Doesn't a "contract" threaten us?

Doesn't a "contract" threaten us?
Doesn't a "contract" threaten us?

Video: Doesn't a "contract" threaten us?

Video: Doesn't a
Video: Cervical Hybrid Surgery 2024, May
Anonim
Image
Image

How many copies were broken due to the increase in spending on the domestic defense industry! At one time, all those who disagreed with the concept of the need for an early modernization of the Russian army and the defense industry were publicly subjected to obstruction. Even the seemingly unsinkable Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin, who was replaced by Anton Siluanov in a firefighting order, suffered. I remember that Kudrin tried to criticize the plans of the country's top leadership regarding the allocation of colossal money for the modernization of the Armed Forces and the defense industry, arguing that the global financial crisis may still manifest itself at the most inopportune moment. As a result, such remarks seemed to the authorities, let's say, not entirely correct, and therefore Alexei Kudrin found himself behind the government board not only of the Cabinet of Vladimir Putin, but also later in the Cabinet of Dmitry Medvedev, who reacted so hotly to criticism from the then Minister of Finance.

As a result, the overdue reform went forward, but it did not go quite like clockwork. A certain creak in the implementation of ambitious plans is manifested today, and, in the opinion of many economists, will appear tomorrow. At the same time, a fairly large number of those very experts in the field of economics are inclined to think that Kudrin's words had a certain logical basis, which needed to be paid attention to …

One of the manifestations of the creak of the mechanism of army modernization and reform can be called the state with the level of funding for such an item as an increase in the number of contract soldiers in the Russian army. The fact is that according to the presidential decree of May 7 of this year (the date of the inauguration of Vladimir Putin), by 2015 the number of servicemen serving on contract in the RA should be significantly increased. The phrase "in a substantial way" means quite unambiguous figures - 50 thousand "man-bayonets" per year, starting from 2013. An increase in the number of contract servicemen would solve the perennial problem associated with the balance of the contract-conscription form of service in the Russian army, and would also give the army, at least, the external color of a professionally trained combat force.

But the aspirations of the authorities, unfortunately, cannot always be matched with the existing realities. The fact is that 150 thousand contract servicemen in 3 years is an undertaking that could well have been realized, if not for one "but". This "but" lies in the notorious financing. The budget for the needs associated with an increase in the total number of contract servicemen by 50 thousand people next year includes a total figure of about 16.4 billion rubles - with an average calculation of 328 thousand rubles per person (per year). If we recalculate for months, we get about 27333 rubles per contract soldier. This amount should include direct monetary allowance, monetized payments for rental housing, if the contractor is not going to live in the barracks, and other payments. Moreover, from this amount you need to make deductions related to taxes, financing of social obligations, and so on, so on, so on. It is not difficult to notice that the real monetary income of a contractor, for whom the state is going to allocate 27333 rubles per month, at best, will be equal to 50-60% of this amount. For obvious reasons, not everyone will be eager to sign a contract and become a military man on such financial terms.

In this regard, it turns out that the Ministry of Defense will either have to lower the bar for recruiting contract servicemen to at least 30-35 thousand people, or increase funding for the project. But since the budget for next year in terms of modernizing the army and its gradual transition to a balanced contract-conscription basis has already been formed, and the President's Decree is in place, any decrease in the planned number of contract soldiers by the country's main military department will look like a wave of obvious sabotage. And today, no one likes to get nuts from Vladimir Putin again for failure to fulfill his personal orders. And the hapless Anatoly Serdyukov clearly does not want to become the fourth minister to receive an administrative penalty.

In such a situation, the Ministry of Defense has two options: either to somehow convince potential contractors to serve for a year or two on modest funding, and then, they say, it will be better; or fill the contract gap with the help of conscripts.

Naturally, one can not especially guess what step will be taken by Anatoly Serdyukov, who was assigned a very modest amount to attract contract soldiers. Anatoly Eduardovich, whether he wants it or not, will simply be forced to take the second path, which has been tested over the years. In this case, we can also talk about sabotage of the presidential decree, but only everyone understands perfectly well that there would be no sabotage if the funding had been pledged not in the amount of 16.4 billion rubles, but in somewhat larger amounts.

Another strange fact should not be overlooked: no additional costs associated with financing new contract servicemen in 2014 and 2015 are provided at all. One can only guess at which bottom ends Anatoly Serdyukov and the entire Ministry of Defense are going to scrape, in order to be staffed with 150 thousand more new contract soldiers in 3 years. Perhaps there is a certain parallel item of expenditure in the military budget, which has not yet been voiced, and in which the financial points of how Russia can ensure the transition to the contract-conscription in the right ratio are indicated. But nothing is known about such an expense item, and therefore the fate of the potential 150 thousand contract soldiers is in limbo.

Are we witnessing the first stage of reform slipping? After all, it is still difficult to explain why, out of the almost 7.5 trillion rubles allocated for the needs of modernizing the army and the military-industrial complex in 2013-2015, there was not enough money to implement the program to increase the number of contract servicemen. I would like to hope that the necessary funds will still be found so that the modernization plans in the future do not remain at the level of slogans.

Recommended: