So, starting somewhere from 13.15-13.20, the battle in the Yellow Sea was briefly interrupted in order to resume soon after 13.30 (most likely, it happened around 13.40), but it is not possible to indicate the exact time, alas. At 13.15, the Russian and Japanese squadrons parted in opposite directions, and V. K. Vitgeft led his battleships to Vladivostok. Soon the distance between the end Russian and Japanese ships increased so much that even 12-inch guns could not send their shells to the enemy. Only then the commander of the United Fleet turned around and rushed in pursuit - at that moment the distance between the warring detachments reached 100 cables.
Immediately after there was a break in the shooting, the Russian commander tried to increase the progress of the squadron and give at least 14 knots instead of 13. But during this attempt, the terminal "Poltava" and "Sevastopol" began to lag behind, and V. K. Vitgeft was forced to slow down to 13 knots.
At about 13.35-13.40, the Japanese approached the end Russian ships by 60 kbt, being on their starboard side, and the battle resumed. This time, Heihachiro Togo tried to adhere to a different tactic than the one he had demonstrated before: apparently, the Japanese admiral noted that the fire of Russian battleships was completely ineffective at a distance of over 55 kbt. At the same time, it was noticeable that the Japanese artillerymen fought quite effectively at these distances, hitting not so often, but regularly. It can be assumed that H. Togo came up with a completely logical decision - to approach the Russians at a distance of 50-60 kbt and concentrate fire on the terminal battleship. Undoubtedly, V. K. Witgeft outplayed the commander of the United Fleet at the first stage of the battle, but H. Togo still had the opportunity to fix everything: there was enough time before dark, so that one could even try a small experiment.
For about 20-25 minutes the Japanese were shooting at Poltava, getting hits with six 12-inch shells, not counting other, smaller calibers: it is interesting that all six "heavy" hits were achieved in ten minutes, between 13.50 and 14.00. The Poltava received some damage, but nothing that seriously threatened the ship's combat capability. And then the 1st combat detachment of the Japanese, which continued to move at a speed of about 15 knots, reached the traverse of the Russian squadron and was forced to disperse fire - at this time the distance between the opponents was about 50 cables (senior artillery officer of the battleship "Peresvet" V. N. Cherkasov wrote about 51 kbt). The battle continued for another 50 minutes after that, but then the Japanese turned away, increasing the distance to 80 cables, and then completely lagged behind. Thus ended the 1st phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea.
It is not easy to understand the reasons why H. Togo interrupted the battle. As we wrote above, the very idea of a long-range battle, where the Japanese gunners could still hit, and the Russians no longer, was quite reasonable and could bring the Japanese a certain profit. This did not happen, but why then did Kh. Togo interrupt the battle exactly when he went to the traverse of the Russian squadron, i.e. actually compensated for his failed maneuvering at the start of the battle? Indeed, in order to re-occupy an advantageous position in front of the Russian squadron, he had very little left: it was enough just to move the same course, that's all. If it suddenly seemed to him that the Russian fire by 50 kbt had become too accurate, then he could easily increase the distance to 60 or 70 kbt and overtake the Russian squadron. Instead, he, turning to the side, again lagged behind V. K. Vitgeft.
Russian officers in their memoirs usually associate this decision of H. Togo with the numerous damage received by the ships of the Japanese 1st Combat Detachment. In no case should they be reproached with hat-making or a desire to embellish the picture of the battle. Firstly, in battle, one always sees what one wants to see, and not what is actually happening, therefore, on Russian ships, they really "saw" numerous hits on the Japanese. And secondly, one can hardly assume any other reasonable reason to justify the Japanese withdrawal from the battle.
Let's try to figure out what happened.
