Destroyers of project 23560 "Leader". For the first time, the general public heard about it in June 2009, when ITAR-TASS announced the start of work on the creation of a multipurpose destroyer in the ocean zone. At the same time, the tasks that the naval command set for the promising ship were announced:
"Its main purpose will be to fight both ground targets to support the landing, and the enemy surface forces, as well as anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defense."
They also provided minimal information about its future characteristics, including: stealth elements, a high level of automation, unlimited seaworthiness and a speed of over 30 knots, a hangar for 2 helicopters, while the standard displacement was supposed to reach almost 9 thousand tons. In June 2009, the state of work on the latest destroyer was as follows:
“The tender for the selection of a new generation destroyer project for the Navy is planned to be held before the end of the year. At the same time, research and development work will begin to shape the appearance of a promising ship, which will be completed in about three years."
At about the same time, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy V. Vysotsky announced that the construction of a new destroyer could begin as early as 2012. a lot of incomprehensible. Since at least 2011, the media have been talking about the fact that the destroyer is being developed in two versions - with a gas turbine and a nuclear power plant, but which of the options will the fleet prefer? It was only clear that as the project was worked out, the displacement of the future ship was growing. If initially they talked about "almost 9 thousand tons", then later about 9-10 thousand tons for the gas turbine, and 12-14 thousand tons for the nuclear version. It was the latter that seemed preferable to the leadership of the Navy. In 2015, TASS reported, citing an unnamed source:
"The Main Command of the Navy refused to develop the" Leader "with a gas turbine power plant. In accordance with the modified terms of reference, approved by the Ministry of Defense, the preliminary design of the destroyer is carried out in only one version - with a nuclear power plant."
At the same time, a TASS source clarified:
"The preparation of the technical project is being carried out by the Northern Design Bureau, it is planned to be completed in 2016".
Alas. As it became known in June 2016, the technical design of the promising destroyer has not been completed, but has just begun: according to the annual report of Severnoye PKB JSC, the completion of the technical design by the end of 2016 should be only 5%. However, already at the 2015 International Maritime Defense Show (IMDS), the project 23560E destroyer model in the export version was presented.
A rather unusual appearance and the fact that this model (along with the model of the Shtorm aircraft carrier) was exhibited by the Krylov State Research Center, and not by the Leader developer: the Severnoye design bureau raises certain doubts that the promising destroyer will look like this. On the other hand, there are no other images of the "Leader" in the open press (except for cases when drawings of the destroyer of Project 21956 are mistakenly shown). At the same time, the approximate performance characteristics of the newest ship were announced. They are well known, but we will repeat them again: 17,500 tons of full displacement, 32 knots of maximum speed, 200 m in length, 20 m in width and 6, 6 m in draft, "seaworthiness of 7 points" (most likely it meant that the ship can use weapons with excitement up to 7 points). Well, the armament will be (judging by the model presented by the Krylov State Research Center).
Will include:
64 (8 * 8) UKSK silos for Bramos missiles, Caliber family, in the future - Zircon.
56 (14 * 4) missile silos for the "hot" complex S-400, or S-500 "Prometheus".
16 (4 * 4) mines for the Redut air defense missile system.
3 ZRPK "Pantsir-M".
12 (2 * 6) "Packet-NK" torpedo tubes.
1 * 1-130 mm AU A-192M "Armat".
Hangar for 2 helicopters.
A small nuance. Earlier it was repeatedly reported that the Leader-class destroyer would carry 128 missile defense missiles, while the model has only 72 missile silos. But there is no contradiction here, since up to 4 smaller missiles can be placed in one silo. So, for example, one mine of the Redut air defense missile system includes 4 short-range missiles 9M100, which means that the number of anti-aircraft missiles on the Leader, not even counting the Pantsir, can be much more than the 72 available silos.
Let's try to figure out how it happened that a large, oceanic, but still a destroyer managed to grow up to a giant missile cruiser, to understand the tasks that such a ship could solve as part of our fleet and guess when, after all, we should expect bookmarks of the lead ship of the series.
