America versus England. Part 11. "Ukraine - this is the path to empire"

America versus England. Part 11. "Ukraine - this is the path to empire"
America versus England. Part 11. "Ukraine - this is the path to empire"
America versus England. Part 11. "Ukraine - this is the path to empire"
America versus England. Part 11. "Ukraine - this is the path to empire"

The Munich agreement, it would seem, has long and reliably been studied up and down. Meanwhile, it is considered to be an agreement between the monolithic West and Nazi Germany, while in the last part we established that the West was in fact fragmented and its leaders pursued their own, moreover, diametrically opposed goals, objectives and interests. In light of the new circumstances, the September events of 1938 appear in a completely new light - as one of the brightest episodes of the diplomatic still struggle of America against England for world domination.

As we remember on the eve of Munich, “France … was satisfied with the option of defeating Germany and Poland in the event of their attack on Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, France benefited from the alliance of England, France and Italy directed against Germany, familiar to us from Stresa. " England needed an Anglo-Franco-Italian-German alliance for the controlled surrender of Czechoslovakia, the defeat of the USSR during the "crusade" "in which the role of a strike force was assigned to Nazi Germany in the West and militarist Japan in the East" for the sake of a radical solution of inter-imperialist contradictions and retaining its leadership in the international arena (Year of the crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and materials. In 2 volumes. T. 1. September 29, 1938 - May 31, 1939 - M.: Politizdat, 1990. - P. 7; Lebedev S. America vs. England. Part 10 // Clash of Leviathans //

"In turn, America was satisfied with the defeat of Germany, first of Czechoslovakia, and then of France in order to weaken Great Britain, conclude an Anglo-German-Italian alliance and surrender (Great Britain - S. L.) leading positions in the world arena to the United States of America." Inter-imperialist contradictions were supposed to be resolved either at the expense of the USSR, or at the expense of England (Lebedev S. America against England. Part 10. Ibid). Hitler defended the American point of view in Munich, while the British actively used the French project to localize the American project. As a result, in Munich in the fall of 1938, there was a clash of the exclusive interests of England and America.

In particular, when “in Munich, Czechoslovak observers expressed their bewilderment to Chamberlain why he prompted Czechoslovakia to mobilize, and also publicly stated in a fairly clear form that Britain and France, together with the USSR, would oppose Germany if Hitler used force to resolve the Sudeten question, and now openly sacrificed all the interests of Czechoslovakia and demands the withdrawal and demobilization of the newly mobilized army. Chamberlain replied with cynical frankness that he did not take all this seriously, but was only a maneuver to put pressure on Hitler, in other words, it was Chamberlain's counter-bluff”(Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 36).

On September 11, 1938, England and France announced that in case of war they would support Czechoslovakia, but if Germany did not allow war, then she would get everything she wanted. The next day, speaking at a party congress in Nuremberg, Hitler announced that he wanted to live in peace with England, France and Poland, but would have to support the Sudeten Germans if their oppression did not stop. Thus, England rejected the American version voiced by Hitler and offered him a choice of either his own or French. Hitler showed firmness and insisted on his own.“For a moment the war seemed inevitable, but then events took an amazing turn.

In a message sent out on the night of September 13, the British Prime Minister declared his readiness to immediately, regardless of considerations of prestige, come to any city for a personal conversation with Hitler. … Hitler felt very flattered, although this proposal impeded his obvious desire for a clash. Later he said: "I was completely stunned" (Fest I. Hitler. Biography. Triumph and fall into the abyss / Translated from German. - M.: Veche, 2007. - S. 272). At the very first meeting with A. Hitler on September 15 at his Berghof residence in the Bavarian Alps, N. Chamberlain agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia, but not by force, but by peaceful means. Thus, N. Chamberlain created an Anglo-German alliance with a dominant position of England, which, with the participation of France, was able to dictate its terms to both Italy and Germany. “We agreed that Chamberlain would return to England to discuss the issue with the Cabinet of Ministers, and Hitler, meanwhile, would not take any military measures. …

As soon as Chamberlain left, Hitler began to force the crisis … pushed Hungary and Poland to present territorial claims to Prague, at the same time stimulated the desire of Slovaks for autonomy”(I. Fest, op. Cit. - pp. 273–274). Thus, Hitler nullified the outcome of the negotiations. At the same time, England and France really demanded that Czechoslovakia accept Hitler's proposals, threatening that “if… the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stay on the sidelines”(History of Diplomacy / Edited by VP Potemkin //

