So, in December 1903, about a month before the outbreak of hostilities, the Varyag was sent from Port Arthur to Chemulpo (Incheon). More precisely, the Varyag went there twice: the first time he went to Chemulpo on December 16, returning back six days later (and on the way, shooting at the shield at Encounter Rock), and then, on January 27, V. F. Rudnev received an order from the Governor to go to Incheon and remain there as a senior hospital. Having replenished supplies, the Varyag went to sea the next day and arrived on the afternoon of December 29, 1903, to its destination.
I would like to note a lot of questions that have arisen and will continue to arise among people interested in naval history regarding the actions of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev before the battle, which took place on January 27, 1904. Let's highlight several key ones:
1. Why V. F. Rudnev did not prevent the landing of Japanese troops in Chemulpo?
2. Why did the ships of foreign powers on the Chemulpo raid ignore the rights of sovereign and neutral Korea by their actions?
3. Why didn't the Varyag, alone or together with the Koreyets, make an attempt to break through on the night before the battle?
4. Why V. F. Rudnev did not accept the battle on the Chemulpo raid, but tried to go to sea?
To begin with, it is worth brushing up on what the state of Korea was at that time. T. Lawrence, professor of international law at the Royal Maritime College in Greenwich, a contemporary of those distant events, spoke about her like this:
“In practice, Korea has never been and has never been accepted as a completely independent state in the sense understood by international experts. Russia in its opposition to Japan was based on the permanent formal recognition of the independence of Korea, not hesitating to exert any pressure up to a real war with the Seoul court. In 1895-1904 there was a diplomatic duel between her and Japan on Korean soil, when the conflict of the art of diplomacy was replaced by an armed conflict. It was a struggle for complete and permanent influence, and no matter which side prevailed at one time or another, Korea was never truly independent."
How right was the British professor? We will not make a deep digression into the history of Korea, but recall that the last time this power fought to some extent effectively against a foreign invasion (by the way, it was Japan) in the seven-year war of 1592-1598. Fleet lovers remember her well from the victories of the Korean fleet, led by Admiral Li Sunxin and using unusual Kobukson warships.
Nevertheless, Korea could not defend its own independence on its own - the Chinese army and navy helped it to do this (in fact, it should be said about the battles on land that it was the Koreans who helped the Chinese). It must be said that the Japanese aim of their conquest was by no means Korea, but all of China, Korea was only required to give passage to the Japanese troops, which she did not provide, because she feared (probably more than justly) to be captured without war. In this sense, China's aid to Korea was fully justified - the Chinese perfectly understood the true goals of the Japanese conquerors.
Without a doubt, the Koreans fought valiantly in that war, especially the widespread guerrilla movement that emerged after their army was defeated, but prolonged hostilities undermined the strength of this not too numerous nation. As a result, Korea suffered severely from the Manchu invasions of 1627 and 1636-37. and could not repel any of them, and the conditions of peace imposed on her actually made her a Manchurian protectorate. All would be fine, but as a result of the Manchurian expansion, the latter displaced the Ming dynasty ruling China with their own Qing dynasty and gradually conquered the Chinese provinces that retained Ming loyalty. This is how, in fact, Korea turned into a protectorate of China. The ruling Korean elite was not going to somehow get out of this situation, recognizing China as a kind of "elder brother", and taking a course towards isolation from the outside world.
At the same time, the Japanese did not like this state of affairs very much - they perceived Korea as a pistol aimed at Japan. This, however, was not surprising, because the Korean Strait separating the two countries had a minimum width of only 180 kilometers. In other words, the Korea Strait for Japan was, on the one hand, the same as the English Channel for England (despite the fact that Japan did not have a powerful fleet), and on the other, a springboard for expansion into China, from which the Japanese never thought to refuse.
Therefore, as soon as the Japanese once again felt themselves strong enough for expansion, they forced Korea (1876) by force of arms to sign a trade agreement that was very enslaving for her, which, although formally recognized the independence of Korea, contained a number of points that could not have been agreed upon. an independent state - for example, the right of extraterritoriality (non-jurisdiction to Korean courts for Japanese citizens residing in Korea). Following this, similar agreements were concluded with the leading European powers.