From the beginning of the battle until the very battle on counter-gals, i.e. in the interval from 12.22 to 12.50 and while the squadrons were fighting at distances of 60-75 cables, the Japanese ships did not receive a single hit. And only during the divergence with counter-courses, when the distance was reduced to 40-45 cables or less, the artillerymen of the 1st Pacific Squadron finally began to inflict damage on the enemy. Mikasa got hit by 12-inch shells at 12.51 and 12.55, respectively, and then it was the turn of the terminal Nissin - already at the very end of the battle on countergals, at 13:15 he received a six-inch round, and ten minutes later - a ten-inch one. Alas, this is all that the Russian gunners could do in half an hour of battle. Then the fire was temporarily stopped and resumed only at 13.35-13.40. While the distance remained within 55-60 cables, gunners V. K. Vitgefta could not do anything, but later, after 14.00, when the ships of H. Togo approached the Russian squadron by 50 kbt, the Russian battleships were still able to inflict some damage on the Japanese.
At 14.05 the squadron battleship Asahi got hit - its descriptions are somewhat different, but most likely it was like this: a twelve-inch projectile hit under the waterline in the stern and reached the carapace armored deck, whose "bevels" went much below the waterline. The projectile, whose energy was largely wasted by the movement under water and breaking through the side of the armor, did not overpower and exploded right on it, and the armor withstood this blow.
At 14.16 a six-inch projectile hits the Mikasa in the waterline area, at 14.20 - a twelve-inch shell hits the quarterdeck on the left side, 14.30 - the Japanese flagship receives a ten-inch projectile (probably into the side in the middle of the hull), 14.35 - two twelve-inch hits at once, one - into the casemate battery, the second into the front tube of the battleship. But by this time H. Togo was already breaking the distance, which, apparently, after 14.35, again became too great for V. K. Vitgefta - until the very end of the first phase, i.e. until 14.50 no other hits on Japanese ships were recorded.
Thus, the Russian squadron in the battle on countergals achieved 3 hits with large-caliber projectiles, and one six-inch, and after the resumption of the battle at 13.35 and until 14.50, another 5 large-caliber and one six-inch shells.
Of course, it should be borne in mind that the time of the hit of a part of the Russian six-inch shells, as well as shells of an unknown caliber, is unknown: the Japanese, having noted the fact of the hit, did not record its exact time. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that in the first phase of the battle several more shells hit Togo's ships. But this is doubtful - the fact is that in the next phase the battle took place at a relatively short distance and it should be assumed that all these hits happened exactly then. Moreover, in the first phase, due to the large distances, it was mainly large-caliber guns that "talked", and hits with a projectile of 6 inches and below (and it is these that basically fell into the category of "unidentified calibers") are generally quite doubtful.
Having studied the hits on the Japanese ships, we come to the conclusion that the only hit that could knock the Japanese down and force them to lag behind the Russian squadron is hitting the Asahi's waterline. But it happened at 14.05 and after that H. Togo continued the battle for another 45 minutes - so, apparently, it did not become any dangerous for the Japanese battleship and did not threaten significant flooding. Thus, it can be argued that combat damage is not the reason for H. Togo's withdrawal from the battle. But if not them, then what?
Let's figure out the quality of shooting of the Japanese artillerymen. Without going into details, we note that in the first phase of the battle, from 12.22 to 14.50, 18 12-inch and one 10-inch shells hit the Russian ships, as well as, according to some sources, 16 shells of smaller calibers. Accordingly, the Japanese gunners achieved 19 hits with large-caliber shells, and the Russians - only 8, the difference is more than two-fold and not in favor of the Russian squadron. If we compare the total number of hits, then everything becomes even worse - 10 Russian hits against 35 Japanese. Here it is, the price of "a great standing in the raid"!
Although in fairness it should be taken into account that the technical equipment of the Japanese artillerymen was superior to that of the Russians: the presence of stereoscopic sights in the Japanese played a significant role, while not a single ship was equipped with them in the Russian squadron. Russian gunners, "not spoiled" by training, had to direct in the literal sense of the word "by eye". Of course, when firing at 15-25 kbt, as it was assumed before the war, it was quite possible to adjust the fire without optics, but already at a distance of 30-40 kbt, to distinguish with the naked eye the fall of a projectile of your own gun from other projectiles fired from other cannons of the ship. it was very difficult, if not impossible.
