The cruiser "Varyag". In the days of the USSR, there would hardly have been a person in our country who had never heard of this ship. For many generations of our compatriots "Varyag" has become a symbol of the heroism and dedication of Russian sailors in battle.
However, perestroika, glasnost and the "wild 90s" that followed. Our history has been revised by all and sundry, and throwing mud at it has become a fashion trend. Of course, the Varyag also got it, and in full. What were the accusations of his crew and commander! It was already agreed that Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev deliberately (!) Flooded the cruiser where it could be easily lifted, for which he subsequently received the Japanese Order. But on the other hand, many sources of information have appeared that were not previously available to historians and lovers of the history of the navy - perhaps their study can really make adjustments to the history of the heroic cruiser familiar to us from childhood?
This series of articles, of course, will not dot the i's. But we will try to bring together information about the history of the design, construction and service of the cruiser up to Chemulpo, inclusive, based on the data available to us, we will analyze the technical condition of the ship and the training of its crew, possible breakthrough options and various scenarios of actions in battle. We will try to figure out why the commander of the cruiser Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev made certain decisions. In light of the above, we will analyze the postulates of the official version of the Varyag battle, as well as the argumentation of its opponents. Of course, the author of this series of articles has formed a definite view of the exploit of "Varyag", and it will, of course, be presented. But the author sees his task not in persuading the reader to any point of view, but in providing maximum information, on the basis of which everyone can decide for himself what the actions of the commander and crew of the cruiser "Varyag" are for him - the reason to be proud of the fleet and their country, the shameful page of our history, or something else.
Well, we'll start with a description of where, in general, such an unusual type of warships as the high-speed armored cruisers of the 1st rank with a normal displacement of 6-7 thousand tons appeared in Russia.
The ancestors of the armored cruisers of the Russian Imperial Navy can be considered the armored corvettes "Vityaz" and "Rynda" with a normal displacement of 3,508 tons, built in 1886.
Three years later, the composition of the domestic fleet was replenished with a larger armored cruiser with a displacement of 5,880 tons - it was the "Admiral Kornilov" ordered in France, the construction of which the Loire shipyard (Saint-Nazaire) began in 1886. However, then the construction of armored cruisers in Russia began a long pause - almost a decade, from 1886 to 1895 the Russian Imperial Navy did not order a single ship of this class. And laid down at the end of 1895 at the French shipyards "Svetlana" (with a displacement of 3828 tons), although it was quite a small armored cruiser for its time, it was nevertheless built rather as a representative yacht for the admiral general, and not as a ship corresponding to the doctrine of the fleet."Svetlana" did not fully meet the requirements for this class of warships by Russian sailors, and therefore was built in a single copy and was not replicated at domestic shipyards.
And what, in fact, were the requirements of the fleet for armored cruisers?
The fact is that the Russian Empire in the period 1890-1895. began to seriously strengthen its Baltic fleet with battleships squadron. Prior to that, in 1883 and 1886. were laid down two "battleship-ram" "Emperor Alexander II" and "Emperor Nicholas I" and then only in 1889 - "Navarin". Very slowly - one battleship every three years. But in 1891 the Sisoy Veliky was laid down, in 1892 - three battleships of the Sevastopol class at once, and in 1895 - the Peresvet and Oslyabya. And this is not counting the laying of three coastal defense battleships of the "Admiral Senyavin" type, from which, in addition to solving traditional tasks for this class of ships, it was also expected to support the main forces in the general battle with the German fleet.
In other words, the Russian fleet sought to create armored squadrons for a general battle, and of course, such squadrons needed ships to support their actions. In other words, the Russian Imperial Navy needed scouts for squadrons - this role could be played quite successfully by armored cruisers.
However, here, alas, dualism said its weighty word, which largely predetermined the development of our fleet at the end of the 19th century. By creating the Baltic Fleet, Russia wanted to get the classic "two in one". On the one hand, forces were required that could give a general battle to the German fleet and establish dominance in the Baltic. On the other hand, they needed a fleet capable of going out into the ocean and threatening British communications. These tasks completely contradicted each other, since their solution required different types of ships: for example, the armored cruiser "Rurik" was excellent for ocean raiding, but was completely out of place in a linear battle. Strictly speaking, Russia needed a battleship to dominate the Baltic and, separately, a second cruiser fleet for a war in the ocean, but, of course, the Russian Empire could not build two fleets, if only for economic reasons. Hence the desire to create ships that can equally effectively fight enemy squadrons and cruise in the ocean: a similar trend has affected even the main force of the fleet (the series of "battleships-cruisers" "Peresvet"), so it would be strange to think that armored cruisers will not be supplied a similar task.
