In a duel situation, our fighter has a better chance
Su-27 heavy fighters will be the main tool for the operational maneuver of air defense groups in the most dangerous sectors. His opponent is likely to be the main fighter of the United States Air Force, the F-15C.
In the open press one can often find comparative assessments of combat aircraft, mainly fighters. In most cases, the authors of such materials try to determine the winner in a real battle based on a comparison of tactical and technical characteristics, airborne electronic equipment and weapons, as well as maneuvering capabilities. Combat tactics, the purpose of the compared combat vehicles are not taken into account.
The choice of yardstick
A certain exception is the comparison of Soviet and American fourth-generation fighters, which in the 90s had a chance to converge in training battles. However, the parties tried to avoid the full-fledged use of their RES, in particular, electronic warfare, apparently for reasons of flight safety and secrecy. The MiG-29 fighters, which the FRG got from the NNA of the GDR, were also subjected to a similar test. In these battles, our vehicles demonstrated superiority, mainly due to their maneuverability. But a combat fighter is a complex that includes, in addition to the aircraft itself and its onboard equipment, weapons, including suspended weapons, primarily missiles. And in terms of purpose, the aircraft of different countries differ. Therefore, to compare the two samples, it is advisable to refer to the methodology that was tested on Russian and foreign warships, adapting it to aircraft.
The first step is to correctly select the objects for matching. With a significant advantage of NATO in combat aviation, the main task of our air forces will be to prevent the enemy from gaining air superiority. The main solution to this problem, taking into account the limited capabilities to deliver strikes against the aircraft basing system of the alliance, is to destroy them in battle. Accordingly, the main role is assigned to fighter aircraft. To assess the real level of combat capabilities, it is advisable to choose the most massive types of vehicles. We have Su-27 and MiG-29 of various modifications. Possessing a long range and powerful armament, the Su-27 heavy fighters will be the main means for the operational concentration of air defense potential in the most dangerous areas. The NATO opponent is likely to be the F-15C.
Recognizing the correctness of such a comparison, let us take into account that the "duelists" will have to carry out a range of other tasks, in particular, to destroy airborne radar and electronic warfare aircraft, bombers and attack aircraft. Note that both samples do not have special bomber equipment, so their use for strikes against ground and sea targets will be the exception rather than the rule. Let us dwell on the analysis of the capabilities of the Su-27 and F-15C to fight precisely with fighters, with each other.
Our eagle
Su-27 with a normal take-off weight of about 23 tons can carry up to six thousand kilograms of load and has a combat radius when flying at high altitudes at subsonic speeds of up to 1400 kilometers. Outboard armament is located on ten nodes: six under the wings and four under the fuselage and engine nacelles. Ammunition - air-to-air missiles: medium-range with semi-active seeker (PRGSN) - R-27R and R-27RE, thermal seeker (TGSN) - R-27T and R-27TE, as well as short-range with TGSN R-73 … The built-in armament is represented by a 30-mm air cannon with 150 rounds of ammunition. The averaged RCS of the Su-27 airframe is estimated at 10–20 square meters. The thrust-to-weight ratio of the aircraft is greater than one. The RLPK-27 onboard radar sighting system includes an N001 pulse-Doppler radar with mechanical scanning of space, which allows you to find targets with an EPR corresponding to the American F-15C, at distances of up to 190 kilometers in the PPS and up to 80-100 kilometers in the ZPS. The Su-27 has an optical locating station (OLS) 36Sh with a search field of 120x75 degrees, capable of detecting fighter-type objects at a distance of up to 50 kilometers in the ZPS and up to 15 kilometers in the PPS. The weapon control system provides tracking of up to 10 targets and the firing of one of them with two missiles with PRGSN. The on-board defense complex includes an SPO-15 "Bereza" radiation warning station, and APP-50 passive jamming blocks. At the wingtips (in place of the launcher), an active jamming station "Sorption" can be installed in two containers. In its basic configuration, the Su-27 does not have the ability to use guided weapons to engage ground and surface targets.
The maximum energy firing range of the R-27 missile is 80 kilometers in the PPS and 20-30 kilometers in the ZPS. Corresponding indicators for R-27RE and TE are 110 and 40, for R-73 - 30 and 10-15. However, the effective firing range may turn out to be significantly (several times) less depending on the flight altitude of the target and carrier, the capabilities of the target capture of the seeker.
Their hawk
The F-15C with a normal take-off weight of about 21 tons has a combat radius when flying at high altitudes at a subsonic speed of up to 900 kilometers. Suspended armament is located at eight nodes, where four medium and short-range missiles are placed in a typical load. The thrust-to-weight ratio, even with a normal take-off weight, is less than one. The averaged RCS of the airframe is slightly higher than that of the Su-27. The vast majority of F-15Cs are equipped with AN / APG-63 airborne radar of various modifications, which ensures the detection of an aircraft with an EPR, like that of the Su-27, at a distance of 160-170 kilometers in the PPS. Azimuth scanning is mechanical, and elevation scanning is electronic. The main means of fire are medium-range missiles with PRGSN AIM-120 (AMRAAM) and short-range missiles with TGSN AIM-9L / M. The built-in armament is represented by a 20 mm Vulcan cannon. The airborne defense complex includes the Laurent AN / FLR-56 radiation warning station (RWS), AN / FLQ-135 active jamming and AN / FLE-45 dipole reflector ejection. The maximum energy range of the AIM-120 missile is estimated at 50 kilometers in the PPS and about 15–20 kilometers in the ZPS. The figures for the AIM-9L / M roughly correspond to the Russian P-73.
