The new shipbuilding program is very optimistic, but subject to government support
The current state of the Russian Navy is characterized by the overwhelming majority of experts as a crisis, and this primarily concerns its ship composition. As you know, it has hardly been updated for the last 18 years. On June 23, 2010, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, announced that within the framework of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, it is planned to build 15 surface ships and submarines, which will be transferred to the Black Sea Fleet. Thus, for the first time after the collapse of the USSR, it is planned to renew the whole formation of the Navy, and, according to reports from competent sources in the defense industry and the Ministry of Defense, similar processes should occur in the rest of the Russian fleets. However, what is the Russian Navy today? What are the prospects for the development of this type of our Armed Forces in the next two decades?
But I'll start by saying that the history of the modern Russian Navy is inextricably linked with the name of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov. The warships that the Russian Federation currently have, with all their advantages and disadvantages, were for the most part designed during the period when he held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy (a record long time - 1956-1985). They bear on themselves the imprint of this man's views on the role of sea power in ensuring the national security of the country, and traces of the contradictions that arose between the navy, shipbuilding and military industries.
Troubled Heritage
As for the assessment of the current state of the Russian surface naval fleet, it is immediately striking that it is small in number for such a huge country, combined with its exceptional diversity. The Russian Navy includes the following ships of the main classes: one aircraft-carrying cruiser of project 1143.5, one (not counting the counterparts standing at the wall) heavy nuclear missile cruiser of project 1144, three missile cruisers with gas turbine power plants of project 1164, eight large anti-submarine ships of project 1155, one BOD of project 1155.1 (formally, it is a development of the previous project, but in fact it is a new ship), one BOD of project 1134B, eight destroyers of project 956, the same number of patrol ships of five (!) Projects - 61, 1135, 1154, 11661 and the newest 20380, more often classified as a corvette; in addition, a large number of landing ships, as well as ships and boats of other classes.
The listed ships of 12 projects are equipped with four different anti-ship missiles (five, if we count separately the Basalt and Vulcan SCRCs on Project 1164 cruisers), two anti-submarine and five anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as other weapons. Moreover, each complex uses its own launcher (PU) and fire control system.
Against this background, the US naval forces, with which the Russian Navy is traditionally compared, favorably differ from it, having in its composition only five types of surface ships of the main classes: two types of aircraft carriers, one type of cruisers, one type of destroyers and one type of frigates (landing and other forces, as before, are not taken into account). These ships carry on board strategic cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine missiles of the same type, three types of anti-aircraft missiles and other weapons. At the same time, most of the missile weapons use unified launchers, and the Aegis unified combat information and control system provides the accuracy of the fire of destroyers and cruisers, which form the basis of the US surface fleet.
The diversity of surface ships of the Russian Navy, which is also noted in the domestic submarine (as discussed in an article published in No. 24 "VPK" for 2010), is caused by the peculiarities of relations between the Armed Forces and the defense industry of the USSR in late Soviet times. During this period, our defense industry de facto imposed on the Navy the ships designed and built by it, while the opinion of the customer (the fleet itself) was practically not taken into account or was taken into account only formally. One of the striking consequences of this state of affairs today is the presence in the Russian Navy of both projects 956 and 1155 ships. Despite the fact that the naval sailors from the very beginning insisted on the construction of destroyer class ships unified in energy and main armament, it was decided to lay two types ships for various purposes with similar dimensions, but completely different weapons. Unification was achieved only on project 1155.1 ("Admiral Chabanenko"), but in connection with the collapse of the Soviet Union, only one ship of this project entered service.
BOD "Admiral Chabanenko"
Already at that time, the danger of heterogeneity was understood, and at the end of the existence of the USSR, it turned to the release of a limited number of projects unified in armament and equipment, which would sharply reduce the "variety of types", but this decision was belated.
It will now be necessary to correct the "excesses and shortcomings" in the course of the implementation of the new shipbuilding program. What ships within its framework should the Russian Navy receive?
THE CASE OF THE DOMESTIC AIRCRAFT CARRIER
You can write a detective story about the misadventures of ships of this class in the Russian Navy. Despite the fact that their necessity and usefulness were realized by domestic naval specialists back in the 20s of the last century, the first aircraft-carrying ship entered the USSR Navy only in the 60s (anti-submarine cruiser Moskva). The first aircraft carrier (AB) with vertical take-off aircraft on board - in the 70s (heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kiev"). It was only in 1990 that a ship appeared capable of receiving aircraft with conventional takeoff and landing - "Tbilisi" (now "Admiral Kuznetsov"). As a result, he became the last in his generation - his sister ship "Varyag" and the "Ulyanovsk" created on their basis never entered service. However, the "Varyag" sold to China can still serve under a different name and flag in the Chinese Navy.
Why did the USSR leadership refuse to build aircraft carriers for so long? This was due to many reasons, but in the late Soviet era - mainly by the categorical rejection of "floating airfields" as a means of warfare by a number of the highest statesmen of our country. As a result, ships of this class had to fight the way to the slipway.
