America versus England. Part 15. Woe to the Vanquished

America versus England. Part 15. Woe to the Vanquished
America versus England. Part 15. Woe to the Vanquished

Video: America versus England. Part 15. Woe to the Vanquished

Video: America versus England. Part 15. Woe to the Vanquished
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America versus England. Part 15. Woe to the Vanquished
America versus England. Part 15. Woe to the Vanquished

French citizens entering Paris during the Second World War by the Nazis. Source:

When talking about the reasons for the catastrophic defeat of bourgeois France by Nazi Germany in the spring of 1940, external and internal reasons are usually mentioned. First of all, they call the Wehrmacht with its blitzkrieg - a deep offensive operation with close interaction of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation, as well as the French defeatists with their slogan "slavery is better than war." For my part, I want to draw your attention to such a reason for France's defeat as her betrayal by the political leadership of Poland and England.

According to Churchill, after the fall of Warsaw, “Modlin, a fortress twenty miles downstream of the Vistula … fought until September 28th. So it was all over in one month”(W. Churchill. World War II // https://militera.lib.ru/memo/english/churchill/1_24.html). “The attempts of the Germans in several rounds (September 3, 8, 14) to push the Soviet side to go beyond the line of demarcation of Soviet-German interests, drawn in the secret protocol, were withdrawn by Moscow under various pretexts” (Falin BM On the background of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany / / Score of World War II Who started the war and when? - M.: Veche, 2009. - P. 99). And only after Tokyo officially notified on September 16 about the cessation of hostilities in Mongolia and the threat of the Germans to create "on the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, if Soviet troops do not enter there, the state of Ukrainian nationalists under the control of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)" (Shirokorad A. What did the Moscow Treaty of 1939 give Russia? // https://vpk-news.ru/articles/17649) Red Army units entered Poland on September 17, 1939.

At the same time, "taking into account the mood of the ruling circles of England and France regarding the" Curzon line "(M. Meltyukhov, Stalin's missed chance. The Soviet Union and the struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 // https://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov /03.html) Stalin decided to reconsider his August agreements with the Germans regarding Poland, he sent troops "to help the Ukrainians and Belarusians who are threatened by the Germans" Vistula ". Already on September 20, Molotov suggested that Schulenburg discuss the “fate of the Polish state,” “On September 23, Ribbentrop informed Moscow about his readiness to arrive for negotiations and asked for a convenient time for this. The Soviet government proposed September 27-28, and … in the evening of September 25, Stalin and Molotov conveyed to Schulenburg a proposal to discuss at future negotiations the transfer of Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of interests, and in return they were ready to abandon part of the Warsaw and Lublin Voivodeships to the Bug. Stalin said that if the Germans agree to this, then "the USSR will immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic states, in accordance with the protocol of August 23, and expects the full support of the German government in this matter" (M. Meltyukhov, September 17, 1939. Soviet-Polish conflicts 1918-1939. - M: Veche, 2009. - S. 433-434).

During the negotiations on September 27-29, Stalin told Ribbentrop that he saw in the partition of Poland along the Vistula the reason for possible friction between the USSR and Germany, since if Germany created a protectorate, and the USSR was forced to form an autonomous Polish socialist Soviet republic, then this, in the opinion Stalin, could give the Poles a pretext for raising the question of "reunification". The Germans went to meet the Soviet side and on September 28 a new agreement was adopted on the delimitation of spheres of interest along the Bug. Germany was left with a small so-called ransomed later. "Mariampolsky ledge". Since now "the Curzon line" drawn in December 1919 was taken as a standard.the supreme council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland "(Falin. BM Decree. op. - p. 99), the USSR could show England and France that" it does not claim national Polish territories, and its actions are potentially anti-German in nature "(Meltyukhov M I. Soviet-Polish conflicts 1918-1939. Op. Cit. - p. 441).

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Border of mutual state interests of the USSR and Germany on the territory of the former Polish state. September 1939. Source:

Indeed, “although the Anglo-French press allowed itself rather harsh statements, the official position of England and France was reduced to a tacit recognition of the Soviet action in Poland” (Meltyukhov MI Soviet-Polish conflicts 1918-1939. Decree. Op. - S. 439). America also refused to “qualify the crossing by Soviet troops of the eastern border of Poland, established by the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, as an act of war. For reasons of long-term order, the embargo requirements stipulated by the law on neutrality in terms of the sale of weapons and military materials were not extended to the USSR”(Falin, B. M. Decree, op. P. 99). As for Churchill, he was still convinced of the deep and, in his opinion, insurmountable antagonism between Russia and Germany, and clung to the hope that the Soviets would be drawn to our side by the force of events”(W. Churchill, ibid.).

