We can say that the conclusions are somewhat premature, because only the first week has passed since the group of our ships headed by the TAVKR "Admiral Kuznetsov" operates in Syria. However, we can already say that everything went a little differently as planned.
As I understand it, “Admiral Kuznetsov” was sent to the shores of Syria not at all because the air group in Khmeinim, without his air wing, is not able to fulfill the assigned tasks. This is logical and understandable.
It is also clear that the Su-24M and Su-34 in terms of combat capabilities are an order of magnitude superior to the Su-33 fighters and MiG-29K fighter-bombers. Su-34 is capable of carrying up to 8 tons of bombs, Su-24M - 7.5 tons. For carrier-based aircraft, these indicators are lower, the Su-33 can lift a maximum of 6.5 tons, the MiG-29K - 4.5 tons. And the Su-33 will have exclusively unguided bombs. In addition, despite the apparent superiority in load of the Su-33, the figure of 6.5 tons is in the overload version. The combat equipment of the air-to-air fighter is more modest - 3.2 tons.
It is also clear that the composition of the air group in Syria can be quickly and cheaply increased by deploying additional bombers there. And for this it is not at all necessary to drive an aircraft carrier with a cover group across half the world.
Undoubtedly, I believe that the main task of the campaign was to accumulate experience in the use of Russian carrier-based aircraft in a real war. Indeed, by and large, this campaign is really the first combat on the account of "Admiral Kuznetsov". "Demonstrations of presence" with several fighters on the deck, which took place earlier, cannot be called serious.
Here we have exactly combat experience, in the conditions of hostilities.
It is quite possible that this experience will be invaluable not only for the pilots of carrier-based aircraft, but also for those who are developing plans to build a new generation of Russian aircraft carrier. We are all aware that work in this direction is under way. The only question is the need to draw full conclusions about the advisability of using such ships.
It seems to me that it was precisely this that dictated the rush, in the conditions of which the Kuznetsov campaign was being prepared. The facts confirm this.
From January to mid-June 2016, the cruiser was under repair at the 35th shipyard in Murmansk.
From June to August, work was carried out at the dock of the 82nd shipyard in Roslyakov.
I will not comment on how well and successfully the work was carried out, the "smoking aircraft carrier" has become the talk of the town. But it is worth noting that the merit of Russian shipbuilders in this is very significant, since making a ship move in accordance with the performance characteristics, the power plant of which is a kind of designer from parts of different ships, is already a feat in our time.
This, incidentally, testifies to the proper level of training of the crew.
And only in September, the pilots of the 279th OKIAP on the Su-33 and the 100th OKIAP on the MiG-29KR / KUBR began to practice takeoffs and landings on it.
Under normal circumstances, this should have taken at least two or three months. But this time was not at the disposal of the pilots. And in Soviet times, according to the instructions and instructions, the pilot was given up to three years to fully master the course of combat training.
None of the pilots of the 100th OKIAP had such an opportunity for training. But I already wrote about this. The 100th OKIAP was formed a year ago, in December 2015.
It can be argued that the pilots of the 276th OKIAP had the NITKA simulator at their disposal in the Crimea, and the pilots of the 100th OKIAP had its analogue in Yeisk.
I agree. But I will only ask one question: is there a difference between a ground concrete with a lifting squiggle and the deck of an aircraft carrier in motion on the high seas when practicing takeoff and landing?
Something tells me that the difference is not just there, but very significant.
Apparently, time was running out. And already on October 15, "Admiral Kuznetsov" with a group of ships set out on its first military campaign …
And quite naturally, the MiG-29KR disaster occurred.
Naturally for many reasons. Chief among them - the MiG-29KR / KUBR did not complete the complex of state tests. To date, they have not even been officially adopted yet.
On September 6, 2016, the commander of the naval aviation, Major General Kozhin, said: “While the tests are underway, so we cannot say about the future. So far, everything is positive. We have already carried out a very large part of the tests, but in general they are designed until 2018. For the time being, the aircraft will be used to a certain extent. The tests are a long process, but the lion's share of the tests concerning the ship, we will carry out this year."
That is, conducting state tests in conditions of combat use. And there are a lot of pitfalls, one of which is the low quality of components that has already become a reality.
It is no secret that this disaster is not the first for the MiG-29KR. During the tests, the MiG-29KUBR was lost in June 2011 in the Astrakhan region. Both pilots were killed. And in June 2014, another plane crashed in the Moscow region. The pilot could not be saved either.
The blatant insufficiency of the MiG tests obviously had to close our eyes for the sake of either a real need to test the aircraft in combat conditions, or for the sake of victorious reports.
Naturally, after the disaster in the Mediterranean Sea, a ban was imposed on the flights of the MiG-29KR. And here a very acute question arises: how quickly and is it even possible to determine what caused the catastrophe?
According to the pilot's report, both engines suddenly stopped. Preliminary conclusions - failure of the fuel supply system. But it is unrealistic to answer all the questions without decrypting the data of the "black boxes". Again the question is: can the sunken plane be lifted at all, and how quickly?
As a result, the MiGs were chained to the deck, and the Su-33 crews began to fly combat missions. At no fish, as they say …
By the way, sorties on November 15 and 18 are the first cases in history of combat use of carrier-based Su-33 fighters. And at the same time - the first use of these aircraft against ground targets.
The value of these missions is more than doubtful, since the Su-33s were originally created exclusively as fighters for air cover for our ship formations far from their shores.
None of the developers ever planned to destroy objects on land using the Su-33. This became possible only in recent years, after some of these combat vehicles were retrofitted with a special computing subsystem for navigation SVP-24-33 "Hephaestus", which allows the use of unguided 500-kilogram and 250-kilogram free-fall bombs with an accuracy characteristic of guided munitions. According to the developers, "Hephaestus" increases the efficiency of using aircraft weapons against ground targets by 3-4 times.
Still, it's more of an option.
The main advantage of the MiG-29KR / KUBR over the Su-33 lies not in the number of means of destruction of ground targets, but in the quality. The Su-33 is primarily a fighter. MiG-29KR - fighter-bomber.
The main difference between the MiG and the Su is in the multifunctional radar N010 "Zhuk-M", which allows detecting strike targets at a distance of up to 110 kilometers against the background of the earth's surface and at the same time mapping the area.
The Su-33 cannot do that. It has the only airborne Sword radar station operating, as it should be for a fighter-interceptor, only in the air-to-air mode. Low-contrast targets on the ground are unable to distinguish the "Sword".
The appearance on the part of the Su-33 sighting systems SVP-24-33 "Hephaestus" on the "Admiral Kuznetsov" partly neutralized this shortcoming, but did not reduce it to zero. Alas, so far only "dryers" are taking part in combat missions. With all the consequences that come out.
In general, the operation with the use of the TAVKR "Admiral Kuznetsov" is still slightly surprising. A hastily repaired (and not brought to mind initially) ship, aircraft that have not completed testing, and pilots that have not undergone proper training.
Did all this have to be neglected in order to gain experience in the combat use of Russian carrier-based aircraft in a real war?
But excuse me, what are the costs, so will the result! There is an old Russian proverb: "If you hurry, you will make people laugh." Well, the world has already mocked the "smoking aircraft carrier" enough. Kudos to the crew, we have dealt with the problem. We don't smoke.
Now the second item is on the agenda. MiGs. The ban on flights (absolutely fair) threatens that the planned combat experience in the use of these aircraft will be greatly underestimated, if at all.
The question arises: was it worth dragging such a grouping of ships across half the world in order to work out the use of fighters against ground targets? Let me emphasize, fighters, not very much intended for this?
Maybe you shouldn't have been in such a hurry?