I must say that at the dawn of its relations with the West, Japan itself found itself in a similar (to some extent) position, but it had ambitions and political will to defend its independence and be an independent power, but the Koreans had the strength to do so. was not found. Accordingly, Korea quickly turned into a battlefield for the interests of other powers - it could not and did not know how to defend its own. European countries, by and large, were not too interested in Korea, which allowed Japan to increase its influence and impose a new peace treaty on the Korean leadership (1882), which actually doomed the latter to a vassalage against Japan. In other words, Korea has managed to become a vassal of two opposing powers!
The absolute weakness and incapacity of the Korean leadership, the inability and unwillingness to defend the country's interests (including economic ones) led to a natural result: artisans went bankrupt, because they could not withstand competition with foreign cheap goods, and food products became more expensive, since it was in exchange for them that these the goods themselves were imported into the country. As a result, in 1893, a peasant uprising began, aimed, among other things, at eradicating the dominance of foreigners in Korea. The Korean government, having previously demonstrated its complete failure in the fight against "external threats", was also unable to cope with the "internal threat" and turned to China for help. China sent troops to suppress the rebels, but, of course, this did not suit Japan at all, which immediately sent almost three times more troops to Korea than China did. This resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. to which, in essence, the political incapacity of Korea led, but, funny, Korea itself did not participate in it (although hostilities were fought on its territory), declaring neutrality … As a result of the war won by Japan, Korea finally had to enter the orbit of Japanese politics. But then the European powers intervened (the so-called “Triple Intervention”)? who did not like this strengthening of Japan at all. The result was geopolitically completely unsatisfactory for the sons of Mikado - they were forced to abandon the Liaodong Peninsula, limiting themselves to indemnity, and as a result, Russia and (to a lesser extent) Germany received territorial acquisitions, honestly won by Japanese weapons. At the same time, Russia immediately declared itself as a serious player in the Korean field, beginning to exert a serious influence on the state of affairs in this "independent" power.
In other words, Korea, while formally maintaining its sovereignty, could solve absolutely nothing neither in foreign policy, nor in domestic policy; no one paid any attention to the Korean authorities. Without a doubt, in the era of the "triumph of humanism" and the "primordial right of the nation to self-determination" the words of the English scientist T. Lawrence may seem cruel:
“Just as a person who does not care about preserving his honor has little hope of being supported by his neighbors, so a state that does not use force to defend its neutrality should not expect a crusade in its defense from other neutral states.
But this does not make them less fair than they are. Without justifying the aggressive, predatory actions of China, Japan and Western countries (including Russia) towards Korea, we must not forget the absolute obedience of the Korean authorities to any form of violence towards their country - and what kind of sovereignty or neutrality can we talk about then?
Accordingly, any agreements with Korea at that time were not considered by any of the countries that concluded them as something necessary for execution - any actions on the territory of Korea were undertaken without any regard for the interests of Korea itself, only the positions of other countries "playing" were taken into account. on Korean territory - China, Japan, Russia, etc. This, of course, today looks completely immoral, but we see that the Korean leadership itself is largely to blame for this, completely incapable and not even trying to resist the arbitrariness of other countries. Therefore, it should be clearly understood that the question of whether it is necessary to oppose the Japanese landing, or not, was considered by Russia, as well as by other countries, solely from the standpoint of their interests, but not the interests of Korea: no respect for either her or her neutrality, neither Russia nor other countries had absolutely.
What were Russia's interests?
Let us recall one simple truth - in the event of a war with Japan, the latter would have to be transported across the sea and supplied with a sufficiently large army, the number of soldiers had to go to hundreds of thousands of people. All this was possible only if Japanese domination of the sea was established. And the Japanese, we must give them their due, made the most titanic efforts to this, in the shortest time ordering from the leading world powers and building the most powerful fleet in the region.