Already on September 12, 1939, Hitler announced “his intention, after the victory in Poland, to immediately launch an offensive in the west with the aim of crushing France. On 17 September, the Army Command issued a preliminary order in this spirit. On September 20, Hitler announced his decision to start an offensive war against Western countries in 1939. On September 27, Hitler gathered the commanders of the three branches of the armed forces in the Reich Chancellery and already officially announced his intention "(Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. - M.: ACT; Transitbook; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 2004. - p. 75 –76) “as soon as possible go on the offensive in the West with the inclusion of the territories of Holland and Belgium in the combat zone” (Müller-Hillebrand B. German Land Army. 1933–1945 - M.: Izografus, 2002. - P. 174). Hitler also pointed out the goal of the upcoming hostilities - to crush France and bring England to her knees. "September 29 … the commander-in-chief of the ground forces instructed Halder to prepare preliminary considerations on the strategic concentration and deployment of the German army and the conduct of operations" after overcoming the Dutch and Belgian fortifications "(Dashichev V. I. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. Historical essays. Documents and materials. In 2 vol. Volume I. Preparation and deployment of Nazi aggression in Europe. 1933-1941. - M.: Nauka, 1973. - P. 431).

On October 6, 1939, Hitler proposed to convene a general peace conference, which threatened to turn into a new Munich. And only after the refusal on October 7, Daladier on October 9, Hitler gave the order to prepare a plan for the defeat of France "Gelb". Germany planned to complete the preparations for conducting an offensive operation in the West by November 11, 1939. Such a short time frame for preparing an offensive was explained by the fact that Hitler thought that “a long war with France and England would drain Germany's resources and put her in danger of a fatal blow from Russia. He believed that France must be forced into peace by offensive actions against her; as soon as France leaves the game, England will accept it ", which remained unchanged since the days of" Mein Kampf "- the surrender of their leading positions to America and the joint defeat of the USSR (Liddell Garth B. G. World War II. - M.: AST, St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 1999 //

On October 10, Hitler repeated his attempt, having received a refusal from Chamberlain the next day. At the same time, if Chamberlain strictly followed the American plan to defeat France because he was forced to think not about a new four-party agreement, but about expelling Churchill, who led the war party, from the government, Daladier really believed that Germany was on the verge of defeat. On October 10, France began developing plans to tighten the economic blockade of Germany. In particular, it was supposed to paralyze the mechanized Soviet army, industry, agriculture by bombarding the Soviet centers of oil production and its processing in the Caucasus, supplying the country with up to 80-90% of fuel and oils Germany. “In Paris it meant that these plans should be carried out in close cooperation with the British” (Stepanov A. Caucasian crisis. Part 1 // https://www.airforce.ru/history/caucasus/caucasus1.htm). On October 19, 1939, England and France signed an agreement on mutual assistance with Turkey, which made it possible, if necessary, to significantly expand the network of airfields for an attack on the USSR.

Meanwhile, the USSR began to expand its sphere of influence. “As early as October 1, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a program for Sovietization of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, which began to be rigorously implemented. The People's Assemblies of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, elected on October 22nd, on October 27-29, proclaimed Soviet power and asked to be incorporated into the USSR. On November 1–2, 1939, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted their request. These events completed the solution of the Polish question”(MI Meltyukhov, ibid.). On September 28, 1939, the Soviet Union signed an agreement on mutual assistance with Estonia, on October 5 - with Lithuania, on October 10 - an agreement on mutual assistance and transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Republic of Lithuania. On October 5, 1939, V. Molotov invited the Finnish Foreign Minister E. Erkko to Moscow for negotiations "to discuss topical issues of Soviet-Finnish relations." The negotiations were disrupted by the Finns and ultimately ended with the incident in Mainil and the outbreak of hostilities on November 30, 1939.

