The allies expressed support for Russia without much enthusiasm, the central powers rushed with their own declarations, and the neutrals were even slightly at a loss because of the prospects opening up for them. London, which generously paid for the efforts of the "Russian steam roller", and Paris, which, for fear of a German invasion in the Polish question for many years, had been currying favor with Petersburg for many years, hastened with approval through their foreign ministries. Reputable newspapers, Le Temps and The Times, did not hesitate to describe the document, signed by the hand of the Russian commander-in-chief, as a "great" "noble" act, evoking "the most ardent sympathy and support." Even in Switzerland, the French-language "Le Matin" was celebrated on the occasion of the grand ducal manifesto.
However, according to many indications, the press appearances were intended to hide a certain irritation in the upper circles of Paris and London, who already then feared Russian expansion into Eastern Europe. What is at least a harsh assessment of the appeal by French President Raymond Poincaré:
But at that moment, England and France could forgive the Russians for almost anything - after all, their troops, under the blows of the Germans, were rolling back to Paris. By the way, and much later, contrary to all the anti-European assertions of the Pan-Slavists, the allies were ready to allow Russia a lot - up to the occupation of Constantinople and the subsequent establishment of a protectorate over the city. ("Russian Castle" at the gates to the Russian Sea).
As soon as reports of the manifesto appeared in the French press, the Russian ambassador in Paris, former foreign minister A. P. Izvolsky telegraphed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sazonov that they "made a tremendous impression here and met … an enthusiastic reception."
The ambassador also reported on a meeting with representatives of a newly formed ad hoc committee composed "of Russian, Austrian and German Poles, to recruit Polish volunteers for the French army and other patriotic purposes." “According to them, the Russian and German Poles … even before the announcement of the sovereign's generous intentions, decided to declare themselves on the side of Russia and the powers of the Triple Accord. The Austrian Poles, who have reason to be completely satisfied with their fate under the Habsburg scepter, but who doubt the victory of the Austrian arms, are also, apparently, ready to join their Russian and German compatriots, but would like to have confidence that the autonomy promised to them by Russia will not deprive them the rights they now own”(2).
In fact, the prospect of granting Poland real autonomy in the highest circles of Russia has not yet even been considered. Moreover, she openly frightened them, as in the propaganda on the Polish issue within Russia. Already on August 6/19 Sazonov hastened to send a telegram to Izvolsky in response: “The agency * apparently translated the word“self-government”in the appeal of the commander-in-chief by the term“autonomie”, which could give rise to incorrect conclusions. It is still premature to clothe the general promises contained in the appeal in legal formulas”(3).
Sazonov reminded his former boss in this regard that the usual legislative activity in the country was suspended during the hostilities. At the same time, the minister considered it necessary to convey to Izvolsky that "from the explanations with the local Poles it is clear that they fully understand our point of view and do not intend to enter into the discussion of the details of the implementation of the promises made to them"
Many foreign representatives of Russia were faced with the need to provide clarifications on a question of which they had a very superficial idea. For example, the ambassadors in Washington and Rome found themselves in such a situation. B. A. Bakhmetev reported on the inquiries coming to him about whether the rumors "about a manifesto, allegedly published by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich", were reliable. The ambassador complained that he did not have any information on this issue, except for the information provided by the foreign press and asked to be informed about the actual situation in order to “stop the conflicting rumors” (4).
A slightly more informed D. A. Nelidov (nevertheless, in Rome, unlike Washington, dispatches from the Russian Foreign Ministry and the press arrived fairly quickly), expressed a desire to be aware of "the true nature and scope of the measures proposed in this matter." But, apparently, under the impression of conversations with local Poles, also "about the limits of expected benefits, in order to avoid exaggerated hopes and misinterpretations."
In the end, Sazonov had to explain that the “general principles involved in the appeal of the Grand Duke, obviously, could be more precisely determined only after the end of the war, with the resumption of legislative activity. It is desirable that the Poles wait with patience and trust for this moment, helping Russia, if possible, in the implementation of the outlined assumptions”(5).
The reaction of the neutrals is quite remarkable. If Italy and Romania directly welcomed the decision of Russia, then the press of still undecided Bulgaria was full of contradictions. So, even the newspaper "Mir", the mouthpiece of Russophile circles, immediately after the publication of the grand-ducal proclamation, tried to arrange a kind of bargaining and ended its generally loyal editorial with the words:
Inside Russia, in the popular mind, the Grand Duke's manifesto was generally perceived in a strange way as a kind of promise to the peasants of the land. And the Polish endeavor, the most influential political force in the Kingdom, hastened to propagate the "Proclamation" as a confirmation of its strategic orientation, as a natural result of the eight-year (1907-1914) season of NDP politics. In the Duma, the Polish Kolo, through the mouth of Viktor Yaronski, issued a declaration on August 21, proclaiming the identity of the interests of Poland and Russia.
In radical circles, the impression of the "Appeal" is completely different - depressing. It is easy to understand them: after all, now, perhaps, there is nothing and no one to fight for.
The Grand Ducal Manifesto was also noticed on the other side of the front. The real threat of Poland's unification within or in union with Russia shook up the Berlin and Vienna courts. A characteristic confession of the French ambassador to Denmark can be found in the same memoirs of the French president R. Poincaré “… This Russian manifesto caused very strong irritation in Germany. The imperial authorities forced the clergy of the Poznan diocese to issue an appeal to their flock, which recalls "the persecution of Polish Catholics under Russian rule and the believers are called to faithfully fight under the German banner" (6).
