As before, disputes about why the colossal military catastrophe that happened to our country on June 22, 1941 and brought innumerable calamities to our people became possible.
It would seem that the Soviet leadership before the war did everything possible and even impossible to prepare the country and people for severe trials. A powerful material base was created, tens of thousands of units of tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces and other military equipment were produced. Despite the unsuccessful war with Finland (although it was fought in difficult winter conditions and ended with the breakthrough of the powerful reinforced concrete fortifications of the Finns), the Red Army persistently learned to fight in conditions as close as possible to combat. Soviet intelligence, it seemed, "reported accurately" and all of Hitler's secrets were on Stalin's desk.
So what are the reasons that Hitler's armies were able to easily break through the Soviet defenses and end up at the walls of Moscow? Is it right for all fatal miscalculations to place the blame on one person - Stalin?
CALCULATIONS OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
The quantitative and, in many respects, the qualitative indicators of the work done in the USSR, especially in the production of military equipment, were gigantic. If by the end of the 1920s the Soviet armed forces had only 89 tanks and 1394 aircraft (and then mostly foreign models), then by June 1941 they already numbered almost 19 thousand Russian tanks, among them the first-class T-tank. 34, as well as more than 16 thousand combat aircraft (see table).
The trouble is that the Soviet political and military leadership failed to reasonably dispose of the means of armed struggle created, and the Red Army turned out to be unprepared for a major war. This begs the question: what are the reasons?
It is indisputable that, first of all, it is the regime of Stalin's sole power established in the 1930s, in which not a single, even the most insignificant, issue of military development was resolved by the military department without its sanction.
It was the Stalinist regime that was to blame for the fact that just on the eve of the war, the Soviet armed forces were actually beheaded. By the way, Hitler, when deciding on direct preparation for an attack on the USSR, especially on the timing of the aggression, attached paramount importance to this fact. In January 1941, at a meeting with representatives of the Wehrmacht command, he said: “For the defeat of Russia, the question of time is very important. Although the Russian army is a headless clay colossus, its future development is difficult to predict. Since Russia must be defeated in any case, it is better to do it now, when the Russian army does not have leaders ….
The repressions gave rise to fear in the command staff, fear of responsibility, which means lack of initiative, which could not but affect the level of management and the work of command personnel. This did not remain outside the field of vision of German intelligence. So, in the "Information about the enemy in the east" - the next report dated June 12, 1941, it was noted: connections. They are incapable and unlikely to be able to carry out major operations of an offensive war, quickly engage in battle under favorable conditions and act independently within the framework of a general operation."
In connection with the repressions, and mainly due to the constant adjustment of plans for military development by the political leadership of the country, in 1940-1941. the military command had to make decisions on expanding the training network for command and command personnel simultaneously with the start of organizational measures related to an increase in the size of the armed forces, including the command personnel. This, on the one hand, led to a huge lack of command staff. On the other hand, people with insufficient work experience came to command positions.
In the course of the reorganization of the armed forces, which began in 1940, fatal miscalculations were made that literally had catastrophic consequences. The formation of a large number of new formations and units with an unjustifiably large number of basic types of military equipment was undertaken. A paradoxical situation arose: with almost 19 thousand tanks in the Red Army, only one of the 29 mechanized corps could be fully equipped with them.
In 1940, the Soviet military command abandoned aviation armies, subordinating the bulk of combat aviation (84, 2% of all aircraft) to the command of combined arms formations (fronts and armies). This led to the decentralized use of aviation, which contradicted the general trend in the development of this highly maneuverable long-range weapon of warfare. In the Wehrmacht, on the contrary, all aviation was organizationally consolidated into several large operational-strategic formations (in the form of air fleets), it was not subordinate to the combined-arms command, but only interacted with ground forces.
Many mistakes in military development in the USSR on the eve of the war resulted from excessive adherence to the experience of the Red Army's military operations in local conflicts (Spain, the campaign of Soviet troops in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus), as well as the inability of the inexperienced, poorly trained in a professional sense, moreover deprived of the independence of the military leadership to objectively assess the experience of the great war that the Wehrmacht waged in Europe since September 1939.