The closest analogue of the Project 23560 destroyer in the Russian Navy is the Project 1144 heavy nuclear missile cruisers, but, of course, the history of the design of these ships is fundamentally different - the more interesting is the similarity of the final result. In the case of 1144, the Soviet admirals originally expected to receive a nuclear-powered ocean-going anti-submarine ship with a displacement of 8,000 tons to search, track and destroy American SSBNs. It was believed that to ensure acceptable combat stability in the ocean, the ship would need not only powerful anti-submarine weapons, but also echeloned air defense, as well as anti-ship missiles, but it was not possible to fit all this into one medium-displacement ship. Therefore, at the first stages of the design, it was supposed to create two nuclear-powered ships: the BOD of project 1144 and the missile cruiser of project 1165 with strong air defense, which were supposed to act in tandem. Subsequently, this idea was abandoned in favor of a universal ship: it was probably the right approach, but it led to an explosive increase in the displacement of the TARKRR project 1144. As a result, the USSR Navy received a unique ship - equipped with almost the entire range of naval weapons, it was equally effective in providing Air defense (S-300F - "Osa-M" - AK630) PLO (PLUR "Blizzard" -533-mm torpedo tubes - RBU), and its strike capabilities (20 anti-ship missiles P-700 "Granit") according to the then ideas of domestic military experts ensured the breakthrough of the AUG air defense and inflicting decisive damage to the aircraft carrier. Of course, everything had to be paid for - the total displacement of the TARKR reached 26 thousand tons, and its cost turned out to be comparable to that of aircraft carrying ships: according to some reports, the TARKR project 1144 cost about 450-500 million rubles, while the TAKR pr. 1143.5 ("Kuznetsov") - 550 million rubles, and the nuclear aircraft carrier pr. 1143.7 ("Ulyanovsk") - 800 million rubles. (without air groups). The cost of the Ulyanovsk air group could be about 400 million rubles.
The creation of such ships became the apotheosis of the concept of Soviet missile cruisers designed to destroy American aircraft carrier strike groups, including from the tracking position, when the domestic RRC was located at a distance from the AUG, but kept it within the radius of action of its own anti-ship missiles and, in the event of a conflict, could inflict an immediate missile strike on it. But could the domestic missile cruiser fulfill the tasks assigned to it? The controversy on this topic is rocking the Internet to this day.
The arguments of the supporters of aircraft carriers are impeccable - a missile cruiser, acting without the cover of its own aviation, cannot repel a massive air strike, no matter how many air defense systems you put on it. The aircraft carrier's capabilities for finding the enemy are much higher, due to the presence of AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft, at the same time, the missile cruiser needs external target designation, which there is simply no one to give it in the ocean. This could be done by spy satellites, but with the exception of extremely expensive satellites capable of actively searching (using radar in active mode), such satellites either do not guarantee detection of the AUG, or take too much time to decipher information, which is outdated and cannot be used for targeting anti-ship missiles. Thus, it will be much more difficult for a missile cruiser to find an AUG than an AUG to find a missile cruiser, and the RRC will not be able to defend itself against its aircraft. As for tracking the enemy, except when such tracking is carried out at a distance that allows visual observation of the AUG ships, the problem of external target designation remains relevant. Based on the foregoing, a number of analysts consider missile cruisers to be a dead-end branch of the evolution of surface ships.
However, not all so simple.
Six months before the 1982 Falklands conflict, an Anglo-American naval exercise took place in the Arabian Sea. From the US side, the AUG took part in them at the head of the aircraft carrier "Coral Sea" under the command of Admiral Brown. The British were represented by the destroyer Glamorgan, three frigates, two tankers and a supply vessel, led by Rear Admiral Woodworth (who later led the British carrier group off the Falklands).
The conditions were quite simple: the exercises begin at 12:00, while the British ships occupy a position unknown to the Americans, but no closer than 200 miles from the American aircraft carrier. The task of the British is to destroy the Coral Sea with a missile strike, the task of the Americans is to find and destroy British ships. For the US sailors, the situation was greatly facilitated by the fact that of all British ships, only Glamorgan, which had four Exosets with a range of 20 nautical miles, had anti-ship missiles. In fact, they alone represented the only threat to the American connection. Rear Admiral Woodworth decided to try to attack with single ships from different directions, placing his frigates and a destroyer in a circle with a 200-mile radius with an aircraft carrier in the center, but still the chances of a British connection in the face of dozens of carrier-based aircraft and a powerful ship escort tended to zero. As if this was not enough, the Americans "cheated a little" - their plane had found the Glamorgan three quarters of an hour before the start of the exercise - the British could not yet "shoot down" it, but Admiral Brown roughly knew the location of the only ship that represented for him at least some -that danger.
