Returning to London after the signing of the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain assured the British at the plane's ramp: "I have brought peace to our generation."
Having suffered a crushing defeat in Munich, Roosevelt began to restore his undermined position as an asphalt roller - slowly and at first glance imperceptibly, but at the same time steadily and inexorably. The first to fall into the arms of the United States, as we already know, was Poland, which, with its intransigence, leveled Chamberlain's Munich triumph. And soon after Poland was followed by England itself. To be fair, Americans have perfected the gift of persuasion. Now brotherly Ukraine has succumbed to his truly diabolical influence.
“On March 15, at six o'clock in the morning, German troops entered the territory of Bohemia and Moravia. There was no resistance to them, and that very evening Hitler was in Prague. The next day … March 16 … German troops entered Slovakia and "took it under the protection" of the Reich. … Hitler announced the creation of a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which was to receive autonomy and self-government. This meant that now the Czechs finally fell under the rule of Hitler "(Shirokorad AB Great intermission. - M.: AST, AST MOSCOW, 2009. - P. 267). In addition to the Germans, the Hungarians invaded Czechoslovakia: “On March 15, 1939, Czech troops began to leave Transcarpathia, where Hungarian troops had already entered in three columns. … It is curious that Hungary officially announced the invasion of its troops in Transcarpathia only on March 16. On this day Miklos Horthy officially gave the order for the troops to attack the Carpathian Ukraine”(Shirokorad AB Decree. Cit. - pp. 268-269).
The postponement of the official announcement of Hungary's invasion of Transcarpathian Ukraine, as well as the case, which became known to the French radio broadcasting, of the demand by the representative of the "German Reichswehr … to immediately suspend the advance of Hungarian troops to the Carpathian Ukraine, to which Budapest replied that it was technically impossible to fulfill this requirement", hid the true state of affairs in Czechoslovakia (Year of the crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and materials. In 2 volumes. T. 1. September 29, 1938 - May 31, 1939 - M.: Politizdat, 1990. - S. 280). Moreover, even on March 17, the status of Slovakia was still unclear. In particular, the Ambassador of Poland to the USSR V. Grzybowski “expressed some concern about the uncertain situation in Slovakia. Slovakia seems to remain independent under the protectorate of Germany, maintaining its own army, the command of which, however, is subject only to the Reichswehr. The German currency is introduced there”(Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 288). And only on March 18, after “Hitler arrived in Vienna to approve the“Treaty of Protection”, which Ribbentrop and Tuka signed in Berlin on March 13,” the legal status of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine finally became clear - “now Slovakia was becoming a vassal of the Third Reich” (Shirokorad A. B., op. Cit. - p. 268), and the Transcarpathian Ukraine irrevocably ceded to Hungary.
Having finally clarified the situation, on March 18, the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov recognized the occupation of “the Czech Republic by German troops and the subsequent actions of the German government … arbitrary, violent, aggressive. The above remarks apply entirely to the change in the status of Slovakia in the spirit of subordination to the German Empire…. The action of the German government served as a signal for a brutal invasion of the Hungarian troops into Carpathian Rus and for the violation of the elementary rights of its population (Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 290).
England, obviously confident in A. Hitler's strict observance of the agreements reached earlier and the beginning of the creation of the Great Ukraine, on March 16, 1939, hastened to ratify the agreement concluded with Germany on the principles of future trade relations. And only after clarifying the situation with Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine and finally making sure of Germany's refusal to create a bridgehead for the invasion of the USSR, on March 18, together with France, she declared “that they cannot recognize the legal position created by the Reich in Central Europe” (Year of Crisis Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 300). Meanwhile, Germany's actions were not limited to Czechoslovakia alone. A. Hitler was determined to solve at once all the problems of Germany connected with Romania, Poland and Lithuania.
