The patrol ship of the Black Sea Fleet "Vasily Bykov" of project 22160 made the transition to the Northern Fleet for testing weapons. This was reported on August 12 by the press service of the Russian Defense Ministry.
With a high probability, we are talking about firing a cruise missile (CR) of a missile weapon complex (KRO) "Caliber" (in container design) from the waters of the White Sea.
So, will the new patrol ships of the Navy, which received the nickname "doves of peace" for the extreme weakness of weapons in the Navy, gain strength? Unfortunately no.
First. Container KRO
Actually, there is nothing original in the placement of the launcher (PU) in a standard container, and, by and large, reasonable. When this idea arose, its justifications were given, to put it mildly, far from adequate, they say, container ships will be at least all over the world, secretly having missile among the containers. Those who talked about this had no idea what international container transportation was.
On the technical side, placing a missile launcher in a standard 40-foot container is possible. However, the main question is: why?
In terms of disguise, disguise as a 40-foot container is pretty ridiculous. It can be compared with anti-ship missile launchers in Iran, which are made as compact as possible (just for camouflage!), But have a frame on which, if necessary, you can install any camouflage means (including "under the container").
A standard container for a launcher is obviously excessive in size and weight.
A separate problem is "navigation": the initial exhibition of the "side" of the rocket with significant errors in the starting coordinate system (which we have in the "standard container"). We are looking at the "American analogue" - a rather compact lifting launcher for the Mk143 KR.
The first thing that catches the eye for all the compactness of the P is its powerful foundation. What will be the "foundation" for our "missile container"? Thin deck flooring (usually without reinforced frames)? Of course, it is possible to "shoot" a rocket with such a "launcher" (in quotes), but the question is in the limitations (primarily in excitement) and the characteristics of such a launcher.
As a matter of fact, they are so problematic that the fleet was unlocked from such a "gift to industry" as soon as it could. Prior to the appointment of V. V. Chirkov as commander-in-chief. After that, there were very fewer people who wanted to resist.
Moreover, there is nothing original about the launch itself with such a launcher. This has already been done! At the naval show in early 2010. a video of a vertical launch of a "caliber" rocket from the aft side of the BOD project 1155 was shown. And the answer to the question, what is it, is:
Those. everything is simply “the contents of the patent” is installed in a “metal box” (highlighted in red in the figure) in the form of a 40-f container, and voila, “a new weapon has been invented”!
And this "wunderwaffe" was planned for projects!
A simple question arises: what prevented us from throwing out this innovative trash and simply putting normal foundations on which, if necessary, classic inclined launchers (the same missiles) or anything else could be installed (see the upper cargo deck of the Absalon):
With the same mass of structures, the missile ammunition could be 1.5-2 times more, and, most importantly, these launchers could launch these missiles at a high pace and in conditions of developed excitement.
However, this sound and reasonable technical solution is too "non-innovative", and therefore the fleet is simply obliged to accept missile containers! After all, the 21st century is in the yard!
It should be noted here that container KROs still have their own niche of efficiency. Moreover, they make sense and can be very valuable for the country's defense capability. But in no case in the existing (and strengthened by the naval) appearance and concept. But this is the subject of a separate article.
Second. What modularity do we need?
One of the key issues with modern ships is their upgradability, and modularity can help a lot with that. But for this, such constructive solutions must be optimized, incl. with a breakdown of systems and complexes into fairly compact modular blocks.
Those. modularity is really expedient (and for the sake of it it is really possible to sacrifice a part of the ship's combat qualities), but in the form of "compact" components, which ensures a real fast and effective modernization of ships. As a matter of fact, this is implemented in MEKO programs (a number of others).
However, with our effective managers, modularity was reduced to "stuffing" everything and everything into 20- and 40-foot containers. A vivid example of this is the 40-foot container Minotaur (for projects 22160 and 20386).
Comparison with Western BUGAS is illustrative … Ie. foreign developers made it so that their BUGAS could be delivered anywhere and in the shortest possible time, ours - so that it could be done only on projects 22160 and 20386.
And this is far from the most lethal example of our modularity, it's just public. Then everything is much funnier and sadder. The most accurate phrase for modularity being implemented today for the Russian Navy is insanity under the sauce of innovation. It is no coincidence that one of the major domestic specialists, during a discussion about the quality of our modular works, used an illustration of a public toilet in the form of a 40-foot container, indicating that there are such facilities under the requirements of the Maritime Register.