The Soviet military-political leadership made the biggest mistake in the ratio of the means of armed struggle. Back in 1928, when planning the first five-year plan of military development, priority was given to the creation of the main means of armed struggle - artillery, tanks, and combat aircraft. The basis for this was the conclusion: in order to conduct successful operations, the Red Army needs highly mobile and well-armed units for the alleged theater of operations (motorized small arms and machine-gun units, reinforced with large tank units, armed with high-speed tanks and motorized artillery; large cavalry units, but certainly reinforced armored (armored vehicles, high-speed tanks) and fire weapons; large airborne units). In principle, this decision was correct. However, at some stage, the production of these funds assumed such exaggerated proportions that the USSR not only caught up with its main potential opponents, but also significantly surpassed them. In particular, the production of a huge number of so-called "highway tanks" was established, which had exhausted their resources by 1938. According to experts, their condition "was terrible." For the most part, they were just lying around in the territories of military units with faulty engines, transmissions, etc., and most of them were also disarmed. Spare parts were missing, and repairs were carried out only by dismantling some tanks to restore others.
Errors were also made in the course of the reorganization of the armed forces. First of all, it was carried out in the troops of the border military districts, and it covered them almost completely. As a result, a significant part of combat-ready, well-coordinated and equipped formations was disbanded by the beginning of the war.
In view of miscalculations in determining the necessary and possible number of formations, as well as errors in the organizational structure of troops and for other reasons, the bulk of the planned activities turned out to be incomplete, which had an extremely negative effect on the level of combat effectiveness of the armed forces in general, but especially tank forces, aviation, airborne troops, anti-tank artillery RGK and troops of fortified areas. Not fully staffed, they had low mobility, training and coherence.
In 1939-1940. the main part of the Soviet troops stationed in the west was redeployed to the new territories annexed to the USSR. This negatively affected the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of those units and formations that had to fight the German aggressor on June 22, 1941. The fact is that the redeployment violated the plans for the mobilization and strategic deployment of Soviet troops in the west in case of war, and the development of new plans was not fully completed. The troops and staffs were unable to master them sufficiently.
According to the testimony of Marshal S. S. Biryuzova, Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov proposed to K. E. Voroshilov and I. V. Stalin should leave the main forces of the troops east of the old border, on which well-fortified defense lines had already been built, and in the new territories to have only mobile troops along with strong engineering units of the fence. According to Shaposhnikov, in the event of an attack by an aggressor, they will conduct deterrent hostilities from line to line, thereby gaining time to mobilize and create groupings of the main forces on the line of the old border. However, Stalin, who believed that not a single inch of his land should be given to the enemy, and that he should be smashed on his own territory, rejected this proposal. He ordered the main forces of the troops to concentrate in the newly annexed areas, i.e. in close proximity to the border with Germany.
The troops introduced to the new territories were forced to be deployed in unequipped theaters of military operations. What this led to can be seen in the example of aviation. The airfields available in the new territories only half satisfied the needs of the air forces of the western military districts, therefore 40% of the air regiments were based two at one airfield, i.e. more than 120 aircraft each, at a rate of two or three airfields per regiment. Sad consequences are known: in the conditions of a surprise attack by the Wehrmacht, a huge number of Soviet aircraft from the first raid were destroyed on the ground.
The fact that during the war with Finland the Red Army had to break through long-term deep defenses, and powerful long-term fortifications were also erected on the borders of a number of European countries, served as a good reason for the Soviet leadership to make a decision to build long-term defensive lines along the new western border. This costly event required a huge amount of effort, money, and time. The leadership of the USSR did not have either one or the other, or the third. By the beginning of the war, about a quarter of the planned work had been completed.
At that time, the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army A. F. Khrenov recalled after the war that he and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense B. M. Shaposhnikov, who was entrusted with leading the defensive construction on the border, was first proposed to build not concrete, but light field fortifications. This would make it possible to create conditions for a stable defense as quickly as possible, and only then gradually build more powerful concrete structures. However, this plan was rejected. As a result, by June 1941, the planned work was far from complete: the plan for the construction of fortifications was only fulfilled by 25%.