On September 21, the Czechoslovak government accepted the Anglo-French ultimatum, while Poland, incited by Germany, sent a note to Czechoslovakia demanding a solution to the problem of the Polish minority in Cieszyn Silesia. As a result, when Chamberlain met Hitler for the second time on September 22 in Godesberg (now a suburb of Bonn) and informed the Fuehrer that the issue of the Sudeten Germans had been resolved by the British and French governments in strict accordance with the wishes of Germany, Hitler unexpectedly demanded that “territorial claims of Hungary and Poland, with which Germany is bound by friendly agreements”(W. Shearer. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich // According to E. von Weizsäcker, “Hitler repaid evil for good, demanding more from Chamberlain than was declared in Berchtsgaden” (Weizsäcker E. Ambassador of the Third Reich / Trans. FS Kapitsa. - M.: Centerpolygraph, 2007. - P. 160).

The Polish government on the same day urgently announced the denunciation of the Polish-Czechoslovak treaty on national minorities and announced an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia to annex lands with the Polish population to Poland. In response to this, “on September 23, the Soviet government warned the Polish government that if Polish troops concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia invaded its borders, the USSR would consider this an act of unspoken aggression and denounce the non-aggression pact with Poland” (Shirokorad A B. Great intermission. - M.: AST, AST MOSCOW, 2009. - S. 249), and Czechoslovakia announced a general mobilization. “The news of the mobilization in Czechoslovakia, which burst into the disorderly, nervous final negotiations, further strengthened the feeling of impending catastrophe” (I. Fest, op. Cit. - p. 272) and “the second time the parties parted, doubting whether it was possible come to an agreement, as the date set by Hitler for the invasion of Czechoslovakia was stubbornly approaching.

Meanwhile, the actual disagreements between England and Germany were so insignificant and connected only with the way in which the Sudetenland would be annexed - peacefully or by war”(E. Weizsacker, op. Cit. - pp. 161-162). Thus, the fate of Czechoslovakia was initially predetermined and the essence of the negotiations was reduced to the struggle of England and America for world leadership and the conclusion of an alliance with the participation of England, France, Italy and Germany, followed by the defeat of the USSR for the sake of maintaining England's leadership in the international arena, or an alliance with the participation of England. Italy and Germany, followed by the defeat of Czechoslovakia, France and the USSR for the sake of Britain's surrender of the leading position in the world arena to the United States of America.

“The British cabinet, which met on Sunday, September 25, to discuss Hitler's memorandum, flatly rejected the new demands and assured the French government of support for Czechoslovakia in the event of a military clash with Germany. Prague, which accepted the Berchtesgaden conditions only under strong pressure, now has a free hand to rebuff Hitler's claims. Military preparations began in England and France”(I. Fest, op. Cit. - p. 275). “On September 26 and twice on September 27, 1938, US President F. Roosevelt sent messages to Hitler, B. Mussolini, N. Chamberlain, E. Daladier and E. Beneš, calling for new efforts to prevent an armed conflict, having convened a conference for this purpose. directly interested countries "(Year of the crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and materials. In 2 volumes. T. 2. June 2, 1939 - September 14, 1939 - M.: Politizdat, 1990. - S. 372). On September 28, 1938, "the Soviet government came forward … with a proposal" to immediately convene an international conference to discuss measures to prevent aggression and prevent a new war. " … Moreover, he agreed to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia even without the participation of France on the sole condition that Czechoslovakia itself would resist the aggressor and ask for Soviet help "(History of USSR Foreign Policy. In 2 volumes. Volume 1. - Moscow: Nauka, 1976. - P. 347).

Thus, Chamberlain refused to follow Roosevelt's lead and did not allow Germany, together with Poland, to defeat Czechoslovakia, and then France. He preferred the destruction of Hitler's regime to the acceptance of American conditions. Saving Nazi Germany from a military defeat at the time of the highest tension “Roosevelt personally asked Mussolini to act as an intermediary. On the morning of September 28, following the American proposal and the advice of the British, Mussolini suggested that Hitler cancel the mobilization order, which was supposed to take effect that morning, "and convene a quadripartite conference in order to settle all the problems that arose peacefully (Weizsäcker, Ed. Op. Cit. - S. 162).

