Accumulated towards the end of the 1950s. The experience of operating the first anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), adopted for supplying the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces, showed that they had a number of significant drawbacks that made them unsuitable for use as mobile covering means in the conduct of mobile combat operations. For these purposes, fundamentally different complexes were required, possessing a high degree of autonomy and mobility, capable of covering both stationary and mobile objects from air strikes.
The first among such complexes were the Krug long-range air defense systems and the Cube medium-range air defense systems, which organically entered the organizational structure of the defended troops. The long-range air defense system was tasked with defending the most important facilities at the front and army levels, and the medium-range air defense system was assigned to provide air defense for tank divisions.
In turn, for direct cover of motorized rifle divisions and regiments, short-range artillery and missile systems were required, the engagement zones of which had to correspond to the organizational structure of the Soviet Army and be determined based on the need to overlap the front width and the depth of the combat lines of the defended unit during its action in defense. or offensive.
A similar evolution of views was characteristic in those years for foreign developers of anti-aircraft missiles.
ket funds that came in the mid-1950s. to the need to develop a self-propelled short-range air defense system. The first such air defense system was supposed to be the American Mauler, intended to repel attacks from low-flying aircraft, as well as unguided and guided tactical missiles with an EPR of up to 0.1 m2.
The requirements for the Mauler complex were put forward in 1956, taking into account the scientific and technological breakthroughs in the field of electronic and rocket technology that had taken place by that time. It was assumed that all the means of this air defense system will be located on the basis of a tracked armored personnel carrier Ml 13: a launcher with 12 missiles in containers, target detection and fire control equipment, radar antennas of the guidance system and a power plant. The total weight of the air defense missile system was supposed to be about 11 tons, which made it possible to transport it on transport aircraft and helicopters.
It was planned to begin deliveries of the new air defense system to the troops in 1963, while the total release was supposed to be 538 complexes and 17180 missiles. However, already at the initial stages of development and testing, it became clear that the initial requirements for the Mauler air defense system were put forward with excessive optimism. So, according to preliminary estimates, a single-stage missile with a semi-active radar homing head, created for an air defense system, should have had a launch weight of about 40 kg (warhead weight -4.5 kg), a range of up to 10 km, develop a speed of up to M = 3, 2 and perform maneuvers with overloads up to 30 units. The fulfillment of such characteristics was significantly ahead of the capabilities of that time by about 25-30 years.
As a result, the development of a promising air defense system, in which the leading American firms Convair, General Electric, Sperry and Martin took part, immediately began to lag behind the target dates and was accompanied by a gradual decrease in expected performance. So, it soon became clear that in order to obtain the required effectiveness of destruction of ballistic missiles, the mass of the warhead of the missile defense system must be increased to 9, 1 kg.
In turn, this led to the fact that the mass of the rocket increased to 55 kg, and their number on the launcher decreased to nine.
Ultimately, in July 1965, after 93 launches were carried out at the White Sands test site and more than $ 200 million was spent, Mauler was abandoned in favor of implementing more pragmatic air defense programs based on the Sidewinder aircraft guided missile. automatic anti-aircraft guns and the results of similar developments carried out by Western European firms.
The first among them, back in April 1958, was the English company Short, which, on the basis of research carried out to replace anti-aircraft guns on small ships, began work on the Seacat missile, which had a range of up to 5 km. This missile was supposed to be part of a compact, cheap and relatively simple air defense system. The need for it turned out to be so great that already at the beginning of 1959, without waiting for the start of mass production, Seacat was adopted by the ships of Great Britain, and then Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and several other countries. In parallel with the ship version, a ground version of the system with a 62-kg Tigercat rocket (with a flight speed of no more than 200-250 m / s) was developed, which was located on tracked or wheeled armored personnel carriers, as well as on trailers. For several decades, Tigercat systems have been in service in more than 10 countries.
In turn, in 1963, the British company British Aircraft began work on the creation of the ET 316 air defense system, which was later designated Rapier. However, its characteristics in almost all respects turned out to be significantly lower than those expected for Mauler.
Today, several decades later, it should be admitted that in the correspondence competition held in those years, the ideas laid down in Mauler were to the greatest extent implemented in the Soviet air defense system "Osa", although its development was also very dramatic, accompanied by the replacement of both leaders and organizations that develop its elements.
Fighting vehicle experienced SAM XMIM-46A Mauler
Shipborne air defense system Seacat and land Tigercat
Beginning of work
The decision on the need to develop a simple and cheap short-range air defense system to protect against air strikes of motorized rifle divisions was made almost immediately after the design of the Krut and Kub air defense systems began in 1958. Consideration of the creation of such a complex was asked issued on February 9, 1959.