It is reliably known that from the beginning of the battle until its resumption at 13.35-13.40, the Japanese ships achieved at least 6 hits with twelve-inch shells on the Russian battleships. Another 6 twelve-inch and ten-inch rounds hit the Russian ships after the battle resumed at 13.35-13.40. Unfortunately, the exact time of the remaining 6 "twelve-inch" hits was not recorded, it is only known that they were achieved in the 1st phase of the battle. Making the assumption that these hits were distributed approximately evenly and in the period 13.35-13.40 3 shells out of six hit, we find that after the resumption of the battle and before the end of the 1st phase, 10 large-caliber shells hit the Russian battleships.
Now let's put ourselves in the shoes of Heihachiro Togo. Here the Japanese column is slowly catching up with the Russians, here is 60 kbt left to the end of the Russian battleship and the battle resumes. The explosions of Japanese heavy shells are clearly visible - but the Japanese commander-in-chief cannot keep track of all the enemy ships at the same time. He sees some hits on the enemy, but he does not notice some. Since everything seems to be in battle, H. Togo also probably sometimes sees hits that in fact were not, but what general impression can he have? In fact, about 10 heavy shells hit the Russian ships, H. Togo probably could have seen five or six, but errors in observation could easily have turned 15 of them, or even a little more. But they could not see hits on their ships moving in a wake column from the Mikasa - one could only observe the white-foam pillars of close falls at the sides of the nearest battleships. But hitting his own ship is felt quite well, especially since H. Togo was not in the wheelhouse, but on the bridge.
How could the Japanese commander see the situation, "observing" 10-15, or even 20 hits of heavy shells in Russian battleships and knowing that his flagship received four such hits, but at the same time not knowing how many Russian shells hit his other ships? Only that his calculation of smashing the Russians from a long distance with impunity turned out to be erroneous, and that, quite likely,his ships receive no less powerful blows than they themselves inflict. It is possible that this was precisely what became the reason for H. Togo to withdraw from the battle.
But why should he lag behind V. K. Vitgefta? After all, nothing prevented the Japanese commander, breaking the distance, to move forward and again take a position south or southeast of the Russian squadron. Perhaps there is one and only explanation for such an act of H. Togo.
The fact is that the Russian squadron was slowly but surely overtaken by the 3rd combat detachment and the Yakumo. Of course, three armored cruisers, supported by one armored one, could not enter the battle with the Russian squadron, so the Yakumo had no chance to take part in the battle. But if it was possible to attach him to the 1st combat detachment, then the forces of the Japanese would grow to a certain extent.
By the end of the third hour, Heihachiro Togo was finally convinced that the long-range exchange of fire would not stop the Russian squadron, so that he would have a decisive battle at short distances - this was the only way to hope to inflict critical damage on the Russian ships and prevent their breakthrough into Vladivostok. But against 6 Russian battleships, the commander of the United Fleet had only 4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers, so joining his forces with another armored cruiser was very useful. It should be borne in mind that at that time there was still confidence about the important role of rapid-fire artillery, so that the 4 * 203-mm and 12 * 152-mm "Yakumo" could appear to H. Togo a big boost in short-range combat. In addition, 6 ships V. K. Vitgefta, even having dispersed the fire, could still fire at only 6 ships of H. Togo, which means that one Japanese ship would not be fired upon in any case. Usually, a ship that is not fired on shoots more accurately and this would be a small, but still an advantage for the Japanese.
Thus, Kh. Togo's withdrawal from the battle, and the subsequent lag of the 1st combat detachment from the Russian squadron pursued by them, could be connected with the desire of the Japanese commander to find out the extent of the damage received by his ships, as well as with the desire to attach the Yakumo to the main forces in on the eve of a decisive battle. Of course, this is just a hypothesis, we can only guess what the commander of the United Fleet was thinking at that moment. However, we do not see any other reasonable explanations for H.'s actions.