As a result of recent events, the balance of power in European politics has undergone significant changes. For collective security and resistance to Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union continued to act in splendid isolation. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, and France deserted to the camp of Munich and actively fought for the resolution of inter-imperialist contradictions at the expense of the USSR. In view of the disappearance of Czechoslovakia from the political map of Europe, Germany began preparations to involve France in the conflict by attacking Poland, since the latter itself took the path of confrontation with Germany. In this situation, England had no choice but to link its fate with either France, and continue its Munich policy of not involving France in the conflict between Germany and its eastern neighbors, or with Germany, and involve France in an armed conflict for its defeat by Germany and the subsequent campaign to the USSR, or from the USSR, and create a collective security system in Europe.
Even before the capture of Czechoslovakia, Germany presented Romania with an ultimatum - Germany is ready to guarantee the Romanian borders in case Romania stops developing its industry and agrees to send all 100% of its exports to Germany, that is, Germany needed Romania as a market for its goods and a supplier of raw materials. Romania rejected the ultimatum, but on March 17 Germany again presented the same ultimatum, but in a more threatening form. Romania immediately informed the British Government of the situation in order to find out what support from Britain it could count on. Before making a decision, the British government on March 18 decided to find out the position of the USSR on the issue of providing the USSR with assistance to Romania in the event of German aggression - in what form and in what amount.
On the evening of the same day, the Soviet government proposed to immediately convene a conference of representatives of the USSR, Britain, France, Poland and Romania, and to strengthen its position it proposed to convene in Romania. “True, from Bucharest there were suddenly refutations: they say, there was no ultimatum. But the "machine" spun. One way or another, on the initiative of London, the diplomatic isolation of the USSR after Munich was lifted "(Bezymensky L. A. Hitler and Stalin before the battle. - M.: Veche, 2000 // https://militera.lib.ru/research/bezymensky3/ 12.html), which was a step by England in the direction of creating a collective defense against Germany. The British government supported the Soviet proposal in essence, but on March 19 proposed the USSR, France and Poland to publish a joint declaration in the sense that all the named powers are interested in preserving the integrity and independence of the states in the east and southeast of Europe. The exact text of the declaration was still looming.
On March 20, Germany presented an ultimatum to Lithuania on the immediate return of Memel, and “on March 21, 1939, the German government offered Warsaw to conclude a new treaty. Its essence consisted of three points. First, the return of the city of Danzig and its surroundings to Germany. Secondly, the permission of the Polish authorities for the construction of an extraterritorial highway and a four-track railway in the “Polish corridor”. … The third point was that the Germans offered the Poles an extension of the existing German-Polish non-aggression pact for another 15 years.
It is not difficult to understand that the German proposals did not in any way affect the sovereignty of Poland and did not limit its military power. Danzig did not belong to Poland anyway and was overwhelmingly inhabited by Germans. And the construction of a highway and a railway was, in general, a routine matter (Shirokorad AB Great intermission. - M.: AST; AST Moscow, 2009. - S. 279-280). On the same day, the Soviet government received a draft declaration, which the British government proposed to sign on behalf of four states: Great Britain, the USSR, France and Poland, and the next day, March 22, the Soviet Union adopted the wording of the draft declaration and agreed to immediately sign the declaration as soon as France and Poland will accept the British proposal and pledge their signatures.
At the same time, March 21-22, 1939, negotiations were held in London between J. Bonnet, on the one hand, and N. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, on the other. Negotiations took place in connection with the capture of Czechoslovakia by Germany and the threat of German aggression against Romania and Poland. On March 22, “the British and French governments exchanged notes containing mutual obligations to provide assistance to each other in the event of an attack on one of the sides” (Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - p. 277).
On the eve of the Anglo-French negotiations, French Ambassador to Germany R. Coulondre advised J. Bonnet to stop the Munich policy of encouraging German expansion to the East. In his opinion, the Munich Agreement, the Anglo-German and Franco-German declarations gave Germany freedom of action in the East with the tacit consent of the Western powers. The seizure of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany, as well as an attempt to occupy the whole of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine by force of arms, corresponds to the policy of expansion to the East, and consequently to the interests of England and France.