In addition, such a large enterprise had other negative consequences: significant funds were diverted from such important activities as the construction of roads and airfields, the creation of the necessary conditions for combat training of troops. Moreover, the lack of manpower and the desire to save money forced the large-scale involvement of combat units in the construction, which had a detrimental effect on their combat readiness.
Unlike the Wehrmacht, where the youngest soldiers in the active army were conscripts in the fall of 1940, and the recruits of the spring draft of 1941 were sent first to the reserve army, in the Red Army privates of the additional spring draft (April-May) of 1941 were immediately supplied the same in operation. In the troops of the border military districts, soldiers of the first year of service accounted for more than two-thirds of the total number of privates, and almost half of them were drafted in 1941.
OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS
By the spring of 1940, as a result of the annexation of new territories to the USSR, a significant part of the Soviet troops had changed their deployment. By this time, the Soviet armed forces had grown significantly. Their action plan, adopted in 1938-1939, completely ceased to correspond to the situation. Therefore, in the General Staff, by the summer of 1940, the foundations of a new plan had been developed. Already in October, this plan, after some refinement, was approved by the country's political leadership. In February 1941, after the completion of the mobilization part of the war plan at the General Staff, the districts began to develop their mobilization plans. All planning was scheduled to be completed in May. However, due to the formation of new formations that continued until June 21 and the continued redeployment of troops, the planning could not be completed.
The intentions of the first operations were constantly corrected, but in the main they remained unchanged from October 1940.
It was believed that the Soviet Union "needs to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the west - against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, and in the east - against Japan." It was also allowed to act on the side of the fascist bloc and Turkey. The Western theater of operations was recognized as the main theater of operations, and Germany was the main enemy. In the last months before the war, it was expected that, together with the allies, it would deploy 230-240 divisions and more than 20.5 thousand guns against the USSR; about 11 thousand tanks and over 11 thousand aircraft of all types. It was assumed that Japan will deploy 50-60 divisions in the east, almost 9 thousand guns, more than 1,000 tanks and 3 thousand aircraft.
In total, in this way, according to the General Staff, the probable opponents could oppose the Soviet Union with 280-300 divisions, about 30 thousand guns, 12 thousand tanks and 14-15 thousand aircraft.
Initially, Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov assumed that the main forces of the German army for the offensive would be deployed north of the mouth of the San River. Therefore, he suggested that the main forces of the Red Army be deployed to the north of Polesie in order to go on the offensive after repelling the attack of the aggressor.
However, this option was not accepted by the new leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In September 1940, Timoshenko and Meretskov, while agreeing that Germany would deliver the main blow north of the Pripyat River, nevertheless believed that the main option for the deployment of Soviet troops should be one in which “the main forces would be concentrated south of Brest-Litovsk.
All military planning in the USSR since the 1920s. was based on the fact that the Red Army would begin military operations in response to the attack of the aggressor. At the same time, her actions at the beginning of the war and in subsequent operations were conceived only as offensive.
The idea of retaliation was still in force on the eve of the war. It was declared by political leaders in open speeches. She also figured in closed sources and found a place in the training of command personnel of the strategic and operational level. In particular, at the strategic military games held in January 1941 with the commanding staff of the fronts and armies, military operations began with strikes by the western side, i.e. enemy.
It was believed that the enemy would begin his actions with an invasion operation, for which he would already have a significant number of troops saturated with tanks in the border zone in peacetime. In accordance with this, the Soviet military leadership on the eve of the war kept the most powerful troops in the border areas. The armies stationed in them were more fully equipped with equipment, weapons and personnel. In addition to rifle formations, they included, as a rule, one or two mechanized corps and one or two air divisions. By the beginning of the war, 20 of the 29 mechanized corps of the Red Army were stationed in the western border military districts.
After repelling the first attack of the enemy and completing the deployment of Soviet troops in the west, it was planned to launch a decisive offensive with the aim of finally crushing the aggressor. It should be noted that Soviet military specialists have long considered the southwestern strategic direction the most advantageous for offensive operations against Germany and its allies in Europe. It was believed that the delivery of the main blow from Belarus could lead to protracted battles and hardly promised the achievement of decisive results in the war. That is why in September 1940 Timoshenko and Meretskov proposed to create the main grouping of troops south of Pripyat.