As a matter of fact, this is exactly how the requirements for the domestic armored cruiser were determined. He was to become a scout for the squadron, but also a ship suitable for ocean cruising.
Russian admirals and shipbuilders at that time did not at all consider themselves "ahead of the rest of the planet", therefore, when creating a new type of ship, they paid close attention to ships of a similar purpose, built by the "Mistress of the Seas" - England. What happened in England? In 1888-1895. "Foggy Albion" built a large number of armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd class.
At the same time, the ships of the 1st class, strange as it may sound, were the "heirs" of the armored cruisers of the "Orlando" class. The fact is that these armored cruisers, according to the British, did not live up to the hopes placed on them, due to overloading their armor belt went under water, thereby not protecting the waterline from damage, and in addition, in England, the post of the chief builder was taken by William White, opponent of the armored cruisers. Therefore, instead of improving this class of ships, England in 1888 began building large armored cruisers of the 1st rank, the first of which were Blake and Blenheim - huge ships with a displacement of 9150-9260 tons, carrying a very powerful armored deck (76 mm, and on the bevels - 152 mm), strong weapons (2 * 234-mm, 10 * 152-mm, 16 * 47-mm) and developing a very high speed for that time (up to 22 knots).
However, these ships seemed to their lordships excessively expensive, so the next series of 8 Edgar-class cruisers, which got on the stocks in 1889-1890, had less displacement (7467-7820 tons), speed (18, 5/20 knots at natural / forced draft) and armor (the thickness of the bevels decreased from 152 to 127 mm).
All these ships were formidable fighters, but they, in fact, were not cruisers for the squadron service, but for the protection of ocean communications, that is, they were "defenders of trade" and "raider killers", and as such, were not very suitable for the Russian fleet. In addition, their development led the British to a dead end - seeking to create ships capable of intercepting and destroying armored cruisers of the Rurik and Russia types, the British in 1895 laid down the armored Powerful and Terribble, which had a total displacement of over 14 thousand. t. The creation of ships of a similar size (and cost), without vertical armor protection, was an obvious nonsense.
Therefore, the analogue for the newest Russian armored cruisers was considered to be the English cruisers of the 2nd class, which had similar functionality, that is, they could serve with squadrons and carry out overseas service.
Starting from 1889-1890 Great Britain laid down as many as 22 Apollo-class armored cruisers, built in two sub-series. The first 11 ships of this type had a displacement of about 3,400 tons and did not carry the copper-wooden plating of the underwater part, which slowed down the fouling of the ships, while their speed was 18.5 knots with natural thrust and 20 knots when forcing boilers. The next 11 Apollo-class cruisers had copper-wood plating, which increased their displacement to 3,600 tons, and reduced their speed (on natural thrust / forced) to 18/19, 75 knots, respectively. The armor and armament of the cruisers of both sub-series were the same - armored deck with a thickness of 31, 75-50, 8 mm, 2 * 152-mm, 6 * 120-mm, 8 * 57-mm, 1 * 47-mm guns and four 356-mm torpedo tubes apparatus.
The next armored cruisers of the British, 8 ships of the Astraea type, laid down in 1891-1893, became the development of the Apollo, and, in the opinion of the British themselves, not a very successful development. Their displacement increased by almost 1,000 tons, reaching 4,360 tons, but the additional weights were spent on subtle improvements - the armor remained at the same level, the armament "grew" by only 2 * 120-mm guns, and the speed decreased further, amounting to 18 knots with natural thrust and 19.5 knots with forced. Nevertheless, it was they who served as the prototype for the creation of a new series of British armored cruisers of the 2nd class.
In 1893-1895. the British lay down 9 Eclipse-class cruisers, which we called the Talbot class (the same Talbot that served as a stationary in the Chemulpo raid along with the Varyag cruiser). These were much larger ships, the normal displacement of which reached 5,600 tons. They were protected by a somewhat more solid armored deck (38-76 mm) and they carried more solid weapons - 5 * 152-mm, 6 * 120-mm, 8 * 76- mm and 6 * 47-m guns, as well as 3 * 457-mm torpedo tubes. At the same time, the speed of the Eclipse-class cruisers was frankly modest - 18, 5/19, 5 knots with natural / forced thrust.