The indignation is caused not by the German aggression itself, but by the uncertainty of German plans generated by the lack of consultations between Germany and Britain and France - “will the Fuhrer try to return to the concept of the author of Mein Kampf (according to R. Coulondre, the author of Mein Kampf and Hitler and the same person, and two completely different persons - S. L.), which is identical, however, to the classical doctrine of the German General Staff, according to which the Reich cannot fulfill its lofty missions in the East until it defeats France and puts an end to power England on the continent? We should ask ourselves the question: is it not too late to create a barrier in the East, and should we not to some extent restrain the German advance, and should we not, for this purpose, take advantage of the opportunity created by the unrest and anxiety reigning in the capitals Central Europe, and in particular in Warsaw? (Year of the crisis. T. 1. Decree. Cit. - S. 299-301).
In essence, R. Coulondre suggested supporting the USSR's aspirations and joining the creation of a collective security system in Europe by creating a threat to Germany from the West and the East - on the one hand, England and France, and on the other, Poland and the USSR. However, J. Bonnet did not heed his advice, continued the policy of the Munich agreement to incite Germany to the East and decided to disrupt the signing of the declaration, the subsequent consolidation of England, France, Poland and the USSR to organize the resistance of Germany, to leave Poland alone with Germany and, having secured an alliance with England, from the sidelines calmly observe how Germany will deal with Romania, Lithuania, Poland, and later with the USSR.
To implement his plan, J. Bonnet raised the question of the impossibility of a defensive alliance of Poland and Romania with the USSR. Since Poland and Romania feared friendship with the USSR more than enmity, and without the participation of the USSR, an effective defensive alliance against Germany, England and France with Poland and Romania could not be created, J. Bonnet quite rightly hoped that England would never agree to such madness. As a result, according to his assumption, first Poland and Romania will abandon the alliance with the USSR, then England - from the alliance with Poland and Romania, after which France, in alliance with England, will only have to watch quietly from the outside as Germany, having dealt with Poland, will attack the USSR.
The French position received a warm response and full approval in Poland. On March 22, “in the hope that doing nothing but its own business and taking military precautions in order to reflect a possible threat to its own borders, it will not attract the close attention of Germany” J. Beck decided to “think” over Britain's proposal to sign a declaration "(Year of the crisis. T. 1. Decree. Cit. - pp. 316, 320). Meanwhile, “on March 22, a German-Lithuanian treaty was signed on the transfer of Klaipeda to the Third Reich, according to which the parties committed themselves not to use force against each other. At the same time, there were rumors about the conclusion of a German-Estonian treaty, according to which German troops received the right of passage through the territory of Estonia "(Dyukov A. R." Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact "in questions and answers. - M.: Fund" Historical Memory ", 2009. - S. 29). On March 23, without waiting for Poland's response to the British proposal and not seeing Poland's desire to help her in the confrontation with Germany, Romania also accepted the terms of the German ultimatum and concluded a trade agreement with Germany.
On March 25, Poland continued to persistently reject the British proposal, insisting that it was impossible for Poland to sign a political agreement, one of the parties to which would be the USSR. Having finally established itself in the impossibility of Poland joining the draft quadrilateral declaration on the one hand and the USSR signing the declaration in case Poland refuses to sign it, that is, the final failure of the creation of a defensive alliance of England, France, the USSR and Poland, England sided with France and offered Poland to conclude a satisfactory an agreement with Germany regarding Danzig, thereby realizing a second Munich, this time at the expense of Poland.
In response, on March 26, Poland called up three ages of reservists at once. In turn, A. Hitler announced on March 28 the termination of the Polish-German non-aggression pact. In view of the deterioration of its position, Poland continued to reject the alliance with the participation of the USSR and, together with Romania, made it clear that it would enter a peaceful bloc only on condition of firm guarantees of military commitments from Britain and France. Thus, having finally buried the Soviet plan for collective security, Poland buried the plan of England and France for a second Munich, that is, the signing of a new agreement between England and France with Germany and Italy at the expense of Poland.
Under the circumstances, Chamberlain, in my humble opinion, for the sake of preserving, if not leadership, then at least the existence of Great Britain, betrayed British national interests and agreed with the American plan voiced by Hitler in Mein Kampf for Britain to recognize American global dominance and to defeat France first by Germany. and then the USSR. Despite the fact that Chamberlain's betrayal of France was secret and unreported, all his subsequent actions, which later led France to military defeat, are more eloquent than any words and oath assurances.
First of all, Chamberlain gave Poland security guarantees for the sake of involving France in the war with Germany. On March 30, he called an emergency cabinet meeting in connection with the receipt by the British government of accurate information about Germany's intention to attack Poland, and said that he considered it necessary to warn Germany now that England in this case could not remain an outside spectator of the events taking place. Despite the unreliability of rumors about Germany's attack on Poland on March 31, Chamberlain, having given guarantees to Poland, confused J. Bonnet all the cards - instead of distancing itself from the conflict with Germany, France, quite unexpectedly, was promptly involved in it. Which immediately caused confusion, anger and indignation in the British establishment.
After the announcement of the declaration in parliament, N. Chamberlain met with Lloyd George, who was unpleasantly amazed by the actions of N. Chamberlain, who risked making a declaration threatening England's involvement in the war with Germany, not only without the participation of the USSR in the bloc of peace-loving countries, but even in the face of open opposition from Poland and Romania attracted the USSR. In conclusion, Lloyd George said that in the absence of a firm agreement with the USSR, he considers N. Chamberlain's statement "an irresponsible gambling game that can end very badly" (Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - pp. 353-354).
“The unheard-of conditions of guarantees put England in such a position that its fate was in the hands of the Polish rulers, who had very dubious and fickle judgments” (Liddell Garth B. G. World War II. - M.: AST; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 1999 // https://militera.lib.ru/h/liddel-hart/01.html). “The British minister, later Ambassador D. Cooper, expressed his point of view as follows:“Never in its entire history has England given the right to a country of secondary power to decide whether to go to war or not. Now the decision remains with a handful of people, whose names, except for Colonel Beck, are practically unknown to anyone in England. And all these strangers are capable of unleashing a war in Europe tomorrow (Weizsäcker E., von. Ambassador of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a German diplomat. 1932-1945 / Translated by FS Kapitsa. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. - P. 191).
“Moreover, England could fulfill its guarantees only with the help of Russia, but so far not even preliminary steps have been taken to find out whether Russia can provide, and Poland can accept such assistance. … Only Lloyd George found it possible to warn parliament that it would be recklessness, like suicide, to take on such a fraught commitment without being bothered by Russia's support. The guarantees to Poland were the surest way to hasten the explosion and the outbreak of the world war. They combined the maximum temptation with open provocation and incited Hitler to prove the futility of such guarantees in relation to a country outside the reach of the West. At the same time, the guarantees received made the die-hard Polish leaders even less inclined to agree to any concessions to Hitler, who now found himself in a position that would not allow him to retreat without prejudice to his prestige”(Liddell Hart B. Ibid.).
On April 3, Germany adopted the "Weiss" plan to defeat Poland, and "the operation could begin at any time, starting from September 1, 1939". Ten days later Hitler approved the final version of the plan. " Meanwhile, after Germany, Germany and its allies strengthened their activity - by April 1, 1939, Franco had finally established itself in Spain, on April 7 Italy invaded Albania, quickly occupied it and incorporated it into the Italian Empire, and in the Far East, Japan began systematic provocations against the allied USSR Mongolia. For England and France, Mussolini's actions were overwhelming, as they ran counter to the Munich agreements on the joint resolution of disputes. Thus, fascist Italy, following Nazi Germany, tore up the Munich Agreement, after which “Chamberlain complained to his sister Hilda that Mussolini was behaving towards him“like a scoundrel and a boor. He did not make a single effort to preserve my friendship”(May ER Strange victory / Translated from English - M.: AST; AST MOSCOW, 2009. - P. 214).
The Soviet Union greeted N. Chamberlain's initiative coldly. In particular, M. Litvinov said that the USSR considers itself free from any obligations and will continue to act in accordance with its interests, and also "showed some annoyance that the Western powers … did not attach due importance to Soviet initiatives to effectively organize collective resistance to aggression" (Year of Crisis Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - pp. 351-255). In spite of everything, N. Chamberlain on April 3 “confirmed and supplemented his statement to parliament. He said that France would come out to help Poland against aggression together with England. On that day, Polish Foreign Minister Beck was already in London. As a result of his talks with Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Lord Halifax, the British Prime Minister delivered a new message to Parliament on April 6. He stated that an agreement on mutual assistance had been reached between England and Poland. " In addition to Poland, on April 13, 1939, Great Britain provided the same guarantees to Greece and Romania. Subsequently, Great Britain signed a mutual assistance pact with Turkey.