Nevertheless, the exercise ended when a British officer contacted the aircraft carrier Coral Sea and notified the latter's command that:
"We launched four Exocets 20 seconds ago."
We add that the "Glamorgan" at that time was only 11 miles from the "Coral Sea". For the sake of fairness, it should be pointed out that the Americans nevertheless discovered Glamorgan on their own, but this happened after the latter's “missile strike”.
How did the British manage this? Very simply - after the discovery of the Glamorgan by an American fighter, the British destroyer abruptly changed course and speed, and by the time the strike group of carrier-based aircraft Glamorgan arrived at the area of its intended location three hours later, it was 100 miles to the east. Then during the day the Americans found and "destroyed" all three British frigates, but the Glamorgan, remaining undetected at dusk, approached the 200-mile border from which it was supposed to begin training. Further … the ship rushed into the attack under cover of darkness, observing light and radio disguise? Not at all - "Glamorgan" lit every single light that was on the destroyer and proudly followed ahead. According to Rear Admiral Woodworth:
"From the bridge, we looked like a floating Christmas tree."
What for? A British admiral came up with the idea to disguise himself as a cruise ship. Therefore, when an American destroyer discovered this something shining in the darkness and asked on the radio to identify itself:
“My homebrew impersonator Peter Sellers, already instructed in advance, responded with the best Indian accent he could muster:“I am a Rawalpindi cruising from Bombay to Dubai Port. Good night and good luck!" It sounded like the wish of the head waiter from an Indian restaurant in Surbiton."
The camouflage was 100% successful, and the Americans did not suspect anything until Glamorgan approached the US aircraft carrier by 11 miles - then they still realized it, but it was too late.
Of course, one should take into account certain conventions of these exercises, as well as the fact that during hostilities the Americans would hardly allow the "Indian liner" Rawalpindi "to move so freely in the space they protect. But you should pay attention to this: according to the passport performance characteristics of American weapons, the success of the British destroyer was completely impossible. So what if the Glamorgan was 100 miles (185 km) from the place where the American planes were looking for it, if the E-2C Hawkeye AWACS is capable of detecting the ship at a distance of 300 kilometers or more, depending on the flight altitude? However, the British destroyer, while maneuvering 200-250 miles from the aircraft carrier for half daylight hours, was not detected by American reconnaissance aircraft. And this is in perfect weather!
Thus, it can only be stated once again that sea combat is much more complicated and multifaceted than its modeling based on reference tables: a classic missile cruiser is not at all something completely useless and is quite capable of attacking AUG with its missiles under certain conditions. By the way, Rear Admiral Woodworth himself, based on the results of the exercises described above, made a completely unambiguous conclusion:
“The moral is that if in such conditions you command (an aircraft carrier. - Author's note) a strike group, be prudent: in bad weather conditions you can be defeated. This is especially true when you are facing a determined enemy willing to lose several ships to destroy your aircraft carrier."
Another question is that in the confrontation "missile ship against AUG" the latter will still and always have significantly greater chances: we must not forget that, despite the success of "Glamorgan", it was the only one of the four British ships that completed its task. The other three were discovered and "destroyed" by US carrier-based aircraft, which took only half a day for the latter. In addition, it should be taken into account that there were four British ships, i.e. the Americans were forced to disperse their forces, fearing attacks from various directions.
Returning to the destroyer of project 23560, we note that with ships of this type, the Russian Navy either returned to the Soviet tradition, or re-stepped on the same rake (depending on the point of view). "Leader" is a classic reincarnation of the idea of creating a universal missile ship capable of single-handedly "deal with" an aircraft carrier group, with echeloned air defense and effective means of fighting submarines. The "Leader" will be especially effective as a means of "power projection" on a foreign AUG: nothing prevents him from taking a position for an immediate strike in the pre-war time, and the strike of sixty-four anti-ship "Calibers" (especially when using the ZM-54, attacking the target by 2, 9M) can hardly be repelled by the air defense and electronic warfare forces of several Arlie Burke-class destroyers. At the same time, and taking into account the fact that vertical launchers usually provide a rate of fire of 1 missile in 1-2 seconds, the destroyer must hold out for only 1-2 minutes until the anti-ship missile ammunition is completely depleted - a completely achievable task for its powerful and echeloned air defense. Of course, there are questions of external target designation, but here too there are options - especially in terms of tracking the enemy in peacetime. For example, the development of over-the-horizon radar - modern ZGRLS are not able to identify the enemy, but who is in the way, when a multiple target is detected, establish contact with it using a destroyer / aircraft / helicopter, find out what it is - AUG and then track its movements using ZGRLS? Previously, the missile cruiser, being, say, 200 km from the AUG, was not able to control its movements on its own - of course, there were helicopters, but they could not carry out round-the-clock duty. In the not so distant future, with the development of UAVs, our Navy will have such opportunities. The declared service life of the Project 23560 destroyer is 50 years, and its combat use should be planned based on both existing and promising weapons and equipment.