Some calculations are necessary here. After all, in fact, why should the German authorities not have completely silenced the appeal of the enemy commander-in-chief? But the fact of the matter is that the document received unexpectedly wide publicity. The press, of course, did a lot - all Russian newspapers unanimously not only published, but also greeted him. There were thousands of recipients of Russian newspapers on the other side of the front. Others could not remain silent at all - after all, at that time it was bad form for print media not to report any significant performance by representatives of the supreme power or command, even on the part of the enemy.
But there is no exact data on the circulation, which was issued by the "Appeal" itself. Only an indirect assessment can be made from the memoirs of B. Shaposhnikov, A. Brusilov and others. Based on the ratio of one to one - to the troops and to be posted in the front line, and counting one copy in each company, we get about 30 thousand copies in a direct printout, not taking into account those published by the newspapers. The newspaper versions, unfortunately, did not reach the other side of the front. However, out of the 15-20 thousandth circulation, about half was intended for posting in settlements along the front line. At the same time, approximately every tenth copy was supposed to be behind enemy lines - by airplanes or with the help of local residents. Many of them, despite the hostilities, in the first weeks of the war moved freely on Polish lands, since a solid line of trenches was still absent in September 1914.
With certain assumptions, we can say that about a fifth of these 10 percent eventually reached the addressee - that is, about 500-600 "Appeals" were still managed to reach enemy territory. By the standards of that time, this is a lot. In some cities, there could be 5-10 copies of the text. In this case, it would be quite fair to consider that almost the entire Polish population learned about the Grand Duke's "Appeal" in the very first days of the war.
It is not surprising that the occupying authorities of the already occupied Polish lands took tough measures to limit the spread of the "Proclamation". Almost all press organs of Galicia and Poznan, from the peasant "Piast" to the radical "Zaranie" with the famous Maria Dombrovskaya, were forced to silence the grand ducal manifesto. The Galician Central National Committee, in which the same Lviv professor Stanislav Grabsky played the first violin, also kept silent about the Grand Ducal Manifesto - in August 1914, the State Tax Committee expressed its readiness to side with Austria-Hungary.
As a condition, the Galician Poles demanded only guarantees that, if liberated, their homeland would not be annexed to … Germany. Oddly enough, this position found understanding in Vienna, despite the fact that S. Grabsky himself, we recall, unlike his comrades-in-arms, almost immediately took the side of Russia and, in the end, was evacuated from Lvov along with the tsarist army. Two years later, despite the fact that Franz Joseph came out of his dying state of dementia only for a few moments, this would actually predetermine the apparently spontaneous solution of the Polish question. Germany and Austria-Hungary turned it around by creating a supposedly independent Kingdom on lands that almost exclusively belonged to Russia.
And in August 1914, the Austrian and German authorities did not hesitate to come up with policy statements, similar to the "Proclamation" in goals, but much more rough and less definite in content. Especially impressive in this sense is the appeal of the main command of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies of the eastern front to the population of the Kingdom of Poland, dated presumably on August 9, 1914:
In the meantime, the hype around the grand-ducal "Proclamation" noticeably embarrassed Nicholas II and his entourage. The very next day after the publication, the editors of the leading newspapers received an order from the censorship department not to write about Polish autonomy (7). Minister of Internal Affairs N. A. Maklakov gave instructions to the governor-general of Warsaw to "cool down" the stirring up of the national sentiment of the Poles. Things went so far that the censorship in general deleted from the "Appeal" the words "self-government of Poland". Some members of the cabinet, not familiar with the mechanism for creating the manifesto, believed that the emperor, who was not at all keen on the idea of reuniting Poland, was seriously displeased with the grand duke's imprudence. This opinion, for example, was held by Baron M. Taube (8).
But in fact, the tsarist cabinet did not delay the release of the "Proclamation" because he wanted to use it as a kind of trial balloon, which will allow you to get acquainted with the reaction to real steps towards Russian-Polish rapprochement in Polish lands, both within the empire and and beyond. Moreover, according to all the pre-war strategic plans, the Russian troops inevitably had to leave western Poland (9). However, the "Polish balcony", so named due to the geographical configuration of the theater of military operations, of course, was considered by the Russian command primarily as a springboard for the march to Berlin. But only after the capture of the Konigsberg salient and the liberation of Galicia.
Notes (edit)
1. R. Poincaré, In the Service of France 1914-1915 Memoirs, memoirs, M. 2002, pp. 85-86.
2. International relations in the era of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments 1878-1917 Moscow, 1935, series III, volume VI, part 1, pp. 120-121.
* The first to announce the appeal of the Grand Duke in France was the Havas agency, which did not hesitate to announce the intention of Nicholas II to grant Poland “full autonomy”.
3. Ibid, pp. 124-125.
4. Ibid., P. 125.
5. Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Italy (copy to Washington). No. 2211 dated August 15/28, 1914
6. Telegram of the French ambassador to Denmark Bapst to President Poincaré from Copenhagen. August 16, 1914, no. 105, cit. according to R, Poincaré, p. 94.
7. S. Melgunov, Memories, m, 2003, vol. 1, p. 183.
8. RGIA, f.1062, op.1, d.5, l.20 Diary of M. A. Taube, entry dated November 4, 1914
9. V. Melikov, Strategic deployment, M. 1939, pp. 259-261.