As we remember, England intended to retain its world leadership by forging an Anglo-French-Italian-German alliance and the defeat of the USSR. In turn, America challenged British domination and intended to knock together an Anglo-Italo-German alliance, coupled with the defeat of France and the destruction of the USSR, to oust Great Britain from the political Olympus, and in case of her disagreement, then destroy the joint actions of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Having given security guarantees to Poland, Chamberlain essentially agreed with the first version of the American plan, but nevertheless did not finally abandon his attempts to organize a second Munich.
The beginning of Chamberlain's opposition to France marked a turning point in the confrontation between America and England. Indeed, after the destruction of France by Nazi Germany, all options for further development led to the triumph of the United States of America without alternative. That England and Germany would lead the campaign against the USSR, that Germany and the USSR would jointly destroy England, that England together with the Soviet Union would destroy Germany - America was the winner in any case. From now on, the question was in time, as well as in whose expense the United States of America will achieve the longed-for hegemony over the world - Great Britain, Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.
It can be said that from now on the Cold War for the world leadership of America and England took a new turn, and further confrontation was reduced to clarifying the relationship between Chamberlain, Churchill and Stalin. Hitler was in no way satisfied with the prospect of Churchill coming to power in Britain, so he, like a drowning man, seized on Chamberlain's idea of organizing a second Munich and leaving France alone. Yes, only now, apparently, the fate of Germany was decided in the White House, and not at all in Berchtesgaden, and therefore all his efforts were in vain.
Having set a course for the destruction of France, Chamberlain, in fact, began to eliminate the results, fruits and achievements of forty years of work of his predecessors, aimed at preserving the global influence of Great Britain, and stepped on the throat of his own idea of resolving inter-imperialist contradictions at the expense of the USSR by concluding a quadripartite alliance of England. France, Italy and Germany, and began the integration of Great Britain as a junior partner into the Anglo-Saxon world of the United States of America.
With his actions, Chamberlain at once put an end to both British leadership and the very existence of an independent France. Since Chamberlain took his step in secret from both the British and the French, his act can be qualified as a betrayal of both. As for the Soviet citizens, his step prevented the defeat of the Soviet Union and allowed Churchill to subsequently come to power and lead England against the Nazis. As you know, Chamberlain hated communism more than Nazism and, despite the fact that “he considered Hitler rude and pompous, … he was sure that he understood the motives of his actions. And in general, they aroused Chamberlain's sympathy”(May ER, op. Cit. - p. 194). The miraculous rescue of the British expeditionary corps in Dunkirk shows how close Chamberlain was to the conclusion of a "cordial agreement" with Hitler (S. Lebedev How and when Adolf Hitler decided to attack the USSR // https://www.regnum.ru/news/polit /1538787.html#ixzz3FZn4UPFz).
Unlike Chamberlain, Churchill, for all his hatred of communism, hated the Nazis even more. According to him, "if Hitler had conquered hell, I would have uttered a panegyric in honor of the devil." In essence, by starting a confrontation with Hitler, Britain recognized the transfer of its leadership to America. According to Liakvad Ahamed, “in the last months of 1939, when there was no longer any doubt that a great war was coming, Neumann [Montague Collet, Governor of the Bank of England in 1920-1944. - SL] bitterly complained to the American Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy: “If the struggle continues, the end of England as we know it will come. … The lack of gold and foreign assets will cause British trade to shrink more and more. In the end, we will most likely come to the conclusion … that the Empire will lose its power and territory, which will reduce it to the level of other states”(Ahamed L. The Lords of Finance: Bankers who turned the world / Translated from English - M: Alpina Publishers, 2010. - S. 447).