According to the head of the personal archive of the former president of Czechoslovakia T. Masaryk Shkrakh, the Hitler regime in Germany was “rotten through and through and would not have withstood even the shortest war, even with Czechoslovakia alone. … Shkrakh drew the conclusion that Czechoslovakia was sacrificed precisely because all the participants in this tragedy were terribly afraid of the collapse of the Hitlerite regime, they were afraid of perishing under the ruins of this colossus, they were afraid of the inevitable revolution that would then affect not only France, but also England, and the whole of Europe "(Year of Crisis. T. 1. Decree. op. - p. 104).

"Hitler then had not enough forces for the war with Czechoslovakia - against 30 well-armed divisions of the Czechoslovakians, relying on strong defensive structures, the Germans had only 24 infantry, 1 tank, 1 mountain rifle and 1 cavalry division" (E. Weizsäcker, op. P. 160). Even despite the fact that Poland "was preparing for an attack on Czechoslovakia in alliance with Germany … the Red Army alone could defeat the united armies of Germany and Poland in September 1938" (Shirokorad A. B. … Backed to the wall by the military preparations of England, France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, Hitler backed down and "offered to meet with Mussolini, Chamberlain and, possibly, with Daladier in order to settle the Czech question" peacefully (E. Weizsäcker, op. Cit. - S. 163).

“On September 29, Chamberlain boarded the plane for the third time and departed for Germany. … Germany was represented by Hitler, England - by Chamberlain, France - Daladier, Italy - Mussolini. The negotiations ended at about two o'clock in the morning. The terms of the Godesberg memorandum were fully accepted. It was proposed to Czechoslovakia to transfer all border regions to Germany. … The agreement also indicated the need to "settle" the issue of the Polish and Hungarian national minorities in Czechoslovakia. Thus, this meant the severing of several more parts of its territory from Czechoslovakia in favor of Poland and Hungary. After the "settlement" of this issue, the rest of Czechoslovakia must be given guarantees to England, France, Germany and Italy against unprovoked aggression "(Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - p. 248).

As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia lost part of its territory, “lost the right to ask for and expect something from the USSR,” and its will to fight, because in the event of Czechoslovakia's resistance, a war between the USSR and all of Europe would immediately begin in which Czechoslovakia would be “swept away and … deleted from the map of Europe”even in the event of the victory of the USSR, was paralyzed (Year of the crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - pp. 35, 46). For France, Munich became a surrender, a new Sedan - with the loss of Czechoslovakia, she was deprived of her greatness, and with it her last allies. Faced with the threat of a one-on-one armed clash with Germany, she was now forced to obediently stand in the wake of British policy.

“The USSR was put in a position of virtually complete international isolation. The Soviet-French agreement on mutual assistance was devoid of any sense and significance. The governments of England and France, hoping to push Germany into war with the Soviet Union, openly emphasized that they did not want to have anything in common with the USSR. After Munich, the Foreign Office ceased all contacts with the Soviet embassy in London. In England, seriously began to consider the issue of breaking the trade agreement with the Soviet Union "(Sipols V. Ya. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of World War II. - M.: International relations, 1979 // /03.html).

In essence, Germany was given freedom of action in Eastern Europe in exchange for expansion into the USSR. One should not discount the fact that “in July – August 1938, the Red Army fought heavy battles on Lake Khasan and was on the brink of a major war with Japan” (Shirokorad A. B. Decree. Op. - p. 245), and “During the Munich conference, I. Ribbentrop presented the Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano with a draft of the tripartite pact between Germany, Italy and Japan” (Year of Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 51).

Meanwhile, the Munich Agreement was initially directed against America and therefore it was the States that suffered the main defeat. England, having cut off the American plan, was able to implement its project. According to the British "it is in the face of the constantly strengthening economy of the United States of America that the European economy is in serious danger if the four powers, instead of cooperating, oppose each other" and therefore the British government immediately began to implement economic cooperation between Germany, England, France and Italy against unwanted America (Year of Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 70).

In the fall of 1938, Chamberlain realized his unrealized dream of 1933 - the "Pact of Four" (Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 42). Unsurprisingly, when he returned to London, he happily declared at the airport, waving the text of the agreement: "I brought peace to our time," while the pro-American Churchill and Hitler, in contrast, were dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations. Moreover, Hitler was determined to re-zero all the agreements reached at the first opportunity.“Official London sought to formalize the proposed collusion in a full-fledged treaty, but in the end was content with signing with Hitler on September 30, 1938, a declaration“never to fight each other again”and to continue efforts to eliminate“possible sources of disagreement”by the method of consultations. In fact, it was a non-aggression agreement”(Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - p. 6).

