To get closer to understanding the role of maneuverability for a modern fighter-type aircraft, one would like to dig deep into history and extract artifacts from the early days of combat aviation. Moreover, sometimes there is a feeling that some modern fighters are being designed with an eye on the experience of … the First World War.
It was then that the classic "dog fight" or, if you like, dogfighting appeared - when relatively slow and poorly armed aircraft were forced to make sharp maneuvers all the time in order to shoot down someone and at the same time stay alive.
Evolution in those years did not stand still. If at the beginning of the war the best aircraft was the extremely archaic (in the opinion of a modern person) Fokker E. I, then in 1917 the Albatros D. III appeared, which even now looks like a formidable combat vehicle. But even such a technically advanced plane as the British Sopwith Snipe fighter did not make a real revolution.
It was committed by the following world war: although, in fairness, let's say, the first rudiments of the further evolution of air combat could be seen earlier, say, during the Spanish Civil War, when Soviet pilots in I-16s began to lose to the Germans in early Bf 109s.
What can be said at the end of the Second World War, except that technology and weapons can evolve at an insane speed? The main conclusion on the tactics of air combat can be formulated as follows: maneuverability faded into the background, and the classic "dog fights" became the lot of desperate daredevils, and more often - inexperienced young pilots. Speed came to the fore.
Speed rises, maneuverability falls: this is the main trend in WWII fighter aircraft. Some Soviet and Japanese aircraft during the war had outstanding maneuverability, but this did not become an important trump card. The time taken to complete a steady turn by the I-16 type 29 at an altitude of 1000 meters was in the optimal left direction more than one and a half times less than that of the Bf.109E-3 (although it was a light donkey configuration without wing armament). However, this did not become a plus due to the fact that the I-16 was much inferior to the Bf.109E and Bf.109F in speed. The latter could develop at a high altitude of 600 kilometers per hour, while the "maximum speed" of the I-16 barely reached 450.
Someone will consider such an example not too correct due to the technological gap that lies between the machines (and it's not just about speed). However, it is worth recalling that German pilots could achieve superiority over the enemy, even if the difference in speed was not too great and amounted to 10-15 kilometers per hour. In this sense, examples of battles between Bf.109G and early Yaks and La-5s (but not La-5FNs!), Which very often became victims of the Messers, are typical. Despite the fact that the same Yak-1B or Yak-9 had a shorter horizontal turn than the Bf.109G, it was incorrect to talk about any superiority of these machines.
I would also like to recall the well-known and very accurate phrase of the most productive German ace Erich Hartmann, on whose account there are officially 352 aerial victories:
“If you see an enemy plane, you don't have to immediately rush at it and attack. Wait and use all your benefits. Assess what formation and what tactics the enemy is using. Evaluate if the enemy has a stray or inexperienced pilot. Such a pilot is always visible in the air. Shoot it down. It is much more useful to set fire to just one than to get involved in a 20-minute merry-go-round without achieving anything."
In a word, the German ace, like many others, did not want to get involved in risky protracted battles on bends. And this allowed him to survive.
A similar picture could be seen in the Pacific Ocean, where the Japanese Zeros, having better maneuverability than the American Grumman F6F Hellcat and Chance Vought F4U Corsair, completely lost the high-speed war. Leaning against the ceiling of its development back in 1942. And even if we look at such a literally outstanding aircraft for its time as the Japanese Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate, we will see that, despite its maneuverability, it was not designed for dogfighting at all. And the "Hay" variant, armed with two 30-mm cannons, was intended to destroy American "fortresses", however, this is a slightly different topic. Interception of heavy bombers requires special qualities: both from the pilot and from his vehicle.
In general, the most powerful piston aircraft of the war, such as the German FW-190D, can be called "straight-flying". They were too clumsy in comparison with earlier machines, even with the FW-190A, which were also not famous for their outstanding maneuverability: at least at altitudes up to 4000 meters.
"The turnaround time at an altitude of 1000 m is 22-23 seconds," says the report in the FW-190D Test Act, approved on June 4, 1945. “In a horizontal maneuver, when meeting at a speed of 0.9 from maximum, La-7 enters the tail of FV-190D-9 in 2–2.5 turns,” the document says. At the same time, experts almost unanimously classify the Douro as one of the most successful medium-altitude fighters of the war. The pilots loved the plane for its high speed, good firepower and good climb rate.
Speed requires sacrifice
Let's summarize. Maneuverability for a WWII fighter was quite an important indicator, but secondary in terms of speed, rate of climb and firepower. The result of the development of propeller driven aircraft was the birth of such machines as the FW-190D, Hawker Tempest and Ki-84, which, for all their merits, were not among the most maneuverable fighters of the war.
This category includes the Soviet La-7 and Yak-3, which had really outstanding horizontal and vertical maneuverability. However, such indicators were achieved due to strict weight and size restrictions, which exclude the placement of any powerful weapons and do not allow aircraft to carry a large supply of fuel, bombs or missiles. The most successful from a conceptual point of view, the Soviet fighter - La-7 - was armed with two 20-mm ShVAK cannons, while the conventional "norm" by the end of the war was the installation of four 20-mm cannons. That is, twice as powerful weapons. The exception was the United States, which traditionally relied on large-caliber machine guns, which was quite enough against poorly defended Japanese fighters. Or the "gaping" FW-190 and Bf.109 in the Western theater of operations.
In theory, the Soviet Union could get a modern "heavy" fighter in the person of the I-185, but long before the end of the war, the country's leadership gave preference to Yakovlev's aircraft. Whether this is correct or not is another question. It deserves a separate consideration.
If we try to sum up the main result, then it is worth noting that the two most important qualities for a WWII fighter plane, in descending order, were:
1. Speed.
2. Powerful weapons.
3. Rate of climb.
4. Maneuverability.
With an incomparably higher value of the first two points, not counting, of course, heavy propeller driven twin-engine aircraft, which in general could rarely fight on an equal footing with their single-engine counterparts.
The proposal follows …