At the same time, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense undoubtedly knew Stalin's point of view. The Soviet leader, determining the likely direction of the enemy's main attack in the west, believed that Germany would first of all strive to seize the economically developed regions - Ukraine and the Caucasus. Therefore, in October 1940, he ordered the military to proceed from the assumption that the main attack of the German troops would be from the Lublin region to Kiev.
Thus, it was planned to ensure the achievement of the immediate strategic goals with offensive actions, primarily of the troops of the southwestern direction, in which more than half of all divisions intended to be part of the fronts in the west were to be deployed. While it was supposed to concentrate 120 divisions in this direction, in the north-west and west - only 76.
The main efforts of the fronts were concentrated in the armies of the first echelon, mainly due to the inclusion of most of the mobile formations in them to ensure a strong initial strike against the enemy.
Since the strategic deployment plan and the concept of the first operations were designed for the complete mobilization of the army, they were closely linked with the mobilization plan, the last version of which was adopted in February 1941. This plan did not provide for the formation of new formations during the war. Basically, they proceeded from the fact that even in peacetime, the necessary number of connections would be created to conduct it. This simplified the process of mobilization, shortened its time and contributed to a higher degree of combat effectiveness of the mobilized troops.
At the same time, a significant part of the human resources had to come from the interior of the country. This required a significant volume of inter-district traffic and the involvement of a large number of vehicles, which were not enough. After the withdrawal from the national economy of the maximum permissible number of tractors and cars, the saturation of the army with them would still be only 70 and 81%, respectively. The mobilization deployment of troops was not ensured for a whole range of other materiel.
Another problem was that due to the lack of storage facilities in the western military districts, half of their ammunition stocks were stored in the territory of the internal military districts, with a third at a distance of 500-700 km from the border. From 40 to 90% of the fuel reserves of the western military districts were stored in the warehouses of the Moscow, Oryol and Kharkov military districts, as well as in civilian oil depots in the interior of the country.
Thus, the inadequacy of mobilization resources in the new areas of deployment of troops in the western border military districts, the limited capabilities of available vehicles and communications, complicated mobilization and increased its duration.
The timely deployment of troops in order to create the envisaged groupings, their systematic mobilization were made in direct proportion to the organization of reliable cover. Covering tasks were assigned to the border military districts.
According to the plans, each army received for defense a strip with a width of 80 to 160 km or more. Rifle divisions were to operate in the first echelon of the armies. The basis of the army reserve was a mechanized corps, designed to deliver a counterattack against the enemy who had broken through into the depths of the defense.
The front edge of the defense in most sectors was in the immediate vicinity of the border and coincided with the front edge of the defense of the fortified areas. For battalions of the second echelon of regiments, not to mention units and subunits of the second echelon of divisions, positions were not created in advance.
The cover plans were calculated for the presence of a threatened period. Units intended for defense directly at the border were deployed 10-50 km from it. To occupy the areas assigned to them, it took from 3 to 9 hours or more from the moment of the announcement of the alarm. Thus, it turned out that in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy deployed directly at the border, there could be no question of the timely withdrawal of Soviet troops to their borders.
The existing cover plan was designed for the ability of the political and military leadership to timely reveal the intentions of the aggressor and take measures in advance to deploy troops, but it did not at all envisage the order of actions of the troops in the event of a sudden invasion. By the way, it was not practiced at the last strategic war games in January 1941. Although the "western" attacked first, the "eastern" began to practice their actions by going over to the offensive or by delivering counterstrikes in those directions where the "western" managed to invade the territory " eastern ". It is characteristic that neither the one nor the other side worked out the issues of mobilization, concentration and deployment, which were considered and really were the most difficult, especially in conditions when the enemy attacked first.
Thus, the Soviet war plan was built on the idea of a retaliatory strike, taking into account only those armed forces that were planned to be created in the future, and did not take into account the real state of affairs. Because of this, its constituent parts were in conflict with each other, which made it unreal.
Unlike the troops of Germany and its allies, who were in a state of full combat readiness at the time of the attack on the USSR, the grouping of Soviet troops in the west was not deployed and not ready for military action.