Having concluded an essentially anti-Soviet military alliance in case the USSR provided assistance to Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland invaded Czechoslovakia on October 1, 1938. Germany occupied the Sudetenland, and Poland, to the great dissatisfaction of England and Italy - the Teshin region. Following England, on October 3, 1938, France began consultations with Germany regarding the conclusion of an alliance similar to the alliance between Germany and England (Year of Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - p. 46). "Chamberlain attached great importance to this signing and (was - S. L.) was disappointed that the German side … did not appreciate the significance of this Munich declaration." What, in England, in particular, was judged "by the fact that this declaration was not noted in the Fuehrer's speech delivered in Saarbrücken" (Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 70).

At the insistence of Berlin, on October 5, President Benes resigned, and General Syrovs temporarily took over his post. On October 7, under pressure from Germany, the Czechoslovak government decided to grant autonomy to Slovakia, on October 8 - to Subcarpathian Rus. As in the case of the Pact of Four, Poland immediately set about torpedoing the new quadripartite treaty and supported Hungary's intention to form a powerful barrier for Germany on the way to the Soviet Union by creating a Polish-Hungarian border in the Carpathians. On October 13, 1938, Hungary tried to resolve the misunderstanding with Germany that arose as a result of the demand for the return of Carpathian Rus to itself, and on October 21, 1938, Hitler issued a secret instruction “about the possibility of resolving the issue with the“remnants of the Czech Republic”in the near future (Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree.oc. - p. 78).

To resolve the conflict with Poland, Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador Lipsky, on October 24, 1938, offered to sacrifice Carpathian Rus in exchange for Danzig and the road (Year of Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 86). “These proposals provided for the accession to the Third Reich of Danzig (with the preservation of economic benefits in Danzig for Poland); the construction by Germany of an extraterritorial highway and railway line through Polish Pomorie; extension of the Polish-German declaration of friendship and non-aggression for 25 years; the guarantee by Germany of the Polish-German border. Ribbentrop suggested that, thus strengthening the Polish-German friendship, both countries should pursue "a common policy towards Russia on the basis of the anti-Comintern pact" (V. Ya. Sipols, op. Cit.).

"At the end of October 1938, Ribbentrop visited Rome to negotiate with Italy on the conclusion of a (Steel - SL) pact" (Year of Crisis. Vol. 2. Decree. Op. - p. 377). On October 31, England proposed to Germany to expand the treaty and, in exchange for "satisfying Germany's just claims to the colonies … to think about accepting by Britain, France, Germany and Italy of certain defense responsibilities or even guarantees against Soviet Russia in the event of a Soviet attack" (Year of Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - pp. 90–93). "There is no doubt that … the rulers of France, together with their British colleagues, would not mind to resolve all controversial and" damned "issues at the expense of the USSR, but there is nothing fundamentally new in this" (Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Op. Cit. - p. 96). On November 2, by the decision of the first Vienna arbitration of Germany and Italy, Hungary received part of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Rus. On November 16, 1938, the Anglo-Italian agreement entered into force (Lebedev S. America v. England. Part 10. Ibid).

November 20, 1938 W. For the sake of destroying the Anglo-Franco-Italian-German alliance, the US bullet incited Polish Ambassador to the United States Jerzy Potocki to turn against Germany in a long conversation - “democratic states … will need … at least two years for a complete rearmament. In the meantime, the German Reich would probably direct its expansion to the east, and it would be desirable for democracies that there, in the east, it would come to war between the German Reich and Russia. While the potential strength of the Soviets at this time is not yet known, it is likely that, operating away from its bases, Germany would be forced to wage a long and debilitating war. Only then, Bullitt said, could democracies attack Germany and achieve its surrender”(Year of Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - pp. 111–112).

