The end of the Cold War, instead of simplification, made the development of BMPs even more difficult, with more conflicting requirements than ever before. Translating new requirements into design led to a series of design errors dating back to the early stages of the Cold War. The cumulative result is a generation of infantry fighting vehicles, which, at the moment, are generally ineffective in either local or large-scale combat conditions. Understanding the relationship between tactics and technology is essential to any discussion of modern tactical requirements and BMP design.
Where revolutionary technologies are introduced first, these technologies drive tactics. In most other cases, including those involving the development of disruptive technologies, tactics usually guide that development. In other words, revolutionary technologies drive tactics, and the development of evolutionary technologies must be tactical driven.
Once the relative primacy of tactics in the development of infantry fighting vehicles is accepted, the next problem should include the allocation of justified tactical requirements. While this is a problem that does not have an easy solution, most would agree that tactical requirements derived from combat experience are significantly better than those made in peacetime.
The development of the first BMP was primarily influenced by the creation of nuclear weapons. The first modern infantry fighting vehicle, the Soviet BMP-1, was a direct result of the development of such vehicles in response to the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. The subsequent development of the BMP in the USSR and in the West reflected the influence of the BMP-1 design even after it became clear that the influence of nuclear weapons at the tactical level was no longer a decisive factor.
The development of infantry fighting vehicles around the world in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s continued almost exclusively in peacetime and is largely based on the specifics of global combat in a nuclear war, which was given crucial importance during the Cold War. If learning from mistakes is an effective source for making tactical demands on infantry fighting vehicles, then the Russian ground forces can gain important insights from the experience gained in Afghanistan and later in Chechnya, etc. Chechnya, in particular, provides invaluable data on the effectiveness of the current generation of BMPs and on future tactical requirements.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from recent conflicts is the inconsistency of the BMP security with the requirements of their use and the need to create a special highly protected vehicle. Although there are many requirements for an infantry fighting vehicle, only two of them determine its functional purpose:
- providing the infantry with a protected vehicle;
- providing fire support for infantry during the battle.
The main components of the BMP design are the number of the crew and the landing force, firepower, protection and mobility. The peculiarities of the conditions of local conflicts, which are increasingly occurring in the 1990s, added another requirement - adaptability to changing the layout. Financial considerations have raised another issue - the unification of the main components, assemblies and systems.
Consider the projects of highly protected combat vehicles based on a tank that currently exist in Russia.
DPM (BTR-T)
DPM or initially BTR-T can be equipped with various variants of combat modules with cannon armament, ATGM, AGS, etc.
If equipped with a light module with a 12, 7 mm machine gun, the crew is 7 people. The BTR-T was developed by the Omsk KBTM, taking into account the experience of the war in Afghanistan in the early 90s. It was not accepted into service and was not exported. Initially, the main disadvantage of the BTR-T was the insufficient number of paratroopers - 5 people.
The next machine developed by OKBTM was the BMO-T (object 564)
Initially, the BMO-T was supposed to have a closed-type machine-gun mount (aiming the machine gun remotely from under the armor) on production vehicles, this was not implemented.
A specialized vehicle for the chemical troops designed to operate in conjunction with another development of OKBTM - TOS-1A. Manufactured on the basis of the T-72 tank. It is in service with the Russian Federation and is produced in series, the landing - 7 is designed to transport the personnel of the flamethrower squad and its weapons (30 RPO-A units) in conditions of probable fire contact with the enemy.
Another project (currently not yet presented to the public) is a specialized vehicle for the ground forces
Currently not implemented, landing - 12 people (motorized rifle squad).
All of these vehicles are made on the basis of existing tanks with MTO placed in the rear of the hull. Obviously, such a solution has a significant disadvantage - difficulty in dismounting and loading into the car, especially the wounded.
Both of the above machines developed in Russia have one key drawback. The now accepted standard is dismounting through hatches in the rear of the hull.
But this requires solving a complex task of reprofiling the tank hull, i.e. placing MTO in front of the body.
The photo shows a comparison of the landing conditions for various domestic highly protected armored personnel carriers (BMP), on the left is the Ukrainian BMP-55, based on the T-55 tank with the placement of MTO in the bow of the hull, on the right is the Russian BTR-T, also on the basis of the T-55.
It is obvious that there are significant difficulties and time when dismounting the landing force, as well as when loading into a car from machines developed by OKBTM without reprofiling, especially when it comes to loading the wounded.
Unfortunately, the development of highly protected infantry fighting vehicles with the ability to quickly and conveniently dismount and load, including oversized cargo, is not given sufficient attention in Russia. But there are such developments. And, it is worth noting that such developments are sufficiently substantiated by the realities of modern military operations. Below is one of the projects of a heavy combat vehicle based on the T-55 tank with a front MTO (OKBTM).
Due to the insufficient level of protection in recent years, hostilities in populated areas or in "unfavorable for tanks" terrain have repeatedly led to large losses of armored vehicles, including mainly armored personnel carriers for the transport of personnel. It is easy to understand that standard armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, with their light armor, cannot withstand a blow from light anti-tank weapons, for example, the RPG-7 and its many modifications. No less critical is the possible impact of explosive devices (landmines) for light armored vehicles.
Bearing in mind the above situation, many designers and the military have come to understand that the traditional concept of armored infantry fighting vehicles as universal or multipurpose combat systems can no longer develop in a form that would provide the machines with the ability to withstand the full range of modern threats on the battlefield. From a technical point of view, it seems important to redistribute the tactical tasks of modern armored combat vehicles into two or three specialized vehicles:
- a clean armored personnel carrier for the transport of personnel ("battle taxi", ie highly protected armored personnel carrier), - a combat vehicle armed with a cannon / missile system, i.e. highly protected BMP, i.e. functionally analogue of BMPT)
Each of these machines must be optimized to fulfill its intended primary task and, in particular, its protection scheme can be shaped in accordance with the specific nature and level of threats that it will face.