HOW EXACTLY REPORTED THE INTELLIGENCE?
Acquaintance with the intelligence data that came to the Kremlin in the first half of 1941 creates the impression that the situation was extremely clear. It seems that Stalin had only to give a directive to the Red Army to bring it into full combat readiness to repel aggression. However, he did not do this, and, of course, this is his fatal miscalculation, which led to the tragedy of 1941.
However, in reality, everything was much more complicated.
First of all, it is necessary to answer the following main question: could the Soviet leadership, on the basis of information received, in particular, from military intelligence, guess when, where and with what forces Germany would strike the USSR?
When asked when? fairly accurate answers were received: June 15 or 20; between June 20 and 25; June 21 or 22, finally - June 22. At the same time, the deadlines were constantly pushed back and were accompanied by various reservations. This, in all likelihood, caused Stalin's growing irritation. On June 21, he was informed that "according to reliable data, the German attack on the USSR is scheduled for June 22, 1941." On the report form, Stalin wrote: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation and punish him."
On the other hand, information about the date of June 22, although it was received literally on the eve of the war, nevertheless, could play a significant role in increasing the readiness of the Red Army to repel a strike. However, all attempts to pre-occupy positions in the border zone (foreground) were rigidly suppressed from above. Known, in particular, are the telegrams of G. K. Zhukov to the Military Council and the commander of the KOVO with a demand to cancel the instruction on the occupation of the frontline by field and Urovsky units, since "such an action can provoke the Germans into an armed conflict and is fraught with all sorts of consequences." Zhukov demanded to find out "who exactly gave such an arbitrary order." Therefore, in the end, it turned out that when the decision was made to move the troops according to the cover plan, there was practically no time left. On June 22, the commander of the ZAPOVO armies only received a directive at 2.25-2.35, ordering to bring all units to combat readiness, to occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border, to disperse all aviation across field airfields, and to bring air defense into combat readiness.
To the question "where?" an incorrect response was received. Although intelligence analysts at the beginning of June concluded that it was necessary to pay special attention to the strengthening of German troops in Poland, nevertheless, this conclusion was lost against the background of other intelligence reports, which again indicated a threat from the south and southwest. This led to the erroneous conclusion that "the Germans significantly strengthened their right wing against the USSR, increasing its share in the overall structure of their eastern front against the USSR." At the same time, it was emphasized that "the German command, having already at this time the necessary forces for the further development of actions in the Middle East and against Egypt … at the same time, rather quickly rebuilds its main grouping in the west … having in the future the implementation of the main operation against the British Isles."
To the question "by what forces?" we can say that on June 1, a more or less correct answer was received - 120-122 German divisions, including fourteen tank and thirteen motorized divisions. However, this conclusion was lost against the background of another conclusion that almost the same number of divisions (122-126) were deployed against England.
The undoubted merit of Soviet intelligence must be that it was able to reveal clear signs of Germany's readiness for an attack. The main thing was that, as the scouts reported, by June 15, the Germans had to complete all measures for strategic deployment against the USSR and a sudden strike could be expected, not preceded by any conditions or an ultimatum. In this regard, intelligence was able to identify clear signs of Germany's readiness for an attack in the near future: the transfer of German aircraft, including bombers; conducting inspections and reconnaissance by major German military leaders; the transfer of shock units with combat experience; concentration of ferry facilities; the transfer of well-armed German agents equipped with portable radio stations with instructions after completing the assignment to go to the location of the German troops already on Soviet territory; departure of families of German officers from the border zone, etc.
Stalin's distrust of intelligence reports is well known; some even attribute this distrust to a "manic character." But we must also take into account the fact that Stalin was under the influence of a whole series of other mutually contradictory and sometimes even mutually exclusive factors of international politics.
FACTORS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY
Foreign policy conditions for the USSR in the spring and summer of 1941 were extremely unfavorable. Although the conclusion of a neutrality treaty with Japan strengthened the position on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR, attempts to improve relations with countries such as Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, or at least prevent their participation in the bloc of fascist states, were unsuccessful.
