Before the arrival of the general, Russia was, as it were, a tributary of the mountaineers, paying salaries to local authorities
In the fall of 1816, Alexei Petrovich Ermolov arrived at the control center of the North Caucasus, the city of Georgievsk, a man whose name is associated with a whole era in the history of this region.
Sharp, sometimes extremely unpleasant in communication, he, nevertheless, was the favorite of ordinary soldiers of the Russian army.
Ermolov's exploits during the Napoleonic Wars created for him the well-deserved image of an epic knight. But relations with many generals did not go well. Unable to keep a sharp tongue, he allowed himself to be insolent even to Kutuzov and the influential Count Arakcheev, not to mention other officers.
In addition, Ermolov enjoyed the notoriety of a free-thinker and a liberal, he was even suspected of having connections with the Decembrists. From time to time, Ermolov fell into disgrace, he was sometimes carried around with awards, but whenever things took a difficult turn, the obstinate was remembered and sent to the very thick of the fighting. And here Yermolov's military talent was fully revealed, and nothing - neither the intrigues of envious people, nor his own difficult character could interfere with promotion.
The same Arakcheev admitted that Yermolov deserves to be a minister of war, but at the same time made a characteristic reservation: “he will start by squabbling with everyone” [1].
And such a complex person was sent by Alexander I to the Caucasus as the commander-in-chief, and with diplomatic powers. The Tsar granted Ermolov unprecedented rights. Not a single governor of past eras could boast of the practically unlimited power that the tsar endowed Ermolov with. The general became practically the autocratic ruler of a vast region.
Arriving at the place, Ermolov was convinced that things in the Caucasus were going badly. The Russian army has won many victories, but entire areas are subordinate to St. Petersburg only on paper. Russian fortified posts constantly suffer from the raids of the mountaineers, the neighboring independent khanates, like a weather vane, hesitate between Russia, Persia and Turkey, taking the side that suits them.
Great Russia was like a tributary of the mountaineers, paying salaries to local authorities. The Caucasian clans blackmailed Russia with raids and demanded money. And the more they were paid, the more greedy they became.
Of course, the Caucasian leaders understood that Petersburg was being bought off not out of weakness, not because it considered them stronger than the vast empire. However, the local princelings instilled in their subjects the idea that Russia was afraid of the Caucasians. It is clear that such propaganda only pushed the local bandits to participate in the "profitable trade", which consisted in the robbery of Russian settlements and the slave trade of Russian prisoners.
Here is how Ermolov described his first impressions of the Caucasus in a letter to Count Vorontsov: “There is an extreme disorder in everything. The people have an innate inclination towards him, encouraged by the weakness of many of my predecessors. I need to use extreme severity, which here will not please and, of course, will not instill affection for me. This is the first powerful remedy that I must certainly be deprived of. Our own officials, having rested from the fear that instilled in them the severity of the glorious prince Tsitsianov, embarked on plunder and they will hate me, for I am a harsh persecutor of robbers”[2].
The current state of affairs was rooted in the inconsistency of St. Petersburg's events in the Caucasus, and when Ermolov wrote about the weakness of his predecessors, he was partly right. In the capital, they could not decide whether to stake on drastic measures or try to attract local leaders through all kinds of benefits. The hesitation of Petersburg was also manifested in who was appointed commanders of the Caucasus. Take, for example, Prince Tsitsianov, who in 1802 became an inspector of the Caucasian fortified line.
Tsitsianov's approaches to solving problems in the Caucasus are best seen from his following words: “If the Tatars of this region are attracted more by their own motives to us than to the Persian owners, then from nothing else but from the fact that the strength of the Russian troops was seen, and this last is the only spring that can be both kept within the proper boundaries of decency and accomplishment, and be sure that the local resident is looking for and will seek to be a strong patron”[3].
And here is how another representative of Russia, Gudovich, looked at the Caucasus: “to calm down and bring into submission” the mountain tribes were most easily done by measures of “meekness and humanity, rather than with weapons, which, although they would be struck and will, but having the right refuge, they would leave for the mountains, will always harbor irreconcilable revenge, akin to them, for the defeat, and especially for the harm done to their estate”[4].
Gudovich's ideas were put into practice. For example, the Chechens were given the right to duty-free trade in Russian fortresses, large sums of money were allocated for their elders, and, in addition, a certain independence was granted to the penitentiary system of Chechnya. In practice, this meant that it was not the Russian authorities who were directly punishing the Chechens for their misdeeds, but the Chechen foremen. Rtischev also distributed money to the mountaineers.