The Soviet-Finnish war drew the attention of the belligerent countries to the northern regions of Europe. “For the Germans, the question of whether the invasion of the Western Allies in Norway should not be prevented in order to exclude the threat to the northern flank of Germany, at the same time to ensure the unhindered import of ore and capture bases for their fleet outside the limited German Bay [the German coast North Sea - SL]. On December 14, 1939, Hitler instructed the OKW to study the question of the possibility of military occupation of Denmark and Norway. In January 1940, he decided to begin the practical preparation of such an operation. On January 16, 1940, the state of constant combat readiness for the immediate start of the offensive … in the West … was canceled. On January 27, 1940, a working headquarters was created at the OKW, which began to develop this operation, which bore the code name "Weserubung" (Mueller-Gillebrand B. Decree. Cit. - pp. 175, 179-180).

The dragging out of the Soviet-Finnish war gave England and France a chance to accelerate the victory over Germany by providing tacit help to Finland with volunteers, military equipment, weapons and ammunition, and by openly declaring war on the USSR. In this case, according to E. Daladier, “the economic war of the allies against Germany will become more effective, because they will be able to strike at oil developments in the Caucasus, from where Germany gets fuel, and go to Finland through Norway and Sweden, thus cutting off Germany from her main source of iron ore. As the Allied intelligence reports the German economy is overstretched, these Allied actions will force Berlin to admit that the war is lost; the German military, officials, representatives of industry and finance, already disappointed with the current policy, will unite and displace Hitler and the world - without a single shot and without a single bomb dropped on the Western Front (May ER Strange Victory / Translated from English - M.: AST; AST MOSCOW, 2009. - S. 359–365).

Meanwhile, “On February 11, 1940, an economic agreement between the USSR and Germany was signed in Moscow. It stipulated that the Soviet Union would supply Germany with goods in the amount of 420-430 million German marks in 12 months, that is, until February 11, 1941. Germany was obliged to supply the USSR with military materials and industrial equipment for the same amount in 15 months, that is, before May 11, 1941. On August 11, 1940 (six months after the signing of the agreement), as well as on February 11, 1941 (a year later), German supplies should have lagged behind Soviet ones by no more than 20%. Otherwise, the USSR had the right to "temporarily suspend its supplies" (German-Soviet Trade Agreement (1939) //

On January 19, 1940, French Prime Minister Daladier instructed Commander-in-Chief General Gamelin, Air Force Commander Vuilmen, General Koelz and Admiral Darlan "to develop a memorandum on a possible invasion to destroy Russian oil fields" (Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. Op. P. 24-25). Planned three most likely directions of intervention in the Soviet Union from the south - 1) interception of Soviet oil tankers; 2) direct invasion of the Caucasus; 3) organization of Muslim - separatist riots. “And it was written on the day when the German side was actively preparing for the defeat of France. Halder wrote on the same day in his diary: "The appointment of the date of the offensive is desirable as soon as possible," and Hitler, having appointed new corps commanders for the army of the invasion of France, announced that he was convening a regular meeting in the Reich Chancellery on a plan for a war in the West "(Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West, op. Cit. - p. 25).

E. Daladier persuaded N. Chamberlain to hurry up with the invasion of Finland. However, he, interested in the defeat of France, in every possible way delayed and downplayed British aid. In early February 1940, at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council in Paris, the Allies discussed a plan for the operation being developed. “It seemed that Great Britain was ready to provide most of the troops and transport. However, when on February 10, Daladier announced at a closed session of the Chamber of Deputies that the Allies were going to send enough men and aircraft to continue the fight against the USSR … the British government … made it clear that it was not preparing any Scandinavian operation - let alone an operation of this magnitude and character as described by Daladier in his speech. Chamberlain agreed only with the general plan of the operation - but not with the need to carry it out. In case of a landing of the expeditionary force, the heads of the British headquarters could provide about 12,000, and not 50,000 people at all, and no more than 50 aircraft. Moreover, despite any requests from Paris or Helsinki, the British contingent will not be ready to leave until mid-March. Daladier was furious (May ER Decree. Op. - p. 367).

Meanwhile, “a month after Daladier's request of January 19, General Gamelin submitted a memorandum on February 22 with a plan for an attack on the USSR from the Caucasus. … Gamelin pointed out that “an operation against the oil industry in the Caucasus will deal a heavy, if not decisive, blow to the military and economic organization of the Soviet Union. Within a few months, the USSR may face such difficulties that it will create the threat of complete catastrophe. If such a result is achieved, then a circle of blockade in the East will close around Germany, which will lose all supplies from Russia. " … Emphasizing that Baku provides 75% of all Soviet oil, Gamelin noted that the bases for the raids should be in Turkey, Iran, Syria or Iraq "(Stepanov A. Caucasian Crisis. Part 1. Ibid). “And two days later, on February 24, in Berlin, Hitler signed the final version of the Gelb directive, which provided for the defeat of France” (Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. Decree. Op. - p. 25).

