This article raises the question of the importance of understanding the problem of "network-centric" combat operations and their impact on the further development of the RF Armed Forces, the development of weapons and control systems, the improvement of the staff structure, the development of tactical techniques, methods and methods of warfare, and one of the solutions is proposed. this question.
Modern armed forces must correctly combine and apply tactics, methods and methods of warfare, standard operational approaches and technologies in order to successfully perform combat missions in a modern, rapidly changing combat space.
The strongest influence on the forms and methods of conducting hostilities has always been exerted by information about both its troops and the enemy and the terrain where these actions are carried out, however, at present, information technologies change not only approaches to the development of military equipment and weapons, but more and more often affect questions of changing the principles of organization of the military command and control system as a whole and organizational and staff changes in the structure of military formations and their tactics of action.
The result of a breakthrough in information technology was the creation of the concept of control on the battlefield, in which the control, reconnaissance and defeat systems were combined into a single network.
This concept is called "network-centric". The ideologists of this concept, Vice Admiral A. Cebrowski and D. Garstka, note that "network-centric wars" are not only the deployment of digital networks in order to ensure both vertical and horizontal integration of all participants in the operation. It is also a change in the tactics of action of promising formations with dispersed combat formations, optimization of methods of reconnaissance activities, simplification of procedures for coordinating and coordinating fire damage. Moreover, the increase in the combat capabilities of modern formations is a direct consequence of the improvement of information exchange and the increasing role of information itself, i.e. implementation of the principles of the new concept.
NATO is implementing the concept of "Integrated network capabilities" (NATO Network Enabled Capabilities), in France - "Information-centric warfare" (Guerre Infocentre), in Sweden - "Network Defense" (Network Based Defense), in China - "Command and control system., communications, computing, reconnaissance and fire engagement”(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Recognizance & Kill), etc.
It is in "network centrism" that military experts of foreign countries see an innovative tool for increasing the combat capabilities of the downsized armed forces and quite objectively expect to receive economic benefits.
This will allow the creation and implementation of hardware and software systems that ensure the collection of intelligence from diverse sources, the automation of the processing and decryption of incoming information, as well as the formation of a common base of intelligence information with distributed access to it.
The basis of information exchange in a unified ACS is a picture of a combat situation, in which the coordinates of one's forces are determined using GPS, and data about the enemy comes from various sources of reconnaissance.
The created picture of the combat situation is applied to the cartographic base and displayed on the screen of the onboard PC.
The first experience of operating a single automated control system of the brigade showed the increased combat capabilities of the US Army units due to a significant decrease in the likelihood of "friendly" fire and, accordingly, an increase in the commanders' determination to give orders for fire destruction in a timely manner, as well as a reduction in the combat control cycle due to the timely delivery of data on the location of forces and enemy means.
At the same time, the following shortcomings were identified:
- to work with hardware and software requires highly qualified specially trained personnel;
- receiving, processing information and distributing it to consumers require more and more sophisticated software and hardware;
- limited performance (vulnerability) of data transmission channels and the possibility of their suppression by means of electronic warfare;
- high mobility of modern means of destruction and control lead to a decrease in the time for making a decision.
However, in spite of everything, according to American military theorists, the troops, relying on the combined information support, will become more mobile, will have a high strike power, an increased level of survivability and endurance, are capable of rapid operational deployment and immediate use immediately after arriving in the zone of operation. combat operations and will be able to conduct hostilities with any enemy with a guaranteed result.
The implementation of this concept will provide an opportunity for geographically distributed armed forces to achieve a high level of joint and interrelated actions through their common perception of the battle situation in order to achieve goals of different level and scale in accordance with the intention of the commander of the group of forces (forces). Technologically, the formation of a unified picture of the combat situation should be based on the widespread use of modern digital information and communication systems, the development of which in the US Armed Forces, and in other developed countries, is given special attention. Further development of information technology will lead to the improvement of software to a level where it can work with minimal human intervention.
Despite the fact that our armed forces in practical terms of the development of the network-centric concept lagged behind the developed technological countries by at least 20-30 years, at present the RF Armed Forces are developing practical measures for its implementation.
One of the achievements of the Russian military-industrial complex is the development and testing of the Unified control system of the tactical level ESU TZ "Sozvezdiye", intended for integrated command and control of troops using navigation systems, as well as satellite and unmanned brigade-level surveillance equipment.
In addition, the troops are implementing a set of reconnaissance, command and control and communications "Strelets M", which ensures the solution of the main tasks:
- combat control, - communication and transmission of information, - individual and group navigation, - detection, - measurements of coordinates and identification of targets, - targeting, - generating data for the use of small arms.
Changes are taking place in the regular structure of the units. Thus, in the brigades of a new type, reconnaissance battalions and command battalions have appeared, the task of which will be to receive, process and bring information to means of fire destruction.
