A lot of talk is going on around some "agreements" between the officers of the Varyag and the Koreyets (where, to a heap, they also managed to add the commanders of the French and Italian cruisers) in order to embellish the circumstances and results of the battle on January 27, 1904. Let's try to deal with by the example of the key moment of the battle - the turn of the Varyag after leaving the fairway and the events that followed.
Let us once again quote the Varyag logbook:
“12h 5m. Having passed the traverse of the island,“Yo-dol-mi”was broken on the cruiser by a pipe in which the steering gears passed, simultaneously with these fragments of another shell that exploded at the foremast and flew into the armored cabin through the passage, were: shell-shocked in the head of the cruiser commander, killed on the spot, standing near him on both sides, the headquarters bugler and drummer, wounded heavily in the back, the helmsman Snigirev standing at the helm and lightly wounded in the arm of the commander's orderly quartermaster Chibisov. Control of the cruiser was moved to the steering compartment. With the thunder of shots, the orders given to the tiller compartment were hard to hear, which is why all the subsequent time it was necessary to correct the course of the cruiser by machines. The cruiser did not obey well, being, moreover, on a strong current."
After reading these lines, there is an unambiguous feeling that the cruiser received serious damage, but nothing extraordinary has happened yet - in any case, about any accident threatening the ship, or about any rapprochement with about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) is out of the question. Yes, the damage is extremely unpleasant, yes, it became difficult to control the cruiser, yes, the commander was concussed, but the ship still did not lose control, and its damage and losses remain quite within reason. We read the following entry, or rather, its first paragraph:
“At 12h 15m, wanting to temporarily leave the sphere of fire, in order to correct the steering gear and extinguish the fires that had arisen in different places, they began to turn to the right with cars, since the cruiser did not obey the steering wheel well. In view of the proximity of the island, "Yo-dol-mi" went into full reverse gear."
That is, it turns out like this - at first there was a hit that interrupted the steering, but the cruiser went for a breakthrough for another 10 minutes and fought. However, he received considerable damage, as a result of which V. F. Rudnev decided to get out of the fire for a while to eliminate them - and it was then, already being badly damaged and poorly obeying the steering wheel, the Varyag got into a situation in which he had to reverse. Everything would be fine, but we just read the second paragraph of the entry quoted above:
"The cruiser was put at a disadvantage relative to the island at a time when the steering gear was interrupted when the left rudder position was about 15-20 degrees."
The phrase, I must say, is the key one. First, it follows that the ship, at the moment of impact, made a turn to the right, and this happened at 12.05, that is, 10 minutes before V. F. Rudnev decided to withdraw from the battle for a while. Here, however, the reader may have a reasonable question - if the rudder was jammed in the "left rudder" position, then the cruiser should have turned to the left, not to the right! How could he then find himself "in an uncomfortable position" relative to Fr. Pkhalmido (Yodolmi), located on the starboard side of the Varyag? The answer may be surprising enough to a layman. Today, at the command "left rudder", the rudder will be turned to the left, and the ship will turn left. But until the 20s of the last century it did not work like that - at the command "left rudder" it was necessary to turn it to the right, which made the ship turn right! Why so - it's hard to say, perhaps the answer should be sought in some peculiarities of sailing ships, but the fact is that the record in the Varyag's logbook indicates that at the moment of passing the traverse of Yodolmi Island the cruiser was turning to the right, and, we repeat, The Varyag commander made the decision to leave the zone of enemy fire 10 minutes later.
And secondly, according to the logbook, it turns out that the "Varyag" was "at a disadvantage" precisely after the steering control was broken on it, that is, at 12.05. And he was in this disadvantageous position at least until 12.15, or even later, since it is completely unclear from the logbook at what point in time the cruiser was reverse gear.
The third paragraph of the entry is more or less clear:
"The distance to the enemy was reduced to 28-30 cables, his fire increased and his hits increased."
