How unique is the Russian army's electronic warfare equipment?
Recently, Russian electronic warfare systems have acquired the aura of a kind of superweapon, which, in the opinion of ordinary people, is capable of causing panic in a potential adversary only by turning it on.
It all started with a Su-24 front-line bomber overflying the American destroyer Donald Cook, described in almost all Russian media, during which the Russian plane allegedly used the latest Khibiny complex. Its impact on the ship's electronic devices caused almost panic, which led to the massive dismissal of sailors and officers from the "Cook". Later, a photograph appeared on the Internet of a supposedly commemorative coin (according to other sources - a medal), marking this historical flight, and on the back of the product was written "Lesson in Peace."
Why did the Khibiny eat the Cook?
Before the story of "Donald Cook" had died down, on August 4 of this year, defensenews.com blog published an article Electronic Warfare: What US Army Can Learn From Ukraine by Joe Gould (Joe Gould), where it is argued that the Russian Armed Forces have made a significant breakthrough in the field of not only the creation of electronic warfare means, but also their use, which, in the author's opinion, demonstrates the emerging lag in this issue of the American military.
We must not forget that one of the leading developers and manufacturers of Russian electronic warfare equipment, the Concern of Radio Electronic Technologies (KRET), is currently conducting an aggressive PR campaign supporting its products. Suffice it to recall that the headlines are more and more often heard in the media: "KRET presented a unique jammer for AWACS aircraft", "A jamming complex will reliably protect troops from enemy artillery fire" and the like.
Thanks to this popularity of electronic warfare, not only industry publications, but even socio-political media report that the Russian army is receiving electronic countermeasures stations "Krasukha-2", "Krasukha-4", "Lever", "Infauna" … And To be honest, this stream of names is quite difficult to understand even for a specialist.
But how effective are Russian electronic warfare systems, what are they, and how is electronic warfare organized approximately? Let's try to answer these questions.
Electronic warfare in priority
The fact that the military-political leadership of Russia pays close attention to the development of electronic warfare is evidenced by the following fact: back in April 2009, the 15th separate electronic warfare brigade (the Supreme High Command) appeared in the Armed Forces. It is noteworthy that according to some sources - in addition to the 15th electronic warfare unit, the RF Armed Forces have only two more brigades bearing the name of the Supreme High Command (engineering and RChBZ), and according to other sources, such a brigade of the Supreme Command is still the only one in the Russian army.
At present, the 15th brigade, previously based in the city of Novomoskovsk in the Tula region and receiving the Battle Banner in April 2009 in accordance with the presidential decree in April 2009, moved to Tula. It should be noted that this compound is equipped with the most modern means of electronic warfare, including the still-secret Murmansk-BN communication line suppression stations and the Leer-3 aerodynamic drop jammers.
In addition to the brigade of the Supreme High Command, since 2009, separate electronic warfare centers have been formed in each military district. True, most of them have now been reorganized into separate electronic warfare brigades. The only exception is the recently formed electronic warfare center in Crimea, subordinate to the command of the Black Sea Fleet.
In addition to brigades, in each district there are also separate battalions, for example, a separate electronic warfare battalion subordinate to the command of the Central Military District and based in the city of Engels, Saratov Region. It should be noted that, most likely, the task of such battalions is to cover especially important civil and military installations.
EW brigades and centers include strategic battalions equipped with the above-mentioned Murmansk, as well as tactical battalions with Infauna complexes based on armored personnel carriers, R-330Zh Zhitel and R-934 jamming stations. In addition to two battalions in brigades and centers there are also separate companies - one equipped with so-called aircraft means, that is, the Krasukha-2 and Krasukha-4 complexes, and a company with the above-mentioned Leers-3.
The recently created Aerospace Forces also receive modern electronic warfare equipment, in particular, we are talking about such products as the Su-34 front-line bombers that have recently become almost legendary Khibiny complexes, as well as Mi-8 helicopters equipped with stations "Lever arm". In addition, the Russian Air Force aircraft fleet has recently been replenished with a certain jammer based on the Il-18 - Il-22 "Porubshchik" aircraft.
"Krasuha", "Murmansk" and other secrets
Until recently, the most secret in the entire arsenal of Russian electronic warfare equipment was the Krasukha-2 jamming station, however, at present, the palm in this nomination has passed to the Murmansk-BN communication line suppression station, allegedly capable of jamming more than two dozen frequencies on range up to five thousand kilometers. However, there is no reliable evidence that the newest complex has such characteristics.
