In modern conditions, the army's ability to defend the country is primarily indicated not by its size, but by another indicator - the equipment of the Armed Forces with modern military equipment. And with this we have big problems.
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, commenting not so long ago on the unsuccessful tests of the Bulava ICBM, expressed the opinion that the reason lies in improper assembly. It is likely that this idea of the head of the defense department was based on the results of the work of a special interdepartmental commission, which was figuring out why this missile failed seven out of twelve launches. At the same time, so far this is just an assumption, and the specific reasons for the failures are still unknown, and in the next test of the Bulava, which is scheduled for November, three absolutely identical missiles will take part at once. This is done with the aim of using purely statistical methods to single out the "weak links" of the rocket, which today are not amenable to logic or engineering insinuations. It is important that while we are not talking about the possible design flaws of the rocket, developed by the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering. Otherwise, it will mean that we have simply forgotten how to design such complex products.
Despite the seeming concreteness of the term "assembly technology", in fact, this concept is quite extensible. It can mean technological defects in the manufacture of individual units and mechanisms of the "under-turned" type, insufficient quality of the materials used, insufficient control of assembly parameters, and even malicious intent. At the same time, the suspicion that the rocket is going in some way incorrectly, in my opinion, suggests that our former pride - the military-industrial complex (MIC) - used the Soviet reserve to the end and entered a phase when it was just some cash injections the situation cannot be corrected qualitatively.
The protracted peak of the defense industry
According to the former chief designer of the Bulava, Yuri Solomonov, the unsuccessful launches were caused by poor-quality materials and violation of production technologies. And the main problem here lies in the fact that the country in the last two decades has lost access to the materials and technologies necessary to create such devices. As a result, now in the domestic military industry there are no 50 types of materials required for solid-propellant ICBMs. To the words of Solomonov, it should be added that in general, in the military-industrial complex over the past 15 years, 300 critical technologies have been irretrievably lost.
At present, the format of the domestic military-industrial complex is hopelessly inferior to the Soviet complex of the 1980s, when the share of defense spending in GDP was 9-13 percent, and about 10 million people were employed in the industry. The main reason for this is not our modern peace-loving policy, but budgetary and wage imbalances, which led to the massive exodus of personnel, the termination of promising research and development. As a result, by 1998, the number of people employed in the military-industrial complex was already 5.4 million people, and only 2 million of them were directly producing military equipment. As of 1999, the domestic defense industry included about 700 defense research institutes and design bureaus, as well as over 1,700 enterprises and organizations in eight industries. In the bowels of the military-industrial complex, about 20 percent of all machine-building products of the country were produced. A decade later, the share of military products in the total volume of industrial production fell to 5.8 percent, and in exports - to 4.4 percent. Today, with some stretch, only about 1,400 enterprises, which employ about 1.5 million people, can be attributed to the defense industry. For comparison: the number of officials in the country has already exceeded 4 million. Moreover, their salaries are incomparably higher than those of those who work for defense. Of course, no one calls for the recreation of the military-industrial monster of the times of the USSR, but serious organizational conclusions must be made immediately.
Cadres no longer decide anything
Because there are clearly few of them left, and there are also big problems with their qualifications. Since the beginning of the 90s, the Soviet system of training and retraining of engineering and technical personnel and workers has practically ceased to exist, and no alternative has been created. Labor in the defense industry has ceased to be prestigious, and in its mass it is no longer able to attract the most talented and skilled workers.
As a result, the most productive generation from 30 to 50 years old is practically "knocked out" in the industry. Today, the average age of workers in the military-industrial complex is over 55 years old, and in defense research institutes and design bureaus this figure for the engineering and scientific staff is close to 60 years. At the same time, wages in mechanical engineering are several times lower than average wages in oil and gas companies. The prestige of a scientist, engineer, turner, toolmaker has fallen catastrophically, many of the remaining research institutes, design bureaus and industries are headed not by professionals in their industry, but by the so-called effective managers, whose entire "efficiency" often boils down to the ability to distribute financial flows and organize kickbacks when the complete absence of a strategic vision of the enterprises entrusted to them. This is the answer to the question - why is it so bad with personnel.
