Pyongyang shares rocket science with the world
Recent nuclear and missile tests have brought unprecedented sanctions on the DPRK. They will deal a serious blow to the country's economy. However, it is unlikely to affect its readiness to create new types of ballistic missiles. In North Korea, a peculiar school of independent weapon design has developed, capable of achieving impressive results with very scarce resources.
Of course, the DPRK cannot count on success in technological competition with developed countries, but it is unlikely to set such goals for itself. The North Koreans have confirmed their ability to independently move forward, maintaining an approximately 35-45-year lag in missile technology from the leading military-industrial powers. At the same time, Pyongyang is gradually expanding its product range - from short-range missiles to increasingly powerful ones, including ICBMs. Judging by the available information, the North Koreans are gradually seeking to improve the accuracy of their missiles.
At the moment, there is no consensus among experts in the DPRK's military industry about its ability to create a miniaturized nuclear charge that can be used as a warhead for ballistic missiles. The data on the four nuclear tests that have passed do not allow us to draw definite conclusions, although the DPRK itself insists that it has successfully solved the problem of miniaturizing the charges and installing them on missiles. The Russian military does not make public its opinion on this issue, and the prevailing opinion in the West is that the DPRK's nuclear warheads cannot be ruled out in principle, but there is still no evidence of their existence.
However, it will not be superfluous to remember that China, which created its nuclear weapons in the 60s, tested an atomic warhead for a DF-2 medium-range ballistic missile just during the fourth nuclear test on October 27, 1966. Solving similar engineering challenges 50 years later, North Korea at least has access to incomparably better computing power, more sophisticated equipment, and a wealth of open source nuclear physics. Today's DPRK is hardly inferior to the PRC of the 60s in terms of the quality of scientific and technical personnel. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the North Koreans are less successful at nuclear weapons than the Chinese in the 1960s.
Nevertheless, even with conventional warheads, North Korean ballistic missiles are quite effective and deadly weapons. Modern missile defense systems, fabulously expensive and made with the use of technologies that are 40-50 years ahead of North Korean ones, do not provide guaranteed protection against old ballistic missiles.
In the hostilities in Yemen, the Houthis and allied units of the old national army that are fighting against the Saudi Arabia-led coalition use Soviet "Points" delivered from the DPRK to Yemen in the 90s "Hwaseong-6" and Iranian "Tondar-69" missiles SAM S-75 or HQ-2). Although of the three types of missiles, only "Hwaseong-6" was purchased by Yemen in the DPRK, the North Koreans are producing their own clone of "Tochki", as well as versions of the C-75 for firing at ground targets.
By now, we can say with confidence that the use of these missiles was effective and led to significant losses of the Saudi coalition troops, despite their PAC3 systems,for whom the fight against such goals is the main specialty. According to the French TTU bulletin, only 40 percent of Hwaseong-6 intercept attempts have been successful. Moreover, this clone of the Soviet R-17 missiles, slightly modified to increase the range by reducing the mass of the warhead, has been produced by the North Koreans since the 80s and does not reflect the current potential of their industry.
"Luna" and her descendants
Korean missile programs must be viewed in the light of the nature of the North Korean regime. In 1956, Kim Il Sung, taking advantage of the chaos in Moscow and Beijing generated by Khrushchev's speech at the XX Congress, made a lightning political coup in the country. Numerous Soviet and Chinese protégés in the North Korean party apparatus were destroyed. From now on, the main idea of the regime was complete independence and independence from the outside world. This principled directive logically followed the need to build an independent military-industrial complex capable of operating in isolation and providing the country with the most important types of weapons. This problem had to be solved at any cost.
The regime skillfully used the interest of the USSR and the PRC in preserving the buffer socialist state on the Korean Peninsula and their fierce rivalry among themselves. The initial basis for mastering the technologies for the development and production of missile technology was the supply of Soviet and Chinese tactical missile weapons, and then the transfer of technologies for their production.
