As we said earlier, the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" (hereinafter - "Kuznetsov") turned out to be too large for one article in the cycle. That is why, before taking on its description, in three separate articles we examined the history of the creation of aircraft-carrying ships of the USSR and their carrier-based aircraft - Yak-141, MiG-29K and Su-33.
Next, we should talk about the design features and capabilities of our only ship capable of providing flights of horizontal take-off and landing aircraft, but … Knowing what controversy this can cause in the comments, the author of this article preferred to first tell about the service of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov", without anything its current state, nor the specifics of its combat use in Syria, will not be clear.
Let us recall (briefly) the main tactical and technical characteristics of the only aircraft carrier in Russia.
The standard displacement (according to various sources) is 45,900 - 46,540 tons, the total displacement is 58,500 - 59,100 tons. The "largest" displacement of the TAKR is also mentioned - 61,390 tons. Machine power (four-shaft boiler-turbine unit) is 200,000 hp., speed - 29 knots. The cruising range at a speed of 18 knots was supposed to be 8,000 miles. Autonomy for supplies, provisions and drinking water - 45 days. Armament - airplanes and helicopters (the total number can reach 50 aircraft), as well as 12 Granit anti-ship missiles, 192 Dagger missiles, 8 Kortik air defense missile systems and 8 30-mm AK-630M installations, the Udav anti-torpedo missile system "(Based on RBU). It was believed that this complex is capable of destroying a homing torpedo with a 76% probability. Crew size (actual) up to 2,100 people. aircraft carrier personnel and 500 people. air groups.
The aircraft carrier, which at that time bore the name "Riga", was laid on the slipway "0" of the Nikolaev ChSZ in a solemn atmosphere on September 1, 1982 at 15.00. Present at the ceremony, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov personally attached a silver mortgage board to the bottom section of the hull.
The start of construction was preceded by extensive preparations, including a major modernization of the slipway, as well as the installation of two 900-ton KONE gantry cranes purchased in Finland. These huge structures (height - 110 m, portal size - 150 m) made it possible to move loads weighing up to 1,500 tons. As a result, the Nikolaev ChSZ received a slipway complex that allows building and launching ships with a launch weight of up to 40,000 tons.
It is interesting that one of the advantages of the deal with the French for the acquisition of Mistral-class helicopter carriers is the transfer by the French side of technologies for large-tonnage modular assembly, which we allegedly did not possess. In fact, the hull of the future "Kuznetsov" was assembled from 21 blocks 32 m long, 13 m high and the width corresponding to the ship's hull. Each of these blocks weighed up to 1,400 tons; the superstructure was the 22nd block.
The construction of the first unit began a little later than the official bookmark, in December 1982, and it was installed on the slipway on February 22, 1983. It is interesting that during the construction of the ship, the computers of the designer - Nevsky Design Bureau were linked to the computing center of the ChSZ into a single electronic computing system, which greatly simplified access to the necessary documentation. New design methods have greatly accelerated the progress of construction work. New (including electronic) were introduced everywhere, for example, it was possible to abandon the traditional markings on the plaza. Cable works, for the first time in the history of domestic shipbuilding, were carried out immediately on the slipway.
Renamed into "Leonid Brezhnev" TAKR was launched on December 4, 1985, having a mass of 32,000 tons (of which the ship itself weighed 28,000 tons, the rest - ballast and other cargo), mooring tests began on June 8, 1989. Of course, this year the ship was not yet ready to go to sea, but the need to gain practical experience in take-off and landing on deck led to the fact that on October 21 the aircraft carrier (now - "Tbilisi") for the first time departed from the shipyard berth and headed to Sevastopol … There, at the training ground near Cape Margopulo, the first tests took place, as well as fly-overs of the ship by Su-27K and MiG-29K fighters. On November 1, 1989, the first in the history of the Russian Navy took place the landing of a horizontal take-off and landing aircraft on the deck of the ship: at 13.46 V. G. Pugachev landed on the Su-27K with tail number 39. At the same time, the ship's readiness even by the beginning of 1990 was 86%. State tests were started on August 1, 1990 and were carried out very intensively - in 2 months and 4 days (the ship returned to the plant to eliminate the comments on October 4, 1990), the aircraft carrier traveled 16,200 miles, 454 aircraft and helicopters took off from its deck … For the first time, night start and landing of aircraft were tested.