So, what conclusions did our admirals make, watching the development of the class of armored cruisers in the UK?
Initially, a competition was announced for a cruiser project, and - exclusively among domestic designers. They were asked to submit projects of a ship up to 8,000 tons with a displacement of at least 19 knots. and artillery, which included 2 * 203-mm (at the ends) and 8 * 120-mm guns. Such a cruiser for those years looked excessively large and strong for a scout with a squadron, it remains only to assume that the admirals, knowing the characteristics of the British 1st class armored cruisers, thought about a ship that could withstand them in battle. But, in spite of the fact that during the course held in 1894-1895. very interesting projects were received (7,200 - 8,000 tons, 19 knots, 2-3 * 203-mm guns and up to 9 * 120-mm guns), they did not receive further development: it was decided to focus on British armored cruisers 2 rank.
At the same time, it was initially planned to focus on the "Astrea" -type cruisers, with the obligatory achievement of 20 nodal speed and "the largest possible area of action." However, almost immediately a different proposal arose: the engineers of the Baltic Shipyard presented to the ITC preliminary studies of projects for cruisers with a displacement of 4,400, 4,700 and 5,600 tons. All of them had a speed of 20 knots and an armored deck with a thickness of 63.5 mm, only the armament differed - 2 * 152- mm and 8 * 120 mm on the first, 2 * 203 mm and 8 * 120 mm on the second and 2 * 203 mm, 4 * 152 mm, 6 * 120 mm on the third. The note attached to the drafts explained:
"The Baltic Shipyard has departed from the prescribed as an analogue of the British cruiser" Astrea "since it does not represent the most advantageous type among other newest cruisers of different nations."
Then for the "role model" were chosen cruisers of the "Eclipse" type, but then the data on the French armored cruiser "D'Antrkasto" (7,995 tons, armament 2 * 240-mm in single-gun turrets and 12 * 138-mm, speed 19.2 knots). As a result, a new project was proposed for a cruiser with a displacement of 6,000 tons, a speed of 20 knots and an armament of 2 * 203-mm and 8 * 152-mm. Alas, soon, by the will of the admiral-general, the ship lost its 203-mm cannons for the sake of uniformity of calibers and … this is how the history of the creation of domestic armored cruisers of the "Diana" type began.
I must say that the design of this series of domestic cruisers has become an excellent illustration of where the road paved with good intentions leads. In theory, the Russian imperial fleet should have received a series of excellent armored cruisers, surpassing the British in many respects. The armored deck of a single 63.5 mm thickness provided at least equivalent protection with the English 38-76 mm. Ten 152mm guns were preferable to the 5 * 152mm, 6 * 120mm British ship. At the same time, the "Diana" was to become significantly faster than the "Eclipse" and the point was this.
The tests of the warships of the Russian fleet did not provide for forcing the boilers, the Russian ships had to show the contract speed on natural thrust. This is a very important point, which is usually overlooked by the compilers of reference books of the ship's composition (and behind them, alas, by the readers of these reference books). So, for example, data are usually given that Eclipse developed 19.5 knots, and this is true, but it does not indicate that this speed was achieved when forcing the boilers. At the same time, the contract speed of the Diana is only half a knot higher than that of the Eclipse, and in fact the cruisers of this type were able to develop only 19-19, 2 knots. Hence, it can be assumed that the Russian cruisers were even less fast than their English "prototype". But in fact, the "goddesses" developed their 19 knots of speed on natural thrust, at which the Eclipse's speed was only 18.5 knots, that is, our cruisers, with all their shortcomings, were nevertheless faster.
But back to the Diana project. As we said earlier, their protection was expected to be no worse, their artillery was better, and their speed was one and a half knots more than that of the British Eclipse-class cruisers, but that was not all. The fact is that fire tube boilers were installed on the Eclipse, while water tube boilers were planned to be installed on the Diana, and this gave our ships a number of advantages. The fact is that fire-tube boilers require much more time to distribute vapors, it is much more difficult to change operating modes on them, and this is important for warships, and in addition, flooding a compartment with a working fire-tube boiler with the highest probability would lead to its explosion, which threatened the ship with immediate death (in contrast to the flooding of one compartment). Water tube boilers were free of these disadvantages.