Yes, and Alexander I himself from time to time instructed the Caucasian governors to deal with the highlanders gently: “Repeated experiments made it indisputable that it is not by killing the inhabitants and the ruin of their homes that it is possible to establish peace on the Caucasian Line, but by affectionate and friendly treatment of the mountain peoples, alien to so many - any kind of enlightenment, like religion. The Circassians, adjacent to the Black Sea people, and the Kirghiz, surrounding the Siberian line, serve as an example of how much influence this good neighborhood of Russians and the disposition of the border authorities towards a peaceful life has on the peoples”[5].
Resolute Tsitsianov and cautious, inclined to negotiations Gudovich with Rtishchev - the poles of the Caucasian policy of Russia, between which were other major military leaders who served in the Caucasus: for example, Tormasov and Glazenap.
Ermolov can be called the successor of the Tsitsianov case. He despised both Gudovich, calling him "the stupidest brute," and his methods. Yermolov acted cool and started from Chechnya. He ousted the mountaineers beyond Sunzha, in 1818 built the Groznaya fortress and erected a chain of fortifications from it to Vladikavkaz. This line secured the area of the middle Terek.
Yermolov covered the Lower Terek with another fortress "Sudden". The problem of forests, the so-called "green", known to us from the wars in the Caucasus in the 1990s, Yermolov undertook to solve in his characteristic radical spirit: the trees were systematically cut down. Glades went from aul to aul, and now Russian troops could, if necessary, enter the very heart of Chechnya.
Seeing such a thing, the Dagestanis realized that Ermolov would soon get to them. Therefore, without waiting for the troops of the formidable general to appear in their lands, Dagestan rose up against Russia in 1818. Ermolov responded with a decisive offensive against the Mehtuli Khanate and quickly destroyed its independence. The next year, Ermolov's ally, General Madatov, conquered Tabasaran and Karakaidag.
Then the Kazikumyk Khanate was defeated, and Dagestan was pacified for a while. Ermolov applied a similar system of measures in Kabarda, the issue with the Circassian (Adyghe) raids remained unresolved, but here Ermolov could not do anything, because Circassia was nominally under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire, and, in fact, was a territory governed by its own laws.
I must say that Yermolov, making the main bet on the force of arms, on occasion used various political and diplomatic tricks, taking into account the specifics of the East. This was especially evident when he was sent to Iran at the head of the Russian embassy in order to achieve a lasting peace. The general went to Persia with a heavy heart, which is clearly seen from the text of Yermolov's letter to Vorontsov: “The shah, a luxurious and dissolute man, wants to live the end in voluptuousness, but he is influenced. War gives great treasures to the greedy nobles. We will see what will happen”[6].
Ermolov knew what an important role external luxury has in the East, so he furnished his visit to Iran with maximum pomp. Arriving at the place, Ermolov refused to follow the accepted ceremony, humiliating for foreign ambassadors. The attempt of the known Abbas-Mirza to put the Russian in his place by demonstrative inattention came across exactly the same behavior of Yermolov. But this only increased the authority of the general in the eyes of the Persian nobility.
Ermolov also understood the intricacies of Eastern flattery, and he himself indulged in florid praise of his interlocutors, if they did not try to humiliate him. At a meeting with the Shah, Fet-Ali Ermolov presented the ruler of Iran with rich gifts, including huge mirrors, which struck the Shah most of all. For the first time in his life, he saw his reflection in a full-length mirror. The vizier, who held a post similar to the European Prime Minister, was not left without gifts.
When negotiations began, Ermolov skillfully combined flattery with harsh threats, his good-natured tone was replaced by irreconcilable and vice versa. In addition, our general went to outright deception, declaring himself a descendant of Genghis Khan. As "evidence" Ermolov presented his cousin, who is in the Russian embassy. His eyes and cheekbones were somewhat Mongolian. This fact had a stunning effect on the Persians, and they were seriously worried that in the event of a new war, the Russian troops would be commanded by "Chingizid".
Ultimately, Yermolov's diplomatic mission was crowned with complete success, Iran's claims to the Russian border territories were rejected, and the Shah agreed not to demand them anymore. And peace with Persia lasted until 1826.
And yet I am far from singing Yermolov's hosanna. The results of his management are very ambiguous. There is no doubt that the general achieved a lot, his name terrified the local ukhars, who for many years had been engaged in robbery and the slave trade. A significant part of the Caucasus has indeed submitted to Russian arms, but the current situation cannot be called appeasement.