In his opinion, the "Carpathian-Russian Ukraine, in whose existence Germany is certainly interested, mainly from a strategic point of view, was to become a springboard for Germany's attack on the USSR." … He argued that Germany has a fully prepared, formed Ukrainian headquarters, which in the future should take over power in Ukraine and create an independent Ukrainian state there under the auspices of Germany. " U. Bullitt wanted to see Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia among the opponents of Germany: “He confirmed that Poland is another state that will come out in arms if Germany violates its borders. I well understand, he said, the problem of the common border with Hungary. Hungarians are also a courageous people, and if they acted together with Yugoslavia, then the issue of defense against German expansion would be greatly facilitated”(Year of Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Op. - p. 112).

Due to Poland's blocking of Germany's access to the Soviet border both on the southern flank - supporting Hungary's desire to gain control over the Carpathian Ukraine, and in the northern - refusing to make concessions on Danzig and preventing Germany from establishing communication with its East Prussian enclave, Hitler began negotiations with Italy on November 26 joint military operations against England and France (Year of Crisis. T. 1. Decree. op. - p. 115). On November 28, Poland demanded from Czechoslovakia “the transfer of … Moravian Ostrava and Vitrovic. However, Hitler refused … in a rather categorical form "(Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - p. 249).

On the same day, at a dinner hosted by the Naval League on the day of the Battle of Trafalgar, Kennedy, who was "the first American ambassador to be given the right to open this celebration … in his speech … not only defended Chamberlain, but also cited Munich as a model to settle relations in the future, arguing that the peaceful resolution of the Czechoslovak question showed that you can get along with dictators. Kennedy also noted that Democrats and dictators must work together for the common good.

Kennedy's statements sounded in dissonance with the position of the president, who was increasingly inclined towards a policy of quarantine of aggression. A week later, Roosevelt delivered an address on nationwide radio that largely refuted the ambassador's point of view: there can be no peace if the use of force is sanctioned instead of law; there can be no peace if a nation deliberately chooses the threat of war as an instrument of its policy. This was the beginning of the end of Kennedy's career "(Mokhovikova GV American diplomats in Europe on the eve of World War II. BULLETIN OF THE NOVGOROD STATE UNIVERSITY. 1998. No. 9 // / All / FEF11D3250EBFEA9C3256727002E7B99).

At the beginning of December, the first promissory notes of MEFO were received and Hjalmar Schacht “with extraordinary harshness demanded that Hitler repay them immediately. The Fuhrer instantly lost his temper: “Don't tell me about the Munich Treaty! I didn't give a damn about those Jewish bastards - Chamberlain and Daladier! The weapons program will continue. "The chairman of the Reichsbank reacted to this with an official statement on the termination of all loans to the government”(A. Nemchinov. Oligarchs in black uniforms // On January 7, 1939, Schacht was dismissed by Hitler. "The chair of the chief banker was taken by Walter Funk, who obediently carried out the order of the Fuehrer to replace the bills with treasury obligations and tax coupons" (A. Nemchinov, ibid.).

Meanwhile, England and France continued their cooperation with Germany and Italy and developed a stormy propaganda of the extreme necessity of Germany's campaign against the USSR in order to create a "Great Ukraine" under a German protectorate. On December 6, France and Germany signed a declaration similar to the Anglo-German one. “It was in essence a non-aggression pact between France and Germany” (History of USSR Foreign Policy. Decree. Op. - p. 355). The declaration consolidated “the rejection of Alsace and Lorraine that occurred in 1919 and the inviolability of the existing borders between states” (Weizsäcker E. op. Cit. - p. 182). In turn, France pledged to limit "its interests to the borders of its colonial empire and not … interfere in what is happening in Eastern Europe", in particular "not to influence Poland against the conclusion of an agreement with Germany, according to which Danzig would return to Germany and Germany would receive an extraterritorial corridor from East Prussia to the Reich, through the territory of the Polish corridor "(E. Weizsäcker, op. cit. - p. 182; History of USSR foreign policy. Ibid.).

