In April 1972, the lead submarine of project 671RT "Salmon" - K-387 was laid down at the Krasnoye Sormovo shipyard. At the end of December 1972, the ship entered service. This boat became the first carrier of new weapons: torpedoes and anti-submarine missiles with a caliber of 650 millimeters. Of the six torpedo tubes on board, only four had a caliber of 533 millimeters. And two were 650 mm, designed for huge anti-ship torpedoes with a caliber of 65 centimeters or comparable in size anti-submarine missiles (PLUR).
From that moment on, large torpedo tubes and ammunition for them were firmly registered on the Soviet "cruising" submarines. This is understandable: a larger torpedo contained a more powerful warhead, more fuel and oxidizer, and a more powerful engine providing greater speed. For Soviet submarines, which, among other things, needed the ability to attack surface ships as part of strong enemy combat groups, the presence of long-range and high-speed torpedoes was very important. It was the 650-mm torpedoes that became the "main caliber" when working on surface ships in our submarine.
Also, in the case of the PLUR for the 650-mm torpedo tube (86R), a significantly faster delivery of weapons to the target was provided than in the case of the PLUR for the 533-mm TA (83R). The reason is the best flight performance of the "large" rocket, directly related to the size of its engine.
The Navy was armed with the following types of weapons launched through the 65-cm TA:
- 65-73: unguided torpedo with a nuclear warhead TNT equivalent of 20 kilotons;
- 65-76: a torpedo with a conventional warhead and a wake homing system. Later, an improved version appeared - 65-76A;
- PLUR of several types from the PLRK RPK-7 "Veter" (86R, 88R).
Already at the beginning of the eighties, a more advanced than the 65-76 torpedo DST appeared, but it did not enter service, although by the beginning of the nineties, the BIUS was even modified for it on many boats. The torpedo was distinguished by greater safety, the presence of telecontrol, less noise and, in general, was much more advanced than the 65-76A, and much safer to use.
Its trial operation in the Northern Fleet in 1991-1992 was quite successful. Alas, for some strange reason, the well-performing torpedo was never adopted, which later had fatal consequences: it was the explosion of the 650-mm torpedo 65-76A that led to the disaster of the K-141 Kursk submarine and the death of its crew. and seconded specialists. Read more about all this in article by M. Klimov "DST: torpedo, which was not on the" Kursk ".
After the Kursk disaster, the 65-76A were decommissioned, and the 650-mm torpedo tubes were left unarmed. But even earlier, long before that, there was a trend towards rejection of "big" TA. The first "swallow" was the project 945A titanium submarine. It used 8 traditional 533 mm torpedo tubes. This made it possible, on the one hand, to increase the ammunition stock to 40 torpedoes and PLUR. On the other hand, the boat lost its long-range torpedo.
But the main event that put an end to the further development of such a weapon system as the 650-mm TA was the development of the Project 885 Yasen submarine, which was positioned as a submarine of the future and also did not have a 650-mm TA. In the future, such torpedo tubes were not installed on new boats. Yasen-M also does not have them, and the strategists do not have them either.
A few years later, under completely insane circumstances, the corresponding test benches were destroyed. This is best illustrated in the book:
At the time when the decision was made to abandon the 650-mm torpedoes, he had certain sound reasons. So, a surface ship inside a protected order could be hit with a cruise missile, and the abandonment of the 650-mm TA made it possible to increase the ammunition load of 533 mm torpedoes and cruise missiles of the S-10 Granat complex (the Soviet "ancestor" of "Calibers" with a nuclear warhead).
Today, however, the situation has changed dramatically, and we can firmly be sure of the following - the refusal to develop a line of 650-mm torpedoes and TA for them is a mistake. And that's why.
The new reality of submarine warfare
In the late 80s - early 90s of the twentieth century, the US Navy's anti-submarine forces made a revolutionary breakthrough in their development. A dash similar to that made during World War II during the Battle of the Atlantic. Or, to use another analogy - the situation in submarine warfare for submarines has changed in the same way as it changed for aircraft in the sky when massive air defense radars appeared - this did not lead to the disappearance of aircraft, but the nature of war in the air changed completely.
So, the means of low-frequency acoustic search were massively put into operation - now a submarine, which reached a wave of great length from a source of external low-frequency "illumination" returned it back into the water column and was discovered regardless of its level of quietness and secrecy. Computing systems appeared that were capable of working with any array of sensors and emitters as a single whole, which turned the buoy field into a huge single antenna of many jointly working elements.
Powerfully entered into practice non-acoustic methods of detecting submarines by wave manifestations on the surface of the water. Highly efficient towed GAS have appeared, capable of tracking low-frequency water vibrations generated by a moving submarine.
The effectiveness of torpedoes has increased significantly. Combining with the experience gained by NATO countries in anti-submarine defense, all this dramatically, by orders of magnitude, facilitated the work of anti-submarine forces and made it equally difficult for submarines to maintain secrecy.
