Having examined the brief biographies of the commanders in the previous article, we move on to the state of the 1st Pacific Squadron by the time Rear Admiral V. K. Witgeft took over the post temporarily and. d. commander of the Pacific Ocean squadron. I must say that by that time the state of our naval forces left much to be desired, and this concerned both the naval personnel and the preparation of the teams for battle.
By the beginning of the war, the squadron in Port Arthur had seven squadron battleships, an armored cruiser, three armored cruisers of the 1st rank and two armored cruisers of the 2nd rank (not counting the former sailing clipper Zabiyaka, which had practically lost its combat significance, but still was listed as a second-ranked cruiser). The light forces of the squadron included two mine cruisers, twenty-five destroyers, four gunboats and two specially built mine layers. To this should be added three armored and one armored cruiser of the 1st rank in Vladivostok; there were also 10 small destroyers. As for the Japanese, only in the main forces of the fleet (first and second squadrons) there were six squadron battleships, six armored and eight armored cruisers, as well as 19 large and 16 small destroyers. And in addition, there was a third squadron, and numerous forces that were not part of the aforementioned formations, but were assigned to various naval bases.
But still it cannot be said that the Russian forces in the Far East were too small in number and unable to give a general battle. The deployment of some of the cruisers in Vladivostok was supposed to divert a significant part of the second squadron (commanded by H. Kamimura), and this is how it actually happened: in order to capture "Russia", "Rurik" and "Thunder-breaker" the Japanese were forced to divert four of their large armored cruisers. Accordingly, the Russian plan was a success, and Heihachiro Togo had only six battleships and two armored cruisers, not counting the light forces, for operations against the Arthurian squadron. At the same time, the Arthurians, having seven battleships and an armored cruiser, would have eight armored ships against eight for a general battle.
Of course, such a score "over the head" completely ignores the quality of the opposing squadrons, but now we will not compare in detail the thickness of armor, speed and armor penetration of the guns of Russian and Japanese ships. We only note that three of the seven Russian battleships were laid down two years before the start of construction of a pair of the oldest Japanese battleships Fuji and Yashima. And although the same "Sevastopol" entered the fleet in 1900 (8 years after the laying), this, of course, does not make it equal to the "Sikishima" that entered service in the same year, which the British laid down for the sons of Mikado in 1897.
Technological progress in those years was moving at an alarming speed, so that the five years that elapsed between the bookmarks of these two ships represented a huge period: in addition, the Sikishima was about 30% larger than the Sevastopol. As for the squadron battleships "Pobeda" and "Peresvet", at the beginning of their design in the working documents they were called "battleships-cruisers", "armored cruisers", or even simply "cruisers". And even in 1895, when the "Peresvet" was laid down, in many documents of the ITC ships of this type were listed as "three-screw steel armored cruisers." As a guideline in their design, British battleships of the 2nd class "Centurion" and "Rhinaun" were taken, as a result of which the ships of the "Peresvet" type received lightweight armament, moreover, their armor protection, formally powerful enough, did not cover the extremities, which for during the Russo-Japanese War was a significant drawback. Of course, these ships were listed in the Russian Imperial Navy as squadron battleships, but nevertheless, in terms of their fighting qualities, they occupied an intermediate position between the Japanese armored cruisers and squadron battleships. Thus, only two Russian battleships, "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan", could be considered equal to Japanese ships of this class, and the only armored cruiser of the Port Arthur squadron was a very unusual type of reconnaissance in the squadron, was almost twice weaker than any armored cruiser X. Kamimura was not intended for line fighting.
However, the advantage of the Japanese navy as ships was not so overwhelming that the Russians could not be counted on to win the battle. History knows cases when they won even in the worst balance of power. But for this the Russian squadron had to gather all its forces into a fist, and this they could not do from the very beginning of the war, when during a dashing night torpedo attack "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" were blown up.
