Kuban scouts in the Caucasian army in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878
Cossacks - participants in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878
BALKAN KNOT
More than 130 years ago, the battles of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 died down, which arose as a result of the rise of the liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in the Middle East. Russia supported the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples, and also sought to restore its prestige and influence, undermined by the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
By the beginning of the war, Russia had deployed two armies: the Danube (185,000 men, 810 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the Caucasian (75,000 people, 276 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich.
As part of both armies, the Cossack cavalry regiments of the Kuban Cossack Host (KKV) and battalions of the Kuban Plastuns operated, which, as in previous years, made a worthy contribution to the victories of Russian weapons. The sabotage and reconnaissance parties of the scouts acted courageously and skillfully in both theaters of military operations. However, if much is known about the feats of arms of the Cossacks in the Balkans, then, according to the author, not enough has been said about the combat work of the Plastuns in the Caucasus.
The mobilization of the Caucasian army was preceded by a preparatory period (September 1 - November 11, 1876) and the actual mobilization period (November 11, 1876 - April 12, 1877). Simultaneously with the mobilization of the infantry, artillery and cavalry units of the Russian army, by order of the Minister of War, the following units of the Kuban Cossack army were subject to mobilization: 10 cavalry regiments, a squadron of His Imperial Majesty's own convoy and 20 Plastun hundreds. In November, from hundreds of Plastuns, five battalions of four hundred strengths were formed (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th battalions), the regiments were given the name of the second.
The formation of the Cossack units was complicated by the fact that by the beginning of the mobilization of firearms it was not enough to arm the Cossacks. Alas, insufficient preparedness of the army for war was characteristic of both the Russo-Japanese and the First World War. As of September 1876, the KKV had 6454 rifles of the Berdan system, 2086 were missing. At the end of October, a transport with 10 387 rifles arrived from St. Petersburg to Yekaterinodar, which made it possible to arm only the regiments of the first set, the second set of Cossacks arrived at the assembly point with their own rifles of the system Tanner. Some Plastun battalions were armed with Carley guns. In the subsequent stages of mobilization, the foot battalions of Plastun were armed with dragoon rifles of the Krnka system. In general, the Cossack units were armed with firearms of different systems, which gave rise to difficulties in providing ammunition.
Soon, the aggravation of the political situation, the military preparations of the Turks and the mood of the highlanders demanded additional mobilization at the beginning of April 1877, including the call for the third stage of the KKV. Additionally, five prefabricated mounted Cossack regiments and five foot battalions of the KKV (8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th) were formed. In total, the KKV fielded 21,600 Cossacks, who took part in the defense of the Bayazet fortress, the capture of Kars and Erzurum, in the battles on Shipka and on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.
WAR
At the Caucasian-Asia Minor Theater, after the declaration of war on April 12, 1877, the troops of the Active Corps and its detachments under the command of Adjutant General Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (future Minister of Internal Affairs) crossed the border and penetrated into enemy territory as part of several columns. Preserved information about the successful actions during this period of the scouts of the 2nd foot Plastun battalion and two hundred of the Poltava cavalry regiment of the KKV, who were instructed to remove the Turkish border posts and ensure the unhindered passage of the main forces of the detachment of Colonel Komarov in the area of the village of Valais. Plastuns and mounted Cossack hundreds were actively involved in flying and reconnaissance detachments to collect data on the enemy's fortifications, the strength of the garrisons, the nature of the terrain, and damage to telegraph communication lines. Information was collected both through personal observation and by interviewing local residents, capturing prisoners.
So, for example, a hunting team of 11 scouts and Cossacks of the Poltava Cavalry Regiment in May 1877 was tasked with reconnoitring the heights of Gelaverdy (near Ardahan), determining the way for the main forces to approach and getting the tongue. To diffuse the attention of the Turks, the distracting actions of other Plastun groups were simultaneously carried out. The hunting team under the leadership of the centurion Kamensky safely passed three enemy lines, conducted reconnaissance of the fortifications and "captured a sentry with a gun, which they brought to the camp as proof of their feat." In July, during the reconnaissance of the Turkish forces near Dagor, a detachment of 20 Plastun Cossacks and 20 Chechens from the Chechen Cavalry Irregular Regiment under the command of the General Staff of Colonel Malama crossed the Arpachai River at night, conducted a successful reconnaissance of the area and returned safely to its territory.
Plastuns were actively used in the seaside direction, where the actions of the Cossack cavalry regiments were hampered by mountainous and wooded areas. So, for example, in a summary of the military actions of the Sochi detachment from July 28 to August 28, 1877, it is said about a successful reconnaissance operation of hundreds of scouts under the command of cornet Nikitin: and the passage was guarded by two Turkish battleships. The commander of the detachment reported that the enemy had taken all measures to prevent the movement of our troops to the Gagra fortification. The plastuns were instructed to reconnoitre bypass mountain trails. In the future, the plastuns were tasked with taking control of the largest possible area near Gagra, so that the enemy did not have time to take hard-to-reach approaches, which would then have to be taken from him with great sacrifices. Subsequently, together with the riflemen, three hundred plastuns took part in the successful assault on the Gagra fortification.