Third. "Modular ships"
More than enough is said about project 20386 in the article "Worse than a crime. Construction of project 20386 corvettes is a mistake".
But about the "foremost of the modularity of the Navy" patrol ships of the project 22160, a representative of which has now arrived for testing at the Northern Fleet, it is necessary to say especially.
According to the statements of its developers, the idea of creating such a ship belonged to V. V. and consisted in "minimum displacement for unlimited seaworthiness" to ensure low operating costs.
Here, one cannot fail to note the trip of V. V. Chirkov. in the USA in 2013, where the modular ships of the LCS program were specially presented by the American side. The fact that by that time the catastrophic failure of the LCS program had already clearly emerged (details in the article "Combat systems of OVR corvettes") lobbyists on this topic, we were not interested (experts knew all this at once and warned many times).
L. P. Gavrilyuk, Doctor of Technical Sciences, JSC "TsTSS":
Loss of useful volumes in the ship's hull … Out of approximately 3,000 tonnes of LBK (US Navy LCS) displacement, only 400 tonnes account for the payload, and replaceable combat modules account for about 180 tonnes. Secondly, the modules are mechanically fastened, as opposed to fastening welding, requires special foundations or platforms with reinforcements, which complicates the layout of the ship. This problem is especially relevant for ships of small displacement.
… the transition to the MEKO concept for frigates and corvettes reduces the mass of their weapon systems by at least 30%.
Those interested are strongly encouraged to read the entire article "Modular principles of building warships". It should be understood that we are not implementing the "MEKO option", but in fact the stupid principle of the port warehouse, in which the loss of payload for ships is simply catastrophic.
For the sake of the main idea on the project 22160, innovative (for ships of this class) contours - "deep V" were used. They wanted to get an increase in seaworthiness. We got … a complete blockage in speed. Instead of the initially promised 27 knots, the ships of Project 22160 barely managed to show 22 knots. Statements that 27 knots "were planned on German diesels", which were under sanctions, were from the evil one, because the speed of 27 knots appeared many times in reports after 2014 and was finally "buried" only by devastating real tests of the lead patrol ship of Project 22160 …
The innovative contours were conceived for seaworthiness. The sad irony is that if the ship were designed according to the "classics", then given the lower resistance of such a hull with the same 22 knots and power (half of the project 20380 corvette), it could have a displacement one and a half times more, a pitching damper (which could not be squeezed into the small building of project 22160) and, accordingly, much greater seaworthiness when solving problems as intended. Only in this version we get a simplified "patrol" version of the serial project 20380. Modules and containers? They could easily be placed on the waist (with the new superstructure).
Real data on the pitching of Project 22160 ships during ocean crossings showed that already at 4 points of excitement, the possibilities of using a helicopter are extremely reduced. It's even worse with boats. Airborne RIBs do not have modern launching and lifting devices (RIB), therefore, their use in waves is extremely difficult.
The widely advertised airborne assault armored boat DSL has low seaworthiness and 2 (two) points on the aft slip! This "charm" looked very clearly last year at the rehearsal of the parade in Sevastopol: on absolutely flat water, the DShL was able to go onto the slip not on the first attempt.
For any foreign "patrolman", a helicopter and a boat are their main working tools. And everything on the ship is subject to their effective use, incl. in severe stormy conditions. Our 22160 has a helicopter and boats. But … for beach conditions.
The thesis about the low cost of patrol ships was buried by the MRK of the project "Karakurt", which, having powerful weapons, high speed, seaworthiness and turned out to be cheaper than the stupid and "toothless" patrol ships of the project 22160 (we are talking about the first "Karakurt" without "Shell") … Here it is worth recalling that the OVR corvettes, critically needed by the Navy, were sacrificed to the scam with the 22160 project.
What to do?
Conclusions to do …
Obviously, the construction of new ships of Project 22160 is out of the question, and something needs to be done with those already built.
Given their extremely low combat value, only one option is objectively visible - to the Baltic, to create a permanent patrol service for the Nord Stream route, the threats to which are quite real and specific. And they are no longer only "oral" and on Internet resources.
When SeaFox (which someone "accidentally lost") suddenly appears next to the "pipe" - this is serious. The device, by the way, after the discovery was blown up on the spot, and "for some reason" there was no desire to figure out who still "lost" the modern ammunition.
The task of ensuring the safety of the "Nord Stream" is quite within the capabilities of patrol ships, provided they are equipped with special complexes and seagoing boats.