In the 90s, there was nothing to think about the construction of aircraft carriers in the Russian Federation. In the 2000s, when the country recovered a bit from the upheavals that were happening to it, the question arose again. Today, the possibility of creating such ships directly depends on how the state armaments program will look like. With a favorable development of events, the first aircraft carrier of a new construction can be laid down in the next five years, with unfavorable - the domestic fleet will have to be content with the presence of a single "floating airfield" for a long time - "Kuznetsov", which is planned to be sent for overhaul with modernization …
If we talk about how a new Russian aircraft carrier might look like, here, according to experts, the most realistic prototype is the modern Anglo-French project CVF / PA2, the characteristics of which are most close to the requirements that were voiced by the leadership of the Russian Navy: 60 thousand tons, 50-60 aircraft. The likelihood of accepting this project as a basis is also increased by the undisguised interest of the command of our Navy in cooperation with French shipbuilders in recent years.
WHERE IS THE MISTRAL BREATHING FROM?
The problem of the development of the amphibious forces of the Russian Navy has recently attracted close attention of experts. This is mainly due to the discussed prospect of building four Mistral-class universal amphibious assault ships (UDC) for the Russian Navy.
The Mistral UDC, created according to the BPC 160 project, is a modern ship of the so-called force projection, intended primarily for use in local conflicts. It is capable of providing a long-term presence of a Marine Corps group with air support in a remote theater of operations and the landing of Marine units, including on an unequipped coast, using landing boats and helicopters. The Mistral can also perform the functions of a command ship (command ship) of a formation solving peacekeeping tasks, as well as convincingly "display the flag" in the conflict area. In addition, it is possible to use it as a base and a floating hospital in emergency zones.
UDC "Mistral"
Does Russia need such a ship, especially now? Opinions were divided on this score. A number of experts believe that a more urgent task is the mass construction of ships of the corvette-frigate class, in the future - a destroyer, to replace the rapidly aging patrol ships (SKR), destroyers and BODs of Soviet construction.
However, there are other judgments: for example, a military expert, director of the Russian Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Ruslan Pukhov believes that the acquisition of such a ship simultaneously with ships of the corvette-frigate class is justified taking into account the future needs of Russia, which in the next 20-30 years will need stable presence of its fleet both in the near sea zone and in the World Ocean.
One of the key regions in this regard is the Far East, primarily the Kuril ridge. This region is strategically important for our country, at the same time, it practically does not have a developed military and civilian infrastructure.
In such conditions, the UDC is considered as a mobile element of the military infrastructure, which makes it possible to quickly deploy the necessary forces in the disputed zone and ensure their functioning. In general, such ships can contribute to a military presence in other strategically important regions, including Africa, Southeast Asia, Antarctic waters and other areas of the World Ocean, where local conflicts are possible, potentially affecting the interests of Russia.
The acquisition of the French UDC and its reproduction at domestic shipyards, in addition to the military, also has industrial significance. This contract should provide Russian shipbuilders with the opportunity to get acquainted with Western achievements in the field of technology and organization of production, to ensure the modernization of shipbuilding facilities involved in the manufacture of ships of this class. Today it is reported that the construction of the UDC is planned to be entrusted to the "Admiralty shipyards" in St. Petersburg.
However, the Mistral also has its drawbacks. Like many other warships of the modern Navy, it was created in order to reduce the cost of the project "using commercial technologies", that is, with significantly lower survivability requirements compared to warships. The Mistral's armament is limited to two launchers for launching melee anti-aircraft missiles, two 30-mm air defense gun mounts and four heavy machine guns, as a result of which it needs a strong escort.
The internal layout of the ship is determined by very high requirements for comfort for the crew and paratroopers (450 people), sacrificed for this is the size of the Marine Corps on board and the usable areas of hangars and cargo decks. And this limits the number of military equipment and helicopters.
The key issue at the moment is the amount of changes that can be made to the structure of the building at the insistence of the Russian Navy. It is known that the ships must receive ice reinforcements, which will allow them to operate in the northern latitudes characteristic of Russia. The height of the hangar deck should also be increased to accommodate domestic helicopters, which are higher than French ones.
The Mistral, however, will not be the only landing craft. In addition to him, the Russian Navy should receive at least 3-4 large landing ships of project 1177.1 in the next 10 years. The lead Ivan Gren is expected to enter the fleet in 2012.
THE FATE OF THE CRUISERS
New cruisers for the Russian Navy will not be built in the foreseeable future, however, apparently, for other fleets too. In fact, today the functions of this class of ships were taken over by destroyers, which in the process of their development reached the size and firepower of cruisers. At the same time, the cruisers remaining in the fleet can serve for a long time. This also applies to the Russian ships of projects 1144 and 1164. Their fate directly depends on whether a deep modernization of these ships is deemed expedient, which will allow them to remain in service for another 20-30 years.