Judging by the photographs of Murmansk (several four-axle off-road trucks with multi-meter towers) available in open sources, where, in addition to the main antennas, characteristic low-frequency stretch antennas are visible, it can be assumed that this complex is capable of jamming signals in the range from 200 to 500 MHz.
The main problem of such a complex, most likely, is that in order to achieve the declared range, the signal must be reflected from the ionosphere and therefore it strongly depends on atmospheric disturbances, which will undoubtedly affect the operation of Murmansk.
At this year's Moscow Aviation and Space Salon, KRET at the static exposition officially presented the 1L269 Krasukha-2 complex designed to jam airborne early warning aircraft (primarily American E-3 AWACS). It is noteworthy that, according to the management of the concern, this station can jam AWACS at a distance of several hundred kilometers.
At the same time, "Krasukha" continues the line of development of the complexes "Pelena" and "Pelena-1" developed back in the 80s by the Rostov research institute "Gradient". The ideology of these products is based on a very simple solution, proposed at one time by the head of the "Gradient", and later by the general designer of the electronic warfare department in the USSR, Yuri Perunov: the signal of the jamming station must exceed the signal power by which the jammer is set by 30 decibels.
Judging by the available information, it is very difficult to suppress such a target as the E-3 AWACS, since its radar has more than 30 tunable frequencies that continuously change during operation. Therefore, Yuri Perunov once suggested that the most optimal solution would be to suppress the entire band with a narrowly directional powerful noise interference.
However, this solution also has serious drawbacks - the Velena / Krasukha interference closes only one direction, and taking into account the fact that the plane is flying along the route, the station's impact on AWACS will be rather limited in time. And if there are already two AWACS aircraft operating in the area, then even taking into account the interference when combining the data, the E-3 operators will still be able to obtain the necessary information.
Strong noise interference will not only be detected by the RTR of a potential enemy, but will also become a good target for anti-radar missiles.
All these problems were known to the developers of the "Shroud" from the very beginning, so the more modern "Krasukha" has become highly mobile, which allows it to quickly escape from the blow, as well as to timely enter favorable positions for inflicting electromagnetic damage. It is possible that not one, but several stations, constantly changing positions, will act against AWACS aircraft.
But "Krasukha-2" is not at all such a universal machine, capable of jamming numerous radars, as is commonly believed. It cannot simultaneously interfere with the E-8 AWACS and the E-2 Hawkeye, since each type of AWACS aircraft will need its own jamming station, which presses only the required frequency range, which are very different from the radar of AWACS aircraft.
It is noteworthy that work on "Krasukha-2" began back in 1996 and was completed only in 2011.
The ideology of "+30 DtsB" is used in another newest jamming station developed by VNII "Gradient" - 1RL257 "Krasukha-4", which is currently actively supplied to brigades and separate battalions of electronic warfare and is intended to suppress air-based radar stations, including those installed not only on fighters and fighter-bombers, but also on E-8 and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. True, there are doubts about the effectiveness of the Krasukha against the ASARS-2 radar installed on the high-altitude U-2, since, judging by the available data, its signal is not only quite complex, but also noise-like.
According to the developers and the military, under certain conditions 1RL257 will be able to interfere even with the homing heads of the AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, as well as the Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems' weapon control radar.
As in the case of "Krasukha-2", "Krasukha-4" is not quite an original product, but a continuation of the line of jamming stations of the SPN-30 family, work on which began at the end of the 60s. The new station uses not only the ideology of the old "thirty", but, undoubtedly, some of the technical solutions used in them. Work on 1RL257 started in 1994 and completed in 2011.
The Avtobaza complex, also thanks primarily to the Russian media, along with the Khibiny, has become in the eyes of the average man a kind of superweapon that can interfere with any drone. In particular, this complex is credited with a victory over the American RQ-170 UAV. At the same time, Avtobaza itself, as well as the Moskva complex recently adopted by the Russian Ministry of Defense, solve completely different tasks - they conduct radio-technical reconnaissance, issue target designation of the electronic warfare complex and are the command post of an electronic warfare battalion (company). It is clear that Avtobaza had a rather indirect relation to the landing of the American UAV in Iran.