As for the power plant, it should be admitted that we actually did not have any choice - an atom and only an atom. Until 2014, before the return of the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation and before the introduction of Western sanctions, the Ministry of Defense leadership could still hope that we would be able to build a fleet plying the vastness of the World Ocean on Ukrainian gas turbines and German diesel engines, but now no one has such illusions. … We can only rely on our own military-industrial complex, and now it faces an extremely important and difficult task - to ensure the production of gas turbines for the latest frigates. And this task will eventually be solved, but with a delay, so that the serial construction of Project 22350 frigates is obviously disrupted. So what is the point of demanding now from a manufacturer who is unable to provide in the required time the supply of power plants for frigates also gas turbine power plants for the newest destroyers? Nuclear power plants created by completely different manufacturers are a different matter. It should also be noted that equipping with nuclear power plants gives our destroyers of Project 23560 undeniable advantages - namely, the ability to maintain maximum speed much longer than a ship with a gas turbine power plant is capable of, and it will be somewhat easier to provide such a ship far from home shores - at least at least he does not need a fleet of tankers.
The disadvantages of the 23560 project directly follow from its own advantages - the need to place the most powerful weapons and a nuclear power plant require significant displacement and increase the cost of the ship. Therefore, it is extremely doubtful that the Russian Federation will be able to build a series of 12 such ships, as previously announced. Questions arise both on the cost of a "unit of production" and on the shipyards where it can be built (the length of the hull of 200 m is not a joke). And even if they could - why do we need it?
Let's take a look at American shipbuilding. The United States has implemented two very ambitious projects - the "destroyer of the future" Zamvolt and the "aircraft carrier of the future" Gerald Ford. Both of these ships, according to the developers, were to become the quintessence of the latest technologies, which should have provided them with unprecedented combat effectiveness. We will not now talk about what the Americans did in the end, according to the author, the American military-industrial complex crisis in terms of naval construction may turn out to be more terrible than ours, but now we will just compare the cost of the newest destroyer and the US aircraft carrier. As for Gerald Ford, according to HBO data for 2014:
“At the conclusion of the contract in 2008, the construction cost of Gerald R. Ford was estimated at $ 10.5 billion.dollars, but then it grew by about 22% and today is 12.8 billion dollars, including 3.3 billion dollars of one-time expenses for the design of the entire series of new generation aircraft carriers."
Thus, we will not be mistaken, assuming that the direct costs of building the ship amounted to about 9, 5-10, 5 billion dollars (later there was information that the cost of "Ford" reached 13, 8 billion dollars). But the problem is that, according to the latest data, the construction cost of Zamvolt has reached $ 4.4 billion, and this is precisely the cost of construction, excluding R&D and design costs. Accordingly, an American aircraft carrier (without an air group) costs 2, 16-2, 37 destroyers Zamvolt. But the ATAKR "Ulyanovsk" (a giant ship of about 80 thousand tons of full displacement, it is still significantly less than the US aircraft carriers) cost about 1.7 TARKR project 1144 "Kirov".
Our Leader-class destroyers are smaller than Kirov, but larger than Zamvolt, the range of weapons is larger, and, in contrast to their American counterpart, they have atomic propulsion systems. At the same time, according to available data, the promising aircraft carrier of the Russian Federation is roughly the size of Ulyanovsk. Therefore, it will not be a big mistake to assume that the cost of the domestic aircraft carrier will be approximately two destroyers of Project 23560 "Leader".
