachiman-maru received two such guns.
Maybe the 75-mm and 47-mm cannons were not actually damaged, and were not included in the arsenals simply because the Japanese considered them worthless? This assumption could be similar to the truth if not a single 75-mm and 47-mm artillery system had hit Kure at all, but two guns were still transferred there.
So, in the opinion of the author, this could be the case. The Japanese removed 152-mm, 75-mm and 47-mm guns from the Varyag. They considered the latter to be useless and unnecessary to the fleet: therefore, they did not repair the 75-mm and 47-mm guns, but wrote them off for scrap, leaving only two 75-mm guns, which, apparently, did not require any repairs. As for the 152-mm guns, since a decision was made about the possibility of their further use, they received the required minor repairs and were handed over to Kure's arsenals. And since the guns themselves could easily not have combat damage (they could have been received by the machine tools and / or rotary mechanisms, which were taken into account separately), then nothing of the kind is mentioned in the documents. However, this does not mean that the Varyag's artillery was serviceable after the battle.
However, there is one more point noted by N. Chornovil in the report of the commander of the "Pascal", Captain 2nd Rank Victor Sanes (Senes?) the spectacle that presented itself to me …”The fact is that it contains the following description:
“The entire light caliber is out of action. Of the twelve six-inch cannons, only four are relatively suitable for continuation of the battle - and even then with the condition of immediate repair. Now it is possible to make a shot only from two guns, near one of which, the one behind number 8, I saw a consolidated crew, led by a wounded midshipman, who had risen in alarm."
Here N. Chornovil (and many after him) build a whole conspiracy theory: they say, the commander of the French cruiser was a friend of V. F. Rudnev, so the Varyag commander persuaded him to lie in order to present the case in a favorable light for Vsevolod Fedorovich. However, V. Sanes let slip: he pointed out that gun # 8 was combat-ready, while, according to the report of V. F. Rudnev, it was listed as damaged …
Generally speaking, the case for the fighters against the myths of “this country” is exceptional: usually the refutation of Russian and Soviet sources was based on citing foreign documents and evidence, while a priori it was believed that foreigners know better and (unlike ours) always tell the truth. But, as we see, if a foreigner suddenly speaks out in favor of the Russian version of certain events, there is always a way to throw mud at him and declare him a liar.
In fact, the picture is extremely strange. Yes, Victor Sanes did not hide his sympathy for the Russian allies. But forgive me, they did not graze pigs with Vsevolod Fedorovich and were not close friends, although of course, during the period that their ships were in Chemulpo (less than a month), they saw each other several times. But the assumption that the French officer, the ship's commander, would directly lie to his admiral, inventing something that never happened, on the basis of some friendly relations that began during several (and mostly official) meetings … let's say, it is extremely doubtful if to say the least.
Here, of course, it is worth remembering the wonderful proverb of the British: "Gentleman, this is not the one who does not steal, but the one who does not come across." As you know, V. Senes boarded the Varyag almost immediately after his return to the roadstead, and stayed there for a short time (about 10 minutes). And if he were the only foreigner who had been on board the Russian cruiser, then, no matter what he wrote in the report, there would be no one to catch him in a lie. But, as we know, Victor Sanes was not the only foreigner who visited the Varyag after the battle - both English, Italian, and American ships (in fact, French too) sent their doctors and orderlies, while their help, with the exception of the Americans, was adopted. In other words, indulging in an unbridled fantasy would have been not only unnatural for Victor Sanes (after all, in those years, the honor of the uniform meant a lot), but also dangerous. And, most importantly, what is all this risk for? What did Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev gain from the Frenchman's report? How did he even know that V. Sanesa will go public and not be shelved and never see the light of day? How could V. Sanes himself know this? Suppose V. F. Rudnev actually decided to sink the still fully operational cruiser - but how does he know that the words of V. Senes will reach the officials of the Naval Ministry, who will deal with this case? And why would these ranks even take into account the report of a foreign commander?
Further. If we assume that V. Senes wrote his report under the dictation of V. F. Rudnev, it is obvious that the more precise details there are, the more faith there would be in this French document. Meanwhile, we read: "The broken wing of the bridge hangs deplorably, where, they say, all the signalmen and officers who were there perished, except for the miraculously escaped splinter in the commander's heart." Generally speaking, Vsevolod Fedorovich was wounded in the head, which is quite far from the heart, and in addition, he was wounded by a fragment of a completely different shell.
Or here: “The steel boats of the cruiser were completely shot through, the wooden ones were burned” - but the Varyag housed boats with metal hulls, it was Ch. Crump's idea, and there is no evidence that some of them were replaced by wooden ones, and why ?
And if we agree that at a cursory examination of the cruiser, with the design of which the French commander was unfamiliar, such errors are quite forgivable, then why then should his remark about gun # 8 be considered true? Perhaps it was not tool # 8, but another tool? Perhaps, he had not a calculation on combat duty, but gunmen trying to repair the weapon?
It is absolutely reliably known that in the report of V. F. Rudnev greatly overestimated the losses of the Japanese. But again, how? With reference to foreign sources. And they, these sources, were still dreamers, suffice it to recall what French newspapers wrote about the losses of the Japanese.