But, despite the actions for the practical implementation in the troops of the key provisions of the "network-centric" concept, the following difficulties arise:
1. There is no clear understanding of the essence of "network-centric" conditions of warfare; some military experts confuse "network-centrism" with computer technologies. Lack of a list of means and tasks that the troops must perform, i.e.what is needed for the real needs of the troops. Lack of training programs and methods for the formation of new tactical thinking among officers.
2. Weak implementation of information technologies in the daily activities of the Armed Forces. So, the only experimental set of ESU TZ "Sozvezdie M1" is located in Alabino, where the specialists of the Sozvezdie concern were trained to work with the system by the officers of the 5th ombudsmen in specially equipped classes and on equipment. When this system is implemented in other units and formations, in the absence of time for training, there will be an acute shortage of specialists for training, as a result of which this equipment will lie dead in warehouses or in divisions.
3. Compliance with the existing organizational structure of military command and control bodies to the modern nature of armed struggle, determined by the "network-centric" conditions of military operations. The main goals of the JCC are to change the tactics of subunits and units with the dispersal of their battle formations, to optimize the methods of reconnaissance activities, to simplify the procedures for coordinating and coordinating fire damage.
Consequently, platoons, companies and battalions with attached subunits will operate at a considerable distance from each other. If at the brigade level the "command - reconnaissance - defeat" complex was implemented by the creation of reconnaissance battalions and command battalions, then at the battalion-company-platoon level the task of interaction between means of fire destruction and reconnaissance has not yet been organized and worked out.
4. The economic factor. An increase in the technical equipment of troops with reconnaissance, command and communication means will increase the effectiveness of the use of a subunit (in terms of fire damage, maneuver, control, survivability, etc.), which will allow subunits with the same means of destruction to solve a greater number of tasks.
However, there are limitations for the further growth of technical equipment, since this leads to a significant increase in the cost of such developments.
The development of computer simulators (simulators) and their introduction into the troops will give the personnel the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems, and will also allow the consumer (the Armed Forces) to formulate technical specifications for weapons, communications, reconnaissance and control equipment.
5. Weak realization of the potential capabilities of modern weapons in the army. Lack of skills and practice in subunits of using means of fire destruction at the maximum range (firing at long ranges).
For the implementation of the CCS in the brigades of the "new type" it is proposed:
1. Improvement of the regular structure of the battalion level.
The organizational and staff structure of the unit must correspond to the following sequence of actions: detection, orientation, control, defeat. To do this, it is proposed to switch to tactical groups formed according to the principle of modular construction, which will be based on the relationship between the range of subunit weapons and the range of reconnaissance and fire adjustment means.
A module is a functionally acting element of a group that performs a specific function (solves a specific task).
The elements of the modular structure of tactical groups will be:
a) Command module, which will include:
- reconnaissance module
- control module
- communication module
- module for adjusting fire
- combat guard module
- tactical camouflage module (smoke, radio camouflage)
- navigation (topogeosis) module
- hydrometeorological module
b) Combat module - means of fire destruction
c) Combat support module:
- RChBZ module
- engineering module
- electronic warfare module
d) Rear module:
- technical module
- rear module
- medical module
For example, small arms and a grenade launcher are the means of fire destruction of a motorized rifle squad. The effective firing range is up to 500 m. According to the combat regulations, the front of the defense and offensive of the squad is up to 100 m, i.e. the personnel are located close to each other, which allows using the necessary minimum of special or improvised means (binoculars, thermal imager, night vision devices, voice, whistle, tracing bursts towards the target, RSP of various colors) when controlling fire, detecting an enemy. To solve navigation problems, a GPS beacon with the function of recognizing friend or foe from the squad leader is enough.
A motorized rifle platoon can be attached to a grenade launcher, anti-tank, flamethrower, and sometimes engineer-engineer units, reconnaissance chemists and a tank, which increases the effective range of weapons of fire to 2000 m.
To conduct reconnaissance to such a depth, it is possible to attach special means, for example, the Farah SBR or the PDU-4 laser rangefinder, and to adjust the fire of its own and attached fire means of the Pear-type UAV with a range of up to 10 km.
For processing, studying, generalizing the information received, displaying the situation data, it is enough to use the “TT” or “AK” tablet developed at the Svyaz Scientific and Technical Center.
As a communication module, use radio stations of the R-168-0, 5 U or R-168-5 UN type for communication with the departments. If necessary, the platoon can be assigned a radio station R-853-B2M as guidance for aviation.
As a navigation module, the GPS receivers of the squad commanders and the platoon commander's tablet with maps of the area of upcoming hostilities installed in it are used.
Tactical camouflage module - used systems 902 "Tucha", located on military equipment.