But here's the fourth one again plunges us into conjectures:
“At about this time, a large-caliber projectile pierced the port side under water; water poured into the huge hole and the 3rd stoker compartment began to quickly fill with water, the level of which approached the furnaces. Coal pits were battened down and filled with water. The senior officer with the senior boatswain brought the plaster down, the water was pumped out all the time, the level began to drop, but nevertheless the cruiser continued to roll to the port side.
The question is that the logbook first describes the events that occurred after 12.15, then goes back in time, to 12.05, when the steering gears were damaged, and it is completely impossible to understand when exactly the hit happened that led to the flooding of the stoker.
Now let's look at the logbook of the gunboat "Koreets". It is much more concise:
“Within half an hour after the first shot, it was clear that the Varyag received several holes and rudder damage. At about 12.15 pm, two simultaneous fires were ignited on the Varyag by intensified fire from the squadron. Then we with the "Varyag" under the shots of the Japanese ships turned into the roads."
In fact, very little useful information can be taken from here: perhaps only that the turn to the raid, according to the commander of the Koreyets, took place precisely after 12.15, and not after 12.05, when the Varyag, passing traverse about. Yodolmi, turned to the right, and, besides that, the damage to the Varyag's rudder was noticeable on the gunboat even before 12.15.
Now let's turn to the reports of the commanders. Unfortunately, the report of V. F. Rudnev to the Governor and, later, to the Head of the Naval Ministry, do not contain anything additional to the cruiser's logbook. In both of these reports V. F. Rudnev repeats what was said in the logbook, but in a slightly abbreviated form. So, he reports on a hit that damaged the steering, and that it happened during the passage of Fr. Yodolmi, but does not specify when it happened (12.05). He mentions that this hit jammed the steering wheel in the "left hand drive" position, without mentioning only the degree of its turn. In both reports V. F. Rudnev testifies that the "Varyag" was "at a disadvantage relative to the island" precisely after the steering gear was damaged, and the decision to temporarily withdraw from the battle was made by him later. However, on the basis of the reports, it is impossible to understand when exactly the hit was received, which caused the flooding of the stoker - before the decision to withdraw from the battle, or after it.
The report of the commander of the "Koreyets" (addressed to VF Rudnev, since he was the head of the Russian "squadron"), on the contrary, is much more informative than the logbook of the gunboat:
“Having passed the island of Yodolmi, I saw your signal“change course to the right”, and avoiding to make up with you for the enemy, and also assuming you had damage in the steering wheel, put“right on board”and, reducing the stroke to small, described the circulation at 270 degrees … All this time, it continuously supported the fire from two 8-inch linear and 6-inch. retired cannons; three shots of the 9-pound were fired along the way. Cannons, but, after large overshoots, stopped firing from them. At 12.15 o'clock in the afternoon, following the movement of the cruiser of the 1st rank "Varyag" turned to the roadstead … ".
Please pay attention - in all the schemes the "Korean" turns not to the right, but to the left, despite the fact that the command to the helmsman was "right to board."
Thus, reading the report of the captain of the 2nd rank G. P. Belyaev, we see that the Varyag's turn to the right on the gunboat was not regarded as a signal to return to the Chemulpo roadstead - instead of a 180-degree turn, which should be expected in this case, the Koreets turns 270 degrees. This, incidentally, is another example of how dangerous it is to be guided solely by schemes when analyzing naval battles. For example, taking the diagram of the same V. Kataev, we will not see any reversal by 270 degrees. - in fact, according to V. Kataev, "Koreets" turned 180 degrees, and then went to the fairway. And, looking at such a scheme, one might really think that the "Korean", having turned to the right, no longer thought about continuing the battle, but was going to retreat.
In fact, according to the report of G. P. Belyaev turned out like this - on the gunboat they saw the signal of the cruiser "changing course to the right", and had to follow him, but, observing the movement of the "Varyag", they noticed that instead of just turning 80-90 degrees to the right, began to turn almost 180 degrees in the direction of the island, which is why it was considered that there was a problem with the steering control on the cruiser. Accordingly, there was no point in turning the Koreyets to the right - it would really stand between the Varyag and the Japanese ships, and it would be absolutely stupid to follow the cruiser to the Chemulpo stones. Therefore, G. P. Belev complied with the Varyag's order, and lay down on the course prescribed for him by the flagship - but not over the right, but over the left shoulder.