The acceptance act was signed on December 25, 1990, and on January 20, 1991, the aircraft carrier (now “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov”) was enlisted in the Northern Fleet. 9 days later (January 29), the naval flag was raised over the ship for the first time.
It was assumed that 1991 Kuznetsov will spend in the Black Sea, he was even included in the 30th division of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet, and then, in 1992, the aircraft carrier will enter the first combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, upon completion of which it will go to the Northern Fleet … However, in November 1991, it became clear that the collapse of the USSR had become irreversible, and the situation became … let's say, unstable. As you know, for a certain period of time, Ukraine claimed no less than the entire Black Sea Fleet of the USSR. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Chernavin, decided to transfer "Kuznetsov" to the north, and on December 1, 1991, the ship went to sea.
The first TAKR campaign took place without any special excesses, although, of course, there were some nuances. Already in the Aegean Sea, the vibration of the third machine was discovered, as it turned out later - a fishing net was wound around the screw. It did not particularly “stick”, so we went with it to Gibraltar, and even there, during a two-day stay (connected, first of all, with fuel intake), it was cut off by the efforts of the divers on board the ship. During this campaign, Kuznetsov first met with the US Navy, an aircraft carrier strike group led by the aircraft carrier George Washington. The Americans immediately raised their aircraft and began flying over and photographing the newest aircraft carrier, and also tried to explore its physical fields. In response, ours transmitted the signal "I am carrying out exercises", increased the speed to 24 knots and raised both rescue helicopters into the air (unfortunately, there were no aircraft on board the Kuznetsov during this transition). The patrol ship "Zadorny" fished out a hydroacoustic buoy from the water. There was nothing more worthy of mention in that campaign, and on December 21, 1991, the aircraft carrier arrived at its destination. Here "Kuznetsov" was included in the 43rd division of missile cruisers based in Vidyaevo.
In order to understand what happened to our aircraft carrier further, it is necessary to stop and deal with the situation in which our only heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser found itself.
The first is the largest and most complex ship ever built in the USSR. It implemented fundamentally new technologies necessary for basing horizontal take-off and landing aircraft. Without a doubt, this was a huge step forward, but usually in such cases, ships with so many new technologies suffer from many "childhood diseases" that need to be identified and "treated".
Second, we can say that we inherited Kuznetsov from the USSR, but this cannot be said about its air group. The Su-33 is not nearly complete testing yet. Yes, it was developed in the USSR, but fine-tuning of such a complex object as a carrier-based combat aircraft is extremely difficult, and it was necessary to organize also mass production.
The third is the question of training deck pilots. Without a doubt, there were many professional pilots in the USSR, there were also those who piloted VTOL aircraft, but no one knew the specifics of takeoff from a springboard and landing with an aerial finisher, except for literally a few test pilots.
In other words, the state tests were passed, the acceptance certificate was signed, the flag was raised, and on December 21, 1991, Kuznetsov himself arrived at the place of permanent deployment. But at the same time, we still did not have a combat-ready aircraft-carrying cruiser with a manned and trained air group in the fleet, and in order to get it, the Russian Federation needed to make a lot of efforts. The problem was that the country was entering an era of political chaos and financial crises, notoriously known as the "wild nineties", which, of course, did not contribute at all to the acquisition of the combat capability of such a complex weapons system, which was the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov".
Organizationally, the Kuznetsov air wing was formalized in February 1992, forming the 57th Smolensk Red Banner Mixed Naval Air Division (57th Scud), which included:
1.279th shipborne fighter aviation regiment (279 kiap). It was supposed to include two Su-33 squadrons and, probably, a squadron of Su-25UTG training aircraft;
2. 830th shipborne anti-submarine helicopter regiment (830 kplvp), equipped with Ka-27, Ka-27PS and Ka-29 helicopters.
In turn, 279 kiap were formed on the basis of two compounds. On the one hand, the 279th kiap became the heir to the 279 okshap (a separate shipborne assault aviation regiment), which dates back to December 1, 1973, when the formation of the first in the USSR regiment of carrier-based aircraft Yak-36M (Yak-38) for the aircraft carrier began. Kiev . This regiment was a pioneer in every respect: it was the first to master completely new technology, such as VTOL aircraft, its pilots became the first pilots of carrier-based aviation, they were the first to gain experience in sea and ocean cruises … All this was on them, so who, if not them, was to master the newest Su-33?
However, in addition to them, many officers of another unit, the 100th Research and Instructor Fighter Aviation Regiment (100th Iiap), with which … an interesting story turned out, also entered the 279th Kiap.
