In recent years, the tank support combat vehicle (BMPT) has received exceptional attention at various exhibitions and shows. A high level of protection is combined in it with serious fire capabilities to defeat or suppress enemy manpower and other, mainly ground targets. But her future, oddly enough, is still in question.
The BMPT implements new design solutions, which are based on modern scientific achievements and technological capabilities. As a fresh direction in the development of armored weapons and equipment (BTVT), it is interesting both for specialists in organizing combat operations and for weapons and military equipment developers.
BMPT was created to improve the efficiency of combat missions by infantry units and subunits, to significantly reduce the loss of personnel, armored vehicles. The TTZ laid down capabilities higher than those of the existing heavy armored vehicles, in terms of the density of fire impact on enemy infantry at distances of up to 1,500 meters, the mobility and protection of the crew. Design features provide better combat survivability than in a tank, and even more so in an infantry fighting vehicle.
The vehicle has all-round protection, a powerful weapon system designed to defeat and suppress enemy anti-tank weapons (PTS) in the "saw-shot" mode, is capable of destroying tanks, other protected equipment and low-flying targets at a distance of up to five kilometers before they strike.
But to this day, most military experts have considered BMPT solely as a means of reducing the combat losses of tanks. The name of the car pushes to this conclusion. Unfortunately, this is what caused the negative attitude towards BMPT. Critics reasoned simply: what support can a powerful tank provide a vehicle with two 30-mm cannons?
Wedge wedge
The experience of using tanks in the First and especially in the Second World War showed that without the accompaniment of infantry, the "armor" suffers heavy losses. In this regard, the so-called tank landing appeared. He covered from enemy infantry, armed with light anti-tank weapons, and solved the problem of mastering settlements, defensive lines and objects, using the breakthrough of tanks in the enemy's tactical defense zone and operations in the operational depth.
The need for a comprehensive organization of interaction between tanks and infantry was clearly expressed in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 325 dated October 16, 1942 "On the combat use of tank and mechanized units and formations." It states: the practice of the war with the German fascists showed that we had serious shortcomings in the use of tank units. Our tanks in the attack broke away from the infantry, lost interaction with it. And the cut off infantry did not support the armored vehicles with their fire and artillery fire. As a result, both tankers and infantrymen suffered heavy losses.
Now the situation is much more difficult than during the Second World War, due to the widespread proliferation of automatic small arms. The rate of fire of assault rifles and machine guns increased, small-caliber guns appeared, but with the most effective effect of ammunition on targets. Automatic hand grenade launchers became standard weapons in every infantry squad, and anti-tank rocket grenades and RPGs with cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation ammunition - for every soldier. The presence of such an arsenal of means of destruction on the battlefield creates unbearable conditions for the soldier, no matter what personal protective equipment he is equipped with.
A deeper analysis of the nature of modern battles gives full reason to consider BMPT as the main means of reducing losses, first of all, of personnel of mechanized and motorized rifle formations in a collision with the enemy. But then why is the BMPT's path to the series so thorny with its indisputable necessity?
The logic of the opponents of the innovation is simple: what kind of tank is it if it needs cover and support? It worked quite often at the highest level and determined the further attitude towards development.
To find out the truth, let's return to the history of the creation of tanks. Their appearance on the fields of the First World War is not accidental and is associated with the appearance of semi-automatic and automatic small arms, primarily machine guns and mortars, the increased power of engineering barriers, and the saturation of the belligerent armies with artillery.
The main task of tanks is to support the infantry in breaking through the enemy's defenses. They moved ahead of the attackers, destroying the barriers with cannon and machine-gun fire, paralyzing the will of the enemy with a terrifying look. The effectiveness of the impact when the British broke through the German defense on the Somme River on September 15, 1916 (32 tanks) and the Battle of Cambrai on November 20, 1917 (476 tanks) was overwhelming. However, at that time it did not give the expected results. Having made a breach in the defense for 10-15 kilometers, the tanks stopped, because without the support of infantry and light artillery, their offensive was choking. In the operational pause, the Germans counterattacked and regained their lost positions.