As of April 22, 1904, when VK Vitgeft took command of the Port Arthur squadron, both of these battleships had not yet been returned to the fleet. Only the Pallada armored cruiser was repaired, but it was not expected to be of any use in the general engagement. Even under S. O. Makarov, during the exercise on March 13, the battleship Peresvet rammed the lingering Sevastopol into the stern, slightly damaged the skin and bent the blade of the right propeller, which made the latter unable to develop more than 10 knots and required repair at the dock … Since there was no dock capable of accommodating a battleship in Port Arthur, a caisson was required, but this was a long business, so S. O. Makarov preferred to postpone the repair until later. On March 31, the flagship Petropavlovsk exploded on a Japanese mine and sank, taking its admiral with it and depriving the squadron of another battleship. On the same day, Pobeda was blown up, which, although it did not die, was out of order for a long time. In addition, since the beginning of the war, the armored cruiser "Boyarin", the minelayer "Yenisei" and three destroyers were killed by mines, in battle and for other reasons. Thus, VK Vitgeft took command of a squadron consisting of three battleships, counting the 10-node Sevastopol (which was put under repair, which was completed only on May 15), one armored cruiser and three armored cruisers of the 1st rank, one armored cruiser of the 2nd rank, two mine cruisers, 22 destroyers, four cannonboats and a minelayer.
But the Japanese fleet received reinforcement: not only did it retain all six battleships and the same number of armored cruisers, in May-April the Argentine Nissin and Kasuga still reached combat readiness, bringing the total number of Japanese armored cruisers to eight. Of course, with such a balance of forces, there could be no talk of any general battle.
But, in addition to the quantitative (and qualitative) problems of materiel, there was also the issue of training crews, and here the Russians were doing very badly. The first test of strength, which took place on the morning of July 27, 1904, when the Arthurian squadron had an approximately 40-minute battle with the Japanese fleet, demonstrated the best training of the Japanese gunners. Of course, the squadron did not think so. This is how the senior artillery officer of the battleship Peresvet, Lieutenant V. Cherkasov, saw this battle:
“Soon we noticed that one of their battleships leaned heavily on its side, and now after that the Japanese turned stern to us and left, and then there was a chance to break them, since the Bayan, which was 17 cables from them, I saw how, having departed from us, they began to take the damaged ships in tow and then left”.
All of the above is just one of many illustrations that eyewitness testimony should be treated with great caution. Unfortunately, in battle, people very often (and completely in good faith!) Are mistaken and see not what is actually happening, but what they really want to see: this is characteristic of absolutely all nations and absolutely at all times. Therefore, the proverb "lies like an eyewitness" prevailing among historians, for all its seeming absurdity, is completely true.
However, the intelligence data is even more interesting:
"From the reports of the Chinese:" Mikasa "sank in the Arthur raid during the battle, three armored cruisers threw themselves into Chief."
Over the years, the details of both Russian and Japanese injuries became known, but in general the picture is as follows.
Comparative analysis of the accuracy of artillery fire in the battle on January 27, 1904.
Of course, it would be desirable to "sort everything out", indicating the number of shells fired and hits for each caliber, but, unfortunately, this is impossible. The number of shells fired by the Russian and Japanese squadrons is known, but the situation with hits is worse. It is not always possible to accurately identify the caliber of the hitting projectile: in some cases it is easy to confuse six- and eight-inch shells or ten- and twelve-inch shells. So, for example, Russian ships fired 41 twelve-inch and 24 ten-inch shells, while the Japanese ships hit three twelve-inch, one ten-inch and two shells of an indeterminate caliber of ten to twelve inches. Accordingly, the hit percentage for twelve-inch projectiles ranges from 7, 31 to 12, 19%, depending on whether the last two projectiles were ten- or twelve-inch. The same picture is for medium-caliber artillery: if the Russian cruiser Bayan, firing 28 shells, achieved one reliable hit (3.57%), then Japanese ships reached 5 hits with eight-inch and nine - with a caliber of six-eight inches. In other words, we can only say that the Russians received at least five, but not more than fourteen hits with eight-inch shells, therefore, the firing accuracy of the Japanese 203-mm cannons (firing 209 shells) is in the range of 2, 39-6, 7%. The grouping adopted in the above table avoids such a spread, but the mixing of calibers in itself generates a certain incorrectness. In addition, the following should be noted.
The percentage of hits by Japanese 12-inch guns is higher than indicated in the table, since some, alas, not an established number of shots were fired by them not at ships, but at coastal batteries. Most likely, there were not many such shots: the total number of large and medium caliber shells fired at land targets did not exceed 30, and it is highly doubtful that there were more than 3-5 shells among them, but, in any case, the Japanese shot a little better than indicated in the table.