And after all, all this was taken seriously then - the above text is a copy of a page from the very authoritative Russian edition of the Sea Sbornik in those years. So we can say that Vsevolod Fyodorovich was also modest in assessing the Japanese losses - at least he did not drown Asama in his report.
And now it turns out interesting: on the one hand, in the reports and memoirs of V. F. Rudnev as if there are many inaccuracies, very similar to a deliberate lie. But upon closer examination, most of them can be explained by certain circumstances that do not cast a shadow on the honor of the Varyag cruiser commander. And what conclusion would you like to draw?
The author of this article will not draw any conclusion, and here's why. On the one hand, the main complaints against V. F. Rudnev can be explained. But on the other hand … there are a lot of these explanations. It's one thing when certain statements of someone's report are questioned - this is normal, because it is difficult for a participant in hostilities to be impartial, there is even such a saying among military historians: "He lies like an eyewitness." But when almost half of the report raises doubts … And, again, all the explanations come down not to a strict proof of the correctness of Vsevolod Fedorovich, but rather to the fact that: "but it could have been so."
Accordingly, the author is forced to become like the blonde from the anecdote, who assessed the chance of meeting a dinosaur on the street as 50/50 ("Either meet, or not meet"). Or V. F. Rudnev indicated data that were completely true from his point of view (in the worst case, conscientiously mistaken with losses), or he still sank to a deliberate lie. But why? Obviously, to hide something that Vsevolod Fedorovich himself considered reprehensible.
Just what did he want to hide?
Critics V. F. Rudnev chorus announce the following: the cruiser "Varyag" fought only for "demonstration", fled at the first signs of a serious battle, and, returning to the Chemulpo raid, had not yet exhausted its combat capability. V. F. Rudnev, however, did not want to go into battle again, so he came up with a bunch of damage to the artillery and steering control in order to convince the authorities that the Varyag was completely non-combatant.
From the point of view of historical science, a version as a version is not worse than others. But, alas, she is killed in the bud by one single, but indisputable fact. V. F. Rudnev did not need to convince anyone that the cruiser was incapable of combat for one simple reason: by its return to the raid, the cruiser was already absolutely incapable of combat. And for reasons that have nothing to do with either the steering or the ship's artillery. This is obvious in the literal sense of the word - just look at the photograph of the ship going to the anchorage.
There is one point that all documents: and the reports of V. F. Rudnev, and the "Battle Reports" of the Japanese commanders, and "Top Secret War at Sea" unanimously confirm. This is a hole in the left side of the Varyag, the receipt of which led to the ingress of water into the cruiser. The Japanese report its dimensions: 1, 97 * 1, 01 m (an area of almost 1, 99 sq.m.), while the lower edge of the hole was 80 cm below the waterline.
It is interesting that later, before the battle on July 28, 1904, the battleship Retvizan received a hole of similar size (2, 1 sq. M.). True, it was completely underwater (the shell hit the armored belt), but still the Russian ship was in the harbor, in the presence of good repair shops. The hit occurred in the middle of the day on July 27, but the repair work was completed only by dawn on July 28, while they gave a half-hearted result - the water flow into the ship continued, because the steel sheet used as a plaster did not repeat the bends of the side (in including from the impact of the projectile). In general, although the flooded compartment was partially drained, 150 tons were pumped out of about 400 tons, but water remained in it, and all the hope was that the bulkheads reinforced during the repair would withstand the movement of the ship. As a result, "Retvizan" became the only ship to which V. K. Vitgeft allowed a return to Port Arthur if necessary.
Well, the "Varyag", of course, did not have time for any lengthy repairs, which, moreover, would have to be carried out in icy water difficult) there were no repair shops nearby, and he himself was half the size of the "Retvizan". The ship was damaged in battle, the floods turned out to be quite extensive, and it is enough to bring the protractor to the above photo to make sure that the roll to the left side has reached 10 degrees. It might have been possible to correct this by counterflooding, but in this case the hole would have gone even more into the water, the volume of water entering the Varyag through it would have also increased so that it would have become dangerous to go at any serious speed. bulkheads could pass at any time.
In general, this damage would have been more than enough to admit that the Varyag could not continue the battle. Some readers, however, express doubts that this photo of "Varyag" was taken when the cruiser was going to the anchorage, and not when it was already sinking with open Kingston. However, the fallacy of this point of view obviously follows from the analysis of other photographs of the cruiser.
As we know, the Varyag's anchorage was not far from the British cruiser Talbot (less than two cables), as reported by both the Russian commander and Commodore Bailey. The same is evidenced by one of the last (before the sinking) photographs of the cruiser.
At the same time, in the above photo we see Talbot at a considerable distance, the Varyag has not yet approached it.
There is no doubt that this is the "Talbot", since its silhouette (especially high sloped pipes) is quite unique
and not like the Italian Elba,
nor the French Pascal.
Well, the American gunboat was generally one-tube and three-masted. Consequently, the photograph we have shown captures the Varyag after the battle, but even before anchoring. And the cruiser is clearly incapable of combat.
Thus, we come to an interesting conclusion. Perhaps V. F. Rudnev did not lie at all in his report. But, perhaps, he still lied, but here's the thing: if the commander of the Varyag lied, then he had absolutely no need to imitate the non-combat capability of the ship, which was so incapable of continuing the battle. And from this it follows that V. F. Rudnev was hiding (if he was hiding!) Something else.
But what exactly?