Meanwhile, after “on March 4, the Norwegian and Swedish governments unequivocally refused to support any operation to help Finland or allow the landing of allied troops … the British government quickly informed Paris that this circumstance put an end to all French plans. If nothing can be done about Finland, then you should move directly across the Baltic - but not earlier than mid-April. Daladier vainly opposed this proposal. He called the Finnish ambassador and told him that France would provide assistance even if Sweden and Norway opposed and even if Britain was not yet ready to act.

It happened on March 11th. The Finnish delegation was already in Moscow for negotiations at that moment. On March 12, Daladier learned that the Finns had signed an agreement to end the war and finally ceded all disputed territories to the USSR. … In government, parliament and in the press, Daladier's supporters denounced Britain. On March 18, Daladier announced that there would be no offensive in the north,”and on March 21, P. Reynaud replaced him as prime minister (May ER Decree, op. - pp. 367–368). The main role in the new cabinet "was played by supporters of an" honorable peace "with Germany - Marshal F. Petain, General M. Weygand, Admiral J. Darlan, P. Laval, C. Schotan. This did not stop the German attacks on May 10, 1940, but predetermined the rapid military collapse of the Third Republic regime. With the strength to defend itself, but led by weak-willed politicians, France became a new victim of Nazism "(The recent history of the countries of Europe and America. XX century. In 2 hours. Part 1: 1900-1945 / Ed. By AM Rodriguez and MV Ponomarev. - M.: Vlados, 2001. - S. 253).

On March 23, 1940, a Lockheed-12A reconnaissance aircraft departed from London with painted over identification marks “and, having made two intermediate landings in Malta and in Cairo, arrived in Habbania. The crew for this mission was selected by the British Secret Service, namely the head of the SIS air unit, Colonel F. W. Winterbotham. … On March 25, Reynaud sent a letter to the British government, where he insistently called for action to "paralyze the economy of the USSR", insisting that the allies should take "responsibility for breaking with the USSR" (Stepanov A. Caucasian Crisis. Part 2 // https://www.airforce.ru/history/caucasus/caucasus2.htm). “Along with the ideas of the intervention in Sweden and the mining of Norwegian territorial waters, Reynaud proposed“by decisive operations in the Black and Caspian Seas “not only … their interests "(Kurtukov I. Dolbanem in Baku! //

“On March 26, the British chiefs of staff came to the conclusion that it was necessary to come to an agreement with Turkey; in their opinion, this would allow "if we have to attack Russia, to act effectively." On March 27, members of the British War Cabinet reviewed Reynaud's March 25 letter in detail. It was decided "to declare the need" to prepare such plans, but not … to take on any obligations in relation to this operation. " On the same day, a meeting of the Allied Chiefs of Staff was held. The chief of staff of the British Air Force, Newall, said that the British had completed the preparation of a plan, the implementation of which was scheduled to begin in a month "(Stepanov A. Caucasian Crisis. Part 2. Ibid).

“On March 28 … Reynaud made an ambitious proposal to the British government. … The first proposal was an immediate attempt to cut off the supply of Swedish iron ore to Germany. … The second were decisive actions in the Black Sea and in the Caucasus "(May ER Decree. Op. - p. 370). On March 30, 1940, reconnaissance Lockheed-12A from the British airbase in Iraq made a reconnaissance of the Baku oil refineries, and on April 5 - Batumi. "The aerial photographs were immediately handed over to the headquarters of the British and French Air Force in the Middle East" Step 2, "they immediately went to work, and on April 2, a plan appeared in rough form, which was first called WA106, then MA6, and then acquired its final name - Operation Pike”(I. Kurtukov Ibid).