In addition to Russian ships, coastal batteries also fired at the Japanese. In total, 35 "coastal" guns took part in the battle, which fired 151 shells, but of these, only battery number 9 was located close enough to send its shells to the Japanese. From this battery, 25 six-inch shells were fired, but given the accuracy of the guns of this caliber (naval six-inch guns used up 680 shells and achieved 8 hits, or 1, 18%), it is unlikely that at least one of its shells hit the target. Therefore, in the table, the shells of the coastal batteries are not taken into account at all, but if we add 25 six-inch shots that could still hit the Japanese, then the percentage of hits by Russian medium-caliber artillery will decrease from 1.27 to 1.23%, which, however, does not affect the overall picture. will not be affected.
A charming historical anecdote on the theme of coastal artillery is told in his memoirs by the above-mentioned V. Cherkasov. In the battle on January 27, 1905, coastal ten-inch guns fired at the Japanese, having a firing range of 85 kbt and therefore quite capable of "getting" Japanese battleships. However, their actual range turned out to be only 60 kbt, which is why they could not cause any harm to the enemy. But how could there be such a big difference between passport and actual data?
“… this can be concluded from the telegram of Captain Zhukovsky, the commander of the Electric Cliff battery, sent to the Artillery Committee in February or March 1904, with a request to explain why the sailors shoot 10 miles from the same gun (Peresvet) or 8, 5 ("Victory"), and he cannot shoot further than 6 miles, since the elevation angle, although it corresponds to 25 °, as on Pobeda, cannot be given more than 15 °, since then the cannon will hit with the breech part into the platform for loading the cannon. This was answered from St. Petersburg: “Read §16 instructions for handling this gun,” and indeed, when you read §16, we learned that when shooting at elevation angles greater than 15 °, this platform should be taken away altogether, for which unscrew four nuts and give away the four bolts connecting it to the installation. It follows that on the day of the battle these guns could fire no further than 60 cables."
In general, it can be considered that when firing with the main caliber of battleships, the Japanese slightly outnumbered the Russians (by 10-15%), but their average artillery hit one and a half times more accurately. The shooting of 120-mm cannons is not very indicative, since all 4 hits with shells of this caliber from the Russians were achieved by "Novik", which, under the command of the dashing N. O. Essen approached the Japanese very closely, and the rest of the ships in the bulk fought at long distances. But at the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that the Japanese "dogs" did not achieve a single hit with their 120-mm, probably due to the fact that the best gunners were collected by the Japanese from all other ships for battleships and armored cruisers. Thus, of course, the best efficiency of the armored giants was achieved, but at the same time the light forces were forced to be content with "on you, God, that we do not want": the result of this practice we observe in the example of the battle on January 27. But the firing of three-inch guns is hardly indicative: the huge, compared to the Japanese, the number of three-inch shells fired suggests that while the main artillerymen of the Russian ships were busy adjusting the firing of large and medium caliber, the crews of the three-inch guns were "amused" by shooting "where "something in that direction" even from distances at which it was impossible to throw a shell to the enemy. In any case, nothing but raising the morale of the crew, the firing of three-inch naval vessels could not give, since the striking effect of their shells was completely negligible.
And nevertheless, in general, the Russians in this battle fired significantly worse than the Japanese. Interestingly, the battle took place on counter-courses (i.e. when the fighting columns of ships followed parallel to each other, but in different directions), where the Russian sailors had an advantage. The fact is that, according to some reports, during the training of Russian gunners, considerable attention was paid to combat on counter courses, while in the United Fleet they did not. Accordingly, it can be assumed that if the battle had been fought in conventional wake columns, the ratio of hit percentages would have become even worse for the Russians.
The question "why" has, alas, many answers. And the first is contained in the book by R. M. Melnikov "Cruiser" Varyag "":
“Life on the Varyag was complicated by the departure of a number of officers and the transfer to the reserve of a large group of senior sailors-specialists who took the ship in America. They were replaced by newcomers, although they graduated from specialist schools in Kronstadt, but did not yet have the skills to manage the latest technology. The composition of the gunners has changed almost half, new miners and machinists have arrived."