In the First World War, tank groups began to be created. They included a heavy breakthrough tank, ammunition and fuel transporter tanks, artillery tractor tanks … By the end of 1917, the MK-9 appeared - an infantry transporter tank. In World War II, large tank formations and formations, "wedges", appeared. They were already developing operational success deep in enemy defenses. This experience made significant changes in the armament system of the Ground Forces. An intensive search began to counter their main striking force. The creation of a powerful anti-tank defense system came to the fore. It was based on new portable ATGM systems such as "Shmel", "Baby", hand grenade launchers and rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades (from RPG-7 to RPG-23, RPG-26, RPG-28), and other means. Similar weapons also appeared in the enemy's possession, and began to be used en masse.
The concept of "tank hazardous manpower" was born - personnel armed with modern portable ATGMs, RPGs, automatic small arms of conventional and large caliber, capable of effectively using them at a distance of up to 1000 meters and well protected. The threat was fatal. Possessing powerful, but essentially single-channel weapons, the tanks could not effectively fight such a significant and massive factor as "tank-hazardous manpower" - the design features affected.
In addition, in tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, fire from the main type of weapon can only be fired by one crew member, even if more dangerous targets are detected by others. The ammunition load of tanks is relatively small, it is irrational to use it to perform essentially artillery tasks - to defeat areal targets, including those saturated with poorly observed "tank-hazardous manpower".
Countering it is relevant when conducting hostilities not only with regular armies, but also with illegal armed groups, as evidenced by the experience of local conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. Insurgents have a quarter more PTSs capable of inflicting damage on armored vehicles than in the regular army, and their share sometimes amounted to 95 percent of all weapons available in illegal armed groups.
In this regard, for the effective performance of combat missions in the forward echelon, it became necessary to have a vehicle in line with the tanks (or slightly ahead), with powerful multi-channel automatic weapons, capable of taking on the destruction of the enemy's "tank-hazardous" infantry, significantly reducing this the likelihood of hitting personnel and armored vehicles.
Targets and targets
The need to solve the problems of interaction between infantry and tanks in new combat conditions led to a wonderful idea - to create a special armored vehicle. This is how the BMP appeared, the main purpose of which is to transport motorized riflemen to the place of combat missions, increase the mobility, firepower and security of mechanized units on the battlefield, as well as joint action with tanks, including when using weapons of mass destruction.
In the Soviet army, BMPs appeared in the early 60s, then they began to equip the ground forces of many countries. BMP, BMD and vehicles based on them have increased the combat effectiveness of both combined-arms formations and units, as well as formations of services and combat arms of the Armed Forces, primarily due to greater mobility. BMP-1, BMP-2, BMP-3 became the basis of motorized rifle formations and units. In the USSR Armed Forces by the end of the 80s, there were about 20 thousand infantry fighting vehicles. They improved rapidly.
But simultaneously with the BMP, the means of their destruction were intensively developed. The attempt to save the soldier in a lightly armored corps led to the opposite result. The hit of even one projectile of a small-caliber cannon, an anti-tank rocket grenade, an explosion on a mine or an IED caused the detonation of ammunition, fire and death of more than one soldier, as happens in open areas, but groups of up to 10 people. As a result, motorized riflemen were afraid to move inside the car, even on the march, in the absence of the danger of shelling.
During the conduct of hostilities in Afghanistan, in the North Caucasus, it was impossible to ensure that the BMP troops were deployed in their regular places. All were on the "armor", just like during the Great Patriotic War. The inadequacy of the BMP as a means of supporting and protecting the infantry was especially convincingly demonstrated in Grozny in December 1994 - January 1995.