In the 70s, the Chinese helped the DPRK organize its own system of maintenance, resource extension and modernization of several types of Soviet tactical missile weapons, including the S-75 air defense system and the P-15 anti-ship complexes. In 1971, the two countries signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, the DPRK received assistance in the form of technology and training.
It is assumed (but not confirmed) that in 1972, Pyongyang received a limited batch of 9K72 complexes with R-17 missiles from the USSR. The DPRK has been seeking the supply of weapons of this class for many years, but in the absence of mutual trust, the Soviet Union limited itself to the transfer of less advanced Luna and Luna-M complexes with unguided missiles. In the same year, Pyongyang, with the help of Beijing, began its own production of clones C-75 and P-15 (or rather, their Chinese versions - HQ-2 and HY-1). Thus, the North Koreans are gaining experience in the development of relatively complex samples.
Work begins on copying other types of Soviet tactical missile weapons, such as the Malyutka ATGM and Strela MANPADS. If necessary, samples for study and copying are purchased from developing countries - recipients of Soviet weapons, primarily in Egypt.
Technology transfer from the PRC continues. The two countries are trying to implement a joint project of the operational-tactical ballistic missile DF-61, which, however, turns out to be unsuccessful. Finally, in 1976, the DPRK acquired another batch of R-17 missiles, this time in Egypt. Unlike the Soviet delivery in 1972, the deal with Cairo is not in doubt. Probably, additional missiles, the existence of which were not known to Soviet specialists, were very useful for studying and copying their design.
General supplier of the third world
Egypt is not the only major recipient of Soviet weapons to interact with the DPRK. There was also an agreement on "scientific and technical cooperation" with Libya.
In April 1983, the DPRK, apparently, conducted the first successful test of its R-17 missile, and in October of the same year Tehran entered the game, which signed an agreement with Pyongyang to finance the North Korean missile program in exchange for subsequent deliveries of products and transfer technologies. This cooperation continues to this day. It is with him that the numerous successes of Iran in the creation of MRBMs and space launch vehicles are associated.
In 1984, the USSR nevertheless begins relatively large deliveries of 9K72 complexes to the DPRK. Meanwhile, tests of their North Korean clones continue at full speed. Own production of these missiles, called "Hwaseong-5", begins after 1985, then the DPRK begins to transfer technologies for their production to Iran. In the second half of the 1980s, the production rate was brought up, according to American estimates, to 10–12 items per month. Since about 1987, large shipments of missiles to Iran begin.
The DPRK is becoming one of the leading suppliers of ballistic missiles to developing countries. According to the American researcher Joshua Pollack, from 1987 to 2009, 1200 ballistic missiles were delivered to third world countries. North Korea accounted for 40 percent. North Korean supplies reached a peak in the early 90s, later they are declining, and since 2006, under the influence of increased sanctions and the UN Security Council ban on the purchase of North Korean weapons, they have come to naught.
But if the export of finished missiles under international pressure is interrupted, then the transfer of technology, according to all available data, has even expanded. Technological cooperation in the missile sphere is becoming an important source of currency for the DPRK, the role of which has grown immeasurably after the collapse of the USSR. Two leading powers of the Islamic world - Iran and Pakistan - are becoming North Korea's technological partners. In addition, Myanmar made attempts to interact with the DPRK in the field of missile technology. By the beginning of 2010, the government of this country, against the background of normalization of relations with the United States, made statements about the termination of such cooperation, but their reliability has not been confirmed, at least in the sphere of deliveries of certain types of conventional weapons, the military-technical cooperation of Myanmar and the DPRK remained.
Another country that tried with the help of the DPRK to deploy its own missile production was Syria, but its plans were never completed by the beginning of the civil war. And the DPRK persistently, albeit unsuccessfully, tried to expand the geography of the export of missile technologies at the expense of other large developing countries, for example Nigeria.