The German invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, with which the USSR had just signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression, was the final blow to Soviet Balkan policy. It became clear to Stalin that the diplomatic confrontation with Germany was lost, that from now on the Third Reich, which dominated almost everywhere in Europe, did not intend to reckon with its eastern neighbor. There was only one hope: to postpone the dates of the now inevitable German aggression.
The relations of the USSR with Great Britain and the USA also left much to be desired. Military defeats in the Middle East and the Balkans in the spring of 1941 brought England to the brink of complete "strategic collapse." In such a situation, Stalin believed, the Churchill government would do everything in its power to provoke a war of the Reich against the USSR.
In addition, a number of important events took place that strengthened these suspicions of Stalin. On April 18, 1941, British Ambassador to the USSR R. Cripps handed the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs a memorandum stating that if the war was dragged out for a long time, certain circles in England might "smile at the thought" of ending the war with the Reich on German terms. And then the Germans will have unlimited scope for expansion eastward. Cripps did not rule out that a similar idea could find followers in the United States. This document clearly warned the Soviet leadership that such a turn of events was possible when the USSR would find itself alone in the face of the threat of a fascist invasion.
The Soviet leadership took it as an allusion to the possibility of a new anti-Soviet conspiracy of "world imperialism" against the USSR. It should be noted that there were circles in England that advocated peace negotiations with Germany. Pro-German sentiments were especially characteristic of the so-called Cleveland clique, led by the Duke of Hamilton.
The Kremlin's wariness increased even more when the next day, April 19, Cripps handed Molotov a letter from the British Prime Minister, written on April 3 and addressed to Stalin personally. Churchill wrote that, according to the British government, Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union. “I have reliable information…” he continued, “that when the Germans considered Yugoslavia caught in their net, that is, after 20 March, they began moving three of their five panzer divisions from Romania to southern Poland. As soon as they learned of the Serbian revolution, this movement was canceled. Your Excellency will easily understand the significance of this fact."
These two messages, coinciding in time, already gave Stalin a reason to consider what was happening as a provocation.
But then another thing happened. On May 10, Hitler's closest associate, his deputy in the party, Rudolf Hess, flew to England on a Me-110 plane.
Apparently, Hess's goal was to conclude a "compromise peace" in order to halt the exhaustion of England and Germany and prevent the final destruction of the British Empire. Hess believed that his arrival would give strength to a strong anti-Churchill party and give a powerful impetus "in the struggle for the conclusion of peace."
However, Hess's proposals were unacceptable primarily for Churchill himself and therefore could not be accepted. At the same time, the British government did not make any official statements and kept a mysterious silence.
The silence of official London about Hess gave Stalin additional food for thought. Intelligence has repeatedly reported to him about the desire of the ruling circles of London to get closer to Germany and at the same time push it against the USSR in order to avert the threat from the British Empire. In June, the British repeatedly conveyed to the Soviet ambassador in London Maisky information about the preparation of the Germans for an attack on the USSR. However, in the Kremlin, all this was unambiguously regarded as Britain's desire to involve the Soviet Union in the war with the Third Reich. Stalin sincerely believed that the Churchill government wanted the USSR to start deploying military groups in the border areas and thereby provoke a German attack on the Soviet Union.
Undoubtedly, the measures of the German command to imitate military preparations against England played a large role. On the other hand, German soldiers were actively building defensive structures along the Soviet borders - this was recorded by the Soviet border military intelligence, but this was also part of the disinformation measures of the German command. But the most important thing that misled the Soviet leadership was information about the ultimatum, which, allegedly, the German leadership was going to present to the USSR before the attack. In fact, the idea of presenting an ultimatum to the USSR was never discussed among Hitler's entourage as a real German intention, but was only part of disinformation measures. Unfortunately, she got to Moscow from sources, including foreign intelligence ("Sergeant Major", "Corsican"), which usually gave serious information. The same misinformation came from the well-known double agent O. Berlings ("Lyceum"). Nevertheless, the idea of an “ultimatum” fit very well into the Stalin-Molotov concept of the possibility of averting the threat of an attack in the summer of 1941 through negotiations (Molotov called them “the big game”).