If necessary, the RSA "Realia-U" or "Tabun" can be included in the combat escort modules. In this modular structure, in addition to the platoon commander, the calculation of reconnaissance means and the calculation of the UAV will be required.
In total, by changing the platoon tactical group using the modular construction method, we can increase the platoon's front of action to 3 km (effective use of means of fire destruction) with a range that will prevent the enemy from inflicting fire damage in response. Thus, the combat capabilities of the platoon (mobility, accuracy of fire damage, level of survivability) will significantly increase.
A motorized rifle company can be assigned an artillery battery, anti-tank, grenade launcher, engineer-sapper and flamethrower subunits, and, when operating in isolation from the main forces, an anti-aircraft missile (rocket-artillery, artillery) unit, which makes it possible to inflict fire damage at a distance of up to 15 km. Accordingly, other forces and means will be required to control subunits, conduct reconnaissance, adjust fire, and camouflage.
That is, for the formation of tactical groups using the modular construction method in the battalion, it is advisable to introduce a reconnaissance platoon into the battalion's staff, which will include reconnaissance groups, UAVs, groups for collecting, processing and analyzing information, which, during the conduct of hostilities, will be attached to motorized rifle companies, significantly increasing their combat capabilities.
Thus, at the battalion level, the task of organizing tactical groups is solved with the possibility of solving various tasks assigned to the subunit.
2. Practicing the actions of tactical groups in combat training sessions.
During the period of single training, computer simulators and simulators are widely used to master the techniques and actions with weapons and when arming combat vehicles. Starting from the moment the platoons are coordinated, the reconnaissance subunits should be assigned to the battalion subunits where to work out the main tasks: detecting the enemy at the maximum range of fire weapons, determining the data for firing and adjusting the fire. Exercises in fire control are considered to be control exercises for firepower training during the coordination period. Conduct tactical training in the form of two-sided team games.
When conducting exercises, use new means of command, reconnaissance and communications: ground stations for short-range reconnaissance, night vision devices, thermal imagers, UAVs, tablets for displaying situation data, equipping them with commanders of the company-battalion level. Whenever possible, use technical means and software of civilian analogues, conducting a comparative analysis between them. For effective work in this direction, reward commanders for rationalization work, showing the best results or offering an unusual solution.
3. Practicing long-range firing.
Firing at long ranges or from closed firing positions will allow: to provide cover from enemy ground observation when firing, provide camouflage from various types of enemy reconnaissance, allow you to have convenient and secret access routes, and maneuver with forces and means. When firing, commanders acquire skills in using subunit weapons at maximum range, organizing target reconnaissance; classification of targets according to the degree of importance, firing missions and fire maneuvers. In addition, it is on these exercises that it is most convenient to use UAVs to perform fire adjustments.
Using the principles of modular building of units at the battalion level will give:
1. Flexibility of management. Depending on the tasks to be solved at the battalion level, fill the modules with fire weapons, hardware and software, and change their effectiveness. Increase in the front and the depth of fire destruction of the enemy by battalion subunits.
2. Will link existing technologies and equipment into a single complex. It will make it possible to more effectively use the old systems of reconnaissance, control and destruction.
3. The personnel will receive the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems.
4. Reduce the economic pressure on the country. Using computer simulators and simulators, it will visually form the learning process, bringing it closer to the situation of a real battle. The change in software will allow retraining personnel for new weapons systems.
Working in the "field" with a real consumer, the needs of the troops for technical means will be determined, allowing the military to formulate the technical specifications for weapons, communications, reconnaissance and command and control equipment. Will create a feedback between the producer (MIC) and the consumer (BC).
Our armed forces are now in the role of catch-up. That which in the west has not only been introduced into the troops, but also worked out in the course of numerous exercises, military conflicts and local wars, is only being worked out theoretically in our country and is beginning to enter the troops. At present, our army is preparing for defense, improving the systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Defense and Electronic Warfare, but we cannot win a war by defense, and as soon as the enemy can effectively overcome the defensive systems, we will lose.
In addition to the technical equipment of the troops, attention should be paid to tactical techniques and methods of conducting combat operations. Using the Blitzkrieg tactics, which were once breakthrough, the German Wehrmacht, even with imperfect weapons, was able to achieve amazing results, and its more equipped opponents were defeated. And right now it is necessary to form new tactical thinking among commanders of all degrees, giving more initiative and creativity, both in conducting classes and in performing combat missions, developing a style of thinking in trainees that allows them to identify emerging problems and find extraordinary ways to solve them.
At one time, the identification of new ways of using UAVs, as well as the study of the capabilities of other promising models of weapons and military equipment, fell on the shoulders of the so-called "combat laboratories" - scientific centers formed in the 90s of the last century, in each type of armed forces, directorates and training centers of the US Department of Defense, which have shown enviable persistence in developing new forms and methods of using these means in modern wars and armed conflicts.