As you know, these efforts of the sons of Yamato did not go unnoticed, and the Russian Empire opposed them with its largest shipbuilding program, at the end of which its fleet ensured itself superiority in forces over the Japanese in the Far East: however, the implementation of this program was late - the Japanese were faster. As a result, their fleet got ahead and turned out to be the strongest in Asia - at the beginning of 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War began, the Russians had seven squadron battleships against six Japanese ones: however, all Japanese ships were built (by British standards) as 1st class battleships, while the Russian "battleships-cruisers" "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" were created in many respects equivalent to the English battleships of the 2nd class and were weaker than the "first-rank" battleships. Of the remaining five Russian ships, three (of the "Sevastopol" type) in their combat qualities approximately corresponded to the two oldest Japanese ships "Yashima" and "Fuji", and in addition, the newest battleships "Retvizan" and managed to sail with the rest of the squadron, while the Japanese ships were a fully trained unit.
Thus, despite the formal superiority in numbers, in fact, the Russian squadron battleships were weaker than the Japanese. In armored cruisers, the superiority of the United Fleet was completely overwhelming - they had 6 such ships in the fleet, and two more (Nissin and Kasuga) went under the protection of the Royal Navy to Japan. The Russian squadron had only 4 cruisers of this class, of which three were ocean raiders, and were not very suitable for squadron battles, unlike the Japanese, created for squadron combat. The fourth Russian armored cruiser "Bayan", although it was intended for service with the squadron and had very good booking, was almost twice inferior to any Japanese cruiser in combat power. Also, the Russian squadron was inferior to the Japanese in armored cruisers and destroyers.
Thus, the Russian naval forces in 1904 were at the peak of their weakness in relation to the Japanese fleet, but the "window of opportunity" for the Japanese was quickly closing. They had already used their financial resources, and the arrival of new large ships in addition to the above should not have been expected in the near future. And the Russians already had a detachment of Virenius with the battleship Oslyabya in Port Arthur, five squadron battleships of the Borodino type were under construction in the Baltic, of which four were capable of ending up in the Far East in 1905. Without a doubt, if the Japanese had postponed the war for a year, they would have had to face not inferior, but superior forces, and this was well understood in St. Petersburg. In an amicable way, the task of Russian diplomacy would have been to prevent war in 1904, when Russia was still relatively weak. And of course, if for this good purpose it was necessary to sacrifice such an ephemeral essence as the sovereignty of Korea, then, without a doubt, this should have been done. Of course, the Russian Empire advocated the independence of Korea, but this very independence of Russia was needed only in order to limit Japanese influence, strengthening its own - and nothing more.
There was one more important question - strictly speaking, the introduction of Japanese troops into Korea did not mean a war with Russia at all, everything depended on what goals the Japanese government would pursue in this case. Of course, this could be the first step towards war with Russia (as it actually happened), but, with the same success, another option was also possible: Japan occupies part of Korea and thereby puts Russia in front of the fact of expanding its influence on the continent. and then it will wait for a response from its “northern neighbor”.
While verbose and completely fruitless Russian-Japanese negotiations were going on during 1903, our politicians, together with the Emperor-Emperor, were just inclined to this opinion. The Historical Commission Report reads:
“Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw the main object of Japanese aggressive policy only in the seizure of Korea, which, in its opinion, as seen from the course of the negotiations, should not have been the reason for the inevitable clash with Japan. On the same day, January 16, 1904, some directives were received in Arthur that determined the political situation in which the actions of the Russian forces at sea would become necessary. For the Viceroy's personal information, it was reported that “in the event of the landing of the Japanese in South Korea or along the eastern coast along the southern side of the parallel of Seoul, Russia will turn a blind eye, and this will not be the cause of war. The northern border of the occupation of Korea and the establishment of a neutral zone were to be determined through negotiations in St. Petersburg, until this issue was resolved, the landing of the Japanese up to Chemulpo was allowed."
A few days before the start of the war, Nicholas II gave the following instructions to the Governor:
“It is desirable that the Japanese, not us, open military action. Therefore, if they do not start actions against us, then you must not prevent their landing in South Korea or on the east coast up to Genzan inclusive. But if on the western side of Genzan their fleet, with or without landing, moves to the north through the thirty-eighth parallel, then you are allowed to attack them without waiting for the first shot from their side."