This regiment was created on December 24, 1985 (based at the Saki airfield, Crimea) precisely with the aim of studying the capabilities of carrier-based aircraft, testing the tactics of its use, as well as training carrier-based aviation pilots. That is, the regiment was staffed with extra-class pilots, who just had to figure out what the Su-33, MiG-29K were and how all this could be most effectively applied in battle - and then teach it to others. But the USSR collapsed, and the 100th Iiap ended up on the territory of now sovereign Ukraine …
Surely, many readers of the site "Voennoye Obozreniye" watched the film "72 meters" at one time. There is an episode in which the crew of the Black Sea submarine must choose - the Ukrainian oath and service in the sunny Crimea, or the hills of the Arctic, where the boat will have to go. With few exceptions, the crew chooses loyalty to duty, and to the sound of the "Farewell of a Slav" they leave the pier where the "solemn event" was planned.
This episode immediately became, as it is fashionable to say now, an Internet meme and, by the way, the reason that the rental of "72 meters" in Ukraine was banned. But … this episode is not fictional at all. Many people faced a similar dilemma, including, of course, the personnel of the research and instructor aviation regiment. So - about a hundred officers of the 100th IAP, including 16 pilots headed by Lieutenant Colonel Timur Avtandilovich Apakidze (by the way, the commander of the 100th IAP), following not the letter, but the spirit of the oath they had given, chose to leave the hospitable Crimea, having moved with families to the polar Severomorsk.
Nails would be made of these people …
Without a doubt, these officers were carriers of a unique, at that time, experience in operating carrier-based aircraft, without which the development of the Su-33 would have been extremely difficult. However, even with them, work on the adoption of the Su-33 and the preparation of an air wing for "Kuznetsov" could not be resumed where they were completed in the Crimea. The fact is that in Ukraine there remained the 3rd Directorate of the State Research Institute of the Air Force, which was engaged in testing the aviation of the Navy. As a result, all materials and documents on the stages of flight design and state tests of the Su-33, performed in the Crimea, were unavailable - “fraternal” Ukraine categorically refused to transfer them to the Russian Federation. One of the Su-27K (T10K-7), which remained at the Kirovskoe airfield in the Crimea, was also "jammed".
But that was not all. In Crimea, NITKA remained - a unique training complex for training pilots of carrier-based aviation, capable of even simulating the pitching when landing on the deck of an aircraft-carrying cruiser. Subsequently, it was still possible to reach an agreement with Ukraine on the operation of this complex, and, starting in July 1994, training of aviation personnel of the Russian Navy was resumed on it, but for two whole years after the appearance of Kuznetsov in the north (1992-1993), it turned out to be is not available to us. And later …, for example, in 1994, Ukraine let our pilots to the thread for a whole month. But it was not only about the complex, of course. During the Soviet era, the most complex infrastructure for the development of carrier-based aircraft was created in the Crimea, and NITKA, in fact, was a part of it. And in Severomorsk, except for military airfields, by and large, there was nothing.
In other words, after the collapse of the USSR, we lost the infrastructure for research and training of deck pilots, as well as a lot of materials on previously performed tests. The country, of course, did not have the means to restore all this to some extent in full. The only "training ground" on which the state tests of the Su-33 could be resumed was, in fact, the aircraft carrier itself. But here, too, not everything was in order.
It is well known that a huge problem for our aircraft-carrying ships (and not only them) was the lack of equipped basing sites. And, I must say that some conclusions from the operation of the aircraft carrier of previous projects in the USSR were nevertheless made. So, Kuznetsov in Vidyaevo was awaited by a pontoon-spacer specially made at ChSZ - a very complex engineering structure, created specifically to ensure the basing of the newest aircraft carrier in the north. For this, special mooring devices, communications for supplying power to the ship, and even living quarters for service personnel were mounted on the pontoon. But, of course, the Black Sea shipbuilders could not supply their creation with a powerful boiler room, coupled with a power plant - it was assumed that the pontoon would only serve as a link between the ship and the corresponding land infrastructure. But they did not have time to build it, as a result of which steam and electricity for Kuznetsov was categorically lacking. As a result, like on other aircraft carrier before him, the crew of "Kuznetsov" is forced to constantly keep one of its engine-boiler rooms in working condition. Which, of course, had the most negative impact on the resource of mechanisms.