The latter is now critical not only at the stages of the boat entering the sea, moving to a given area and searching for a target, but also at the time of the use of weapons and even after it. And here the bet on missiles turns out to be a problem - the launch of missiles from the underwater position of the enemy's acoustics will be detected from such a distance that the fact of a missile attack will be known long before the first "Caliber" or "Onyx" is detected by the enemy's radar. Moreover, the number of missiles in the salvo will also be known.
That is why, for example, American submariners do not like to use the Harpoon anti-ship missile system - it unmasks the fact of the presence of a submarine in the area and can show the enemy exactly where it is. And the Mk.48 torpedo, although it has a high noise level, but due to the launch range on remote control and the ability to bring it to the target from the wrong side from which it was launched (giving the enemy a false bearing), the boat has a chance to remain undetected even with the use of torpedoes, "showing" to the enemy only the torpedoes themselves, but not their carrier.
At the same time, it is much more difficult for a modern surface ship to hit a torpedo than a missile, and the destructive force of a torpedo is incomparably higher.
In the conditions of an abrupt increase in the combat effectiveness of anti-submarine forces, not missiles, but torpedoes again become the main weapon, moreover, torpedoes used at the maximum distance with remote control, in the case of an attack by surface ships, zones of acoustic illumination used from outside, which takes place around each western ship group, as on telecontrol, and with guidance on the wake.
Size matters
And here it suddenly turns out that in the dimensions of a 650-mm torpedo, you can create a much more effective means of attacking surface ships than a 533-mm torpedo of a normal size. No matter what level of perfection the power plants of torpedoes have reached, a much more powerful propulsion system can be placed in a 650-mm hull than in a 533-millimeter one, unless, of course, we are talking about engines that are at the same technical level.
This makes it possible to increase the speed of the torpedo. But it is even more interesting to use the reserves of its internal volumes not so much for speed (in 533 mm torpedoes, it is generally sufficient), but to increase the cruising range. Modern telecontrol systems allow shooting at a distance of tens of kilometers, so the length of the fiber-optic cable on the best German telecontrol coils reaches 60 kilometers. The ranges of modern torpedoes at speeds of 35-40 knots reach 50 kilometers - and the old 650-mm 65-76 had the same at 50 knots.
If one day it comes to the creation of new torpedoes in this caliber, then, combining the presence of a 650-mm torpedo in an economical mode with a speed of 35-40 knots, a large supply of unitary fuel or powerful batteries, a smooth acceleration (and a slow increase in noise) after exit from the torpedo, the presence of telecontrol to control the torpedo until its homing system detects the wake of the target ship and the homing system along the wake after disabling telecontrol and separation of the fiber optic cable, it is possible to achieve truly "missile" ranges of torpedoes against surface ships and their groups, while the boat will not need to take risks and take a position too close to the attacked order, and the presence of telecontrol will allow additional reconnaissance of the wake trail with information on board the submarine that the trail has actually been found.
The enemy is aware of the fact that there is an attack only when his hydroacoustics hear a torpedo going to the ship, that is, after a long time after launch, which will give the boat enough time to hide - and this is a fundamental difference between a torpedo attack and a rocket attack
On a torpedo with a caliber of 533 mm, all this is also possible to implement, but it is immeasurably more difficult to provide that very "missile" range, firstly, and according to this parameter, a 650-mm torpedo will still win, all other things being equal - and secondly.
Another important factor is the power of the warhead. It is extremely unlikely that one 533 mm torpedo is capable of disabling, for example, an aircraft carrier. A large 650-mm torpedo is quite capable of this.
Thus, of all the options available, when developing a torpedo for attacking surface targets, a caliber of 650 millimeters is preferable.
An important point - in the thick body of a 650-mm torpedo it is much easier to implement certain measures for acoustic protection of a torpedo - the layout of 533-mm torpedoes is too dense for this, it is not at all a fact that they will be able to provide them with the stealth they need in the near future - the Americans with their Mk.48 can no longer provide it. A large 650mm torpedo can be much quieter than a 533mm torpedo made at the same technological level.
The downside of this caliber is the size, due to which the presence of such torpedoes limits the ammunition load for conventional 533 mm torpedoes. However, a small number of such torpedoes on board and a pair of torpedo tubes (or even one) will not critically limit the ammunition load of 533-mm torpedoes. At the same time, 533-mm torpedoes can be the "main" weapon for most situations, and 650-mm torpedoes - for the most difficult targets, which are too dangerous to approach.
In addition, the option of "doubled ammunition" is possible and effective - when short torpedoes are received in the 650 mm caliber, which significantly reduces the severity of the problem. According to domestic experts, the 650-mm torpedo will surpass the 533-mm torpedo in its transport characteristics even with a hull length of 6 meters (65-76 had a length of more than 11 meters), (see A. S. Kotov, D. Sc. in engineering), A. Yu. Krinsky, "There is an alternative to long-range anti-ship torpedoes 65-76", Scientific and technical collection "Underwater sea weapons" Concern MPO "Gidropribor").