Contrary to popular belief, when comparing the cost of aircraft carriers and other means of armed warfare at sea, such as missile cruisers or submarines, it is not necessary to take into account the cost of a carrier-based air group - these aircraft are in any case needed by the fleet, even with an aircraft carrier, even without it. The aircraft carrier is just a mobile airfield that allows aircraft to operate far from their land bases. But even if we do not do this, and add the cost of one more destroyer as compensation for the cost of the air group, it turns out that instead of a dozen missile destroyers, we can build 4 fully equipped aircraft carriers. One can argue for a long time about whether our fleet needs aircraft carriers or not, but the approximate cost of the program for the construction of a dozen "Leaders" is exactly that. And if someone believes that the aircraft carrier fleet is too expensive for the Russian Federation, then the program for the construction of Project 23560 destroyers will also be beyond our means.
It is known that "a wagon can do everything, but equally bad." In the opinion of the author of this article, when designing the Leader, we tried to design a truly efficient ship in the ocean zone, “a station wagon that can do everything, and equally well,” and we succeeded. The only problem is that such high-quality versatility is too expensive and not suitable for large-scale construction. In the end, even the USSR did not try to replace all BODs, destroyers and missile cruisers with the TARKR project 1144 alone, and the industrial power of the Russian Federation cannot be compared with the USSR.
However, this does not at all make Leaders unnecessary or unwanted for our fleet. The creation of even 4-5 such ships, even if stretched out for 20 years, will at least ensure the reproduction of missile cruisers. And (let's be a little optimistic) in the event of the appearance of aircraft carriers in the Russian Navy, the "Leaders" will perfectly complement their capabilities. Even one destroyer of Project 23560 is capable of qualitatively strengthening the air defense of an aircraft carrier multipurpose group, and 64 cruise missiles perfectly complement the power of the carrier-based air group, even against sea targets, even against land targets.
The laying of the lead "Leader" would mark our return to the ocean, and the constant shifts of the dates "to the right" are not at all pleasing to those who are not indifferent to the fate of the Russian Navy. Nevertheless, there are certain reasons for delaying construction: the projected destroyer is crammed with the latest weapons and equipment no less than the lead frigate of Project 22350 "Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Gorshkov". The same frigate, which, having been laid down in February 2006 for more than 10 years, cannot become part of the Russian Navy and it is not yet known when it will. Of course, the problem lies not in the fact that the shipyard has forgotten how to build hulls - the firstborn of project 22350 was let down by disruptions in the supply of weapons (and possibly equipment). The problem was that the same "Polyment-Redut", for example, at the time of laying the "Gorshkov" was at rather early stages of development, and all conceivable terms of its commissioning were disrupted. Let's hope that this ill-fated air defense system will still be able to be brought to mind, but it is unlikely that the leadership of the domestic fleet is eager to step on the same rake again: to lay down a ship much larger than a frigate, and get another much more expensive long-term construction. Therefore, it can be assumed that the laying date for the destroyer of Project 23560 "Leader" is shifted to the right precisely because of the unavailability of its future "stuffing" - weapons, energy and other equipment. Let's try to figure out how ready we are to start building such ships.
Already in the 2000s, as part of a radical upgrade of the country's air defense, it was decided to rely on 3 main complexes - the short-range Morpheus, the S-350 Vityaz medium-range and the long-range S-500, and the latter had to solve the problems both air defense and interception of medium-range ballistic missiles, intercontinental missiles - at the end of the trajectory, as well as low-orbit satellites. At the same time, significant unification was assumed - the same S-400 could (and should) use the S-350 missiles, and the S-500, obviously, should have been able to "work" the S-400 missiles if necessary. In addition, unification was also assumed between the branches of the armed forces: it was assumed that the S-350 in its naval incarnation "Polyment-Redut" would become the basis of medium air defense, and the S-500 - large ocean ships, such as the "Leader". Unfortunately, today, in all the complexes, the work is very far from successful completion, and the S-350 in its "sea" version ("Polyment-Redut") became the main reason for the delay in the commissioning of the "Admiral Gorshkov".
As you know, the fundamental difference between the S-350 and the same S-300 was the use of missiles with an active seeker, the guidance of which does not require a special tracking radar and target illumination, which is necessary for semi-active missiles. It was assumed that the S-400 complex that entered service should be able to direct missiles with both active and semi-active seeker, for which a multifunctional 92N6E radar was developed.