It should be noted that the domestic diplomats until the last moment hoped that the war would be avoided, and made certain efforts to that: on January 22, 1904, Russia notified the Japanese envoy of its readiness to make such big concessions that, according to R. M. Melnikov: "A sense of justice has awakened even in England:" If Japan is not satisfied now, then no power will consider itself entitled to support it "- said the British Foreign Minister." Even in the severance of diplomatic relations initiated by Japan, St. Petersburg saw not the beginning of a war, but another, albeit risky, political maneuver. Thus, the general direction of Russian diplomacy (with the warm approval of Nicholas II) was to avoid war at almost any cost.
As for Korea itself, everything is short and clear with it: on January 3, 1904, its government issued a statement that in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, Korea would maintain neutrality. It is interesting that the Korean emperor, realizing all the precariousness of his position (more precisely, the complete absence of any foundation for it), tried to appeal to England so that the latter would contribute to the emergence of a system of international treaties designed to respect the independence and sovereignty of Korea. It seemed to be reasonable, because unlike Russia, China and Japan, the "mistress of the seas" did not have significant interests in Korea, which means that she was not interested in the struggle for influence on its territory, but at the same time she had sufficient influence. to the three above-mentioned countries, so that her opinion will be listened to.
But, of course, England's Korean sovereignty was completely unnecessary. The fact is that England was worried about the strengthening of Russia in the Pacific, and the Foreign Office understood perfectly well against whom the Russians were building their cruisers. Providing Japan with an opportunity (for its own money) to strengthen its fleet at British shipyards and to confront it with Russia, was undoubtedly politically and economically beneficial for “foggy Albion”. England was completely uninterested in the knot of Korean contradictions being resolved peacefully. Vice versa! Therefore, it would be very difficult to imagine the British defending Korean sovereignty from Japan, and, in fact, from Russia too. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Foreign Office of England responded to the memorandums of Emperor Kojong with meaningless, formal replies.
Other European countries, like Russia, were not worried about Korea's sovereignty or neutrality, but only about their own interests and the well-being of their citizens on its territory. As a matter of fact, it was precisely these tasks that had to be solved (and, as we will see later, solved) the foreign stationary ships in Chemulpo.
In Japan, they did not stand on ceremony with the issues of Korean sovereignty. They proceeded from what Moriyama Keisaburo later said: "a neutral state that does not have the strength and will to defend its neutrality is unworthy of respect."The landing of Japanese troops in Korea can and should be regarded as a violation of Korean neutrality, but no one did it - it is interesting that if the commanders of the foreign stationaries nevertheless protested the possible attack of the Varyag on a neutral roadstead, then they was not considered something reprehensible at all, and given the reaction of the Korean authorities to this, it was not. On the night of January 26-27, 1904, a landing took place in Chemulpo, and on the morning of January 27 (apparently, even before the battle of the Varyag), the Japanese envoy to Korea, Hayashi Gonsuke, told Korean Foreign Minister Lee Ji Yong:
“The government of the Empire, wishing to protect Korea from the encroachments of Russia, landed an advanced detachment of about two thousand people and urgently brought them into Seoul in order to avoid the invasion of Russian troops into the Korean capital and turn it into a battlefield, as well as to protect the Korean emperor. When passing through the territory of Korea, Japanese troops will respect the authority of the Korean emperor and do not intend to harm his subjects."
And what, the Korean Emperor Gojong somehow protested against all this? Yes, it did not happen at all - having received the news of the successful actions of the United Fleet near Port Arthur and in Chemulpo that evening, he "expressed his protest" by violating Korea's neutrality … by immediately expelling the Russian envoy from Korea.
In order not to return to this topic in the future, we will immediately consider the second aspect of the violation of the neutrality of Korea by the Japanese, namely, their threat of conducting hostilities in the Chemulpo raid, that is, in a neutral port. Here, the decisions of the Japanese also cannot be interpreted in two ways: the orders of the Japanese command and the preparation of the landing operation were crowned by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers (signed by the Prime Minister of Japan No. 275:
1. During the war, Japan and Russia are allowed to exercise the right to declare war in the territorial waters of Korea and the coastal waters of the Chinese province of Shengjing.