Not only modernization, but also attempts to create a new type of heavy infantry fighting vehicles to increase the protection of the crew and landing force were made earlier and are quite active now. As a rule, they end in a significant increase in the weight and dimensions of the BMP, which not only reduces its main advantage - high maneuverability, but also retains the same probability of death of the motorized rifle squad inside the vehicle.
We must not forget that the saturation of the battlefield with promising, more powerful means of fire impact will increase and they will "get" the personnel inside the armored vehicles before approaching the line of attack.
In such conditions, the infantry will dismount and cover long distances by march, which will significantly reduce the effectiveness of motorized rifle subunits and units. With the transition to the attack, the probability of death of the BMP will be even higher due to the massive use of RPGs by the enemy in the first line of defense.
As a participant in the hostilities in Afghanistan, I know that not a single operation, including convoy escorting, hostilities in the mountains or "greenery", the provision of outposts and posts, the protection of deployment points and routes, was not carried out without the participation of armored vehicles. Then the question arose about the need to have in battle formations, in addition to standard tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, a special highly protected, primarily from RPGs, a vehicle with powerful small arms.
The modernization carried out - strengthening the protection of the T-62 and using it as a means of fire to cover motorized rifle units did not solve the problem. Tankers, operating at a great distance, especially in the mountains, among the duval and adobe buildings, could not timely detect and localize melee fire weapons. The tank has become a priority target for dushmans. But most of all, BMPs with infantry loaded in them got. The defeat of one BMP immediately claimed the lives of five to seven paratroopers. A striking example of heavy losses of personnel in the BMP is the operation of the 860th separate motorized rifle regiment in Afghanistan in 1984.
There was an urgent need for a vehicle with powerful firepower capable of destroying dangerous enemy personnel at a distance of up to two kilometers, to cover infantry and paratroopers with its fire. This was then the four-barreled self-propelled anti-aircraft gun ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", nicknamed by the dushmans "Shaitan-arba".
The targets of destruction were the Mujahideen, who were entrenched with machine guns, machine guns, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, MANPADS behind the blowers, in mountain crevices, kariz, buildings, "greenery". Fire "Shilka" literally swept away the enemy and was the best defense for the infantry, wherever it was: in the field, in infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, on cars. Whenever possible, ZSU-23-4 was used everywhere: when escorting columns, conducting hostilities, in the desert and "greenery", protecting communications and guard garrisons, and deploying troops. Her drawback was that the booking was too weak.
The first experience in creating a vehicle that provides more reliable protection for the crew and support for the infantry than the BMP was carried out in the Omsk Design Bureau of Transport Engineering.
A large number of obsolete T-55 tanks available in Russia, which were converted into BTR-T (heavy armored personnel carrier), would saturate the army with relatively inexpensive and highly protected infantry fighting vehicles.
What made them different? On the BTR-T, the bottom of the hull has been reinforced to increase the survivability of the crew when blown up by anti-tank mines. This was provided with additional armor, while the sheet was welded indented, the air gap significantly reduced the effect of the blast wave. Converting the T-55 into the BTR-T was cheap. But the car was poorly armed and did not enter the troops.
Came out of the "framework"
In the mid-80s, taking into account the experience of operations in Afghanistan, specialists from the Military Academy of Armored Forces and the 38th Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense formulated the main directions for creating an BMPT. A concept and operational-tactical substantiation (OTO) were developed for its use as part of tank and motorized rifle subunits.
In 1987, GSKB-2 of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant was identified as the main contractor. When modeling the technical appearance of the machine, the designers developed several layout options, which differed in the location of the engine compartment, the composition and placement of weapons.
To clarify the GTR of the BMPT application and its technical appearance, in 1989, three experimental variants were tested in solving fire and tactical tasks, the optimal appearance of the vehicle was chosen, and in 1991 tactical and technical tasks (TTZ) were developed for performing the R&D under the code "Frame".
Under the leadership of the chief designer of GSKB-2 Valery Vershinsky, technical design was quickly completed, working design documentation was created. However, due to the difficult financial situation, the work was stopped.
