Each decent fleet has traditions - the British, according to rumors, are Nothing but rum, sodomy, prayers and the lash, but we do not rely on technology, but on the daring of the sailors and the courage of gentlemen / comrade officers. No, in the times of these, when the sail reigned, our fleet had a decent infrastructure, and a school, and quantitatively nothing at all, as the Turks, the French, and other Swedes were convinced of, but with the advent of steam engines …
Crimean War
I don’t touch the Crimean war, it’s still more sailing, but nevertheless, even then we did not have time. We didn’t have time with the railway to the Crimea, and deliveries went in oxen, did not have time with steam battleships, propeller-driven frigates, modern cannons … The Sinop and Tsesarevich, which Nakhimov lacked so much, froze on the stocks of Nikolaev, the plan to build did not take off only for the Black Sea six such ships and to supplement them with propeller frigates … But the era was transitional, and stretched out mainly due to the same daring and willingness to die on the bastions of Sevastopol.
Russo-Turkish war
But the next war was already another - a war of armor and steam, a war in which daring would have to be supplemented with technology.
The equipment for the Black Sea residents was built upon the withdrawal from the Paris agreements, it even got into the literature:
Somewhere somehow everyone is embarrassed, Somehow something is a sin …
We are spinning like a "popovka"
And not an inch ahead.
Two round battleships stood throughout the war in Odessa, which the Turks would not have attacked even if there were coastal batteries, and once marched to the mouth of the Danube. Meanwhile, the Turks had a full-fledged fleet …
They saved mines, or rather, their creative use by Makarov, and that same daring, but what else to call the battle of Vesta, a civilian steamer with cannons, against an armored corvette? What to call Makarov's hikes on the same steamer with mine boats on board?
All the famous admirals of the Russo-Japanese war began just then, but instead of the experience of battles, they acquired only the experience of mine warfare and that same daring, and hope for a bit. There was nothing to fight on. When choosing what to sail against the enemy on, the Vesta looks, perhaps, preferable to the creations of the gloomy genius of Admiral Popov …
And with a normal fleet, as usual, they did not have time. They did not even try, all the forces went to the popovka, although floating batteries and tower armored monitor boats were completely built for the Baltic … This time the daring rescued again, but I had to give in at the Berlin Congress, I had to abandon the straits.
Neither the Minoski nor the Popovka danced against the Royal Nevi, the historical chance was missed.
What prevented the construction of six steam vessels, not 800 tons each, but a little larger and similar to the "Monitor"? The Paris treatise did not prohibit this. And from 1871 to 1876, five years passed, for a comparable period, 12 armored boats were built in the Baltic, for example. There were opportunities, but there was no desire and understanding.
Russo-Japanese war
Two lessons in a row: that the fleet should be built in advance, seemed to be quite convincing, but in 1904 we were late again.
Potential beauty and pride - five squadron battleships of the "Borodino" class did not have time for the war. "Alexander III", however, could have time that, if "Oslyabya" and "Aurora" also arrived, it would radically change the alignment of forces, but …
The tests of the new ship were not without surprises, which began on August 22, 1903, when the battleship suffered damage to the bottom when docked: the location of the keelblocks and cages did not sufficiently take into account the mass, size and shape of the ship's hull. The belated decision to install a network barrage required annealing of the armor plates to attach the shoes of the shots.
On September 23, 1903, during the factory sea trials, the "Emperor Alexander III", with 19 boilers introduced, easily developed full speed, but while circulating to the left, it unexpectedly tilted up to 15 ° to the starboard side and "took water through the ports of the lower battery." The reasons for the excessive "agility" (the diameter of the circulation is less than 1 kb at a time of 3 m 20 s), instability on the course and the swelling of the battleship were established by a special commission, which suggested cutting off the side keels in the bow up to 18 m and repairing the "edge cut" in the stern …
In short, a series of stupid mistakes and a corresponding result.
And so it is typical already - sailors and officers showed daring, but the fleet entered the battle in parts, without a normal rear and repair facilities. This time, the daring did not give anything, except for the memorial plaques in the Naval Cathedral and the death of sailors who were able to finally create a world-class fleet. As Suvorov used to say:
"Once lucky, two lucky - have mercy on God, because you need skill!"