On December 15, 1938, French Ambassador to Germany R. Coulondre, in a letter to French Foreign Minister Jean Bonnet, reported that “Ukraine is the path to empire”: “The desire of the Third Reich to expand in the East … seems as obvious as his rejection, at least for the time being, of all conquests in the West; one follows from the other. The first part of Hitler's program - the unification of the German people in the Reich - is basically complete. Now the hour of "living space" has struck. … To become the master in Central Europe, subjugating Czechoslovakia and Hungary, then to create a Greater Ukraine under German hegemony - this is basically, it seems, the concept now adopted by the Nazi leaders, and, of course, by Hitler himself. The submission of Czechoslovakia, unfortunately, is already an almost accomplished fact. …

As for Ukraine … the ways and means, it seems, have not yet been worked out, but the goal itself seems to be already established - to create a Greater Ukraine, which would become the granary of Germany. But for this it is necessary to crush Romania, convince Poland, take away part of the territory from the USSR; German dynamism does not stop at any of these difficulties, and in military circles there is already talk of a march to the Caucasus and Baku. … Transcarpathian Ukraine will become the center of the movement. Thus, by strange quirks of fate, Czechoslovakia, created as a stronghold to contain the German advance, serves the Reich as a battering ram to break the gates in the East”(Year of Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - pp. 147–149). Meanwhile, Poland was categorically against the creation of the Great Ukraine, itself claimed the Soviet part of Ukraine, and in Transcarpathian Ukraine it saw a dangerous and uncontrollable center of Ukrainian separatism.

On January 1, 1939, Mussolini informed the Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano "his decision to accept Ribbentrop's proposal to transform the anti-Comintern pact into a union." According to Ciano, “he wants the pact to be signed in the last decade of January. He considers more and more inevitable a clash with Western democracies and therefore wants to prepare a military alliance in advance”(Year of Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - p. 167). “On January 2, 1939, Ciano informed Ribbentrop of Italy's consent to sign the pact” (Year of the Crisis. Vol. 2. Decree. Op. - p. 377).

On January 5 and 6, 1939, Beck met with A. Hitler and I. Ribbentrop to resolve issues on Danzig, Transcarpathian Ukraine, guarantee borders, transform the 1934 statement into an agreement like an agreement between Germany and England and France and Poland's accession to the anti-Comintern pact. Let me remind you that in the German-Polish declaration there were no guarantees of the Polish-German border. "Refusal to use force against each other, not supplemented by guarantees of invariability of borders" and the absence of "an article that would have dealt with the termination of the declaration in the event of one of the parties entering an armed conflict with a third country … under certain conditions could give it a character offensive alliance … to revise the territorial status quo of third states "- the Soviet Union, first of all (Lebedev S. America against England. Part 6. The split of the anti-Soviet camp // -6-raskol-antisovetskogo-lagerya.html).

“In order to finally settle the still unresolved issues in relations between the two countries, the Fuehrer said, one should not limit ourselves to the 1934 agreement, which is rather negative, but try to finally resolve individual problems by treaty. … The German side considers it necessary to settle directly in German-Polish relations the problem of Danzig and the corridor. … If Germany had provided its guarantees, the Polish corridor would have been as little talked about as now about South Tyrol or Alsace and Lorraine. … With a general broad settlement of all problems between Poland and us, it would be possible to reach an agreement in order to consider the Ukrainian question as a privilege of Poland and in every possible way to support it in considering this issue. This, again, has a prerequisite for the increasingly obvious anti-Russian position of Poland, otherwise there can hardly be common interests. In this connection (Ribbentrop - SL) told Beck whether he intends to one day join the anti-Comintern pact”(Year of the Crisis. Vol. 1. Decree. Cit. - pp. 171–172, 176).

Beck confirmed "Poland's aspirations to establish a common border with Hungary" and previous claims to Ukraine, but said that "he must reckon with the true opinion of the people and sees in this respect the greatest difficulties for resolving the Danzig question," assured Hitler "that Poland, in its common position, will remain faithful to the line that it has adhered to since 1934 ", and regarding the Comintern" promised that Polish policy in the future, perhaps, will be able to develop in this respect in the direction we want "(Year of Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - pp. 173-174, 176). In essence, Poland rejected Germany on all the stated issues. At the same time, claiming Ukraine and refusing to give Germany in return Danzig and the road through the corridor, she blocked Germany's path to the Soviet Union. Opposed the guarantee of borders and the transformation of the 1934 statement into an agreement like an agreement between Germany and Britain and France. She did not want to join the anti-Comintern pact.

Following the talks on January 22, I. Ribbentrop announced a plan to defeat Poland in the summer of 1939. In Poland, on February 4, 1939, the Vostok (Vostok) defense plan was hastily completed in case of war with the Soviet Union, and on March 4, 1939, the chief of the Polish Army's headquarters began to develop a plan for preparing for an armed conflict with Germany, “West” ("Zahud"). According to him, “This work can and should advance faster than the previous one, since the principles and methods were tested during the development of the plan“East”(From the war of 1914 to the war of 1939 (on the example of Poland) // https://www.polska. ru / polska / historia / 1914-1939.html). Thus, Bullitt's influence on the Polish establishment yielded results and Poland, in its political preferences, began to drift from England to America, drastically changing confidential relations with Germany to confrontational ones.