The next message for the creation of BMPT was the results of the use of armored vehicles in the first Chechen war. When troops were deployed to Grozny on December 31, 1994, the Tunguska air defense missile system was used as part of motorized rifle subunits to enhance the fire effect, as in Afghanistan. But they turned out to be the first targets of the RPG-7 militants. Naturally, the task of providing fire cover for the troops was not solved.
Again, as in Afghanistan, there was talk about the need to have vehicles with powerful fire capabilities in the combat formations of troops. The requirements were clarified, but the main ones, as before, were:
achieving the level of crew protection and combat survivability of the vehicle is higher than that of tanks;
equipping with a multichannel weapon system capable of concentrating fire and simultaneously hitting several targets in a circular manner;
ensuring continuous all-round observation of the battlefield and effective detection of tank-hazardous targets;
giving the vehicle a level of mobility higher than that of tanks;
high ergonomic performance;
maximum possible operational and production unification with tanks in service or in development.
However, the attempt to continue working at ChTZ was unsuccessful. The plant went into bankruptcy and stopped developing armored vehicles.
In 1998, ROC under the code "Frame-99" was resumed at the Ural Design Bureau of Transport Engineering (UKBTM) in Nizhny Tagil. At the technical design stage, many schemes were analyzed, both their own and their predecessors, in order to choose the optimal option combining multi-channel weapons with a large ammunition load, vehicle protection from all angles, a highly effective search system, target detection and fire control when using the T-72B tank base. / T-90.
By the beginning of 2000, an experimental prototype was created. After analyzing the comments of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and specialists from other departments, the TTZ was clarified. In the next two years, the BMPT design was significantly redesigned, and by July 2002 a prototype was made. The design findings implemented in it contributed to a significant increase in the combat and technical characteristics of the product.
Kazakhstan upgrade T-72
A distinctive feature of our design in comparison with foreign counterparts is that it is not a means of transporting infantry, a squad of 10 motorized riflemen is not squeezed into it, as was the case, for example, in an infantry fighting vehicle. The lack of a landing was made up for by combat capabilities. Five channels of fire ensured the simultaneous destruction of three targets at a distance of up to 1700 meters. In terms of firepower, the vehicle surpassed two motorized rifle platoons, the BMPT was capable of striking not only enemy infantry, but also armored vehicles, long-term fire installations, shelters and low-flying air targets due to the angle of elevation of the gun of 450. A large arsenal ensured the conduct of hostilities for a long time.
The low-profile hull and uninhabited fighting compartment create a level of protection and mobility higher than that of a tank. Four optical observation and aiming channels, all-round panorama, high turret traverse speed, constant readiness to fire automatic weapons, the possibility of long-term non-stop firing - all this guarantees the timely detection and defeat of the enemy's "tank-hazardous" manpower. The range of aimed firing from a gun with an armor-piercing projectile is up to 2000, a high-explosive fragmentation projectile - up to 4000, a course automatic grenade launcher - up to 1700 meters. Two cannons and machine guns installed in the conning tower provide circular destruction of manpower, armored objects and well-protected shelters. The angle of elevation of the armament unit in 450 allows you to shoot at targets on the upper floors of buildings or at dominant heights in the mountains. Four launchers of supersonic ATGM "Attack" with a semi-automatic guidance system highly protected from interference in the information laser control field have a firing range of up to six kilometers and penetrate up to 1000 millimeters of homogeneous armor. The radius of the continuous destruction of a high-explosive fragmentation grenade is seven meters.
The car has successfully passed state tests in 2006. The State Commission was headed by the Deputy Chief of the Ground Forces, one of the most authoritative experts in the conduct of hostilities in local conflicts, twice wounded in Afghanistan and receiving the "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Russian Federation for leading the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, Colonel-General Vladimir Bulgakov. Despite this, the decision to equip the Ground Forces with BMPT was not made.