Middle Eastern missiles
By the late 1980s, North Korea had developed and began exporting a new extended-range version of the P-17, the Hwaseong-6. By 1990, the DPRK achieved major success in the development of its own technologies - it had a rocket based, of course, on the R-17, but still of the original design - "Nodong-1". It, having a range of 1,000 to 1,600 kilometers, according to various estimates, makes it possible to threaten not only South Korea, but also Japan. More importantly, in the 1990s, the technology of these missiles was transferred to Iran and Pakistan.
Nodon-1 became the ancestor of the Iranian Shahab-3 and Pakistani Ghori-1, although in both cases changes were made to the missile design in order to adapt them to the local production base. The Nodong-1 and the improved version of the Nodong-2 are still the most powerful Korean ballistic missiles that have passed the full course of flight tests and confirmed their combat readiness.
More lethal MRBMs, including the first shown at the 2010 parade "Musudan" (with an estimated range of up to 4,000 kilometers), have never been flight tests on North Korean territory. At the same time, according to a telegram from the US State Department published by Wikileaks, the Americans believed that in 2005 a batch of these missiles had been delivered to Iran. Thus, it is possible that flight tests took place on its territory. As for another new North Korean missile, the alleged KN-08 intercontinental missile, shown at the 2013 parade, its test launches have never been carried out anywhere in the world.
According to American statements, North Korean space launches serve to accumulate experience in the field of ballistic missile development. This is doubtful. Such launches do not make it possible to test a key element of any combat missile - the warhead. It must enter at the final section of the trajectory into the dense layers of the atmosphere, not collapse and reach the target with a given accuracy. The DPRK's ability to solve such complex technical problems for missiles more powerful than the Nodong has not yet been proven. Space technologies have an independent value for Pyongyang, as they serve as an export item and strengthen national prestige.
There are suggestions that Musudan is a by-product of the Safir space launch vehicle (the Korean version is called Ynha-3), which was being developed in the interests of Iran. The reason is the strong outward resemblance between Musudan and the second stage of the launch vehicle. According to some Western estimates, not documented, in the 90s, the DPRK intelligence was able to gain access to materials on the Soviet naval MRBM R-27, which served as the prototype of Musudan. In those conditions, when a significant number of old Soviet missiles and their carriers were disposed of, and chaos reigned in the security sphere, such an opportunity could be. At least now it is known for sure that in the mid-90s, the operation to remove the decommissioned P-27 was carried out by South Korean intelligence. Nevertheless, a number of experts in rocketry are questioning this version and the question of the origin of "Musudan" remains open.
In parallel with the creation of the MRBM, the DPRK began work on ballistic missiles for submarines. Test launches of the rocket, designated the western designation KN-11, from the ground platform began at the end of 2014, and throw tests at sea were recorded in January 2015. The missile has an external resemblance to the Musudan and R-27.
The feasibility of developing a program of naval ballistic missiles from the point of view of the DPRK's security raises doubts. Boats carrying such missiles will be extremely vulnerable due to the overwhelming technical superiority of the Japanese and South Korean fleets, not to mention the possibility of their strengthening by the United States. It can be assumed that the technology is developing based on the prospects for sale, and in this case, its transfer, for example, to Pakistan, could have great consequences for world politics.
Another line of development of the Korean ballistic missile programs is the production of clones of Soviet 9M79 Tochka missiles launched in the second half of the 2000s, presumably on the basis of documentation and samples acquired in the 90s in Syria.
Thus, at present, the DPRK is one of a very limited circle of countries capable of independently developing and producing a wide range of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as space launch vehicles. At the same time, the DPRK already knows how or will soon be able to produce nuclear warheads. Only Russia, the USA, France, China, and India have a similar or higher potential.
Although North Korean technology is 40-50 years behind, it is deadly and effective. And unlike large countries, the DPRK is not bound by any control and non-proliferation regimes. The export of North Korean missile technology to countries such as Iran and Pakistan has already become an important factor in world politics and has affected the situation in parts of the planet very far from Pyongyang. In the future, for example, after the DPRK creates operational ICBMs or ballistic missiles for submarines, the destabilizing role of North Korea as a major exporter of missile technology will only intensify.