The bottom line is the following - at 12.05 am "Varyag" got hit, after which it lost control for some time. Soon after that, and, apparently, when the "Varyag", instead of turning to the right and going along about. Yodolmi instead turned right into the island, the Korean slowed down and turned left, but did not go to the fairway, but made a circulation, eventually entering a course leading along Yodolmi Island, where the Varyag was originally going to turn. Thus, G. P. Belyaev had not yet withdrawn from the battle, but gave V. F. It is time for Rudnev to return to the breakthrough course, if it was possible, or to undertake a different maneuver, to give another command. V. F. Rudnev in the period from 12.05 to 12.15 avoids "meeting" with about. Yodolmi (although it is possible, nevertheless, having collided with a stone), and then decides to withdraw from the battle - and only then, noticing his turn towards the fairway, the "Korean" follows him.
Thus, we have a completely consistent picture of this episode of the battle, reconstructed by us according to the reports of V. F. Rudnev to the Governor and the Head of the Marine Ministry, the report of the commander of the gunboat "Koreets" to Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, as well as the logbooks of both ships. It follows from them that:
1. in a "disadvantageous position relative to the island" the cruiser put not a deliberate maneuver, but damage to the rudder;
2. the decision to withdraw from the battle was made much later after the rudder on the cruiser was damaged and had nothing to do with it;
3. Severe damage to the Varyag, which caused the stoker to flood, is also not related to the decision to withdraw from the battle.
But the fact is that in addition to the above documents, there was also a report by G. P. Belyaev to the Governor, compiled by him on February 5, 1904. And in it the description of this episode looks different. Here G. P. Belyaev does not report anything about what happened to the Varyag at 12.05, describing only the shooting of the Japanese and the actions of his ship, but further indicates:
“At 12.15 pm, two simultaneous fires broke out on the Varyag under heavy enemy fire. At this time, the enemy's fire reached its highest tension, and the flights of the shells noticeably decreased in range, and they were already bursting near the boat. About 12.15 a.m. the day when the "Varyag", having a noticeable roll, raised the "P" and began to turn to the right with reduced speed, I changed course to the left and, avoiding to make up against the enemy, with the "Varyag", reduced the speed and described the circulation in 270 degrees … to the left. When "Varyag" went to the road, followed him, giving full speed … ".
Generally speaking, at first glance, the report reads so that no damage to the steering wheel of the Varyag on the Koreyets was noticed, that the Varyag turned to the right (and according to the report of VF Rudnev, this was done immediately after the traverse about. Yodolmi!), Originally intending to return to the fairway, while the critical damage that caused the flooding of the stoker occurred before the turn and, obviously, became one of the reasons for V. F. Rudnev to withdraw from the battle.
In other words, it turns out to be a uniform oxymoron - according to the popular opinion of G. P. Belyaev and V. F. Rudnev conspired to present the results of the battle on January 27, 1904 "in the best possible way." Let us assume that this is so. But in such a hoax, the reports to the Viceroy were, perhaps, the key documents: it was they who were supposed to form the first impression of the “first after God” in the Far East, and precisely how the Vicar of His Imperial Majesty E. I. Alekseev will perceive the circumstances of the battle at Chemulpo depending on what will be reported to St. Petersburg.
It would seem that in this case, both reports should have presented the events of the battle in the same form, without any internal contradictions and other overlaps. Moreover, reasoning logically, if something in the description of the battle could have caused bewilderment to the Governor, it was the reasons why the Varyag withdrew from the battle, interrupting the breakthrough attempt. And here, if one suspects a certain "agreement", V. F. Rudnev and G. P. Belyaev should have shown maximum care, avoiding any discrepancies. Meanwhile, we see that the most important moment - withdrawal from the battle - was described by the commanders of the Varyag and Koreyets in completely different ways.