The "Moscow" currently supplied to the troops is a continuation of the line of the command and control and reconnaissance complex, the beginning of which was laid by the "Mauser-1", which was put into service back in the 70s. The new complex includes two vehicles - a reconnaissance station that detects and classifies the types of radiation, their direction, signal strength, as well as a control point, from where data is automatically transmitted to subordinate electronic warfare stations.
As conceived by the Russian military and developers, the electronic warfare "Moscow" makes it possible to covertly determine the situation from the enemy and inflict a sudden electronic defeat on his forces and means. But if the complex conducts radio-technical reconnaissance in a passive mode, then it sends control commands via radio communication channels and the enemy, under certain conditions, can intercept them. In this case, there is even no need to decipher the signals, it is enough to detect radio traffic and this will reveal the presence of the entire EW battalion (company).
Numb satellites
In addition to fighting enemy aircraft, Russian developers of electronic warfare pay great attention to suppressing enemy radio traffic, as well as jamming GPS signals.
The most famous satellite navigation jammer is the R-330Zh Zhitel complex, developed and manufactured by the Sozvezdie concern. A rather original solution was also offered by the Scientific and Technical Center of Electronic Warfare, whose R-340RP products are already being supplied to the units of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Small-sized jammers are installed on civilian cell towers, whose signal is amplified many times over by antennas located on the tower.
Not only the media, but also some experts argue that it is almost impossible to jam the GPS signal. At the same time, in Russia, technical solutions for "turning off" satellite navigation appeared in the early 2000s.
In the GPS system, there is a concept called "frequency reference". The system is based on the transmission of the simplest signal from the satellite to the transmitter, so the slightest deviation from the specified frequency, even by milliseconds, will lead to a loss of accuracy. The signal is transmitted in a fairly narrow range according to open data - 1575, 42 MHz and 1227, 60 MHz, this is the reference frequency. Therefore, the work of modern jammers is aimed precisely at blocking it, which, taking into account the narrowness of the reference frequency and in the presence of a sufficiently powerful noise interference, is not difficult to drown out.
An interesting enough solution in the field of suppressing the radio exchange of a potential enemy was the Leer-3 complex, consisting of an electronic reconnaissance vehicle based on the Tiger car, as well as several Orlan-10 unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with droppable jamming transmitters capable of suppressing not only radio, but also cellular communication. The RB-531B Infauna complex, produced by the Sozvezdie concern, performs similar tasks, but without the use of drones.
In addition to modern ground-based electronic warfare systems, air-based systems are also being actively supplied to the Russian Armed Forces. Thus, at the end of September, the Concern of Radioelectronic Technologies (KRET) announced that within two years the production of the modernized Lever-AV electronic warfare systems, installed on the Mi-8 helicopter, would begin. The message also indicates that the new complex will be able to blind the enemy within a radius of several hundred kilometers.
Flying "Lever"
As in the case of other electronic warfare systems already described in the article, Lever (full name - Mi-8MTPR-1 helicopter with Lever-AV jamming station) is a development of Soviet and Russian Air Force EW stations of the Smalta family, developed by the Kaluga Scientific Research Radio Engineering Institute (KNIRTI). The main task of both the new "Lever" and the older "Smalta" is quite simple - the suppression of weapon control radars, as well as the homing heads of missiles of enemy anti-aircraft missile systems (systems).
Work on the creation of these complexes began in the 70s, when the Syrian and Egyptian air forces faced the new American Hawk anti-aircraft missile systems, which had just entered service with Israel. Since the regular means of electronic warfare were powerless against the overseas novelty, the Arab states turned to the USSR for help.
According to the original design of the developers, "Smalt" was supposed to be placed on a car, but faced with a number of problems caused by signal reflection from the earth's surface, the developers decided to transfer the station to a helicopter. Thanks to this, it was possible not only to get rid of interference - by raising the Smalta to such a height where the signal is no longer reflected from the surface, the creators significantly increased its mobility and, accordingly, security.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, during the August 2008 war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the use of the Mi-8SMV-PG with the Smalta stations installed on board led to the detection range of the missile guidance radar of the Georgian Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems and S-125 decreased by 1.5-2.5 times (from 25-30 km in a noise-free environment to 10-15 km in the presence of interference), which, according to the Russian military department, is equivalent to a decrease in the number of missile launches by about two times. On average, EW helicopters on duty in the air took from 12 to 16 hours.