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Scheme of overflight of Soviet cities by an English spy plane. Source: A. Yakushevsky. Aggressive plans and actions of the Western powers against the USSR in 1939-1941. // Military History Journal, 1981, No. 8. - P. 55

In turn, N. Chamberlain presented his complex of proposals - to mine the Norwegian coast, bombard the Ruhr and mine German rivers. P. Reynaud's attempt to carry out N. Chamberlain's project ended in nothing - E. Daladier, who remained the Minister of National Defense, vetoed the river mining project and the bombing of the Ruhr, "fearing that Germany might take revenge" (May E. R. Decree, op. P. 372). N. Chamberlain, who only after the supporters of an “honorable peace” with Germany came to power in France suddenly “became convinced of the value of stopping the import of ore from Germany” (May ER, op. Cit. - p. 373). unexpectedly supported W. Churchill's proposal to mine Norwegian waters, capture Narvik in order to clear the port and advance to the Swedish border, as well as Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim in order to prevent the enemy from seizing these bases, despite the cancellation of the operation to bombard the Ruhr and mine German rivers …

Confident of the failure of Churchill's next adventure, Chamberlain reasonably believed that, as in the case of the unsuccessful Dardanelles operation, one of the initiators of which was Churchill, he would again take responsibility for a new failure, resign and leave for the Western Front as a battalion commander. Having removed Churchill from power and created a new cabinet of supporters of an "honorable peace" with Germany headed by Lord Halifax, the aged prime minister apparently intended, after France and Britain had recognized Germany's victory, to support Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union.

On April 4, a French strike plan for the secular oil fields Russie industrie pétrolière (RIP) was sent to Prime Minister Reino. "Allied operations against the Russian oil region in the Caucasus," the plan said, "may have the goal of … taking away from Russia the raw materials it needs for its economic needs, and thus undermining the power of Soviet Russia." The headquarters of the commander-in-chief examined the targets of the attack in detail. “Military action against the Caucasian oil fields,” Gamelin wrote, “should have the goal of targeting the vulnerable points of the oil industry located there. … Gamelin suggested directing the main attack by aviation to Baku. …

This plan envisaged unleashing a war against the Soviet Union by inflicting surprise air strikes on its most important economic centers, undermining the country's military-economic potential, and then by invading ground forces. Soon [April 17 - S. L.] the final date for the attack on the USSR was also set: late June - early July 1941. In addition to air attacks against the Caucasus, which, in the opinion of the Anglo-French leadership, could undermine the basis of the Soviet Union's economy, an attack was envisaged. from the sea. The further successful development of the offensive was to involve Turkey and other southern neighbors of the USSR in the war on the side of the allies. For this purpose, the English General Wavell made contact with the Turkish military leadership "(Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. Decree. Op. - pp. 25–27).

On April 6, 1940, the British War Cabinet agreed to formally notify Norway about the start of the laying of mines three days later, and also resumed preparations for sending an amphibious assault to Scandinavia. “The operation was carried out ineptly. The British expedition was easily repelled by the German troops, who, foreseeing such a move, entered Norway earlier. A puppet government headed by Vidkun Quisling was formed in the country, and the British had to leave Norway.

That is, not only were the supplies of iron ore to Germany not interrupted, but because of the military defeat Norway fell into the hands of the Nazis, in addition, even Swedish sovereignty in Hitler's favor was under threat for a time (Lynn P., Prince K., Prior S. Unknown Hess. Double standards of the Third Reich / Translated from English by Yu. Soklov. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2006. - P. 109) and only the intervention of the USSR prevented the violation of Swedish sovereignty. Among other things, “the landing of German troops in Norway … pushed the operation against the Caucasian oil fields to the margins of planning.… The elaboration of plans for some time rolled by inertia, but the preparation for their implementation was finally frozen. Reynaud is still trying to raise this topic at a meeting of the Allied Supreme Military Council on April 22-23, stating that the blow could be delivered in about 2-3 months, but Chamberlain puts an end to this matter. … At the last meeting of the Supreme Military Council on April 27, 1940, the topic of the Caucasus is no longer discussed”(I. Kurtukov, ibid.).

Contrary to the expectations of N. Chamberlain, W. Churchill turned his complete failure in Norway into a brilliant victory and “despite his guilt, … managed to emerge victorious. … A serious setback had serious consequences, recalling another military disaster planned by Churchill - the Dardanelles operation of 1915, which led to his resignation this year from the post of First Lord of the Admiralty. The memory of the Dardanelles disaster caused many in 1940 to question Churchill's ability as a state leader. Ironically, however, this new fiasco led to renewed criticism of the Chamberlain government, clearing the way for Churchill's ascent”(Lynn P., Prince K., Prior S. Op. Op. P. 109).