Apparently, at that moment, Heihachiro Togo finally gave up the idea of defeating the Russians through tactical maneuvering. After all, he had a choice - to lag behind and annex the Yakumo, or refuse to join the Yakumo to the line, but come forward and take a comfortable position ahead of the Russian squadron. In the first case, H. Togo received reinforcement, but then he would have to engage in battle, catching up with the Russian squadron, as he had already done at 13:35, and then the Russians would have had the advantage of the position. In the second case, H. Togo remained with the ships that he had at the beginning of the battle, but received a positional advantage. Heihachiro Togo chose brute force.
The further actions of the Japanese are understandable and do not have ambiguous interpretations - after the 1st combat detachment moved away from the Russian squadron, the 3rd combat detachment, together with the Yakumo, which was at that moment on the right and behind the Russian squadron, passed behind it for in order to reunite with the main forces. However, while crossing the course of the Russians, the Yakumo was within reach of heavy guns and the terminal Sevastopol and Poltava opened fire on it. The result of this was a very unpleasant for the Japanese hit of a 12-inch shell from the Poltava into the Yakumo's battery deck - hefty destruction, 12 killed and 11 wounded clearly demonstrated that the armored cruiser is still no match, even if not a young one, but armed with a 305-mm cannons to the battleship. Interestingly, "Poltava", which was hit by 15 305 mm, 1 - 254 mm, 5 - 152 mm and 7 rounds of unknown caliber during the entire battle on July 28, lost exactly the same 12 people killed (although there were no wounded on it 11, and 43 people).
A little remark. It is not surprising that the Japanese shot much more accurately than the gunmen V. K. Vitgeft, after all, the Russian artillerymen did not have telescopic sights, did not finish the exercises in 1903 and did not have systematic training in 1904. In addition, there was also a personnel problem: the same S. I. command of artillery towers or officers who are not artillerymen, or artillery conductors (the aft 305-mm tower was controlled by the conductor). But there is some interest in the significant difference in the effectiveness of Russian artillery in different periods of the battle. Judging by the available data, distances from 55 kbt and above were almost unattainable for the gunners of the 1st Pacific Squadron, but in the first phase there were two combat episodes when the opponents approached at shorter distances. For half an hour of the battle on countergals (12.50-13.20), when the distance to the enemy was 40-45 kbt or less, the Russian battleships achieved only 3 hits with large-caliber shells. But later, when Kh. Togo caught up with the Russian squadron and fought with it at 50 kbt, then in 35 minutes of the battle (from 14.00 to 14.35) the artillerymen V. K. Vitgeft have already reached five hits with a caliber of 254-305 mm. And then, at 15.00, during a short firefight with the Yakumo - another hit. That is, in spite of the greater distance than in combat on counter-rollers, the Russians suddenly showed almost twice the best accuracy. Why would it suddenly?
Perhaps the point here is this: the best shooters of the Russian squadron were the battleships Sevastopol and Poltava.
As the senior officer of "Poltava" S. I. Lutonin, at an artillery exercise in July 1903:
“Poltava, taking the first prize, knocked out 168 points, followed by Sevastopol - 148, then Retvizan - 90, Peresvet - 80, Pobeda - 75, Petropavlovsk - 50”.
In the battle on July 28, two old battleships closed the formation. But it just so happened that, diverging on countercourses with the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships passed far enough from its end ships and did not succeed in fighting seriously at the Poltava and Sevastopol. And vice versa, catching up with the Russian squadron, H. Togo, willy-nilly, found himself under fire from the terminal battleships, as a result of which Sevastopol and Poltava had an opportunity to prove themselves properly.
Be that as it may, the Japanese ships did not receive significant damage, the Yakumo nevertheless joined the main forces of the Japanese, and H. Togo led his ships in pursuit of V. K. Witgeft. And, of course, overtook him …
But before proceeding to the second phase of the battle, it will be very interesting to understand what was happening at that time on the bridge of the "Tsarevich".