In doing so, the following information is given in a footnote:
"In total, more than 1,500 old-timers, including about 500 specialists, were dismissed in the squadron before the war."
What can be said about this? Heihachiro Togo, in his wildest dreams, could not hope to inflict a blow on the Pacific squadron, which we inflicted upon ourselves by authorizing demobilization.
The question: "Could the governor, Admiral Alekseev, on the eve of the war, prevent such a demobilization?", Alas, for the author of this article remains open. Of course, the representative of the sovereign-emperor himself was a tsar and god in the Far East, but it is not a fact that even his influence would be enough for some progress in the super-powerful bureaucratic machine of the Russian Empire. However, the governor did not even make an attempt: what to him, a high leader and strategist, some miners and gunners?
In the second half of 1903, the domestic squadron in the Far Eastern waters was inferior in size and quality to the enemy. But this situation should not have dragged on: Japan had already spent the loans for building the fleet, and there was no more money for its further build-up. And at the shipyards of the Russian Empire, five powerful battleships of the Borodino class were being built, the Oslyabya was preparing to be sent to Port Arthur, the old but strong Navarin and Sisoy the Great were repaired … With the arrival of these ships, the temporary superiority of the United Fleet should have been showered with sakura petals”and this should be taken into account by both the Russian and Japanese leaders. If Japan wanted war, then it should have begun at the end of 1903 or in 1904, and then it would have been too late.
But if Japan, having an advantage, nevertheless decides to go to war, what can be opposed to its quantitative and qualitative superiority? Of course, there is only one thing - the skill of the crews, and it was they who had already suffered severe damage from demobilization. This means that there is only one thing left - to train personnel as intensively as possible, bringing the level of proficiency in technology to extreme perfection.
What was actually done? The first phrase "Testimony in the Commission of Inquiry in the case of the battle on July 28, senior artillery officer Lieutenant V. Cherkasov 1st" reads:
"The shooting of 1903 was not over."
Those. in fact, even the exercises laid down by the rules of peacetime were not carried out to the end. And what about the governor?
“On October 2, 1903, Admiral Alekseev made a big review of the squadron in Dalniy. The show lasted three days. The admiral had to evaluate our combat training. Admiral Stark was warned that the governor would pay special attention to the formation of ships, so for two days the entire squadron stood in pairs, and took turns unanchored to put it 2-3 fathoms to the right or left, depending on the wind or current, and as luck would have it, by the time the governor arrived, due to the beginning of the low tide, the newly leveled ships dissolved a little, which made his Excellency extremely unhappy, which he expressed to Admiral Stark. Then the usual viewing program began: a rowing race (sailing for the freshness of the wind was canceled), boating under oars and sails, launching and lifting rowboats, landing exercises, exercises to repel mine attacks, and there was even one shooting, but not combat, but 37 mm barrels. The governor was very pleased with all this, which he expressed to the squadron with a signal."
In other words, Admiral Alekseev generally he was not interested in the combat training of the forces entrusted to him - he came, as if to a circus, to look "at the boats", was angry that they were not going in formation, but after looking at the rowing races (the most important thing in the upcoming battle), his soul thawed and replaced his anger with mercy. V. Cherkasov's phrase is shocking: “ Even there was one shooting. " Those. in other cases, the governor and without firing? But then it gets worse:
"After the inspection, the ships returned to Arthur, and then a startling order followed all of us:" Russia "," Rurik "," Thunderbolt "and" Bogatyr "to go to Vladivostok for the winter, and the other ships to enter the pool and join the armed reserve" …
In other words, during the period of the greatest military danger, the governor did not come up with anything better than to put the ships in reserve, completely stopping all combat training. But, perhaps, Admiral Alekseev was simply not able to add two to two and, for some reason, was sure that the war would not take place? However, V. Cherkasov writes that the war was expected in the fall of 1903, and by no means only in the crews: the squadron was instructed to repaint in a combat color, and this could only be with the knowledge of the governor. The squadron in full force left Vladivostok for Port Arthur, maneuvers began …
"But then a few weeks passed, and everything calmed down."
So, in an atmosphere of admiral's "calm", on November 1, 1903, the Pacific squadron entered the armed reserve. It would seem that it is impossible to come up with a worse solution, but those who thought so would underestimate the strategic genius of the governor Alekseev!