In fact, if we overlap with schemes, and think how we should, then we understand that there is no contradiction in the reports of V. F. Rudnev and G. P. Belyaev is not being held for the Governor. If we look at the movement diagram of the Varyag from the logbook, we will see that the ship made three times what from the side could be described as a turn to the right.
№1 - turn to the right after passing the traverse about. Yodolmi.
№2 - turn directly to the island. Yodolmi.
№3 - turn to the right after the "Varyag", having reversed, moved away from the stones about. Yodolmi.
So, turn number 1 does not suit us - before it the cruiser went to the right side of the enemy, and could not get damage to the left side, where the projectile hit, which caused the roll. Turn number 3 does not fit either, it happened already somewhere at 12.15, and the Koreets obviously turned to the left much earlier - according to the same report, the distance between the Russian ships was 1-1.5 cables, and if the Koreets Turned to the left at 12.15, then he would have done it a few miles away. Yodolmi in the direction of the Japanese squadron, which, of course, was not. Thus, we are talking about turn # 2, when the Varyag "dived" on the island. Then everything more or less adds up - the cruiser raised the "P", trying to turn to the right, but instead turned 180 degrees, during this turn, "snatched" a hit that led to the flooding of the stoker, and on the "Koreyets", seeing that the "Varyag”Goes to the island, turned left and made a circulation. Well, then, when the Varyag turned back and then turned into the fairway, the gunboat went after it.
Thus, the seemingly contradictory reports actually coincide. But it is quite obvious that if these reports were the result of the collusion of V. F. Rudnev and G. P. Belyaev, they would have been written in a completely different way, so that there was not the slightest hint of contradiction in the texts. An analysis of the reports of the commanders of Russian ships to the Governor, on the contrary, testifies that each wrote them independently, not taking into account what and how the other would write, and moreover, it seems that the same G. P. Belyaev did not at all attach much importance to what he stated in his report. And this, in the opinion of the author of this article, testifies against the version of the conspiracy of Russian officers.
In conclusion of the conversation about the reports, I would like to note the following. During the discussion of the series of articles on the Varyag, the question of Japanese losses was repeatedly raised. It sounds like this: “Well, well, indeed, immediately after the fight, V. F. Rudnev could have been misinformed by rumors of Japanese losses. But why did he insist on the same losses in his memoirs “The Battle of the Varyag” at Chemulpo on January 27, 1904, which were published at the beginning of 1907, because the war ended long ago and the real losses of the Japanese were already known?” …
And indeed - reading the memoirs of Vsevolod Fedorovich, we see that the losses of the Japanese initially indicated by him in his memoirs not only did not decrease, but began to play with new colors. Initially V. F. Rudnev pointed out that the cruisers "Naniwa" and "Asama" were damaged and had to be repaired in the dock, and on the "Asam" the stern bridge was destroyed and, possibly, the stern 203-mm tower was damaged. In addition, two ships sank: the destroyer was sunk directly during the battle, and the seriously damaged Takachiho sank on the road to Sasebo with 200 wounded on board. In addition, the Japanese took them to A-san Bay to bury 30 people killed during the battle.
In the memoirs "Naniwa" was replaced by "Chiyoda", but on "Asam", in addition, the commander of the cruiser was killed in the explosion of the bridge. Thus, the question of losses looks quite legitimate.
All this is true, but … let's try to figure it out - what did Russia know about Japanese losses at sea in that war? Let's put it bluntly - the author of this series of articles could not fully "dig" this topic, and will be glad to any practical comments from experts.
Could V. F. Rudnev in 1906 or earlier to get acquainted with the data of the official Japanese historiography? Available to the author Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 years. Meiji (in 1904-1905) were published in 1909-1910, and, as far as the author of this series of articles knows, this was the first Russian-language edition of this source, but in 1906 it did not exist at all, including in the language of the sons of Mikado. So, the Japanese officialdom disappears, and, in fact, there is no special reason to believe everything that is stated in it. We will not refer to domestic assessments, because they can be biased, but the German admiral Meurer wrote in 1925:
“The Japanese description of war is biased and can only be used with great reservations. Secret operating plans and mistakes are carefully veiled. If you want history to be a great teacher, then this can be achieved under the sign of unconditional truthfulness. Against this basic principle of all historical research the Japanese official work sins repeatedly "(" Seekriegsgeschihte in Umrissen "Publishing house Koehler. Berlin, 1925.).