Now it will be extremely difficult to say what is the reason for the first breakdowns of the power plant "Kuznetsov" - someone thinks that the issue is in the initial "capriciousness" of the boiler and turbine plant, on the other hand, one should listen to those who argue that despite the operation, the fleet could well cope with this, if not for chronic underfunding and low qualifications of conscripts, who simply did not have time to train to work with such mechanisms, as well as difficulties encountered in obtaining spare parts and components for boilers. In any case, certain difficulties arose from the very first days of operation - warranty specialists worked on the ship, including due to the vibration of the third vehicle that captured the network in the Mediterranean Sea. During the next exit to the sea, one of the main turbines of the ship broke down, which required a very thorough and expensive repair.
All of the above, no doubt, largely predetermined the use of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" in subsequent years. For three years, in the period 1992-1994, the ship spent 3-4 months at sea, the crew was trained, flight design and state tests of the Su-33 were carried out. Seemingly banal lines, but what was behind that? In fact, it was necessary to revise the entire training program for deck pilots, excluding training at the NITKA simulator complex, it was necessary to somehow teach people to "transfer" from an unusual airfield directly to the deck. And this was in conditions when the equipment responsible for takeoff and landing operations was junk on the ship. As V. P. Zablotsky writes in his monograph dedicated to the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov":
"The most serious drawback was the mismatch of the light zones of the OSB" Luna-3 "and the television monitoring and control system of the landing" Otvodok-Liberation "with the onboard equipment of the radio engineering system (" Resistor K-42 ")"
In the spring of 1993, the first four production Su-33s were at the disposal of the 279th aircraft, and 1994 became, in a way, a landmark for our carrier-based aviation. First, the state tests of the aircraft were completed, and the final chord was the successful interception by a pair of Su-33s and the destruction of the La-17 target aircraft against the background of the sea. Secondly, at the same time, the fleet received 24 Su-33s, which made it possible to staff our only carrier-based aviation regiment. Nevertheless, the aforementioned difficulties with personnel training led to the fact that by 1994 we had only a leader group, consisting of 10 pilots who were allowed to fly from a ship, and … difficulties still remained. The impossibility of using the NITKA simulator, for example, led to the fact that the pilots could not work out the night takeoff and landing, although earlier such flights were carried out from the TAKR in Crimea. As a result, I had to be content with flights only in the daytime and at dusk. A number of malfunctions in control systems did not allow our aviation to work out the group use of fighters and their joint actions with the anti-submarine group.
The credits exercise in 1994 demonstrated the potential capabilities of our carrier-based aircraft. The flights were carried out by six Su-33s, divided into three deuces. The first of them was piloted by test pilots of the Sukhoi Design Bureau V. G. Pugachev and S. N. Melnikov, who were supposed to portray enemy aircraft striking at the TAKR from a distance of about 800 km. The second pair of aircraft (T. A. Apakidze and V. V. Dubovoy) and the third (I. S. Kozhin and K. B. Kochkarev) were supposed to provide air defense of the formation, which included the aircraft carrier outside the ship's air defense systems.
The most interesting thing about these exercises was that NATO aircraft took an active part in them. When entering the designated patrol area, a couple of T. A. Apakidze - V. V. Oak means of the onboard equipment of the Su-33 detected an unidentified target 280 km from the cruiser and were immediately reoriented to intercept it. The target turned out to be the Norwegian patrol "Orion", after its interception the Su-33s returned to the assigned task - aircraft piloted by V. G. Pugachev and S. N. Melnikov, were discovered and "destroyed" by air-to-air missiles.
The same thing happened with the second pair of Su-33s, which were piloted by I. S. Kozhin and K. B. Kochkarev - during the exit to the patrol area, planes were found that had started from Norwegian airfields. By the decision of the ship's control and guidance station, the pilots first intercepted the descendants of the ancient Vikings, and then continued the training mission, which was also completed.
Of course, if we compare the crediting exercises of deck aviation of the Northern Fleet that took place in 1994 with the training process of US aircraft carriers, then the disparity of scale is immediately evident - well, what are only six aircraft … However, you need to understand that our naval pilots took their first steps, and in the most difficult conditions. At the same time, these exercises have already demonstrated the unconditional usefulness of the carrier-based air group, which consisted of horizontal take-off and landing aircraft, even if it was of the most limited number.