Let us state that both aircraft have symmetrical armament (when the Su-27 with Sorption is considered, in this case the composition of the missile weapons is identical). The experience of joint exercises shows that the Russian fighter is superior to the opponent in vertical and horizontal maneuverability.
The F-15C without additional fuel tanks (DTB) has a 36 percent smaller combat radius. Parity with the Su-27 will require the suspension of two heavy-fuel tanks, which will further reduce its maneuverability and reduce the number of weapons by two missiles. The AIM-120 is almost twice as weak as our R-27RE in terms of energy. An important advantage of our fighter is the presence of medium-range missiles with TGSN in the ammunition load. This makes it possible to carry out covert attacks from medium distances according to the OLS without the use of RLPK in the ZPS.
To the barrier!
Consider a scenario where both aircraft are searching over a wide area. The most effective mode of the radar in this case is periodic switching on for a short time. This is due to the fact that the reps of both vehicles are capable of detecting the operation of the enemy's radar at a distance approximately one and a half times greater than the range of their detection. That is, when the radar is switched on continuously, the enemy has the opportunity to preempt and get into a more advantageous position for an attack. At the same time, the Russian fighter can conduct a continuous search using an OLS in a passive mode.
Without going into the details of the calculation, we will give the final result. The probability of detection for a single survey of the area by Russian and American fighters when using only the radar is approximately the same - 0, 4–0, 5. The probability of anticipation when using STR and leaving the viewing strip or taking other retaliatory measures is 0, 3–0, 4. But when maneuvering, when both seek to get out of the viewing strip, the Russian fighter can effectively use the OLS to covertly detect the enemy and attack using missiles with TGSN. In addition, having more long-range IRBMs, the Su-27, even if the F-15C detects it earlier, has a serious chance of preempting the American, since he must approach the target for a relatively long time to reach the salvo position.
The F-15C will be able to carry out the first attack with medium-range missiles with a probability of about 0.2. The Su-27's ability to forestall the enemy using not only medium-range but also short-range missiles is estimated at 0.25–0.3, according to the OLS. Electronic warfare. Active jamming stations are capable of disrupting the automatic tracking of enemy radars for a certain period of time. It takes a few seconds to re-capture the target of the PRGSN. The probability of disrupting an attack by missiles with PRGSN can be quite significant - up to 0, 4–0, 6. The Russian fighter has a better indicator, since the Su-27 performs an anti-missile maneuver more energetically and using aerobatics that are inaccessible to the F-15C. The probability of a preemptive destruction of our aircraft by an American will not exceed 0.7-0.09. Su-27 when using R-27R (RE) missiles with PRGSN, as well as R-27T (TE) or R-73 with TGSN will destroy the enemy in the first strike with a significantly greater probability - 0, 12–0, 16, in particular, due to the fact that missiles with TGSN, launched according to the data of an OLS operating in a passive mode, are very problematic to detect with sufficient lead to repel a strike.
If the first attacks are disrupted from both sides, close air combat will begin, in which the Su-27, as experience has shown, has an undeniable superiority over the F-15C. Predicting its results, presumably, the American pilot will try to get out of the battle. In this case, a certain probability of its destruction will take place. But even the probabilities obtained from the results of the first strike speak for themselves: the Russian fighter is more than one and a half times (1, 7) more effective than the American.
A different picture develops when the F-15C acts on guidance in the radar field, for example, according to the data of the AWACS aircraft. In this case, he will go directly to the point of attack covertly, without turning on the radar. If the Su-27 is not provided with guidance data, that is, it acts independently, searching for targets using radar and OLS, the enemy will most likely be able to take a position for a preemptive strike. However, our fighter will employ sophisticated maneuvering and probably use its radar station in continuous mode, seeking to detect an attack. The F-15C will be advantageous to take a position for a salvo of short-range missiles with TGSN - for a sudden and virtually irresistible strike. If this happens, our fighter will most likely be destroyed. But, since the F-15C does not have optoelectronic systems similar to our OLS, and therefore must actually be brought up to the target acquisition range of the short-range missile's TGSN "from under the wing", the use of the AIM-120 with PRGSN is more likely. In this case, he will be forced to turn on the radar for automatic target tracking and its illumination to ensure missile guidance. The Russian fighter will be able to take measures to disrupt the attack and will begin maneuvering to search for the American fighter and launch an attack on it or evade the battle and leave the enemy's observation zone. Rough estimates of the options for the outcome of such a collision show that the probability of destroying our fighter is very high and can be up to 0.4-0.5, while the F-15C may die with a probability of less than 0.05.
With a directly opposite situation and a similar logic of the development of events, the probability of the death of the F-15C will be higher - 0.5-0.65 be used from a range inaccessible to the American AIM-9L / M.
When both fighters are aiming in the radar field, each side will seek to secure its advantageous position for attack. The Americans, realizing the weaknesses of the F-15C, are likely to confine themselves to long-range combat. Ours, accepting the challenge, will try to build on the success of the duel in close combat. At long ranges, the advantage of our missiles in energy will affect, as well as the presence of an RSD with PRGSN and TGSN, which will significantly increase the likelihood of hitting targets in conditions of REP. Thus, in duels between pairs and flights, our Su-27s will have an advantage over the American F-15Cs. However, in combat operations involving large masses of aviation, other factors will play a decisive role: the tactics chosen and the formation of air formations, the organization of command and control of the airspace, and interaction.
In general, it can be stated that our fighter is superior to the American one and in possible collisions has a better chance of destroying it. This is not surprising, since the Su-27 was created in the early 80s, while the F-15 was created in the mid-70s.