2. In the territorial waters of China, with the exception of the area specified in paragraph 1, it is not allowed to exercise the right to declare war, except in cases of self-defense or other exceptional circumstances."
In other words, if on land the "trampling" of Korea's neutrality could be covered with a "fig leaf" of "protection from the threat of Russia", then the attack by Russian ships in neutral waters was an obvious violation. Accordingly, Japan … simply decided not to recognize Korea's neutrality at sea, without declaring war on it. It should be noted that this step was very unusual, but not so much contrary to the then existing international laws.
By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan signed and assumed obligations to fulfill the Geneva Convention of 1864, the Paris Declaration on the Law of the Sea of 1856, and the Hague Conventions of 1899, but the fact is that in all these documents the rules of neutrality were not yet codified. In other words, the maritime legislation of those years did not contain comprehensive norms on the rights and obligations of neutral and belligerent states. As far as the author of this article could figure out, such rules existed mainly in the form of customs adopted by European countries, and these customs, Japan, no doubt, violated. But the fact is that even the most wonderful custom is still not a law.
And again, among European states, the custom of neutrality was supported by the strength of the state that declared it. In other words, by declaring neutrality, the state not only expressed its political position, but also undertook to defend the declared neutrality by its own armed forces from anyone who would violate this neutrality: in this case, the violation of neutrality led to an armed conflict, and then to war. There is no doubt that in such a case the world community would consider the state that violated neutrality as an aggressor, and the state that defended its declared neutrality by force of arms - its victim, even if the state was forced to use force first to defend the declared neutrality. But all this could not have anything to do with Korea - not to try to obstruct by force, but at least just to protest against the landing of Japanese troops or the actions of the Sotokichi Uriu squadron in relation to the Russian ships on the Chemulpo raid turned out to be much higher than their strength. As you know, Korean officials remained completely silent.
It must be said that as a result of the events in Chemulpo, a rather lively international discussion arose, as a result of which the Hague Convention of 1899 received a new edition - a number of additional sections were added to it, including "Rights and obligations of neutral powers in a naval war."
And so, summarizing the above, we come to the following:
1. It was completely unprofitable for the Russian Empire to defend Korean neutrality by military force, at least until the moment when the Russo-Japanese war began;
2. The Russian Empire did not incur any reputational, image or other losses, refusing to defend Korean neutrality. No damage to the honor of Russian weapons, betrayal of the Korean brothers, etc., etc. it did not happen and could not happen;
3. Under no circumstances did V. F. Rudnev did not have the right to make a decision on counteracting the Japanese landing on his own - it was absolutely not his level, not the level of the squadron chief and not even the Viceroy - having entered the battle with the Japanese ships, he, according to his own understanding, would start a war between Japan and Russia, which was at that time the prerogative of the bearer of the supreme power, that is, Nicholas II;
4. If V. F. Rudnev tried with arms in hand to oppose the Japanese landing, then he would have violated the will and wishes of Nicholas II, expressed by him in telegrams to the Governor;
5. But the funniest thing is that if Vsevolod Fedorovich had entered the battle, then … with the highest degree of probability it would have been him who would have been accused of violating the neutrality of Korea, because it was then that he would have had the dubious honor of the first shot on a neutral road;
6. In addition to all of the above, we must also state that a battle on a neutral roadstead would endanger the foreign stationers stationed there, which would lead Russia to political complications with the countries they represented. It would be completely unpolitical and simply unwise.
All of the above does not take into account the fact that, having entered the battle with the Japanese squadron, V. F. Rudnev would have violated the instructions given to him. However, I must say that this point of view is being revised today, so let's dwell on it in a little more detail.