It is known that our bases in the Far East were not at all provided with everything necessary to support the fleet: ship repair capabilities were relatively weak, which required "driving" squadrons from the Baltic to Vladivostok and back. And if the ships were put into reserve, then it was worth at least to waste the time, having carried out the necessary repairs, if possible. But the governor, in the best traditions "no matter how something happens", approved an excellent decision in its half-heartedness: yes, the ships were put into reserve, but at the same time they had to maintain 24-hour readiness "for march and battle." Of course, having such an order, it was impossible to make any repairs. An exception was made only for the battleship "Sevastopol", which was allowed to have a 48-hour readiness, which made it possible to repair the latter machines and turrets of the main caliber.
If the governor believed that the war was on the nose and could begin at any moment (24-hour readiness for battle!), Then in no case should the ships be placed in reserve, and this question could well be solved by the governor on his own, in extreme the case by seeking approval from the sovereign. If he believed that there would be no war, then he should have taken the opportunity to give the squadron maintenance repairs. Instead, in the "best" traditions "whatever happens," Admiral Alekseev did neither one nor the other.
How did the squadron live at this time? Returning to V. Cherkasov's memoirs:
“For two and a half months, complete calm reigned. I do not know what was done in the diplomatic spheres, but in Arthur there were two balls at the governor's office, evenings and concerts at the Naval and Garrison meetings, etc."
And only on January 19, 1904, having stood in reserve for even more than 2, 5 months, the squadron finally received the order to start the campaign.
How did this affect the level of combat training? It is known that once you learn to ride a bicycle, you will never forget this simple science, but the military craft is much more difficult: in order to maintain a high level of combat readiness, regular training is needed. The experience of the Black Sea Fleet is very indicative here, which in 1911, due to a lack of finances, was forced to take a three-week break in combat training:
“The reduction in appropriations for the fleet forced the squadron to re-enter the armed reserve on June 7; as a result of the cessation of firing practice, the accuracy of fire on all ships dropped, as it turned out later, almost by half. So, "Memory of Mercury" instead of the previously achieved 57% of hits from 152-mm guns with the resumption of firing was able to achieve only 36%.
Training at sea was resumed only on July 1 under the command of Vice-Admiral IF Bostrem, newly appointed commander of the Black Sea naval forces."
In other words, even an insignificant break in classes caused serious damage to the combat capability of the squadron, and only in combination with the departure of the most experienced old servicemen … That's what the squadron chief O. V. Stark (Report to the governor Alekseev dated January 22, 1904):
“A short-term out of necessity, this voyage (the squadron set out to sea on January 21. - Approx. Auth.) Showed all the benefits of it after staying in reserve, the change of many officers, the recent addition of new, unaccustomed to squadron navigation, ships and after leaving more than one and a half thousand old-timers, of whom a third were specialists who had served in this squadron for many years.
The maneuvering of large ships and signal production on them, for these reasons and as a result of the autumn replacement of not only the old signalmen, but also of many navigational officers, leaves much to be desired and requires new practice, since, in addition to the speed of execution, attention has been weakened and lost knowledge, not only in squadron rules, but also in general basic instructions ».
There were 4 days left before the start of the war.
In general, we can state with sadness that the Pacific squadron, which entered the war on the night of January 27, 1904, turned out to be much weaker than itself as of the autumn of 1903 and, first of all, the indiscipline of the governor, Admiral Alekseev, should be "thanked" for this., who managed to organize an armed reserve of ships that had just lost a lot of old servicemen and were replenished with new recruits.
What's next? On the very first night, two of the strongest Russian battleships were blown up as a result of a surprise attack by Japanese destroyers, but what was done on the squadron to avoid such sabotage? Let's remember V. Semenov, "Reckoning":
“- But couples? networks? the lights? patrol and security ships? - I asked …
- Oh, what are you talking about! You don't know for sure!.. Could the squadron chief have ordered this? The permission of the governor was necessary!..
- Why didn't you ask? Didn't insist?..
