In the previous article, the author tried to assess the role of maneuverability for a WWII fighter, having come to the conclusion that maneuverability is an important, but far from the most important quality for machines of that era. Why, then, is the maneuverability of modern combat aircraft so hotly discussed?
There are several reasons for this, and the main one seems to be a misinterpretation of the Cold War experience. Apologists of the "dogfight of the XXI century" church like to recall not so much the Second World War and not even the Korean conflict, where the MiG-15 and Saber, approximately equal in flight performance, converged. No, there is a different conflict at the heart of the assessments. For some reason, aviation enthusiasts consider the need for high maneuverability (and so-called super-maneuverability) with an eye to the Vietnam War.
Losses of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II aircraft are cited as an argument. Indeed, according to various estimates, the United States lost up to 900 such fighters in Vietnam. However, you need to understand that most of the vehicles did not die in air battles, but as a result of non-combat incidents, or from the fire of Vietnamese field artillery. According to the US Air Force, 67 aircraft of all types were lost in air battles, shooting down about the same or more enemy aircraft, while (again, according to the US data), F-4s specifically shot down more than a hundred enemy aircraft.
Be that as it may, only a few "Phantoms" became victims of "MiGs", which preferred to use the "hit and run" tactic against the F-4 loaded with bombs and missiles. And this was quite reasonable given the dominance of American aviation in the skies and the presence of medium-range air-to-air missiles, albeit very imperfect, but still posing a considerable danger. That is, talking about "dogfight" in this case is inappropriate at all. The experience of using missiles in the Arab-Israeli conflicts is a separate topic. Perhaps we will someday break it down in one of the future articles.
Rocket revolution
Now the effectiveness of medium-range air-to-air missiles is constantly growing: modern products have incomparably higher potential than the AIM-7 modifications during the Vietnam war. So aircraft armed with old Soviet R-27R missiles or American Sparrows with semi-active radar homing heads run the risk of facing big problems if more modern missiles such as RVV-AE, AIM-120 or MBDA Meteor are used against them. They do not require radar "illumination" of the target until the moment of its defeat, and do not hold down the fighter pilot in the maneuver after the missile launch.
The effectiveness of the new missiles with an active radar homing head is demonstrated, in particular, by the destruction of the Indian MiG-21 by a Pakistani F-16 fighter (shot down on February 27, 2019 by an AIM-120C missile), as well as the downing of the Syrian Su-22 by an AIM-120 missile (June 18, 2017 of the year). These results are not enough to compile a full-fledged statistical base, but they also show that an enemy aircraft can be hit by even one medium-range missile, which was unattainable for products of the past times of confrontation between the USSR and the United States. At least in combat conditions.
To understand the difference: During the Vietnam War, only ten percent of AIM-7s hit their targets. That is, we can talk about a manifold increase in the effectiveness of medium-range air-to-air missiles over the past half century. In theory, modern electronic warfare systems can affect the accuracy of missiles, however, the ability of new (and even old) products to target interference will significantly neutralize this trump card of a potential victim.
Now experts agree that in a modern air battle, it may not come to close air combat at all. At the same time, on average, one fighter will need from two to five medium-range missiles. And the air battle itself can last not even minutes, but seconds.
Summarize. In the 20th century, the role of maneuverability in air war has been steadily declining since at least the first half of World War II. Some surge of interest in this topic was observed in the 60s and 70s. The reason is trivial: for the effective use of early melee missiles with an infrared homing head, it was desirable to attack the enemy from the rear hemisphere, otherwise the homing head could simply not "catch" the target.
Now new short-range missiles, such as RVV-MD and AIM-9X, no longer require "roundabouts": they can be safely launched into the enemy's forehead with a high chance of defeat. Thus, even the usual close air combat has undergone changes, becoming de facto no longer quite close: a missile with an infrared homing head can effectively hit targets far beyond line of sight, allowing the carrier aircraft to turn around after an attack by 180 degrees and calmly go to your airfield. Without getting involved in unnecessary risky close fights in the spirit of the knights of the sky of the First World War.
Generals are always preparing for the last war
In this situation, a simple question can be posed: what should a modern fighter do in conditions when missile armament has reached such heights? Simply put, how can he survive? There is an opportunity for this, but it requires large financial costs and threatens with considerable technical risks associated with a decrease in the effective scattering area, or, more simply, an improvement in stealth performance.
There is something to strive for. According to the authoritative publication The Aviationist, at the US Air Force Red Flag 17-01 exercise, held in 2017, the latest American fifth-generation F-35 fighters (possibly not without the help of the F-22) defeated the imitating F-16s by a score of 15 to 1. “I didn’t know that the enemy was nearby and didn’t understand who shot me down,” - roughly this is how American pilots who piloted F-16s in exercises, having, by the way, quite modern radar stations, described their collisions with the F-35.
The data from the earlier Red Flag exercises allow us to draw quite specific conclusions: if in World War II speed supplanted maneuverability, now the speed itself has been supplanted by radar stealth. It was she who lay at the forefront of the modern fighter-type aircraft. Nobody intends to change the current course of development of military aircraft, which is confirmed by the new and promising fighters of the USA, Russia, China and Europe, built around the principle of stealth, which often goes against the requirements of improving maneuverability.
But this sacrifice is perfectly justified. Otherwise, we would not have had examples of J-20 or F-35: in fact, the only mass fighters of the fifth generation of the foreseeable future, and possibly the entire first half of the 21st century. If there is an alternative to stealth, we do not see it.
In this regard, the refusal to increase the speeds is completely justified. In modern realities, this is simply not necessary, since high speed is no longer a guarantee of survival. Super-maneuverability - and even more so. In fact, it has receded not even into the background, but into the background, becoming purely optional.
A modern fighter should generally avoid sharp maneuvering in combat conditions, since this threatens with a sharp loss of energy, and besides, huge overloads, which will not allow the pilot to effectively respond to threats. That is, if in a normal situation a fighter still has at least some chances to escape the enemy's missile, then when performing aerobatics it turns into an “ideal” target. And it will be destroyed, if not by the first missile, then by the second - for sure. It can be said even more simply: aerial stunts have little to do with war as such. Unless, of course, modern generals are preparing for the First World War or for repeating the experience of 1941.
Let's summarize. The requirements for a modern fighter aircraft can be arranged in decreasing order of importance as follows:
1. Stealth;
2. Airborne electronic equipment and network centricity;
3. Armament;
4. Speed;
5. Maneuverability.
It is possible that in the future, the priority setting may be influenced by hypersound, but a full-fledged hypersonic fighter may not appear until many decades later.