In theory, large ships of the Northern Fleet were able to detect air targets 280 km away, but provided that the plane was flying high enough so that the radio horizon did not interfere with its detection. And even having discovered such an aircraft, not a single ship of the fleet, including heavy nuclear missile cruisers, had weapons that could destroy it at such a range. Also, attention was drawn to the duration of the stay of the aircraft in the air. Unlike the Yak-38 "mast defense aircraft", the newest Su-33s could be deployed for patrolling in remote areas. Both pairs of Su-33s, having received one task, in the course of its implementation were reoriented to another, unscheduled (interception of NATO aircraft), successfully solved it, and then, without landing and refueling, returned to the original task.
In the winter of 1994-995. "Kuznetsov" underwent the first more or less serious repair of the main boilers, including the replacement of pipes, but judging by further events, it was not done very well - in 1995, during the exit to sea, the ship lost its speed. The reasons voiced earlier - operation in the Far North, the complexity of the boiler and turbine plant, general underfunding and the continuing collapse of the armed forces - led to the fact that the ship that entered service in 1991 already in 1995 actually needed a major overhaul of the power plant. Of course, this is an abnormal situation for a modern warship, but in the period 1991-1995. the situation in the navy and in the country as a whole was infinitely far from the concept of "normal". And instead of repairing the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" went to his first military service in the Mediterranean Sea.
The exit took place on December 23, 1995, while Kuznetsov became the basis of the multipurpose aircraft carrier group (AMG), which, in addition to the aircraft carrier, included the Volk multipurpose nuclear submarine (Project 971 Schuka-B), the Fearless destroyer (project 956), ICR "Pylky" (project 11352). They were supported by the tug SB-406 and the Olekma tanker of the Northern Fleet, sailing from AMG to the Bay of Biscay, and later by the Shakhtar tug and the Ivan Bubnov tanker. As far as the author understood, the tanker "Dniester" accompanied AMG on a constant basis.
Without a doubt, and despite the presence of the latest aircraft carrier in the AMG, such a squadron was only a shadow of the naval power of the USSR, capable of keeping dozens of warships and submarines in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis. Alas, the times of the 5th OPESK are a thing of the past, and most likely forever. Nevertheless, our AMG was quite suitable for demonstrating the military presence, and its composition made it possible to work out the actions of Kuznetsov's carrier-based aviation "in conditions close to combat."
Unfortunately, by 1995 the 57th scud was not ready for combat work in full force. So, the 279th kiap received 24 Su-33s, so both of its squadrons were fully equipped with materiel, but only the first was "ready for the march and battle", whose planes could be distinguished by the image of an eagle on the keels (the machines of the second squadron had a head tiger in the same place). As a result, Kuznetsov went to his first combat service with an air group of 13 fighters, that is, a dozen Su-33s of the first squadron, as well as one aircraft of the pilot batch (T10K-9, which was assigned the number 109), two training aircraft Su-25UTG, as well as 11 Ka-27, Ka-27PS and Ka-29 helicopters from the 830th kplvp. At the same time, there were 15 combat fighter pilots on board the Kuznetsov, who were allowed to fly the Su-33 from the deck of the ship, not counting T. A. Apakidze (commander of the air division) and his deputy, Colonel Vlasov (with them, respectively, 17), as well as 11 helicopter crews. Naturally, the naval pilots were distinguished by the highest qualifications, suffice it to say that out of 15 fighter pilots, 14 were sniper pilots or 1st class pilots. The engineering and technical staff were able to match them - almost all of them had experience in servicing flight equipment in combat services. In addition to the pilots of the 57th scud, test pilots were also present on the aircraft carrier, whose task was to conduct a number of tests of the Su-33 in the Mediterranean Sea.
The hike lasted 110 days - starting on December 23, 1995, it ended on March 22, 1996. 14,000 miles traveled across the waters of two oceans and five seas, 30 flight shifts were carried out (that is, days during which aviation flights were carried out), during this time Su-33s made 400 (according to other sources - 524) sorties, helicopters - 700 (according to other sources - 996), including 250 for searching and tracking submarines.