At the beginning of 1939 A. Hitler began to support the Slovak separatists in order to annex the Czech Republic to Germany to declare Slovakia independent. On February 24, 1939, Hungary joined the anti-Comintern pact. On March 12, 1939, A. Hitler agreed to the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine by Hungary, on March 13, the head of the Zemstvo administration of Slovakia J. Tuka, summoned to Berlin, signed the "Protection Treaty", and on March 14, Slovakia declared its independence. At the same time, despite the concentration of German troops on the Czechoslovak border, the expectation of the introduction of German troops into Czechoslovakia, the formation in Prague with the support of the Germans of the government by the leader of the fascist party in Czechoslovakia, as well as the ultimatum of the Hungarian government of Czechoslovakia demanding to begin the evacuation of Czech and Moravian units from the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine, the non-interference of England and France was considered secured.

The statesmen of England and France until the last moment relied on the occupation by Germany of the whole of Czechoslovakia and the presentation of a claim by the USSR to the Soviet part of Ukraine. Therefore, they turned a blind eye to the military preparations of Germany and with enthusiasm greeted the long-awaited armed action of Germany against Czechoslovakia. “On March 15, British Prime Minister Chamberlain said in the House of Commons:“The occupation of Bohemia by the German armed forces began today at six o'clock in the morning. The Czech people received an order from their government not to resist."

Chamberlain then said that, in his opinion, the guarantee he had given to Czechoslovakia was no longer valid, and continued: “That was the situation until yesterday. However, it changed as the Slovak parliament declared Slovakia independent. This declaration puts an end to the internal disintegration of the state, the borders of which we intended to guarantee, and the Government of His Majesty cannot therefore consider itself bound by this obligation … Naturally, I am bitterly sorry for what happened. However, we will not allow this to force us to deviate from our path. Let us remember that the aspirations of the peoples of the whole world are still concentrated in the hope for peace”(W. Shearer, op. Cit.).

Thus, on the eve of Munich, the West was heterogeneous and its leaders, defending purely national interests, pursued diametrically opposite goals. France needed a guarantee of its security and in the event of aggressive actions by Germany against Czechoslovakia demanded its immediate defeat. England needed to preserve the existing status quo and suppress America's attempts to overthrow it from the pedestal of world politics by concluding an alliance with France, Italy and Germany, and subsequently Poland, surrendering Czechoslovakia to Hitler and resolving inter-imperialist contradictions by defeating the USSR by a broad coalition of interested parties at the head with Germany.

America tried to take England's place on the political Olympus by organizing the defeat of Czechoslovakia and France, imposing on England as a junior partner of an alliance with Germany and Italy, resolving inter-imperialist contradictions under its patronage at the expense of the Soviet Union, and if the British resisted the implementation of American plans, then for the account of England itself, by the hands of Germany and the USSR. A peculiarity of the negotiation process in the fall of 1938 was that Hitler defended the American plan, while Chamberlain, insisting on the adoption of the British plan, cut off the American plan with the French one.

Having flatly refused to accept the American plan put forward by Hitler, Chamberlain opposed him with his own, threatening to use force according to the French version in case of refusal. For the sake of saving the Nazis from the inevitable defeat, Roosevelt agreed to Germany's conclusion of an alliance with England, France and Italy, but did not accept his defeat, continued the struggle and got Poland to block Germany's path to the Soviet Union and begin preparations for war with Germany in order to involve France in it. instead of Czechoslovakia.

Under these conditions, Hitler made the decision to seize the Czech Republic, proclaim the "independence" of Slovakia and hand over the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary not to go to the border with the Soviet Union and not to create a bridgehead for an attack on the Soviet Union in the form of Great Ukraine, thereby canceling out the terms of his agreement with Britain and France, simultaneously starting preparations for war with England, France and Poland. Meanwhile, England and France until the last moment hoped for the inviolability of their agreements and agreements with Hitler regarding the German attack on the Soviet Union after the complete capture of Czechoslovakia and the creation of Great Ukraine.

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