The designers of the UKBTM continued to improve the BMPT, firmly convinced of its usefulness. A new requirement has been added - to use the BMPT to combat terrorist groups. To do this, it is necessary to clarify the conditions of combat use and adjust the design of the vehicle, sighting and observation complex, control system, remove the task of destroying armored targets, adapt the BMPT to combat at close distances against infantry equipped with small arms and grenade launchers.
A further impetus for the development of BMPT for NPO Uralvagonzavod, as in its time with the T-90 tank, was the signing of an agreement for the supply of BMPT abroad.
Tests carried out by specialists of the Kazakh army to assess the combat capabilities of the vehicle both against regular troops and against illegal armed groups have confirmed its uniqueness, versatility and high efficiency. In terms of combat potential, it replaces 2–2, 5 infantry fighting vehicles or 3-4 armored personnel carriers. According to one of the leaders of the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, the BMPT is a versatile vehicle for supporting the personnel of motorized rifle and tank units in offensive and defensive operations.
The matter came to the signing of a bilateral agreement on the creation of BMPT. At the same time, they decided to develop a cheaper version based on T-72 tanks, which are available in the Republic of Kazakhstan in sufficient quantities. As a result, the BMPT-72 was created at the UKBTM, which later received the name "Terminator-2". The peculiarity is that the alteration of the T-72 tank is minimal. This and a number of other measures can significantly reduce the cost of the vehicle and increase its combat effectiveness. Doubts are only caused by the fact that the design of the "Terminator-2" lacks two installations of automatic grenade launchers, located in the bow of the vehicle's hull on the right and left sides.
Together with "Solntsepek"
Another direction in the development of BMPT is the expansion of the scope of combat use. At the beginning of the 21st century, a new threat emerged: the shock troops of terrorist groups. To combat them, the UKBTM proposed a simplified version of the BMPT - BKM-1 and BKM-2 (counter-terrorist combat vehicle). When creating them, the designers proceeded from the conditions of use, which made it possible to abandon expensive fire control systems, observation devices, target reconnaissance and aiming. The armament complex is also being optimized. At the same time, the protection for combat in urban conditions is being improved. The machine has the ability to stealthily approach the positions of terrorists and deliver a powerful strike from the spot, from cover. It has less fuel, which means higher fire safety, more ammunition. To dismantle debris, obstacles or barricades, the installation of a bulldozer blade is provided.
Of course, for the effective use of the vehicle in the combat formations of the Ground Forces, a well-developed regulatory and methodological base is required. Based on the experience of Afghanistan and other local conflicts, the specialists of the Military Academy of Armored Forces named after V. I. R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 38th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces worked out the methods of using BMPTs, identified a niche in the organizational structure of motorized rifle and tank units. It was supposed to create motorized armored groups consisting of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and BMPTs. Tanks and BMPTs - on the front line of combat contact with the enemy, destroy firing points and strong points. BMP with infantry - in the second echelon, hold the taken lines.
Back in 2008, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the Army Aleksey Maslov, outlined the place of the BMPT in the structure of the Ground Forces and the procedure for its combat use: “Various options for using these vehicles are being worked out, the need for the appearance of which in the combat formations of troops has long been ripe. Either as a third vehicle in each tank platoon, or as a separate unit supporting the actions of the tank battalion. Previously, the protection of tanks from being hit by anti-tank weapons on the battlefield was provided by motorized rifle troops. Now this task will be performed by an BMPT armed with two 30-mm cannons, two automatic grenade launchers and a machine gun."
The most effective, in my opinion, variant of using BMPT was demonstrated at the exercises by the armed forces of Kazakhstan. There, a heavy flamethrower system TOS-1A "Solntsepek" and BMPT were introduced into the special unit. Acting in tandem, "Solntsepek" burned out the enemy, behind the BMPT there was a subsequent "cleansing" of strong points. At the same time, motorized rifle subunits occupy and hold areas of terrain or specific objects.