By the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR
№138-61 "On the development of air defense of the Ground Forces, ships of the Navy and ships of the Navy".
A year later, on February 10, 1960, a letter was sent to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed by the Minister of Defense R. Ya. Malinovsky, chairmen: SCRE - V. D. Kalmykov, GKAT - P. V. Dementyev, GKOT -K. N. Rudnev, Shipbuilding Group - B. E. Butoma and the Minister of the Navy V. G. Bakaev, with proposals for the development of military and naval simplified small-sized autonomous air defense systems "Osa" and "Osa-M" with a unified missile, designed to destroy low-flying air targets at speeds up to 500 m / s.
In accordance with these proposals, the new air defense system was intended for the air defense of troops and their facilities in the combat formations of a motorized rifle division in various forms of battle, as well as on the march. The main requirements for this complex were full autonomy, which was to be ensured by the location of all combat assets of the air defense missile system on one self-propelled wheeled floating chassis, and the ability to detect in motion and defeat from short stops low-flying targets suddenly appearing from any direction.
The first studies of the new complex, which at the initial stage had the designation "Ellipse" (continuing the series of geometric designations given by the military air defense system, started by "Circle" and "Cube"), showed the fundamental possibility of its creation. The complex was supposed to include an autonomous control system, missile ammunition required to hit 2-3 targets, a launching device, as well as communication, navigation and topography, computing facilities, control equipment and power supplies. These elements were to be placed on one machine, which could be transported by an An-12 aircraft with full ammunition, refueling and a crew of three. The means of the complex were supposed to detect targets in motion (at speeds up to 25 km / h) and ensure the launch of missiles weighing 60-65 kg from short stops, with the probability of hitting a target with one missile up to 50-70%. At the same time, the engagement zone of air targets having dimensions comparable to those of the MiG-19 fighter and flying at speeds up to 300 m / s should have been: in range - from 800-1000 m to 6000 m, in height - from 50- 100 m to 3000 m, according to the parameter - up to 3000 m.
The general developer of both complexes (military and naval) was supposed to appoint NII-20 GKRE. At the same time, NII-20 was supposed to become the main performer of work on the military version of the air defense system as a whole, as well as on its radio device complex.
Launch of anti-aircraft guided missile SAM Rapier
The creation of a military self-propelled gun with a cabin, a starting device and a power supply system was planned to be entrusted to MMZ Mosoblsovnarkhoz. The design of the unified rocket, as well as the launching device, was to be headed by Plant No. 82 of the Moscow Regional Economic Council; a single multifunctional missile unit -
A. V. Potopalov.
NII-131 GKRE; steering gears and gyroscopes - plant No. 118 GKAT. A few months later, the leadership of the GKAT also proposed to include the NII-125 GKOT (development of a solid propellant charge) in the rocket developers, and the GKRE organizations were invited to deal with the elements of the autopilots.
It was planned to start work in the first quarter of 1960. The first year was allotted for the implementation of the preliminary design, the second - for the preparation of the technical design, testing of experimental samples of air defense systems and guided missile launches. For 1962-1963 it was planned to manufacture and transfer prototypes of the complex for state tests.
In the final version of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was prepared by mid-September 1960 and issued on October 27 under the number 1157-487, the designation "Wasp" was approved for the complex and much higher characteristics were determined - apparently, to give developers of additional incentives. In particular, the slant range of the air defense missile system was increased to 8-10 km with the course parameter up to 4-5 km, and the height of combat use - up to 5 km. The mass of the rocket has not undergone any correction, and the previously planned development timeline was moved by only one quarter.
As the lead executors were assigned: for the Osa and Osa-M complexes as a whole - NII-20, for the rocket - KB-82, for a single multifunctional unit - NII-20 together with OKB-668 GKRE, for the launch device - SKB-203 of the Sverdlovsk SNKh.
Chief designers were appointed: for the complex - V. M. Tara-novsky (he was soon replaced by M. M. Potopalov.
Particular attention in the approved resolution was paid to resolving the issue of choosing a base for a self-propelled installation, which was supposed to be one of the light armored vehicles being developed in those years.
It should be noted that at the end of the 1950s. the development on a competitive basis of new armored wheeled vehicles and universal wheeled chassis began at automobile plants in Moscow (ZIL-153), Gorky (GAZ-49), Kutaisi (Object 1015), as well as at the Mytishchi machine-building plant (Object 560 and "Object 560U"). Ultimately, the Gorky Design Bureau won the competition. The armored personnel carrier developed here turned out to be the most mobile, reliable, convenient, as well as technologically well-developed and relatively inexpensive.