During the parliamentary debate on Norway on May 7-8, 1940, N. Chamberlain was widely criticized, the government received a vote of confidence in the House of Commons with an unconvincing majority (282 deputies against 200) and, having failed to create a coalition government with the Laborites, he was forced to leave the post of prime minister. minister. “In those days, it was customary for the outgoing conservative prime minister to name his successor. At that time there were only two candidates: Lord Halifax and W. Churchill. Halifax was a favorite of both the Conservative Party and the establishment. He was a close friend of George VI, his wife was one of the maids of honor of Queen Elizabeth. Undoubtedly, he is a greater supporter of peace negotiations than Chamberlain, and insisted on their holding even after the outbreak of war (Lynn P., Prince K., Prior S. Decree. Op. - pp. 109-110).

However, E. Halifax at a closed meeting unexpectedly for everyone rejected the offer to take the post of prime minister, which automatically made W. Churchill prime minister. “Obviously, something unexpected happened at this meeting, but no one knows what exactly. Perhaps the clue to the event should be sought in the diary of John Colville, the personal secretary of both politicians (Chamberlain and Churchill), in the entry dated May 10: only the king will not take full advantage of his own rights and will not send for another person; unfortunately, if there is only another candidate - the unconvincing Halifax. …

Churchill's triumph was a terrible blow to the king. He is said to have "strongly objected" to Churchill's appointment as prime minister and tried to persuade Chamberlain to change his mind and find a way to refute Halifax's objections. … When Chamberlain insisted on his own, George VI was so furious that he allowed himself an unprecedented insult, refusing to express the usual regret in this case at his resignation. The broken Chamberlain did not last long after that: poor health forced him to leave politics”in September 1940. He died two months later (Lynn P., Prince K., Prior S. Decree. Op. - p. 110).

“It seems that Churchill had an incomprehensible power over Chamberlain and Halifax - remember Corville's mention of his 'blackmailer prowess' - and he did not hesitate to use it as a threat. Although all chances were on the side of Halifax, the independent ex-journalist climbed to the very top, where he intended to stay - in the most serious way. Nevertheless, it seems that the cabinet received Churchill - however, without pleasure - only because he was considered a plug in the place of the prime minister, capable of staying in this place only until negotiations begin about peace with Hitler (Lynn P., Prince K., Prior S. Decree.oc. - p. 110).

The arrival of W. Churchill to power, and in addition to the Prime Minister, he also became Minister of Defense, entailed a change in the course of British policy - in contrast to N. Chamberlain and E. Halifax, who agreed that England, together with Germany, destroyed the USSR, W. Churchill strove to ensure that England, together with the USSR, destroyed Germany. For the sake of confusing Hitler at first, W. Churchill "brought Chamberlain's supporters into the cabinet and appointed them to responsible foreign policy posts" (Zalessky KA Who was who in World War II: Allies of the USSR. - M.: AST; Astrel; VZOI, 2004. - S. 605). E. Halifax remained at the head of the foreign policy department, N. Chamberlain - "a member of the coalition government of W. Churchill and the leader of the Conservative Party, as well as the Lord President of the Council" (Zalesky K. A., op. Cit. - pp. 129, 602).

"On May 10, 1940, on the day of N. Chamberlain's resignation, Germany attacked France, Holland and Belgium" (S. Lebedev How and when Adolf Hitler decided to attack the USSR // https://www.regnum.ru/news/ polit / 1538787.html). On May 15, Holland fell and W. Churchill was forced in his very first telegram sent to President F. Roosevelt after becoming prime minister to ask him to lend England "40-50 old destroyers in order to fill the gap between what we have available at the present time, and new major construction, undertaken by us at the very beginning of the war. By this time next year we will have a large number of them, but before that, if Italy opposes us with another 100 submarines, our tension may reach the limit”(W. Churchill. World War II // https:// militera.lib.ru/memo/english/churchill/2_20.html).

“Relying on the conclusion of peace with England after the defeat of France and the organization of a joint campaign against the USSR, on May 24, 1940, A. Hitler stopped the tank offensive of his troops” against the allies defending Dunkirk (S. Lebedev, ibid.). Having given the British troops the opportunity to evacuate from the northern "bag", Hitler saved not only British and German soldiers for the upcoming campaign against the USSR, but also armored vehicles that were extremely necessary for the invasion of the USSR. According to D. Proektor, the "miracle at Dunkirk" emerged as the first step towards the implementation of Hitler's new plan, which was now emerging: to conclude peace with Britain and, with her support, to attack the Soviet Union. "Dunkirk", Hitler's attempts to make peace with England, the "Zeelewe" plan (plan to invade England) and, finally, the "Barbarossa" plan (plan of aggression against the USSR) - a single line of political and military maneuvers and decisions. A single chain, and "Dunkirk" is its first link "(Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. Decree. Op. - p. 244).