In return, America agreed to the defeat of its military detachment in the person of Nazi Germany by the British-Soviet Union in order to subsequently lead the West and destroy the USSR, to ensure unconditional global domination. In particular, “Winston Churchill went down in history not only as a man who led one of the victorious powers during World War II, but also as one of the creators of the post-war world order. He saw the balance of power after the war as follows: “I consider it inevitable that Russia will become the world's greatest land power after this war, since as a result of it it will get rid of two military powers - Japan and Germany, which throughout our generation have inflicted on it such severe lesions. However, I hope that the fraternal association of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States, as well as naval and air power, can ensure good relations and a friendly balance between us and Russia, at least for the period of reconstruction. (Kuklenko D. Winston Churchill //
During the November 1940 negotiations “choosing between the inevitably winning coalition of Germany with the USSR and the inevitably ending defeat of Germany in a war on two fronts with Britain and the Soviet Union, A. Hitler chose the defeat of Germany. It must be assumed that the main goal of A. Hitler, as well as the people behind his back, was not the creation of Greater Germany and its acquisition of living space, and not even the fight against communism, but precisely the destruction of Germany in the battle with the Soviet Union "(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria // https://topwar.ru/38865-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-5-bitva-za-bolgariyu.html). According to him, on the eve of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Germans "had to die and give way to stronger and more viable peoples" (Mussky SA One hundred great dictators // https://www.litmir.net/br/?b=109265&p= 172).
“Since the official position obliged W. Churchill to be more restrained, his father's views were expressed by his son Randolph Churchill (by the way, a participant in pre-election flights on Hitler's plane in 1932 - S. L.), who declared:“The ideal outcome of the war in the East would be such, when the last German would have killed the last Russian and stretched out dead side by side "(Quoted from: D. Kraminov, Pravda about the second front. Petrozavodsk, 1960, p. 30). In the United States, a similar statement belongs to Senator Harry Truman, later president of the country. “If we see,” he said, “that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia; if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill as much as possible, although I don’t want to conditions to see Hitler in the victors "(New York Times, 24. VI.1941)" (Volkov FD Behind the scenes of the Second World War. - Moscow: Mysl, 1985 // https://historic.ru/books/item/ f00 / s00 / z0000074 / st030.shtml; Harry Truman // https://ru.wikiquote.org/wiki/%D0%93%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%80%D0%B8_%D0%A2 % D1% 80% D1% 83% D0% BC% D1% 8D% D0% BD # cite_note-10).
The situation was aggravated by the fact that neither England nor Germany were preparing for war with each other. "As a result, at the very beginning of the Second World War, a paradoxical situation was created - England could not ensure the safety of its sea communications, while Germany did not have the strength to defeat the British merchant fleet" (S. Lebedev America against England. Part 8. Long pause // https://topwar.ru/50010-amerika-protiv-anglii-chast-8-zatyanuvshayasya-pauza.html). According to the American historian Samuel Eliot Morison, “in his plans to conquer world domination, Hitler hoped to postpone the war with England until at least 1944. He repeatedly declared to his admirals that the German fleet could not defeat the British Navy.
His strategy was to keep England neutral until the European "fortress" was conquered by him, and England would be unable to take any steps against it. Even more, Hitler did not want war with the United States, betting on … pacifists and supporters of fascism and assuming that the United States would remain neutral until England was conquered and he could dictate conditions to the new world, the fulfillment of which or another country will guarantee its existence.
… In September 1939 … the German navy had only 43 submarines in service, of which 25 were 250 tons each. The rest had a displacement of 500 to 750 tons. These submarines caused the most damage during the Second World War. At the same time, Germany was building only two to four submarines per month. During interrogation on June 9, 1945, Doenitz bitterly declared that “we lost the war before it began,” because “Germany was not prepared to wage a war against England at sea. With a sober policy, Germany should have had 1000 submarines at the start of the war."