However, these qualities were not enough for the new air defense system. At the beginning of 1961, the Gorky residents refused to further participate in the work on the "Wasp" due to the insufficient carrying capacity of the BTR-60P. Soon, for a similar reason, KB ZIL moved away from this topic. As a result, the creation of the self-propelled gun for the "Wasp" was entrusted to the team of the SKV of the Kutaisi Automobile Plant of the Economic Council of the Georgian SSR, who designed, in collaboration with specialists from the Moscow Military Academy of Armored and Mechanized Forces, the Object 1040 chassis (based on the experimental BTR Object 1015B).
"Object 560"
"Object 560U"
It must be said that the preliminary study of the BTR "Object 1015" - a wheeled (8x8) amphibious armored personnel carrier with a stern engine mount, H-shaped mechanical transmission and independent suspension of all wheels - was carried out in the period 1954-1957. at the academy under the leadership of G. V. Zimelev by employees of one of the departments and research and development organizations of the academy G. V. Arzhanukhin, A. P. Stepanov, A. I. Mamleev and others. Since the end of 1958, in accordance with the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the SKV of the Kutaisi Automobile Plant was involved in this work, which in the late 1950s and early 1960s. were consistently led by M. A. Ryzhik, D. L. Kartve-lishvili and SM. Batiashvili. Later, several prototypes of the improved armored personnel carrier, designated "Object 1015B", were built in Kutaisi.
The enthusiasm with which the Wasp designers got down to work was characteristic of that time and was based on many important points. It was understood that the new development would be based on the experience of the already tested Krug air defense system. In addition, by that time the industry had mastered the production of over 30 types of transistors and semiconductor diodes for various purposes. It was on this basis for the "Wasp" that it was possible to create a transistor operational amplifier, which was almost not inferior to the tube RU-50 widely known in those years. As a result, it was decided to manufacture a calculating device (PSA) for
Chassis "Object 1040", designed to accommodate the elements of the "Osa" air defense system.
"Wasps" on transistors. Moreover, if the initial version of the PSA contained about 200 operational amplifiers, then later their number was reduced to 60. At the same time, the problematic achievement of a number of characteristics set for the "Wasp" led to the fact that serious objective difficulties arose already at the first stages.
The specificity of the Osa air defense missile system - low target flight altitudes, short time allotted for processing and hitting a target, autonomy and mobility of the complex - made it necessary to search for new technical solutions and ways. So, the features of the air defense missile system required the use of multifunctional antennas with high values of the output parameters; antennas capable of moving the beam to any point in a given spatial sector in a time not exceeding fractions of a second.
As a result, under the leadership of V. M. Taranovsky at NII-20, a project was prepared that provided for the use of a radar with a phased antenna array (PAR) as part of a new air defense system as a means of detecting and tracking targets instead of a traditional mechanically rotating antenna.
A few years earlier, in 1958, the Americans made a similar attempt when creating an SPG-59 radar with a phased array for the Typhoon shipborne air defense system, the structure of which provided for a radar capable of simultaneously performing fire control tasks and target illumination. However, research that had just begun faced problems associated with an insufficient level of development of science and technology, as well as with a high level of electricity consumption due to the presence of vacuum tubes. An important factor was the high cost of the products. As a result, despite all the attempts and tricks, the antennas turned out to be bulky, heavy and prohibitively expensive. In December 1963, the Typhoon project was closed. The idea of installing a PAR on the Mauler air defense system was not developed either.
Similar problems did not allow to bring to any significant results and the development of radar with phased array for "Wasp". But a much more alarming signal was that already at the stage of the release of the preliminary design of the air defense missile system, the undocking of the indicators of the main elements of the rocket and the complex, created by various organizations, was revealed. At the same time, the presence of a large "dead zone" in the air defense missile system was indicated, which was a cone with a radius of 14 km and a height of 5 km.
Trying to find a way out, the designers began to gradually abandon the most advanced, but not yet provided with an appropriate production base of technical solutions.
The 9MZZ unified rocket was handled by the design bureau of plant # 82, headed by A. V. Potopalov and lead designer M. G. Olya. In the early 1950s. this plant was one of the first to master the production of products developed by S. A. Lavochkin anti-aircraft missiles for the S-25 system, and KB-82 carried out a number of measures to improve them. However, KB-82's own projects were plagued by setbacks. In July 1959, KB-82 was suspended from work on the V-625 missile for the S-125 air defense system - they were entrusted to the more experienced team of OKB-2 PD. Grushin, who proposed a variant of the unified B-600 rocket.