The first combat service "Kuznetsov" had the following consequences. First, it turned out that the ship is fully capable of performing the role of a "floating airfield" for aircraft based on it. So, for example, in the period from 19 to 23 January 1996 (that is, not for 5 days in a row) 5 flight shifts were carried out and the Su-33 took off 67 times. It seems to be not enough, especially against the background of the capabilities of the American "Nimitz", designed to perform more than a hundred flights a day. But remember that the Kuznetsov Air Division had only 13 aircraft at its disposal, and the average number of sorties was 13.4 per day - that is, each aircraft took off once for five days in a row. In fact, during these five days, from 8 to 20 flights per day were made, that is, some of the aircraft carried out 2 flights during one day. Or, for example, the flights on January 26-27 - on the first day the Su-33 made 21 sorties, on the second - 12 more, and it is not a fact that all 13 available aircraft took off. All this is quite comparable with the indicators of the American carrier-based aviation, but one must understand that no one set the task of ensuring the maximum number of sorties before the Kuznetsov air group. For the first time, an aircraft carrier with a Su-33 on board entered combat service, and a lot of things should have been checked and worked out in practice - accordingly, we can say that the actual number of flights per day on the plane was not the maximum, but, so to speak, “comfortable working ".
The interaction of heterogeneous forces - surface and submarine ships with carrier-based aircraft - was worked out. The TAKR air group successfully intercepted numerous reconnaissance and patrol aircraft of NATO countries, tracked the US AUG, helicopters detected and escorted foreign submarines, "working" together with the nuclear submarine "Volk". When Kuznetsov returned home in the second half of March, he took part in large exercises of the Northern Fleet, in which, in addition to him, up to 40 warships and submarines, as well as up to 50 aircraft and helicopters of naval aviation were involved. During these exercises, the destroyer "Fearless" was nominated as a long-range radar patrol ship 200 km from the order, in which the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" followed. Having received information from him, the Su-33, operating at a distance of 500 km from the aircraft carrier, intercepted and "destroyed" the four Tu-22M3, which could not reach the missile launch line on the aircraft returning from combat service. It should also be noted that the "air umbrella" of the TAKR was built in two echelons - the long-range one was focused on intercepting enemy aircraft, the near one - on the destruction of anti-ship missiles. In other words, of course, it is possible and necessary to say that the absence of long-range radar weapons significantly reduces the capabilities of the Kuznetsov air group, but in no case should we forget that even in its current form, Kuznetsov has significantly strengthened our fleet. providing him with opportunities that the fleet has never had before. The experience of the first combat service of "Kuznetsov" testified that the presence of the aircraft carrier increases the combat stability of a ship formation operating in a distant sea or ocean zone by 1.5-2 times.
Secondly … alas, but the first combat service demonstrated the extreme weakness of the ship's power plant. At the very beginning of the campaign, when the aircraft carrier was just leaving the Kola Bay, a seven-point storm began, during which two of eight boilers went out of order, and at the time of returning to the base, only two boilers were working on the ship. Accordingly, in April 1996, Kuznetsov was put on repair, from which it emerged only by the summer of 1998. I must say that if it were not for the chronic underfunding of repair work, the ship would not have had to spend two whole years at the quay wall. And the quality of the repairs was probably lame, and besides, the "wild 90s", underfunding and falling qualifications of the personnel had a strong impact. In the period 1998-1999, Kuznetsov continued to serve in the fleet, but in 1999 one boiler and one (out of four) GTZA were completely out of order.
Despite this, in 2000, "Kuznetsov" was supposed to go to the second military service, but it was canceled in connection with the tragic death of the submarine "Kursk". As a result, instead of the BS, the ship got on a three-year medium repair. Then, during 2004-2007, the ship again plunged into the everyday life of military service, while in 2004 it went to the North Atlantic as part of a ship group, and from December 5, 2007 to February 3, 2008 it made another BS - a trip to the Mediterranean Sea. Then - 7 months of repair at "Zvezdochka" and service until May 2014, when the ship that had just returned from a cruise to the shores of Syria got up for a short three-month repair. Service again, and from January to June 15, 2016 - restoration of technical readiness before a new long-distance campaign and - participation in hostilities in Syria.
In general, we can say the following - for the period from January 29, 1991, when the naval flag first flew over Kuznetsov, and until October 2017, when work began on the overhaul of the aircraft carrier, 26 years and 8 months had passed. During this time, the ship was under repair for about 6 years and 5 months, that is, only 24% of the total being in the fleet. It should be borne in mind that under normal conditions and with the availability of timely funding, a two-year repair in 1996-98 and a three-year one in 2001-2004 could have been carried out much faster, or a much larger volume could have been produced in the same period. repair work.
In other words, the deep-rooted opinion that Kuznetsov does not get out of repairs has no basis. The problem is different - a huge ship, which has been in the fleet for 27 years, has not yet received a single major overhaul …