… However, the pace of construction of submarines was immediately increased in such a way that the number of submarines under construction would increase from 4 to 20-25 monthly. Construction plans were approved, according to which in 1942, 300 submarines (mostly with a displacement of 500 and 750 tons) and more than 900 submarines were to enter service by the end of 1943. This program was not implemented, but even if it were possible to carry it out, then such a number of submarines would still not be enough (S. Morison, American Navy in World War II: Battle of the Atlantic / Translated from English by R. Khoroshchanskaya, G. Gelfand. - M.: M.: AST; SPb.: Terra Fantastica, 2003. - P. 142, 144).
"In turn, Britain, due to the small number of German submarines, neglected the construction of anti-submarine defense ships" (Lebedev S. America v. England. Part 8. Ibid). The first specialized Flower-class anti-submarine corvettes ordered in the summer of 1939 began to enter service after the defeat of France in the fall of 1940 and the redeployment of Axis submarines to convenient bases in Atlantic ports in the territories occupied by Nazi troops. Again, I will refer to the opinion of Alexander Bolnyh - opposing two dozen "German submarines that could operate in the Atlantic" fifty new corvettes, England could well have prevented the "Battle of the Atlantic" - "a protracted and bloody war with German submarines" (Bolnyh A. G.. The tragedy of fatal errors. - M.: Eksmo; Yauza, 2011. - P. 134).
Now the most numerous ethnic group in the United States is the Germans - their share reaches 17%. It is not surprising that the most common surname in the United States (2 772 200 speakers as of 1990) is Smith - the original German Schmidt or Schmid (German Schmidt, Schmit, Schmitt, Schmitz, Schmid, Schmied). This second most common German surname comes from the name of the profession blacksmith - German. Schmied. The Germans are followed by African Americans (13%), Irish (10%), Mexicans (7%), Italians (5%) and French (3.5%). The British make up only about 8% of the US population.
That is, in the modern United States, 8% of the British oppose more than 35% of the historically absolutely unfriendly peoples - Germans, Irish, Italians and French. Moreover, in the first half of the 20th century, the ratio, in all likelihood, was even higher. It was the recognition by the Great British Empire Pax Britannica of its subordination to the newly-minted leader that became the initial point of the gradual end of the first Cold War of the XX century America against England and the beginning of the formation of the modern Anglo-Saxon "American World" - Pax Americana. As well as the emergence of the “Soviet world” - Pax Sovietica, the impending delimitation of the spheres of influence of the US and the USSR, as well as the emergence of the second Cold War of the 20th century, in which Pax Americana collided with Pax Sovietica.
Thus, in the spring of 1939, after capturing the Czech Republic, granting Slovakia ostentatious independence and giving the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary, Hitler refused to create a bridgehead for the invasion of the USSR. What, in fact, disavowed the Munich Agreement. Poland's intransigence allowed Hitler to solve his problems in Lithuania and Romania, and later forced Chamberlain to neglect British interests and agree to a plan for the triumph of America by destroying France and the Soviet Union.
Taking the path of destroying France, Chamberlain radically changed the balance of power. The British plan of the Anglo-French-German-Italian alliance at once lost its relevance. There remained variants of the American plan for concluding an Anglo-German alliance to defeat the USSR and a German-Soviet alliance to defeat England. In order to eliminate the threat of America's solution of its tasks by destroying England, Churchill proposed the option of destroying Germany by the joint efforts of Britain and the USSR. In return, England agreed, as a junior partner, to subsequently assist America in destroying the USSR and gaining unconditional political domination by it.
In view of the emergence of an option for America to solve its problems at the expense of Germany, Hitler suddenly showed interest in the conclusion of a second Munich. The intensity of the struggle for leadership between England and America suddenly shifted from the leaders of England and America to Chamberlain, Churchill, Hitler and Stalin. It now depended on who would win this battle of interests who would pay for the triumph of America - the British, the Germans, or the Soviet citizens. England could no longer peacefully renounce dominion over the world - America needed a new big war in order to recoup the recovery of the German economy with the implementation of the Dawes plan and the Great Depression, make a fabulous profit from World War II, place military bases in the heart of Europe after its end, and bind George Marshall's post-war reconstruction plan. After Mussolini's refusal to follow the spirit of the Munich Agreement, the circle closed, and as a result, Hitler and Mussolini betrayed Chamberlain, who, in turn, betrayed the British and the French.