Judging by the available data, the Lever station is capable not only of automatically detecting, receiving, analyzing and suppressing signals from enemy radars, regardless of the radiation mode used (pulsed, continuous, quasi-continuous), but also when jamming, act quite selectively, without suppressing its radar stations …
Work on the "Lever" began in the 80s, and the first experimental Mi-8MTPR with the "Lever-BV" jamming station entered state tests in 1990. However, as a result of the collapse of the USSR and a decrease in funding, the work on the new station KNIRTI resumed only in 2001, but already under the designation "Lever-AV". State tests of the Mi-8MTPR-1 helicopter with the new station were successfully completed in 2010.
Ideologically, the new helicopter station is close to the ground-based Krasukha-2 and Krasukha-4 developed by the Rostov All-Russian Research Institute "Gradient" - the setting of powerful narrowly targeted noise interference. True, as in the case of the 1L269 and 1RL257, the Lever signal is clearly visible to the enemy's electronic reconnaissance equipment. Also, one should not forget that not only in Russia, but also in the West, work is actively underway to create anti-aircraft missiles capable of aiming precisely at a source with a strong electronic signal.
So what happened to Cook?
Work on the creation of the newest onboard defense complex "Khibiny" (product L175) began at the Kaluga Research Radio Engineering Institute in the late 1980s. The new product was originally designed only for installation on front-line bombers Su-34, and due to the interest in the new station of the chief designer of the aircraft, Rolland Martirosov, the designers of the Sukhoi Design Bureau were actively involved in the work on the Khibiny.
The Khibiny station is not only installed on the Su-34 and continuously exchanges information with the avionics of the front-line bomber, but also displays information about the situation on a special display located at the navigator's workplace.
It is noteworthy that, judging by the video recordings of the radar indicator exposed to the Khibiny complex, demonstrated by the Concern of Radioelectronic Technologies for advertising purposes, there are signs of the use of powerful noise interference. At the same time, there are no "stars" in the video - imitation noise, so named because of the characteristic star-shaped pattern. Although this type of interference is indicated in advertising materials.
The newest jamming stations, however, like Lever, have already taken part in hostilities: front-line bombers Su-34 equipped with Khibiny, during the war in August 2008, carried out group protection of strike aircraft, and also conducted radio-technical reconnaissance. Based on the available data, the Air Force command highly appreciated the effectiveness of the L175.
Summing up, we can conclude that the "Khibiny" is an electronic warfare station equipped with a complex multi-channel antenna array, capable of delivering powerful noise and imitation interference and conducting electronic reconnaissance. L175 can not only protect individual machines, but also successfully perform the functions of a group protection station.
However, it is still possible to install the Khibiny only on the Su-34, since the onboard power supply system for these front-line bombers is specially adapted to the use of the newest REP station, which probably requires a lot of electricity for its operation.
Therefore, the answer to the question of what the Khibiny did with the American destroyer would not be sensational - such a station was not used during the overflight of the Su-24 front-line bomber of the US Navy destroyer Donald Cook. She simply could not be on board this type of aircraft.
Mysterious "Chopper"
In addition to the Murmansk-BN electronic warfare station, already mentioned in the first part of the article, another machine recently entered into service, but this time by the Aerospace Forces (formerly the Air Force) of Russia, is covered with an aura of secrecy - the Il-22PP Porubshchik aircraft. All that is known about the "Prubshchik" is that it has side antennas installed, as well as a station towed in flight, unwinding behind the aircraft, according to some sources, for several hundred meters.
Back in the late 2000s, the Sozvezdie concern, which was working on the creation of automated control systems (ESU TZ Sozvezdie) and electronic warfare stations, focused primarily on suppressing enemy radio communications and automated command and control (R-531B Infauna ), Together with the Beriev Aircraft Company, began work on the A-90 control and data relay aircraft, according to some reports, within the framework of the Yastreb ROC.
In 2012, in the course of work on the Discomfort R&D project, Sozvezdiye carried out ground state tests of the equipment of the air-based multifunctional electronic warfare complex. At the same time, the new complex allegedly uses unique technical solutions in terms of high-potential antenna arrays and liquid-cooled microwave power amplifiers. It is noteworthy that work on "Discomfort" also began in the late 2000s.