The "stop order" surprised not only the German generals, to whom A. Hitler "explained the stoppage of tank units … by the desire to save tanks for the war in Russia." Even the closest associate of A. Hitler, R. Hess, convinced him that the defeat of British troops in France would accelerate peace with England. However, Hitler did not succumb to anyone's persuasion and remained adamant - the defeat of the 200 thousandth British group undoubtedly increased the chances of peace between England and Germany, but at the same time reduced England's potential in the fight against the Soviet Union, which was completely unacceptable for Hitler.

On May 27, the number of evacuees was small - only 7669 people, but later the pace of evacuation increased sharply, and a total of 338 thousand people were evacuated from Dunkirk, including 110 thousand French. A large amount of military equipment and heavy weapons were thrown by the British Expeditionary Force. Meanwhile, "at 4:00 on May 28, the Belgian troops were ordered to lay down their arms, as Belgium agreed to an unconditional surrender."

On May 28, 1940, convinced of the beginning of the evacuation of the British from Dunkirk, A. Hitler began to discuss the army of the invasion of the USSR. On June 2, in the days of the offensive on Dunkirk, he expressed "the hope that now England will be ready to" conclude a reasonable peace "and said that then he would be free to carry out his" great and immediate task - confrontation with Bolshevism ", and on June 15, he ordered the reduction of the army to 120 divisions with a simultaneous increase in the number of mobile formations to 30. The increase in the number of mobile formations, according to B. Müller-Hillebrand, was necessary for A. Hitler for the war in the vast expanses of Russia "(Lebedev S. Ibid).

According to W. Churchill, Hitler "cherished the hope that England would seek peace." According to him, “Hitler … needed to end the war in the West. He could offer the most tempting conditions ", up to the agreement" not to touch England, her empire and navy and conclude a peace that would provide him that freedom of action in the East, which Ribbentrop told me about in 1937 and which was his deepest desire "(Churchill W. World War II // https://militera.lib.ru/memo/english/churchill/2_11.html). However, in spite of everything, on June 4, W. Churchill announced that he was ready to continue the war, and intends to fight "if necessary, for years, if necessary, alone."

“On June 11, Italy declared war on France and England. Now, among the French government, there was no longer a question of resistance to the Germans. Government meetings were incessantly going on. Reynaud offered to surrender the country to the enemy, and the government to flee to North Africa or England, handing over the fleet to the latter. The intentions of the Patain-Laval group were simpler: to conclude a deal with Hitler and, with his support, become "leaders" of the fascist type in France. Both plans did not go beyond the framework of complete surrender "(Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. Decree. Op. - p. 256). “On June 16, 1940, the French government refused to conclude the Anglo-French alliance proposed by W. Churchill with the granting of dual citizenship to all British and French people, the creation of a single government in London and the unification of the armed forces” (S. Lebedev, ibid.).

“Paul Reynaud was completely unable to overcome the unfavorable impression created by the proposal for an Anglo-French alliance. The defeatist group, led by Marshal Petain, refused to even consider this proposal. … At about 8 o'clock, Reynaud, extremely exhausted from the physical and spiritual stress to which he had been subjected for so many days, sent a letter of resignation to the president, advising him to invite Marshal Petain. Marshal Petain immediately formed a government with the main goal of obtaining an immediate armistice from Germany. By the night of June 16, the defeatist group headed by him was already so closely knit together that it did not take much time for the formation of the government”(W. Churchill. World War II //

On June 22, 1940, in the presence of Hitler, France concluded an armistice with Germany, and “at the Retonde station in the Compiegne forest in the same carriage in which in 1918 Marshal Foch signed an armistice with Germany, which ended the First World War. In accordance with the treaty … two thirds of the departments in the north and center of the country, including the Paris region, were occupied by the German army with the introduction of a military administration. Alsace, Lorraine and the Atlantic coastal zone were declared a "no-go zone" and were effectively annexed by the Reich. The southern departments remained under the control of the collaborationist government of Pétain (from the French word for collaboration). … France retained full control over its colonies in Africa, which were not subject to the demilitarization regime. … On June 24, the signing of an armistice between France and Italy took place "(Contemporary history of the countries of Europe and America. Decree. Cit. - p. 254).