It must be said that the Historical Commission, which wrote the official Russian historiography "The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905", had doubts about Japanese information about the complete absence of damage and loss, so even there it was indicated that the issue was not fully clarified. The work of the historical commission says:
“… according to reports of numerous witnesses of the battle - French, British and Italian officers - our shots drowned a Japanese destroyer that sank during the battle, and a strong explosion was made on the cruiser Asama in the aft battle with the "Koreyets"). In addition, the cruisers Asama and Chiyoda were docked shortly after the battle. The number of wounded in the Japanese squadron is unknown, but those killed, including 30 people, were taken by the Japanese to the A-San Bay."
In a footnote to the above text, it is indicated that, according to official Japanese data, the Japanese did not have any casualties or damage on the ships. Thus, we see that even in 1912 the members of the historical commission did not succeed in putting a final point on this issue. In fact, from the entire list of losses signed by Vsevolod Fedorovich, they removed only Takachiho, since it was already known for sure that this cruiser did not die, but fought on and on.
And, by the way, where did it come from? Everything is simple here. On the one hand, of course, "Takachiho" has been repeatedly seen on Russian ships, for example, on the same cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment.
But … did that prove anything? Recall that in the battle on July 28, 1904, the armored cruiser Asama was identified on various Russian ships as “cruiser of the Tokiwa, Iwate, and Yakumo types. On "Askold" it was believed that during the breakthrough they were fighting with "Asama" (although most likely it was "Yakumo"), but on "Novik" they believed that they were fighting with "Izumo". Thus, the fact that the Takachiho was observed from Russian ships during the battle in the Korea Strait and in Tsushima is by no means irrefutable proof that it really was there. I ask you to understand me correctly: today, of course, we know that "Takachiho" took part in these battles for sure, but V. F. Rudnev, even if he had heard from someone's words that "Takachiho" was seen later, he still could not be firmly convinced of this.
Truly irrefutable evidence that the Takachiho did not sink after the battle with the Varyag appeared only after the testimony of those officers and sailors of the armored cruiser Rurik who were rescued by the sailors of this Japanese ship. Here it really is - it is difficult to confuse a ship with some other, if you yourself were on it. However, there is no evidence that Vsevolod Fyodorovich knew the reports of the "Rurikites" who had been in captivity. Moreover, apparently, at the time of writing his memoirs, he absolutely could not have known about them!
Without a doubt, about each case of clashes with the Japanese, numerous reports were written, at least by the commanders of the Russian ships, but often by other officers. However, I would like to note two features of these documents.
Firstly, the reports of the officers of the Russian fleet were not at all laid out by anyone on public display - they constituted an official secret. And if we look at the fourteen-volume books “The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Fleet actions. Documents , then on their very first pages we read:
In other words, even in 1907-1914, when these documents were published, they were intended only for officers of the fleet and it is not a fact that the retired V. F. Rudnev generally had access to them. But even if he did, he obviously could not use them when writing his memoirs in 1906.
Interestingly, even if Vsevolod Fedorovich had a time machine, even then the published documents could not help him in any way in the case of Takachiho. The fact is that, oddly enough, both the Russian official history of the war at sea and the documents published to it contain almost no information about the actions of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. For example, in the "Documents" describing the battle that took place between the ships of K. P. Jessen and H. Kamimura in the Korea Strait, we can only get acquainted with the report of G. P. Jessen (the mention of "Takachiho" appears there, but, as we said earlier, the commanders of the ships were often mistaken when determining the opposing forces of the Japanese) and the report of Lieutenant K. Ivanov, which also mentions that "Rurik" fought with "Takachiho", but, unfortunately, it is not indicated that it was this ship that saved part of the Russian sailors - and this alone would serve as absolute proof that the Takachiho did not die after the battle on January 27, 1904.