The Russian fleet was one of the first to start switching to water-tube boilers. According to the results of the research of the specialists of the Maritime Department, it was decided to use boilers of the Belleville design, and the first tests of these boilers (in 1887 the armored frigate "Minin" was re-equipped) showed quite acceptable technical and operational characteristics. These boilers were believed to be extremely reliable, and the fact that they were quite heavy at the same time was perceived as inevitable payment for other advantages. In other words, the Naval Department realized that there are boilers of other systems in the world, including those that made it possible to provide the same power with significantly less weight than the Belleville boilers, but all this was not tested, and therefore raised doubts. Accordingly, when creating armored cruisers of the "Diana" type, the requirement to install Belleville boilers was absolutely categorical.
However, heavy boilers are not at all the best choice for a fast (even relatively fast) armored cruiser. The weight of the machines and mechanisms "Dian" was absolutely incredible 24, 06% of their own normal displacement! Even for the later-built Novik, which many talked about as a "destroyer of 3,000 tons" and a "cover for cars", in which the fighting qualities were deliberately sacrificed for speed - and the weight of the cars and boilers was only only 21.65% of the normal displacement!
The Diana-class armored cruisers in their final version had 6,731 tons of normal displacement, developed 19-19, 2 knots and carried armament of only eight 152-mm guns. Without a doubt, they turned out to be extremely unsuccessful ships. But it is difficult to blame the shipbuilders for this - the supermassive power plant simply did not leave them the scales to achieve the rest of the planned characteristics of the ship. Of course, the existing boilers and machines were not suitable for a high-speed cruiser, and even the admirals "distinguished themselves" by sanctioning the weakening of the already weak weapons for the sake of a penny saving of weights. And, what is most offensive, all those sacrifices that were made for the sake of the power plant did not make the ship fast. Yes, despite not reaching the contract speed, they were probably still faster than the British Eclipses. But the problem was that the "Mistress of the Seas" did not often build really good ships (the British just knew how to fight them well), and the armored cruisers of this series certainly cannot be called successful. Strictly speaking, neither 18, 5 Eclipse knots, nor 20 Diana contract knots already in the second half of the 90s of the 19th century were not sufficient to serve as a reconnaissance squadron. And the armament in eight openly standing six-inch tanks looked simply ridiculous against the background of two 210-mm and eight 150-mm cannons located in the casemates and towers of the German armored cruisers of the Victoria Louise class - these are the cruisers the Dianas would have to fight in the Baltic in in the event of a war with Germany …
In other words, the attempt to create an armored cruiser capable of performing the functions of a reconnaissance squadron and, at the same time, "pirating" in the ocean in the event of a war with England, failed. Moreover, the lack of their characteristics was clear even before the cruisers entered service.
The Diana-class cruisers were laid down (officially) in 1897. A year later, a new shipbuilding program was developed, taking into account the threat of a sharp increase in Japan: Japanese naval power. At the same time, the ITC (under the leadership of the admiral-general) defined technical tasks for four classes of ships: squadron battleships with a displacement of about 13,000 tons, reconnaissance cruisers of the 1st rank with a displacement of 6,000 tons, "messenger ships" or cruisers of the 2nd class with a displacement in 3,000 tons and destroyers in 350 tons.
In terms of creating armored cruisers of the 1st rank, the Maritime Department took a fairly logical and reasonable step - since the creation of such ships on its own did not lead to success, it means that an international competition should be announced and the lead ship ordered abroad, and then replicated at domestic shipyards. thereby strengthening the fleet and acquiring advanced shipbuilding experience. Therefore, significantly higher tactical and technical characteristics than those of the Diana-class cruisers were presented for the competition - MTK formed a task for a ship with a displacement of 6,000 tons, a speed of 23 knots and an armament of twelve 152-mm and the same number of 75- mm guns. The thickness of the armored deck was not specified (of course, it should have been present, but the rest was left to the discretion of the designers). The conning tower was supposed to have a booking of 152 mm, and the vertical protection of the elevators (supplying ammunition to the guns) and the bases of the chimneys - 38 mm. The coal reserve was supposed to be at least 12% of the normal displacement, the cruising range was not less than 5,000 nautical miles. The metacentric height was also set with a full supply of coal (no more than 0.76 m), but the main dimensions of the ship remained at the discretion of the contestants. And yes, our specialists continued to insist on the use of Belleville boilers.