In general, Soviet intelligence was able to determine the timing of the attack. However, Stalin, fearing to provoke Hitler, did not allow all the necessary operational and strategic measures to be carried out, although the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense asked him to do so a few days before the start of the war. In addition, the Soviet leadership was captured by the subtle disinformation game of the Germans. As a result, when the necessary orders were nevertheless given, there was not enough time to bring the troops to full combat readiness and organize a rebuff to the German invasion.
JUNE: TOMORROW WAS A WAR
In June, it became quite clear: we should expect a German attack in the near future, which will be carried out suddenly and most likely without any preliminary demands. Countermeasures had to be taken, and they were taken. Measures were taken to reduce the time required to bring into combat readiness the cover units allocated to support the border troops. In addition, the transfer of additional formations to the border districts continued: the 16th Army to KOVO, the 22nd Army to the ZAPOVO. However, the strategic mistake was that these measures were delayed. By June 22, only part of the transferred forces and assets was able to arrive. From Transbaikalia and Primorye from April 26 to June 22, it was possible to send only about half of the planned forces and assets: 5 divisions (2 rifle, 2 tank, 1 motorized), 2 airborne brigades, 2 det. shelf. At the same time, the main reinforcement went again in the southwestern direction: 23 divisions were concentrated in KOVO, in ZAPOVO - 9. This was a consequence of an incorrect assessment of the direction of the main attack of the Germans.
At the same time, the troops were still strictly forbidden to take up combat positions in the border zone. In fact, at the time of the attack, only the border guards, who were on duty in an enhanced mode, turned out to be fully operational. But there were too few of them, and their fierce resistance was quickly suppressed.
According to G. K. Zhukov, the Soviet armed forces could not "because of their weakness" at the beginning of the war repel the massive attacks of the German troops and prevent their deep breakthrough. At the same time, if it were possible to determine the direction of the main attack and the grouping of German troops, the latter would have to face much stronger resistance when breaking through the Soviet defense. Unfortunately, as documents show, the available intelligence information did not allow this to be done. The decisive role was also played by the predestination of the operational-strategic thinking of the Soviet command and the point of view of Stalin that the main blow should be expected on Ukraine.
In fact, only on the fifth day of the war did the Soviet command come to the final conclusion that the Germans were delivering the main blow in the west, and not in the south-west. Zhukov writes in his memoirs “… In the very first days of the war, the 19th Army, a number of units and formations of the 16th Army, previously concentrated in Ukraine and brought up there recently, had to be transferred to the western direction and included on the move in battles as part of Western Front. This circumstance undoubtedly affected the course of defensive actions in the western direction. " At the same time, as Zhukov writes, “the railroad transportation of our troops for a number of reasons was carried out with interruptions. Arriving troops were often brought into action without full concentration, which negatively affected the political and moral state of the units and their combat stability."
Thus, assessing the activities of the military-political leadership of the USSR on the eve of the war, it should be noted that it made a number of miscalculations that had tragic consequences.
First of all, this is a miscalculation in determining the direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht. Second, the delay in bringing the troops to full combat readiness. As a result, the planning turned out to be unrealistic, and the events held the day before were belated. Already in the course of hostilities, another miscalculation came to light: the actions of the troops in the event of a deep strategic breakthrough by the enemy were not envisaged at all, and a defense on a strategic scale was not planned either. And the miscalculation in the choice of the line of defense near the western borders in many respects provided the enemy with a surprise attack on the troops of the first operational echelon, which were most often stationed at a much greater distance from the defensive lines than the enemy.
Taking measures to increase the combat readiness of the troops, the military and political leadership of the USSR, fearing to provoke Hitler, did not do the main thing: it did not promptly bring the covering troops intended to repel the enemy's first strike, which were in a better equipped state, to full combat readiness. The maniacal fear of provoking Hitler played a bad joke with Stalin. As subsequent events showed (Hitler's speech on June 22), the Nazi leadership still accused the USSR of the fact that Soviet troops "treacherously" attacked parts of the Wehrmacht and the latter was "forced" to retaliate.
Errors made in operational planning (determining the direction of the enemy's main attack, creating a group of forces, especially a second strategic echelon, etc.) had to be urgently corrected already in the course of hostilities.