If we understand by skill the timely preparation of ships and theater of military operations …
Great War
It seems that the tragedy of the Russo-Japanese was supposed to be a lesson, especially since in 1904 Russia was actually drawn into the anti-German coalition, but we again failed to prepare for the next war.
At the beginning of the Great War, the following were completed for the Baltic: battleships - zero, battle cruisers - zero, light cruisers - zero, modern destroyers - 1 (one), submarines - 1 (one). On the Black Sea, the picture is about the same, unless the destroyers were completed there at all. In the North there was no fleet at all, and a cruiser for the Pacific Ocean was ordered … in Germany. The Germans were very pleased with the "Elbing" and "Pillau", the good ships came out, most importantly for free. They were also satisfied with their "Noviks" in the amount of eight units, the turbines for which were built for the money of … Russia.
A legitimate question arises - what were our naval commanders doing?
Many things, for example, the pre-dreadnoughts "Paul I" and "Andrew the First-Called", which were laid in 1904 and passed in 1912. The admirals wanted ships that would not have sunk in Tsushima under any circumstances, as a result, the project was changed, distorted, changed again … Eight years.
They also built clones of the armored Bayan, which were outdated by 1905. The lead "Admiral Makarov" is still understandable, it was ordered to compensate for losses in 1904, but why two more? A riddle … Especially since the British built and sold with drawings quite solid "Rurik", there was even a project of its turbine version, but it did not take off.
And they also built coal destroyers (outdated and slow-moving), and also engaged in the submarine fleet, albeit unsuccessfully: both the Shark and the Bars are extremely bad boats, not to mention the creativity of the Cayman.
No, the battleships were built, as many as 12, but they did not have time, and after commissioning they were not used in the Baltic at all, and on the Black Sea - with near-zero efficiency.
Likewise, and so on - during the war they introduced a lot of things (except for cruisers), but …
Cruisers are a separate topic. 15 130 mm guns, with a casemate arrangement - this is not even yesterday, it is worse. One good thing is the mines. In the sense of a lot and sensible. Well, dashing, where without it. Moonsund's "Glory" alone is worth something …
Our sailors are good, our policies are economical and slow-acting.
They pulled, in a word, that the old battleships at Sarych against the battle cruiser "Goeben", that cruiser campaigns in the Baltic, with all the chances to perish if the Germans released a couple of their modern battle cruisers. And for the North, it did not at all - the drowned men of the Russo-Japanese War were ransomed from the Japanese and the destroyers of that war were driven across half the world …
The Great Patriotic War
By the Great Patriotic War, nothing has changed - in the construction of three battleships, two battle cruisers, seven cruisers of project 68 … In the ranks - 4 cruisers 26/26 bis, 46 sevens and sevens improved and seven leaders.
There was a difference, after all, the Soviet leadership built a huge submarine fleet, although not entirely successful, powerful mosquito forces and solid coastal defense, for which they did not spare money.
So, on average, it turned out well, but again - we did not have an ocean-going fleet in that war, as well as in the Great War, as well as in the Russo-Turkish one. In the Russian-Japanese, however, was, but what's the point?
At the same time, our sailors always perfectly defended their shores - that of Sevastopol (twice), that of Port Arthur, that of Leningrad and Kronstadt. If objectively, we are leaders in this matter. But the rest …
Everything else is sad, there is no systematic approach, and large ships are toys for rulers who build when there is money and forget when they run out. From there and troubles - such a tradition, there are many speeches, and then the sailors go into battle on boats, outdated destroyers, civilian steamers, relying on the same daring and courage.
Now, in the light of what is happening with funding, the emphasis on RTOs and DPLs can only be welcomed, coastal protection is commonplace, and one or two AUG will not change anything. But, I'm afraid, it will bring the rulers into the next Big Fleet. Already drifting. This is despite the fact that there is not even a floating dock for Kuznetsov, and the repairs of the nuclear submarine are being delayed for a period comparable to the construction period.
There is no consistency, it has not been for 150 years.