In other words, with the greatest degree of probability, at the time of writing his memoirs, V. F. Rudnev, did not have any reliable information about the losses of the Japanese ships in the battle with the Varyag and Koreyets.
Such could appear if Vsevolod Fedorovich continued to "rotate" in the officer environment and could personally talk with the sailors who returned from Japanese captivity. But the fact is that they were returning to Russia just when Vsevolod Fedorovich retired, so he could no longer cross paths with them.
And besides … For some reason, no one thinks that even if V. F. Rudnev would have known while writing his memoirs about the real losses of the Japanese (which, according to the author of this series of articles, could not have been at all), then he could have been asked not to publish them.
Let us recall the lines from the trilogy of Vl. Semenov, a Russian naval officer who served on the 1st Pacific Squadron, and then took part in the campaign of the 2nd TOE and the Battle of Tsushima:
“I came up with a number of articles in which I documented with figures (and, I dare to think, proved) that the creators of the third (non-rich) squadron, detaining Rozhdestvensky in Madagascar, deceiving society by calculating the mythical“combat coefficients”of ships that could be sent to increase the forces of the second squadron, - they committed a crime against Russia!.. Having finished with this question, I promised the readers in the following articles to give a truthful description of the battle itself and the circumstances that preceded it, but here … gave me a categorical order: without the censorship of the authorities, not to write anything about the past war. At the same time, it was pointed out to me that such a prohibition, of course, could be easily circumvented by finding a dummy author who “would write according to my words,” but the minister completely trusts my word (of course, if I agree to give it). As a motive, it was indicated that a special commission had already been appointed to investigate all the details of the misfortune that had befallen us (this commission worked for more than two years. The results of its work have not yet been published, but, judging by the fact that its members consisted exclusively of people who did not accept actual participation in the last war (and there were those that never only did not command, but did not even sail on ships of the line fleet) - the conclusion can easily be predicted) and premature actions of individuals would have an unseemly character of attempts to influence the public opinion that is unacceptable from the point of view of service correctness, etc..
True, one more question arises - why in the memoirs of V. F. Rudnev have new details about Japanese losses (the death of the Asama commander)? Here, unfortunately, it is impossible to prove or disprove anything. Perhaps, of course, Vsevolod Fedorovich simply fantasized these losses, guided by the well-known "Why should you feel sorry for them, foes!" But with the same success he could include in his memoirs some information that he read later (recall the extract from the "Marine collection" from a French newspaper, which, as a result of the Chemulpin battle, managed to drown "Asama"!). Or we can assume such an option - that V. F. Rudnev from the very beginning was "aware" of the death of Yashiro Rokuro, but he did not include it in the official report, considering, for example, this information is dubious, and then, seeing somewhere (in French newspapers?) "Confirmation", everything - so he wrote it down in his memoirs.
And the last question of this article. "Fine!" - the reader will say: “Let in 1906, early 1907, Vsevolod Fedorovich did not know about the real losses of the Japanese. But why did he not have enough civil conscience to announce this later, when the necessary information has already appeared?"
The only problem is that domestic materials on the Russian-Japanese war appeared in the open press quite late. For example, the volume of the official history, dedicated to the beginning of the war and including a description of the battle of the Varyag (we have already referred to it above), was published in 1912. A collection of documents containing the reports of V. F. Rudnev himself was published (and even then - not for the general press, but for the internal use of naval officers) only a year earlier. At the same time, none of the above contained a reliable refutation of the losses indicated in the report of the Varyag commander and his memoirs. And it must be remembered that at this time Vsevolod Fedorovich had long retired from business and lived with his family in his estate in the village of Myshenki, Aleksinsky district. V. F. Rudnev died on July 7, 1913 - apparently, his health by this time was severely undermined. It can be assumed that at this time he no longer had the opportunity or desire to follow the publications devoted to the Russo-Japanese War.