As a result, the complex operates as follows: a general overview radar (one per complex) provides airspace control and, on the basis of its data, the command post distributes targets between the air defense systems (simultaneously controlling up to 8 air defense systems), each of which is assigned a 92N6E radar. And this radar provides tracking of targets and guidance of its SAM system at them, while it is able to direct missiles from an active and semi-active seeker (in the latter case, a greater number of tracked targets is provided). Moreover, it is envisaged to use promising integrated active-semi-active seeker systems in missiles, which also have a passive reception channel. In this case, the maximum range of the 92N6E radar is indicated at 400 km, although it is unclear how large the RCS of the target, which can be accompanied by the radar at this distance. But for the radar of the general view of the S-400, 600 km are given (230 km for a target with an RCS of 0.4 sq. M). It is likely that 92N6E is capable of performing the functions of a surveillance radar - domestic tracking and target illumination stations usually had such an opportunity, simply in a narrower sector than a general radar.
The Poliment naval radar array has much worse characteristics - it combines the capabilities of a surveillance radar with the control of a missile-guided missile with an active seeker, but it is hardly adapted for the control of a missile-guided missile with a semi-active seeker, since the Redoubt air defense system does not provide for the use of such missiles. In total, "Polyment" has four fixed grids directed in different directions of the world, which provide the ship with a 360 degree view, and each of them is capable of simultaneously firing at 4 targets (92N6E radar - 10 targets). But Polyment has a serious problem - the task of transferring a target from one grid to another has not yet been solved, ie. if the target moves from the field of view of one grating to another, then its tracking is disrupted. It can be assumed that such a transfer of control of a missile defense system with a semi-active seeker will turn out to be even more difficult - after all, if for a missile defense system with an active seeker, it is enough to periodically fix the position of the target and missile in space, after which the computer will calculate the trajectory change, then for a semi-active seeker, constant "illumination" is also required target with a radar beam.
At the same time, on the “Leader” model presented by the Krylov State Research Center, we see not even 4 gratings, but a greater number of them. Perhaps these are the Poliment grids and the new S-500 radar complex, but it is more likely that these are surveillance radar grids and a multifunctional one that provides guidance for all types of missiles. Be that as it may, until the fundamental problem of transferring targets from one lattice to another is solved, such a scheme will not work. In fact, it is precisely the problems with the radar that are key for the promising naval air defense system. Despite the fact that work on missiles is behind schedule and even the 40N6E long-range missile defense system for the S-400 (with a range of up to 400 km and an altitude reach of 185 km) has not yet entered service, the dimensions, weight and energy of promising missiles are clear, and nothing prevents you from creating appropriate launchers for them. Thus, it is possible to build destroyers without waiting for missiles - "Leaders" can still walk with an incomplete range of missiles, and besides, the lead destroyer is still very far from commissioning, and no one knows how far the development of promising missiles will progress by that time. But not having solved the fundamental problems with surveillance radars and targeting missiles - it is unlikely. We have already done this once, and now the fate of the air defense of Project 22350 frigates is very vague.
In addition, there is information that a completely new surveillance radar is being developed for the S-500, operating not in the decimeter, but in the centimeter range, but providing a detection range of 750-800 km against the 600 km of the S-400 radar. It is not known what state its development is in, but, of course, it would be desirable to get just such for "Leader".
The second aspect that slows down the immediate laying of destroyers of Project 23560 (of course, in the personal opinion of the author of this article) is energy. Let us recall the creation of the TARKR project 1144 - their KN-3 reactors were created on the basis of the OK-900 icebreaking reactors, but, of course, the design idea has not stood still since then. Today, the next generation RITM-200 reactors have been developed for the series of newest icebreakers of the LK-60Ya project ("Arktika", "Siberia", "Ural") under construction. They are much lighter and more compact than OK-900, but have a threefold longer period of continuous operation, 80% longer resource. When using "civilian" uranium enriched to 20%, the period between fuel reloads is 7 years (versus 2-3 years for OK-900), but with more enriched “military” uranium, reloading of fuel is not required at all. Of course, it would be logical to create reactors for the "Leader" on the basis of RHYTHM-200, but before that it would be worthwhile to study how successful this RHYTHM turned out to be. The first icebreaker with a power plant based on it should enter service in 2017, so it makes sense to wait for the results of state tests so as not to "fly over" again.
Taking into account all of the above, the most realistic date for laying the lead ship of Project 23560 is 2018-2019, provided that by that time the problems with the radar station will be resolved, and the RITM-200 will operate normally.
