The information circulated in the article "Fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse" information that a submarine in a submerged (underwater) position can be detected by means of radar caused some excitement, and even a response - the article "On the collapse of the Russian Navy and new methods of detection submarines ".
It is necessary to clarify the situation with this effect once and for all, so that the question of whether it is possible to detect a submerged submarine using a surface or airborne radar no longer arises, as well as the desire to call this method "new".
Techniques for working with information require that all data sources be divided into groups according to the degree of verifiability, after which, if possible, they need to be cross-checked. In our case, the amount of available information is large enough to carry out such a check.
Scientific substantiation of the possibility of detecting an underwater object using radar
The author of the shoehanger blog has done a tremendous job of collecting links to scientific publications justifying the possibilities of such a search. In order:
1. Stefanik, Non-Acoustic Methods for Submarine Detection, 1988, 2. Potter, Various Promising Unconventional Submarine Detection Techniques, 1999, On the physics of determining turbulence:
3. George and Tantalus, Synthetic Aperture Radar Measurement of Mixed Ocean Turbulence, 2012, 4. Tunali, Bernoullis Hump Created by a Submarine, 2015, 5. There are more links to Tyunali's work here:
6. Contemporary Chinese article. Liu and Jin, Mathematical Modeling of Synthetic Aperture Radar Registration of a Submerged Object Wake, 2017, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7887099 (not available for download).
Of course, knowledge of English is required.
It is worth noting that a really simple search using scientific terminology yields dozens of scientific papers, experiments, companies, etc., related to the detection of underwater objects using radar surface observation.
Then we return to the already posted report for the US Navy: "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES".
It also lists the theoretical rationale behind the effect of anomalies on radar screens. The report lists one theory of the appearance of atmospheric effects over the location of the submarine and four theories of the appearance of anomalies on the water surface, moreover, each of them is referred to as "well-known", that is, the authors of the report refer to them as well known.
A simple cross-validation of headings reveals that, for example, Jake Tunali, whose work is listed above, investigated the same Bernoulli Hump mentioned in the 1975 US report. That is, the phenomenon is described both in an old declassified report (superficially) made in the United States, and in an English scientific publication in 2015. Further, looking ahead, let us say that it is the Bernoulli effect that can generate the very “standing wave” that was the subject of research on the R&D “Window” in the USSR in the late 1980s. We will come back to this later.
What conclusion should we draw from this all? Simple: the effect of manifestation of anomalies on the water surface above a submarine moving in depth has scientific justification. Or it is necessary to refute the calculations of all the above authors (which, again, running ahead, is impossible, since they have been repeatedly checked. But the inquisitive reader may well try and refute).
So, conclusion number one: science does not just admit the discussed effect, it confirms it
Moving on.
Now we need to decide on the detection of submarines by observing surface anomalies in the radar range. Since everything related to submarine warfare and anti-submarine warfare in the world is carefully secreted, we must simply answer the question - is there documented evidence or not, without plunging into what they are and about what.
Everything is simple here - the already mentioned American report was classified until 1988, only military and defense contractors had access to it, it was written "for their own", moreover, in the extremely sensitive area of anti-submarine defense, and to assume that it lists false (not incorrect, namely false) data is at least stupid. If this document were the only document related to the topic under discussion, then it could be completely rejected as disinformation on the part of the enemy, but, as we can see, it is far from the only one. Accordingly, the question of whether there is documented data on radar detection of submarines in a submerged state has to be answered in the affirmative: at least the US Navy has them. You can, of course, build a theory that the scientific articles listed above are correct, and the report is fake, but who would have thought of doing this and, most importantly, why?
So, conclusion number two: with a high degree of probability, the US Navy has a lot of backed-up statistics on the detection of submarines in a submerged state using surface (and air) radars
Moving on.
Anyone who has been involved in investigations or intelligence activities knows that unconfirmed rumors, stories, etc. can make a difference. At least some of them can be checked and further documented (if you have access to the documents). In addition, the very fact of a large number of personal testimonies, even if inaccurate, which more or less similarly describe a certain phenomenon or event, is the so-called. "Information trail", and indicates that, with a high degree of probability, but the described phenomenon or event actually took place, in one form or another.
That is, in documentary unconfirmed, but similar testimonies, we in a sense are dealing with the stories of "wise men who groped an elephant with a blindfold." Their, this evidence, could be challenged, but only if there were no "hard" evidence, the above, documented. And they are, and are mentioned above.