It would seem that there are more than enough arguments in favor of equipping the Ground Forces of the RF Armed Forces with a tank support combat vehicle. Why is there still no BMPT in the troops?
Probably, everything was decided by the position of the ex-chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Makarov. The previous leadership of the Ministry of Defense did not find a place for BMPT in the army structure.
Previous defense ministers and chiefs of the General Staff - Pavel Grachev, Igor Rodionov, Viktor Dubynin, Anatoly Kvashnin, active participants in hostilities and leaders of the Armed Forces during the creation of the BMPT, were in favor of the vehicle being adopted not only by the Ground Forces. The decision to create an BMPT, let me remind you, took place in the wake of the events in Afghanistan and the Chechen Republic, when it became obvious that this vehicle is extremely necessary for the warring units. But if the real experience gained in hot spots is not an argument, then, as a rule, they turn to scientific research that determines the nature of combat operations and weapons systems necessary to achieve a given result. Unfortunately, this has not happened yet either.
Revised - robot
On the basis of many years of research, military scientists and specialists have developed the Concept of Tank-Armored Infantry Integration, in which they made recommendations on changing the organizational structure of the troops. In particular, it is proposed to move from a purely tank unit to integrated armored units and units of the Ground Forces. The project is completed and proposed for consideration by the author of the fundamental work "Tanks" (2015), Major General Oleg Brilev. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, he devoted his whole life to researching the creation and combat use of tanks. The concept is based on the theory of combat and military-economic efficiency as the main tool used in decision-making for equipping the Armed Forces with types and types of weapons and military equipment. Supported by a mathematical analysis of combat operations and data from modeling the process of creating weapons and military equipment. The necessary result was also taken into account, achieved by combining the costs incurred during the combat use of a certain number of different types of armored vehicles, with their properties. As a result, the combat value of each sample in the general grouping of armored weapons and equipment was determined. The researchers came to an unambiguous conclusion: it is advisable to combine various types of armored vehicles with their combat characteristics and properties, a certain quantitative ratio in the structure of the subunit and units of the Ground Forces.
The theory of combat and economic efficiency makes it possible to determine the optimal combination of types and types of weapons and military equipment in the structure of the Ground Forces to achieve the maximum or acceptable combat result in operations against various enemy groupings, depending on the terrain conditions, the qualitative and quantitative ratio of the opposing sides. Instead of purely tank ones, several options are proposed for creating integrated units (company, battalion), operating against heterogeneous enemy forces with the goal of achieving maximum success.
Another prominent scientist in the field of tank forces tactics, Doctor of Military Sciences, professor of the 38th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Nikolai Shishkin confirmed the need to have an armored vehicle differing in combat properties from a tank in the front line of defending or advancing tank units. In his work Tanks in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts, he writes that the BMPT, acting in the front line due to greater stealth and special weapons, makes it possible to maintain interaction with tanks and prevent their destruction, starting from the line of transition to the attack, as well as when breaking through fortified positions on the front line and in the depths of enemy defenses.
In this regard, it should be added that powerful protection from all angles makes the BMPT a hard-to-hit target, which allows it to operate effectively in the face of massive use of anti-tank weapons. The presence of a large ammunition load for a 30-mm automatic cannon (850 rounds) makes it possible to fire for a long time at a high rate (600-800 rounds per minute) and creates a high-explosive fragmentation field, significantly exceeding the capabilities of the Shilka ZSU.
It is also worth noting that the design of the BMPT makes it possible, with minor modifications, to make the vehicle a fully robotic combat complex.
The remotely controlled armament of the BMPT combat module is the first step towards the creation of a robotic "Terminator" based on it. The development of such a machine will allow to remove a person from the front line and thereby significantly reduce losses among personnel.
Today the problem is no longer whether BMPT is needed or not. The delay in adopting it into service and supplying it to the troops can turn into a lot of blood shed by our tankers and motorized riflemen on the battlefield.