Meanwhile, not only cadres are aging. The average age of equipment in the military-industrial complex has exceeded 20 years, that is, its main part was manufactured in the Soviet Union. In general, the depreciation of fixed production assets exceeded 75 percent, more than a third is worn out by 100 percent. The share of new equipment under the age of 5 is about 5 percent. It is more than obvious that it is impossible to develop and manufacture competitive high-tech products on such a production base.
The need for transformation is clear
According to President Dmitry Medvedev, the share of modern weapons in the Russian army by 2015 should be at least 30 percent. For his part, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at a meeting on the defense industry complex in Kolomna last November demanded that the share of modern weapons and equipment in the Russian troops be increased to 70-80 percent by 2020 (today this figure is about 10 percent).
To achieve the planned indicators, it is necessary to increase the rate of rearmament and bring them to the level of 9 percent, and for certain types of weapons - up to 11 percent per year. Meanwhile, in September 2009, the Accounts Chamber of Russia published the following data: the share of modern weapons supplied to the army is only 6 percent. That is, the lag is still quite significant.
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, following a recent meeting in Izhevsk, where it was a question of providing the Armed Forces with modern small arms and melee systems, said that the State Armament Program for 2011–2020. will be prepared and agreed upon in the third quarter of this year. At the same time, according to him, total defense spending during the implementation of this program will amount to about 3 percent of GDP annually. Currently, there is a discussion of the total amount of funding for the program, and only then the nomenclature of military products, the production of which will be supported by the state, will be clarified. It should be noted that after the adoption of the state armaments program, the Government plans to create a program for the modernization of the domestic defense-industrial complex.
So that this does not remain just plans, first of all it is necessary to correct the sectoral imbalances. In a normal market situation, it does not really matter which industry to invest in, since the rate of return is approximately equal for both the oil and gas sector and machine building. Therefore, there is no shortage of engineers and workers, everyone is proud of their profession - a designer, a turner, and an assembly fitter. We, once hooked on the "oil needle", treat any of its alternatives with distrust and disdain.
The way out is in the integration of military-industrial complex enterprises
The defense industry, now fragmented by privatization and market turmoil, needs an early integration. After all, it is obvious that the creation of complex and intelligent military equipment in modern conditions is no longer the lot of talented individuals, artels of enthusiasts and small private shops. As for a very illustrative "example" - cooperation in the manufacture of "Bulava" of several hundred enterprises that operate under different forms of ownership, in different parts of the country, in different areas of the economy and without observing all the rules of technological discipline, it is frankly vicious and even meaningless. Now it is clear why the Bulava still does not fly normally?
The world has long understood the benefits of integration, and therefore only large companies are in the leading positions in the local defense industry. So, according to the annual report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2008 the British company BAE Systems took the first place in the world in terms of arms sales, which earned $ 32.24 billion (95 percent of the company's total sales). Lockheed Martin is in second place with $ 29.88 billion (70 percent of sales). In third place is Boeing, which has gained $ 29.2 billion (48 percent of the company's total sales). The top five suppliers are closed by Northrop Grumman - $ 26.09 billion, and General Dynamics - $ 22.78 billion. The domestic manufacturer of the S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems Almaz-Antey ranked 18th in 2008 with a result of $ 4.34 billion. There are no more Russian companies in the top twenty.
The first effective step towards recreating an effective military-industrial complex could be the emergence of a structure like the innovation city in Skolkovo, but only with an openly defensive bias. By the way, there is something similar, for example, in India - it is the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). It now has 50 laboratories running about 440 projects worth $ 4 billion. Almost 30 thousand people are employed in research and development. Development topics - anti-tank and ballistic missiles, several types of fighters and anti-missile defense systems, drones, early warning and control aircraft.
Finally
At one time, the Soviet Union quickly created a nuclear missile shield through effective organizational efforts and a significant increase in budget funding. New research institutes, design bureaus, production facilities were promptly created, the flow of qualified personnel was organized. As a result, the necessary military parity was achieved on the basis of purely domestic developments.
The army today turned its eyes to foreign weapons - it is actively purchasing or planning to purchase drones in Israel, armor in Germany, landing ships in France. It seems that this series in a certain sense will be continued and it has its own practical justification. However, alas, no one sells strategic missiles, as well as strategic missile submarines and other critical military products such as combat robots, combat lasers, etc. And so we will either learn to make them ourselves, or truly strategic holes will appear in our defenses.