The highlanders were preparing for revenge, and Ermolov's drastic measures pushed them towards unification. In the face of a common, dangerous enemy, the Caucasian clans put aside their feuds and for a while forgot the grievances inflicted on each other.
The first formidable omen of the future great Caucasian war was the uprising of 1822. Qadi (spiritual leader, Sharia judge) Abdul Kadyr and the influential Chechen foreman Bey-Bulat Taimiev formed an alliance to prepare for an armed uprising against Russia. Abdul-Kadyr influenced the Chechen population with his sermons, and Taimiev was engaged in military affairs. In 1822 they raised the Chechens, Ingush and Karabulaks.
General Grekov, a close associate of Ermolov, who fully shared his views, was sent to pacify. Grekov, at the head of a large detachment with artillery, met the main enemy forces in the Shali forest. After a hard battle, Russian units occupied Shali and Malye Atagi. To intimidate and punish the rebels, both villages were ravaged to the ground.
Taimiev then managed to escape, and the remnants of his "army" switched to partisan tactics, regularly attacking the Cossack villages and fortified posts. But by 1823, Taimiev's detachments were losing their former strength, and the leader himself went to Dagestan, where he met the preacher Magomed Yaragsky, the father of Caucasian muridism.
Here we must distract ourselves from the vicissitudes of the military and diplomatic fronts and briefly consider the phenomenon of muridism - the ideology that soldered the scattered highlanders, giving them the ideology of fighting Russia.
What is Muridism? In short, this is a special system of views, which is based on several important postulates. According to this ideology, people are politically divided into four categories.
The first - Muslims (Muslims) - adherents of Islam, enjoying all political and civil rights. The second is dhimmi, who do not profess Islam, but who live in a Muslim state, have limited rights (in particular, they are deprived of the right to bear arms).
The third - the Mustomins - are foreigners who are in a Muslim state on the basis of "aman" (a promise of security). Fourth - the Harbiys (infidels - "kafirs"), living in other countries, not professing Islam; against them should be waged "jihad" ("holy war") for the triumph of Islam. Moreover, in the event of an attack by enemies on the country of Islam, "jihad" was obligatory for every Muslim [7].
Muridism demanded obedience to the norms of Sharia, later supplemented by separate laws, and gradually replaced the old system of justice (adat), based on the traditions and customs of their ancestors. The religious leader, the imam, was placed above the feudal nobility, that is, khans and beks. Moreover, the murid (a person who adopted muridism) was able to move up the hierarchical ladder in society, regardless of origin or personal wealth.
Since 1824, the Chechen clergy launched agitation for a new uprising, and the very next year elections were held for an imam (Magom Mayrtupsky became him), a military leader (Taimiev) and heads of villages. In addition, a recruitment was announced: one armed horseman from each court.
Soon the Caucasus was on fire again. Taimiev was followed not only by the Chechens, but also by the Kumyks and Lezgins. Demonstrations against Russia took place in Kabarda and even in the hitherto loyal shamkhalism of Tarkovsky [8].
But the Russian army did not flinch, and Taimiev's detachments began to weaken again, disagreements began to arise in the leadership of the uprising, many highlanders hesitated and avoided participating in hostilities. And Ermolov, as always, showed determination and steadfastness. But, having won the victory, our general realized that his usual power line of conduct did not lead to strategic success.
Highlanders do not turn into loyal subjects, and only temporarily calm down. Ermolov suddenly realized that rigidity alone is not enough, and his views begin to evolve, become more flexible. He had already outlined the contours of a new Caucasian policy, but did not have time to implement it. The second Russo-Persian war began.
Literature
1. Potto V. A. Caucasian War. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2014. S. 275.
2. A. P. Ermolov. Caucasian letters 1816-1860. - SPb.: Zvezda magazine, 2014. P. 38.
3. Gapurov Sh. A. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences "Policy of Russia in the North Caucasus in the first quarter of the XIX century." WITH. 199.
4. Gapurov Sh. A. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences "Policy of Russia in the North Caucasus in the first quarter of the XIX century." WITH. 196.
5. Gapurov Sh. A. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences "Policy of Russia in the North Caucasus in the first quarter of the XIX century." P. 249.
6. A. P. Ermolov. Caucasian letters 1816-1860. - SPb: Magazine "Zvezda", 2014. P.47
7. Plieva Z. T. Dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences "Muridism - the ideology of the Caucasian war."
8. Gapurov Sh. A. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences "Policy of Russia in the North Caucasus in the first quarter of the XIX century." P.362.