This time, KB-82 was instructed to create a rocket, the mass of which would not exceed 60-65 kg and had a length of 2, 25-2, 65 m. Due to the need to achieve extremely high characteristics, a number of promising decisions were made for the new missile defense system. So, it was proposed to equip it with a semi-active radar seeker, which could provide high accuracy of missile guidance to a target and its effective defeat with a warhead weighing 9, 5 kg. The next step was the creation of a single multifunctional unit, which included a seeker, an autopilot, a fuse and a power source. According to preliminary estimates, the mass of such a block should have been no more than 14 kg. In order not to go beyond the limiting values of the rocket mass, the propulsion system and the control system had to be included in the 40 kg remaining at the disposal of the designers.
However, already at the initial stage of work, the limit on the mass of the multifunctional unit was almost twice exceeded by the developers of the equipment - it reached 27 kg. Soon the unreality of the propulsion system characteristics laid down in the rocket project became apparent. The solid-propellant engine, designed by KB-2 of plant No. 81, provided for the use of a charge with a total mass of 31.3 kg, which consisted of two solid-propellant checkers (starting and marching). But the composition of the mixed solid fuel used for this charge showed significantly lower (by almost g #)%) energy characteristics,.
In search of a solution, KB-82 set about designing their own engine. It should be noted that in this organization back in 1956-1957. developed propulsion systems for the V-625 rocket and the level of the engine-list designers working here was quite high. For the new engine, it was proposed to use a mixed solid fuel developed at GIPH, the characteristics of which were close to the required ones. But this work was never completed.
The SPG designers also faced a number of problems. By the time it entered testing, it became clear that the mass of the self-propelled gun also exceeded the accepted limits. In accordance with the project, the "Object 1040" had a carrying capacity of 3.5 tons, and to accommodate the means of the "Osa" air defense missile system on it, the mass of which, according to the most optimistic expectations, should have been at least 4.3 tons (and according to pessimistic expectations - 6 tons), it was decided to exclude machine-gun armament and switch to the use of a light diesel engine with a capacity of 180 hp. instead of the 220 hp engine used on the prototype.
All this led to the fact that among the developers of the air defense system a struggle unfolded for every kilogram. In September 1962, a competition was announced at NII-20, according to the terms of which a premium of 200 rubles was supposed for reducing the mass of the complex by 1 kg, and if reserves were found in the on-board equipment of the rocket, 100 rubles were supposed to be paid for every 100 grams.
L. P. Kravchuk, deputy director for pilot production at NII-20, recalled: “All the shops worked hard on the production of the prototype in the shortest possible time, if necessary, they worked in two shifts, and overtime was also used. Another problem arose due to the need to reduce the weight of "Wasp". About two hundred body parts had to be cast from magnesium instead of aluminum. Not only the modified ones as a result of the rearrangement, but also the existing model kits had to be cast again due to the difference in shrinkage between aluminum and magnesium. Magnesium casting and large models were placed at the Balashikha Foundry and Mechanical Plant, and most of the models had to be placed throughout the Moscow region, even in state farms, where there were teams of old masters who previously worked at aircraft factories, because no one undertook to make large the number of models. Our capabilities were more than modest, we had only six modelers. These models cost a decent amount - the price of each kit corresponded to the cost of a polished cabinet. Everyone understood how expensive it was, but there was no way out, they went for it deliberately."
Despite the fact that the competition lasted until February 1968, many of the assigned tasks remained unresolved.
The result of the first failures was the decision of the Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues, in accordance with which the developers issued an addition to the draft design. It stipulated the use of radio command guidance of the missile at the target, reduced the size of the affected area in range (up to 7, 7 km) and the speed of the targets hit. The rocket presented in this document had a length of 2.65 m, a diameter of 0.16 m, and the mass reached the upper limit - 65 kg, with a warhead weighing 10.7 kg.
In 1962, a technical design of the complex was prepared, but most of the work was still at the stage of experimental laboratory testing of the main systems. In the same year, NII-20 and Plant 368, instead of 67 sets of onboard equipment, produced only seven; within a given period (III quarter of 1962), VNII-20 was also able to prepare a prototype of the RAS for testing.
By the end of 1963 (by this time, according to the original plans, it was planned to complete all work on the creation of the air defense system), only a few launches of non-standard missile models were performed. Only in the last months of 1963, four autonomous missile launches with a complete set of equipment were carried out. However, only one of them was successful.