The original article contained the statements of Lieutenant General Sokerin and Captain First Rank Soldatenkov. In reality, there are many times more such evidence. There is no way to quote them, the format of the article simply does not provide for the placement of such an array of data.
Instead, we will give a certain "amount" - something that can be established, assuming that the undocumented evidence is correct, and creating a kind of short "story" out of them. Naturally, it is very difficult to collect a "squeeze" from the stories of US Navy veterans, especially considering the frenzy with which the US Navy is still "splurge".
Therefore, below the reader's attention is offered a "squeeze" from what the officers of the Soviet and Russian naval forces said.
This completes the "extraction" of undocumented messages.
Those who are related to intelligence, naval aviation, the Navy, who fly to intercept Americans from the Aerospace Forces, etc. competent people can confirm - US Navy Base Patrol has moved to medium heights. It is a fact. They no longer need to go down in order to accurately set the field of buoys, or several buoys - this remained in the early 80s. Now everything, apparently, is both faster and easier …
Such a wave of information cannot be ignored. The banal mention of the topic "Window" on the "Military Review" revealed a lot of people who are well aware of it, studied it in military schools, searched for submarines using radar methods. Many have noted in the comments.
Russian naval aviation pilots do not just know about the effect - they study it and use it to the best of their ability. The problem is the extremely outdated search and targeting systems, many times inferior to those that the Americans used in the late 1980s.
Junior submariner commanders are often aware of this problem as well. Many submarine commanders are aware of this.
But “several levels higher” the problems begin - the persons responsible for the development of the fleet, for choosing what to direct funding for, and so on. behave as if the described method of detecting submarines simply does not exist, and the boat needs to be quiet enough to be undetectable.
What is it fraught with? The fact that in the course of hostilities, submarines will receive missions based on the conditions of their undetectability, and from the same conditions will be assigned to ensure the fulfillment of combat missions - aviation, for example.
And they will be quite detectable, and it will not be very difficult.
The rest is clear?
And we must understand that the capabilities of the base anti-submarine aircraft of the US Navy are "propped up" by satellite reconnaissance. And they also carefully secret this. True, it turns out sometimes funny:
New York Times, 1999-11-05
Since the beginning of the space age, most satellites have observed the Earth with cameras, which, in principle, are similar to those of any tourist. However, in 1978, NASA's National Aeronautics and Space Administration launched a new satellite that took pictures of radio waves reflected from the planet's surface.
Known as Seasat, this radar satellite saw land and sea in a new way, his photographs revealed narrow lines in the ocean - tracks left by the passage of ships and submarines. Somehow we managed to distinguish the signs of deep turbulence from regular foam and sea waves.
The Seasat exploits came to an abrupt end in 1978 when the spacecraft unexpectedly descended 100 days later and the Pentagon became deeply ambivalent with its discoveries.
Of course, the Navy immediately lost interest in its discoveries, but of course. How could they have done otherwise? And we, of course, will believe them.
More (including new satellites) - at Shoehanger, with a link to the original.
I would like to end with a quote from Sergei Gennadievich Roslyakov, captain of the first rank, former commander of the K-455 nuclear submarine, former commander of a submarine division.
Back in 1985, I could not understand: WHY our nuclear submarine in the Pacific Ocean goes under the screws of civilian transport for 10 hours at a speed of 15 knots (28 km per hour with a displacement of 5500 tons) and before a communication session IMMEDIATELY sharply to the right at a speed of 5 knots. And above us is Orion-P3c. At first I thought that this was the result of the work of the US Navy's low-frequency BPA buoys, which were in service with the BPA ("Orion-P3s"). But then there were other cases that refuted my opinion. And this is all in the sea, where NOBODY will help YOU.
… Americans "see" our nuclear submarines everywhere …
So the captain of the first rank S. G. Roslyakov commented on the article “A Fleet Without Ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse”, which mentioned the radar detection of submarines.
As they say, smart is enough. And the rest can continue to pretend that everything is fine.
P. S. There are ways to combat the phenomenon and reduce the likelihood of detecting submarines in this way, but for obvious reasons, no one in their right mind will talk about them. Nevertheless, it is no longer possible to close our eyes to the problem. Time is almost up.