But already in 2013, in the published long-term plan for the procurement of aviation equipment for the Russian Air Force until 2025, instead of the A-90, a certain "Hawk" was called (without specifying the A-90), and only in the plans for the purchase-modernization from 2021 to 2025. From this document it became known that the Russian Air Force plans to purchase the Il-22PP "Porubshchik" until 2020.
If we add up all the available data, then we can assume that the IL-22PP and A-90 are designed to perform the same tasks and it is possible that at the present time A-90 and "Discomfort" have somehow united in works related to " The chopper ".
Perhaps the Il-22PP is not just an aircraft with an electronic warfare system, designed primarily to suppress communications and the enemy's automated control system, but also a flying command post for electronic warfare, capable of independently conducting electronic and electronic reconnaissance.
A double edged sword
It must be admitted that at present the Russian Ministry of Defense is actively developing the direction of electronic warfare, not only forming EW formations and units, but also equipping them with modern technology. The Russian military has learned to jam AWACS, airborne radar systems, as well as enemy communication lines and even GPS signals, in fact occupying a leading position in the world in some areas.
As an example, the results of the use of electronic warfare by the Russian army during the war with Georgia in August 2008 can be cited. Despite the fact that the enemy has sufficiently modern air defense systems, including the Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems and the modernized S-125, as well as a large number of radars of both Soviet and foreign (mainly French) production, the Georgian air defense account only two Russian aircraft - Tu-22M3, shot down under unclear circumstances, and Su-24 from the 929th GLITs, destroyed either by the Polish Grom MANPADS or the Israeli Spider air defense system.
The units and subdivisions of electronic warfare of the Ground Forces reported on the almost complete suppression of the communication lines of the Georgian army (only satellite communications worked occasionally), as well as the suppression of communication lines of Georgian UAVs, which led to the loss of several aircraft. So the fears of American journalists expressed in the first part of the article have a certain basis.
But still we have to admit that there are some difficulties in the development of forces and means of electronic warfare. First, one must understand that the use of electronic warfare means must be associated with precise control of the entire electromagnetic situation in the combat area. As the experience of modern wars and military conflicts, in particular the already mentioned war with Georgia, shows, EW weapons, if used incorrectly, strike equally hard both at the enemy and at their own troops.
According to the Russian Air Force, in August 2008, during the suppression of Georgian radar stations by An-12PP aircraft, interference was also observed at Russian stations located at a distance of 100-120 kilometers from the jamming zone. Ground stations of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation equally effectively suppressed communication lines - both Georgian and their own troops.
In addition, it should be borne in mind that in the conflict area, civilian radio-electronic means are also operating - communication channels serving the "ambulance", units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the police. And if at present the Russian military, who have had negative experience in the past, are actively learning to act in the conditions of using their electronic warfare means, then no one seems to be worried about the impact on the civilian sector in the military-industrial complex.
Secondly, if you look closely at the line of electronic warfare products presented by the industry, you will notice a large number of stations, especially KRET products, in fact ideological, and in some places technical continuation of the complexes developed in the 70s and 80s. And the same "Krasukhi", "Lever" and "Moscow" could appear in the mid - late 90s, but slowed down due to chronic underfunding.
Most of the electronic warfare systems are made according to the same principle - the setting of powerful noise interference, which, as already mentioned, has both significant disadvantages and no less significant advantages. But until recently, the practically unused millimeter and terrohertz ranges are now increasingly attracting the attention of manufacturers of not only electronic equipment, but also high-precision weapons.
On the so-called lower bands, for example, there may be only ten channels, and already at 40 GHz there will already be hundreds of them. And the developers of electronic warfare need to "close" all these channels, and this is a fairly large band, which means that more sophisticated means of electronic warfare with a large channel are required, which in turn leads to an increase in the weight and dimensions of jamming stations and a decrease in their mobility.
But if we move away from science, then there is one big organizational problem in the development system of Russian electronic warfare systems. In fact, not only KRET is currently developing and producing electronic warfare equipment, but also the recently created United Instrument-Making Corporation (which includes the Vega and Sozvezdiye concerns), individual organizations from Roskosmos and Rosatom, and even private enterprises.
It should be noted that the works are duplicated and overlapped in places; one should not forget about such a phenomenon as lobbying of certain developments and firms. The first attempt to reorganize work in the field of creating electronic warfare was the recent appointment of a general designer in the direction of electronic warfare by presidential decree. But time will tell how effective this solution will be.