Initially, such work will take place on the Admiral Nakhimov heavy nuclear missile cruiser, which is being repaired in Severodvinsk. According to available information, it is planned to equip it with the latest universal shipborne firing systems (UKSK), which will allow the use of a variety of weapons, combining missiles of one type or another, depending on the specific mission of the ship. The radio-electronic equipment of the cruiser will also be improved. Under favorable conditions, the rest of the ships of the project should also undergo such modernization.
Heavy nuclear missile cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov"
The fate of project 1164 can be determined by the fate of the last built ship of this type - the missile cruiser Admiral Lobov (Ukraine), which has been standing at the wall of the Black Sea shipyard in Nikolaev, Ukraine for almost 20 years. The resumed negotiations on its acquisition for the Russian Navy and its radical modernization allow us to hope that in the event of a successful outcome and the launch of the ship, the other three cruisers will undergo modernization.
Destroyers of the future
New ships of this class will replace both destroyers and large anti-submarine ships in the Russian Navy. So far, information about promising destroyers for the domestic fleet is rather scarce: it is known that the industry is completing the development of a ship project, which should have a displacement of about 10 thousand tons, weapons, including UKSK, artillery of 130-152 mm caliber, anti-aircraft missile and artillery melee systems, two helicopters, etc. The development of the project should be completed by 2012-2013, at the same time, apparently, it is worth waiting for the laying of the lead ship. Taking into account modern prices, it can be considered a success if it is possible to build 10-12 similar ships within the next 20 years without foreign help, each of which in its capabilities will correspond to about 2-3 destroyers of Project 956. BODs currently in service with the fleet and during this time the overwhelming majority of destroyers will be out of action.
FRIGATES AND CORVETTEES: THE WATCHOR'S HEIRS
More is known about frigates. At least they will be two projects. This deviation from the declared desire for unification is due to the fact that the newest project 22350 is being mastered by the industry quite difficult and there is no need to wait for the speedy release of the required number of ships. Currently, as you know, two frigates of a new project are under construction. The head one - "Admiral Gorshkov" should be commissioned in 2011, the second - "Admiral Kasatonov" - in 2013-2014. As a result, to update the Black Sea Fleet and, apparently, for other fleets, ships of the already worked out project 11356, which is being successfully built for the Indian Navy, will also be built. They will be maximally unified with the frigates of the new project on electronic equipment and weapons: they will all have the UKSK and the latest fire control systems that provide them with the capabilities of Western Aegis-class ships. It is assumed that over the next 20 years, the fleet will receive 20-24 frigates, approximately equal parts of both projects.
"Admiral Gorshkov" withdrawn from the pool of the "Sevmash" workshop
New frigates will replace the aging patrol ships. The change in classification from the standard Soviet TFR to the western "frigate" was caused by the increased versatility of these ships. Traditionally, the Soviet TFR were primarily patrol ships with rather limited capabilities to counter enemy surface ships and aircraft. Frigates armed with medium-range air defense systems and anti-ship missiles have much greater capabilities, and their ability to withstand an underwater threat is significantly increased due to the presence of helicopters, which most of the Soviet TFR, with the exception of the very last, did not have.
With the growth of capabilities, the range of tasks of these ships also expands: they will be able to accompany large combat units of the fleet (aircraft carriers, cruisers), providing their escort, support the landing, patrol the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone, perform independent tasks, for example, to combat piracy, patrolling in conflict zones, etc.
Corvettes will perform similar tasks with smaller dimensions and reduced armament. The head corvette of the new project 20380 "Steregushchy" entered the fleet in 2007 and is being tested. At the beginning of 2010, the second ship of this project was launched - "Soobrazitelny". Its commissioning is expected next year. In 2012-2013, three more ships of this project will join the Navy.
In addition, it is planned to continue the construction of ships of the project 20380. Starting next year, the laying of the next series of corvettes is expected, somewhat improved compared to the previous ones based on the results of tests of the lead ship. Project 20380 corvettes are also multifunctional warships with very broad capabilities. Starting with the second ship of the project ("Soobrazitelny"), they are equipped with the UKSK, which, in combination with other firepower, provides high firepower and the ability to combine weapons depending on the specific task.
SUBTOTAL
The replenishment of the surface fleet of the Russian Navy described above does not take into account the many other necessary combat and auxiliary units, the description of which is simply impossible within the framework of a newspaper article. At the same time, all these ships must form the backbone, the basis of the surface fleet, its main forces, ensuring the fulfillment of 90% of its tasks. The indicated number of ships is quite impressive, however, it is not excessive and, if there is political will and financial investments, it can be built at the existing Russian shipyards.
At the same time, the formation of the Navy should be one of the first places among the military priorities of the state: the growing power of modern fleets and their capabilities for operations against the coast require an adequate tool capable of fending off a threat from the sea.