Scouts-scouts sometimes obtained information that made it possible to bring some careless officers out into the open. For example, on May 31, 1877, Lieutenant General Gaiman reported the following fact, refuting the officer's report about the incident at the Cossack picket, on May 31, 1877: “From the scouts we received information that not 300 bashi-bazouks attacked our picket near Ardost, but only 30-40 people; there was a complete oversight at the post: half of the Cossacks were asleep, and the others were eating sour milk, which is why they did not have time to collect the horses, which the enemies took all of them. This information was given by the scouts, and it absolutely makes a difference with the report of the officer. We would expect to carry out an investigation and bring the officer to trial, otherwise, with the carelessness of our Cossacks, such cases may be repeated."
The command of the Russian troops skillfully used the outstanding fighting qualities of the plastuns in pursuit of the retreating enemy. For example, by the skillful maneuvers of our forces, detachments of the retreating Turkish troops were brought out on the ambushed plastuns and fell under their well-aimed weapons fire. The effective actions of the scouts suggested to the command of the Russian troops the idea of forming combined battalions of hunters, which, along with the scouts who formed their basis, included the most smart and physically trained volunteers from the infantry regiments of the Russian army.
The Kuban Plastuns in the 7th Plastun Battalion under the command of Esaul Bashtannik, the hero of the defense of Sevastopol, were involved in the Danube Army. From the coastal Sistovsky heights, which the battalion with extraordinary courage and courage captured from the enemy, thereby ensuring the crossing of the Russian army across the Danube, under the leadership of General Gurko, the Kuban scouts began their glorious combat path to the legendary Shipka. For the exploits shown on the battlefields in Bulgaria, many Plast members were awarded the St. George's Crosses, many lower ranks were awarded non-commissioned officer and officer ranks.
The famous journalist and writer Vladimir Gilyarovsky left interesting memories of the actions of the scouts during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. During that war, he volunteered to serve in the army and, thanks to his restless and adventurous character, found himself among the Kuban hunter-scouts who operated on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.
LOST WORLD
One way or another, the war was won. However, the subsequent development of events forces us to ponder the questions of how justified the sacrifices made by Russia turned out to be and who is to blame for the missed results of the victories of Russian weapons.
Russia's successes in the war with Turkey alarmed the ruling circles of England and Austria-Hungary. The British government sent a squadron to the Sea of Marmara, which forced Russia to abandon the capture of Istanbul. In February, thanks to the efforts of Russian diplomacy, the Treaty of San Stefano, beneficial for Russia, was signed, which, it would seem, changed the entire political picture of the Balkans (and not only) in favor of Russia's interests.
Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, formerly vassals to Turkey, gained independence, Bulgaria acquired the status of a virtually independent principality, Turkey pledged to pay Russia an indemnity of 1,410 million rubles, and from this amount lost Kapc, Ardahan, Bayazet and Batum in the Caucasus and even Southern Bessarabia, which was torn away from Russia after the Crimean War. Russian weapons triumphed. How did Russian diplomacy use the victorious results of the war?
Plastuns still continued clashes with the Bashi-bazouks, when the Berlin Congress, which was dominated by the "big five": Germany, Russia, England, France and Austria-Hungary, began to revise the results of the war on June 3, 1878. Its final act was signed on July 1 (13), 1878. The 80-year-old Prince Gorchakov was formally considered the head of the Russian delegation, but he was already old and sick. In fact, the delegation was led by the former chief of the gendarmes, Count Shuvalov, who, judging by the results, turned out to be a diplomat, much worse than a gendarme.
During the congress, it became clear that Germany, worried about the excessive strengthening of Russia, does not want to support it. France, still not recovering from the defeat of 1871, gravitated towards Russia, but was afraid of Germany and did not dare to actively support Russian demands. The current situation was skillfully used by Britain and Austria-Hungary, who imposed well-known decisions on the Congress that changed the Treaty of San Stefano to the detriment of Russia and the peoples of the Balkans.
Thus, the territory of the Bulgarian principality was limited to only the northern half, and southern Bulgaria became an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire called Eastern Rumelia. Serbia was given part of Bulgaria, which quarreled the two Slavic peoples for a long time. Russia returned Bayazet to Turkey, and collected not 1,410 million, but only 300 million rubles as an indemnity. Finally, Austria-Hungary got itself the "right" to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As a result, the Russian-Turkish war turned out to be, although won, but unsuccessful for Russia. Chancellor Gorchakov, in a note to the tsar on the results of the congress, admitted: "The Berlin Congress is the blackest page in my career." Emperor Alexander II added: "And in mine too."
Soon after the end of the Russian-Turkish war, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolai Obruchev, wrote in a memo to the emperor: “If Russia is poor and weak, if it lags far behind Europe, then this is primarily because it very often wrongly solved the most fundamental political issues: where and where she should not sacrifice her wealth. If you go the same way, you can completely perish and quickly complete your cycle of a great Power …"
Even taking into account the changes in the geopolitical situation that have occurred over the past 100 years, the words of General Obruchev have not lost their relevance today.