The official history in the person of the "Report of the Historical Commission" quotes the points of the instructions received by V. F. Rudnev:
1. To perform the duties of a senior inpatient, being at the disposal of the envoy in Seoul, ds. Pavlova;
2. Not to interfere with the landing of Japanese troops, if such had taken place before the declaration of war;
3. Maintain good relations with foreigners;
4. Supervise the landing and security of the mission in Seoul;
5. Do at your own discretion as is appropriate under all circumstances;
6. In no case should you leave Chemulpo without an order, which will be given in one way or another.
However, there was a slight hitch: the fact is that the historical commission did not have this document itself, and it quotes these points directly from the book of V. F. Rudnev (the above instructions are followed by a note: "A copy of the description of the battle of the Varyag near Chemulpo, given for temporary use by Rear Admiral VF Rudnev"). On the other hand, the text of the order of the head of the squadron has been preserved, but there is no clause in it prohibiting interfering with the landing of the Japanese. This gave reason for today's revisionists, in particular N. Chornovil, to assert that this point is an invention of V. F. Rudnev, but in fact he did not receive such instructions.
What I would like to say about this. The first is in the book by V. F. Rudnev is first given a full citation of the text of the order of the Head of the squadron, then it is indicated: "Before leaving Arthur, additional instructions were received" without specifying the official from whom they were received, and then the above points are already listed. And a natural question arises - did the revisionists in general (and N. Chornovil in particular) see the order of the Squadron Chief as a separate document, or did they get acquainted with it from the text of the book of the Varyag commander? If they were able to find this document, that's great, but if not, then why then the same N. Chornovil considers it possible to believe one quote from V. F. Rudnev, but not to believe the other?
Second. The text of the order of the Chief of the Squadron contains (including) the following instructions:
“I draw your attention to the fact that before the state of affairs changes, with all your actions, you should keep in mind the existence of still normal relations with Japan, and therefore should not show any hostile relations, but keep in relations quite correctly and take due measures so as not to arouse suspicion by any measures. On the most important changes in the political situation, if any, you will receive either from the envoy or from Arthur notifications and corresponding orders."
Generally speaking, even this passage is already a direct order not to do anything that could worsen relations with the Japanese, until special circumstances arise. And it is separately stipulated that the commander of the Varyag cannot decide for himself when these circumstances occur, but must wait for the appropriate notifications from the envoy or from Port Arthur, and act only in accordance with the orders attached to these notifications.
Third. There is nothing strange that the documents themselves have not survived to this day - we must not forget that the Varyag, in fact, was sunk in the Chemulpo raid, and Port Arthur, where copies of V. F. Rudnev, was surrendered to the enemy.
Fourth. It is far from the fact that the controversial point of the instructions has ever existed in writing - the fact is that V. F. Rudnev could simply have a conversation with the same Squadron Chief, who clarified the content of his prescription (all points of the instructions are mentioned in one way or another).
And, finally, the fifth - an instruction prohibiting V. F. Rudnev, with arms in hand, to prevent the Japanese landing, completely fits into the logic of the desires and actions of those in power - the Viceroy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even the sovereign-emperor himself.
As the author of this article believes, all of the above is irrefutable evidence that V. F. Rudnev should not and did not have any right to prevent the Japanese from landing. Perhaps the only thing that could justify such actions is if V. F. Rudnev received information from a reliable source that Russia and Japan were at war. But, of course, there was nothing like that. As we know, the landing in Chemulpo took place in time simultaneously with the attack of Port Arthur by Japanese destroyers, with which, in fact, the war began and it is clear that V. F. Rudnev couldn’t.
What is absolutely ridiculous, from the point of view of Korean neutrality, V. F. Rudnev had no right to fire on the Japanese troops and on January 27, when Sotokichi Uriu notified him of the start of hostilities. In this case, the "Varyag" would open hostilities, standing in a neutral port, and would shoot at the territory of Korea, destroying its property. But there would be no military sense in this - to shoot in the city, not knowing exactly where the Japanese troops are stationed, would lead to casualties among the civilian population with a minimum of damage to the Japanese.
So, we see that V. F. Rudnev had no right to interfere with the Japanese landing. But did he have such an opportunity if he still wanted to do it?