As you can see, this time the MTK was not guided by any of the existing ships of other fleets of the world, but sought to create a very powerful and fast cruiser of moderate displacement, which has no direct analogues. When determining the performance characteristics, it was considered necessary to ensure superiority over the "Elsweek" cruisers: as follows from the "Report on the Naval Department for 1897-1900", domestic armored cruisers of the 1st rank were to be built: "according to the type of Armstrong high-speed cruisers, but superior their displacement (6000 tons instead of 4000 tons), speed (23 knots instead of 22) and the duration of the test at full speed increased to 12 hours. " At the same time, the armament of 12 rapid-fire 152-mm cannons guaranteed him superiority over any English or Japanese armored cruiser of a similar or smaller displacement, and the speed allowed him to get away from larger and better armed ships of the same class (Edgar, Powerfull, D'Antrcasto ", etc.)
Strictly speaking, this is how the history of the creation of the Varyag cruiser begins. And here, dear readers may have a question - why bother writing such a lengthy introduction, instead of going straight to the point? The answer is very simple.
As we know, the competition for the projects of the 1st rank armored cruisers took place in 1898. It seemed that everything had to go smoothly - a lot of proposals from foreign companies, the choice of the best project, its revision, contract, construction … No matter how it is! Instead of a boring routine of a well-oiled process, the creation of "Varyag" turned into a real detective story. Which began with the fact that the contract for the design and construction of this cruiser was signed before the competition. Moreover, at the time of the signing of the contract for the construction of the Varyag, no cruiser project had yet existed in nature!
The fact is that soon after the competition was announced, the head of the American shipbuilding firm William Crump and Sons, Mr. Charles Crump, arrived in Russia. He did not bring any projects with him, but he undertook at the most reasonable price to build the best warships in the world, including two squadron battleships, four armored cruisers with a displacement of 6,000 tons and 2,500 tons, as well as 30 destroyers. In addition to the above, Ch. Crump was ready to build a plant in Port Arthur or Vladivostok, where 20 destroyers out of the 30 mentioned above were to be assembled.
Of course, no one gave such a "piece of the pie" to Ch. Crump, but on April 11, 1898, that is, even before the competitive projects of armored cruisers were considered by the MTK, the head of an American company on the one hand, and Vice-Admiral V. P. Verkhovsky (chief of the GUKiS), on the other hand, signed a contract for the construction of a cruiser, which later became "Varyag". At the same time, there was no cruiser project - it still had to be developed in accordance with the "Preliminary specifications", which became an appendix to the contract.
In other words, instead of waiting for the development of the project, reviewing it, making adjustments and corrections, as has always been done, and only then signing a construction contract, the Maritime Department, in fact, bought a "pig in a poke" - it signed a contract that provided development by Ch. Crump of the cruiser project based on the most general technical specifications. How did Ch. Crump manage to convince V. P. Verkhovsky is that he is able to develop the best project of all that will be submitted to the competition, and that the contract should be signed as soon as possible so as not to waste precious time?
Speaking frankly, all of the above testifies either to some, downright childish naivety of Vice Admiral V. P. Verkhovsky, or about the fantastic gift of persuasion (on the verge of magnetism), which Ch. Crump possessed, but most of all makes one think about the existence of a certain corrupt component of the contract. It is very likely that some arguments of the resourceful American industrialist were extremely weighty (for any bank account) and knew how to rustle pleasantly in their hands. But … not caught - not a thief.
Be that as it may, the contract was signed. On what happened next … let's just say, there are polar points of view, ranging from "a genius industrialist Crump, struggling his way through the bureaucracy of tsarist Russia, builds a first-class cruiser of breathtaking qualities" and to "scoundrel and swindler, Crump deceived and bribed the Russian Imperial Navy completely unusable ship. " So, in order to as impartially as possible understand the events that took place more than 100 years ago, a respected reader must necessarily imagine the history of the development of armored cruisers in the Russian Empire, at least in the very shortened form in which it was presented in this article …