And for the fight against submarines, the caliber of 650 mm can give a lot.
It is no secret that American and British submarines have a tremendous superiority in the detection range of a sonar system in a passive, covert mode over domestic submarines. However, domestic submarines are equipped with SOKS - a wake detection system, which makes it possible to detect the fact of the passage of a foreign submarine at a distance large enough so that it does not detect a Russian submarine or find it, but could not immediately use weapons due to the long distance.
In open water, the commander of a nuclear submarine, upon detecting the wake of a foreign submarine, sometimes has the opportunity to immediately use a PLUR launched through a torpedo tube. This method of attack makes it possible to prevent foreign submarines from approaching domestic submarines at a distance of using weapons.
But a significant part of our underwater confrontation with the West is under the ice. And there it is impossible to do it.
A hypothetical torpedo with guidance along an underwater wake could follow a foreign submarine, moreover, at low speed, without revealing itself - such a mode of movement is quite realizable on electric torpedoes at a modern technological level. And here we again come to the conclusion that a 650-mm torpedo, when performing such a task, may turn out to be better than a 533-mm one. A boat performing the task of covertly searching for an enemy under water can dodge, change course, in order to detect tracking itself. Given that the pursuing torpedo must move stealthily, it may need a long range to follow the target following its trajectory. And the dimensions of the "head" of the torpedo will make it possible to accommodate a larger-sized homing system in it, which, in light of the size of our electronic equipment, may also be necessary if the required functionality cannot be implemented in a normal 533-mm caliber.
Naturally, such a large-sized anti-submarine torpedo should be electric, not thermal. And even when following the wake, it must have a telecontrol to assess what is happening on board the Russian submarine that launched it.
All of the above, in an unexpected way, makes 650-mm torpedo tubes in demand even on strategic submarines - after all, if hunting for surface ships is not their regular task, then a battle with an enemy hunter's boat is almost inevitable for them in the event of a real war.
Another advantage of a large-caliber torpedo tube is the ability to launch a larger unmanned underwater vehicle through it than is provided by the 533-mm TA. Such UAVs, as well as torpedoes controlled or guided via fiber-optic cable, can be used for reconnaissance in a wide variety of conditions. They can even be used to issue target designation to weapons. Moreover, it is technically feasible to create a "remote periscope" on such an UVA, with the help of which the submarine commander could visually assess the surface situation tens of kilometers from the submarine itself. And again, the dimensions of such a "drone" turn out to be useful - more powerful batteries and more voluminous and heavier electronic systems can be installed in it, which, alas, is still in demand in our conditions.
Another important advantage that a 650-mm torpedo launcher gives on each multipurpose submarine is the ability to create and combat use of large cruise missiles and, accordingly, range.
It is no secret that the cruise missile of the Navy 3M14 "Caliber" in its performance characteristics is significantly inferior to the cruise missile Kh-101, which is used by the Aerospace Forces. This is due precisely to the size of the missiles - the X-101 is corny more, which makes it possible to place more fuel on it, an engine with more thrust, more explosive in the warhead, if it is ever needed, and so on. Opportunities for increasing the size of the KR "Caliber" are limited precisely by its diameter, which is the same for the surface and underwater versions. "Large" torpedo tubes make it possible to create and use an underwater version of the enlarged KR of the "Caliber" family. This will increase the importance of any torpedo submarine in the system of strategic nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and ensure the delivery of missile strikes over a huge range from safe waters.
One of the advantages of deploying long-range missiles on sea carriers is that they make it possible to "move" the launch line of the CD to any enemy. The presence of especially long-range cruise missiles in the arsenal of submarines will make this much easier and safer. In addition, they, like a large torpedo, may have a more powerful warhead.
It was for similar purposes that as many as 4 650-mm torpedo tubes were installed on German-built Israeli submarines of the "Dolphin" type. According to the US Navy, they are used to launch Israeli cruise missiles from the Raphael Popeye Turbo with a range of up to 1,500 kilometers. It is believed that some of these missiles can be equipped with a nuclear warhead.
In the case of Russia, a hypothetical large missile would have a range of many thousands of kilometers.
conclusions
In the late eighties, the Navy and the military-industrial complex underestimated the potential of 650-mm torpedoes. This was partly due to objective reasons, and partly it was just a mistake.
But today, in the new changed conditions, the need to resume both the development of torpedoes in this caliber and the use of such torpedo tubes on future submarines is obvious. The presence of such weapons is one of the very few potential (not yet real) advantages of Russia in submarine warfare, which can become real in a few years (from seven to eight with the right approach). And the opportunity to realize such an advantage should not be missed.
At the moment, the Laika R&D project is underway in Russia - a program for the development of a next generation submarine. It would be right if it had 650mm torpedo tubes on board again. It will also be correct if, with the modernization of the third-generation nuclear-powered ships that is starting now, 650-mm torpedo tubes not only remain in their armament, but also receive new torpedoes and cruise missiles in ammunition.
If we do not do stupid things, "65 centimeters of death" will still have their weighty say.