"NS. Halifax, had he come to power on May 10, 1940, undoubtedly, following France, he would have made peace with Germany, but events took a completely different turn "(S. Lebedev, ibid.). “On June 23, 1940, the British government announced its refusal to recognize the collaborationist Vichy government and began active cooperation with General de Gaulle’s organization“Free France”. (Recent history of the countries of Europe and America. Op. Cit. - p. 210). On June 27, 1940, W. Churchill declared: “If Hitler fails to defeat us here, he will probably rush to the East. In fact, he might do it without even trying to invade.”(Churchill W. World War II // https://militera.lib.ru/memo/english/churchill/2_11.html). Thus, W. Churchill remained faithful to the chosen course - to recognize the primacy of the United States, to destroy Germany with the help of the Soviet Union, then to help America deal with the USSR in order to gain its sole world domination.

Fearing the use of the French fleet by the Nazis against England, W. Churchill ordered the destruction of the French fleet. As a result of Operation Catapult, from 3 to 8 July 1940, the British fleet sank, damaged and captured 7 battleships, 4 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 8 submarines and a number of other ships and vessels. On July 5, 1940, “the Petain government broke off diplomatic relations with England, but did not dare to go to war with its former ally. On July 12, Prime Minister W. Churchill gave an order not to interfere with the navigation of French warships if they are not sent to the ports of the zone occupied by the Germans "(I. Chelyshev, Operation" Catapult "// Marine collection, 1991, No. 11. - P. 74). According to Churchill, “as a result of the measures we had taken, the Germans could no longer rely on the French fleet in their plans. … In the future, it was no longer said that England would surrender”(W. Churchill, ibid.).

Thus, Hitler's Germany in the shortest possible time broke the resistance of the landlord's Poland. By introducing the Red Army troops into Poland under the pretext of protecting Western Belarus and Western Ukraine from the Germans, having achieved a revision of his August agreements with the Nazis and establishing the border with Germany along the Curzon line, Stalin prevented the West from qualifying the Red Army's Liberation Campaign as an act of war. After the refusal of France and England in early October 1939 to go to peace with the Nazis (Daladier relied on the imminent collapse of Germany, Chamberlain could not do anything because of Churchill in the government) Hitler gave the order to prepare for the early defeat of France. In turn, the Allies began to prepare plans to tighten the economic blockade of Germany, first by bombing Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus, then, after the outbreak of the Winter War, by invading the USSR from Finland. At the same time, Chamberlain once again betrayed France, cutting off both of her plans.

After the end of the Soviet-Finnish war and coming to power in France, a supporter of peace with the Nazis, Chamberlain still agreed to an operation against Norway. But only not for the sake of France's help, but to remove Churchill from the levers of control of Britain and bring, like the French, to power the government of the defeatists who stand for peace with Hitler. However, Chamberlain, betraying the British idea of a quadrilateral alliance, embarking on the path of cooperation with the Americans and starting to embody their plan for the destruction of France and the subsequent joint campaign of the British with the Nazis against the Soviet Union, with his conditional loyalty did not become his own for the Americans, and at the first convenient The case was immediately replaced by an unconditionally loyal Churchill, who, despite the failure of the Norwegian operation, headed the British government.

Thus, if at the beginning of the war, Daladier in France led the war party, and Chamberlain in England led the peace party, now everything has changed diametrically, and if supporters of peace with the Nazis settled in France, then their irreconcilable enemy was established in England. That, ultimately, predetermined the entire further course of hostilities in France - Hitler, in the hope of concluding a peace treaty with England, spared the British Expeditionary Force, the French, without exhausting their defensive potential, surrendered at the mercy of the victor, while Churchill announced the continuation of the war with the Nazis.

Speaking about the reasons for the defeat of France in an incredibly short time, it should be noted that Poland, having drawn France into the war with Germany, did not allow her to enlist the help of the Soviet Union, thereby significantly weakening her chances to cope with Germany. In response, France betrayed the Poles and calmly watched their defeat by the Nazis. Chamberlain on the eve of the economic war, with his criminal inactivity, ensured Soviet-German rapprochement and economic assistance to Germany from the USSR. And after the Nazi attack on Poland, he did not allow Daladier to defeat Germany, imposing an economic war on the French. When the French got involved in it, he did not allow France to strangle Germany with a blockade, cutting off economic aid to the Nazis from Scandinavia and the USSR. By giving Germany time to concentrate against France, Chamberlain gave Germany the opportunity to crush France. What the Nazis did not fail to immediately take advantage of.

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