- They did not ask!.. How many times did they ask! And not only in words - the admiral filed a report!.. And on the report in green pencil a resolution - "Premature" … Now they explain differently: some say that they were afraid that our warlike preparations might be mistaken for a challenge and accelerate the onset of the gap, while others - as if on the 27th a solemn announcement of the recall of the envoys, a prayer service, a parade, a call to breastfeed, etc. was supposed … Only now - the Japanese were in a hurry for one day …
- Well, what about the impression made by the attack? The mood in the squadron?..
- Well … an impression? “… When, after the first, sudden attack, the Japanese disappeared, the firing subsided, but the intoxication had not yet passed,” our good-natured fat man Z. turned to the Golden Mountain and, with tears, but with such anger in his voice, shouted, shaking his fists: “Wait? The infallible, the most luminous!..”And so on (it is inconvenient to publish in print). That was the mood … I think, general …"
Then the morning fight on January 27th. In the light of the above, it is no longer necessary to ask the question: "Why did the medium-caliber artillery of the Russian squadron shoot one and a half times worse than the Japanese?" only one and a half times worse than the Japanese? " It is all the more surprising that heavy guns of ten and twelve inches caliber fired slightly worse than Japanese ones. It can even be concluded that the training system for Russian artillerymen was quite up to par, because if we recall the results of the firing of the cruiser "Memory of Mercury" in 1911 before the three-week standing in the armed reserve (57%) and after it (36%), then we will see a drop in accuracy by 1.58 times, but how much did the accuracy fall after demobilization and 2.5 months of standing on the Pacific squadron? And how would this skirmish with the Japanese fleet have gone if our squadron on January 27, 1903 had been trained at the level of the early autumn of 1903? The author of this article, of course, cannot say this for sure, but assumes that in this case, the accuracy of Russian shooting could well surpass the Japanese.
Interestingly, Heihachiro Togo was apparently not satisfied with the accuracy of his gunners. Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have information about how the frequency and quality of the exercises of the Japanese artillerymen changed: however, there is no doubt (and we will see this in the future) that the Japanese had improved their skills by the battle on July 28, 1904. Thus, the Japanese fired better at the beginning of the war, but they continued to improve their art, at the same time, our ships after the start of the war and before the arrival of Admiral S. O. in Port Arthur. Makarov did not engage in intensive combat training. There were both objective and subjective reasons for this. Of course, any serious training of the crews of the battleships "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" before the ships returned to service was impossible. But no one interfered with the preparation of other ships for battle, of course, except “take care and not risk!”, Which dominated the squadron.
One can argue for a long time on the topic of whether Stepan Osipovich Makarov was a talented naval commander, or was it made by popular rumor. But it should be admitted that it was S. O. Makarov who took the only correct steps at that time, encouraging the squadron with a personal example:
“- On Novik! The flag is on Novik! - suddenly, as if choking with excitement, the signalman shouted."
The admiral immediately began combat training and coordination of the forces entrusted to his command. S. O. Makarov believed in the squadron's ability to defeat the Japanese, but he understood that this would be possible only if he had at his disposal well-trained, well-trained and inspired crews under the command of energetic commanders capable of independent decisions. This is exactly what the admiral did: by starting to conduct systematic hostilities (destroyer operations), he gave people the opportunity to prove themselves and at the same time did not allow the Japanese to loose their belts beyond measure. The trainings were extremely intensive, but at the same time S. O. Essen, others were planned for this replacement.
No matter how correct were the methods of S. O. Makarov, in that little more than a month that was released to him by fate to command the Arthur squadron, he simply did not have time to "pull" the forces entrusted to him to the proper level. The death of Stepan Osipovich Makarov put an end to all his undertakings, at the head of the Port Arthur squadron was a man whom the personnel no longer trusted and who very quickly curtailed Makarov's undertakings. Of course, we are talking about the governor, Admiral Alekseev. Of course, his almost three-week "management" did not improve the state of affairs in the least: he again returned "to take care and not to risk", again the ships defended in the harbor in the presence of the Japanese fleet.
However, as soon as it became known about the impending landing of the Japanese ground army in Biziwo, which is only 60 miles from Port Arthur, the governor left Port Arthur in a great hurry.
This happened on April 22, and now, before the arrival of the new commander, his duties were to be performed by Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft, whose flag at 11.30 on the same day was raised on the battleship Sevastopol.
