Federal Security Service of Russia against the US intelligence services
Although the concept of "main enemy" has become a thing of the past after the collapse of the USSR, it is the US special services that are most active in their efforts to gain access to the most important state and military secrets of our country. The DIA, the CIA, as well as other intelligence agencies that are part of the American intelligence community, are constantly improving the ways and methods of obtaining information of interest to them. Today the veil of secrecy is being lifted from some of the operations conducted by US intelligence against the Russian Federation. We offer the readers of the National Defense magazine documentary materials obtained in the course of operational activities by Russian counterintelligence.
RECRUITING WITH SCIENTIFIC LEGEND
The materials refer to not so long ago (the mid-90s of the last century - the beginning of the present), when the old foundations were crumbling, the future seemed very vague, the life of the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation was penniless and half-starved, and the proposals of foreigners seemed a gift of fate. It was during these years that intra- and interdepartmental narrowly corporate structures were formed in Russia, which established relations with the United States at a qualitatively new unofficial level. It is characteristic that all these numerous scientific, technical, economic and social structures, as a rule, used (and are still using today) the word "Center" in their names. This circumstance, according to the Russian counterintelligence, can be considered a hallmark of their use by the Americans or someone else in the implementation of the policy of globalization of the economy, security and information.
They gave out the appointment of the Centers and the problems they dealt with: the development of weapons, including non-lethal action, the use of dual-use technologies, the collection and analysis of defense information, the organization of scientific and technical expertise, the coordination of interaction between the military-industrial complex of different countries in the creation of effective military-technical means.
The representatives of the United States in these Russian organizations were mainly former and current military personnel, high-ranking officials, and career intelligence officers. Previously, they usually worked in the structures of the US Department of Defense - in the Advisory Council, the Office of Defense Research and Development, Special Weapons, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the Research and Engineering Center of the US Army Strategic Command, NASA, Sandia, Livermore and Tartan National Laboratories.
The personnel of the Centers on the Russian side, too, did not consist of liberal intellectuals who knew little about military affairs. There were also completely retired high-ranking officials from various structural divisions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: the main headquarters of the services of the Armed Forces, central research institutes, military academies, a nuclear test site, the office of the deputy minister of defense, and so on. And more and more academicians, admirals and generals, doctors of military and other sciences. They regularly traveled to the States, read lectures there, took part in symposia and conferences under names that are harmless to many, which only a specialist read correctly and understood what was behind it. And our retirees were specialists and knew what they were doing.
One cannot help recalling a story told by Lieutenant General of the Foreign Intelligence Service Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, now deceased. At a meeting (in the midst of "perestroika") between our and American former intelligence officers, the US officials confessed: if you knew how high positions our agents held in Russia … Apparently, not everything is known today about the work of scientific and public centers. We are about what is known. On the basis of one of them, it was even planned to create a joint Russian-American venture in the form of a closed joint stock company. This form provided the greatest freedom of action in the commercial market, regardless of strict dependence on government funding and control. The creation of the joint venture would allow the accumulation of numerous "satellite" formations already created at regime enterprises, research institutes, design bureaus and educational institutions - as independent legal entities.
The main obstacle to unofficial cooperation was the state intermediary in the trade in arms and military equipment (IWT) - Rosvooruzhenie (now Rosoboronexport). His law determined the status of a monopoly intermediary between the Russian defense industry and a foreign customer. Working through Rosvooruzheniye did not suit the Americans in any way. This would lead to a rise in the cost of contracts by 40-60%, reduce the role and importance of the Centers and the income of their functionaries. In addition, the circle of persons aware of the existence of military-technical contracts, some of which contradicted international norms on the proliferation of nuclear missile and other military technologies, would have expanded. And instead of the joint venture, a mechanism of trilateral relations between representatives of the Russian defense industry and foreign military partners began to work - with the intermediate role of one authoritative Russian academy and the same Centers.
Let's see what such joint work was legendary about. Of course, as "cooperation in the interests of mutual and international security, countering terrorists", under the pervasive concern about the proliferation of military technologies, solving problems associated with the development and combat use of modern types of weapons. The "gullible" Russians were hammered: at the present stage, the issue of using high-precision and intelligent weapons systems has ceased to be abstract, moved into the field of decision-making, and for this there is a need for a constructive dialogue between leading experts from the United States and Russia.
American “colleagues” explained to their Russian “partners” that they were given the opportunity to declare themselves on the Western market and earn money. If, of course, they demonstrate their creativity. Interaction was offered at the levels of "scientist with scientist, engineer with engineer", which, being experts in their field, should themselves determine the most appropriate methods of scientific and technical development, giving them constructiveness and effectiveness.
It looks nice and quite harmless, but once you read the requirements for the materials of Russian scientists accepted for examination, this bliss disappears. So, the developments had to combine a description of what has already been done and, in more detail, the expected results; have a comparison of each of the proposed technologies with existing or traditional methods - to highlight the competitive advantages of these new approaches; have evidence of actual use and experimental results.
The “colleagues” from the United States also demanded to indicate “exact cost estimates”. The US military-political and military-technical programs in Russia were financed through a grant system through international funds and within the framework of assistance programs in the implementation of the then fashionable conversion of the military-industrial complex. All this turned out to be possible with, alas, the absence of legislative federal regulation and control.
The tight-fisted customers resorted to cheating methods - often materials accepted for examination from Russian specialists were not paid for and justified this by the fact that the majority of Russian specialists "know very little in structuring technological and business proposals in order to develop and implement technologies that meet the needs of the world market." Payments to the Russian side were made in stages, and only groups providing valuable information, demonstrating significant ability, received full and ongoing funding.
With the keen interest of the Americans, money flowed like a river. Individual joint projects had funding of $ 100,000 or more. Russian specialists received money in cash, by credit cards of various banks, by transferring to open personal accounts in foreign banks. The only thing was that the unofficial incomes of legal entities and individuals were not declared, and taxes were not paid on the territory of Russia.
Laundering of secrets
The mechanism of action of public-research centers paid from abroad and similar structures was independent of the will of the political leadership of Russia, of the military-political decisions it made and of the current federal legislation. On the contrary, these structures performed the functions of influence. As a result, Russia has turned, in essence, into an object of unilateral disarmament without taking into account the interests of its national security.
On the territory of Russia, the employees of these structures were looking for carriers of important information. And they found it. These were plenipotentiary representatives of the executive branch, the military-industrial complex, employees of leading research institutes and design bureaus, high-ranking officials from ministries, departments, federal government bodies, representatives of the apparatus of key committees of the chambers of the Federal Assembly (there are specific names in the documents). We established with them, and then developed when direct, when indirect contacts. These people were gradually attracted to work in the right directions - naturally, with funding through various kinds of international funds. First of all, the customers were interested in information about the state of Russia's nuclear missile potential, strategic nuclear weapons of land, sea and air, military space systems for various purposes.
The "involved" Russian officials, experts and scientists were aimed at collecting, processing and analyzing just such information - under the guise of conducting scientific research. Here's an example of an official fish out of information. In a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, the head of one of the Centers (a very well-known figure) wrote: “Since one of the most important tasks of our work is to help state and intergovernmental structures in the fight against terrorism,” we ask you to give us the opportunity to familiarize ourselves with such and such plans.
And then, in order to "inform the public about disarmament problems," the collected classified information was massively discarded into open circulation through the media. Recall that there was no censorship as such, the information security structures that replaced it had not yet found their feet, moreover, they were intimidated by the constantly attacking liberal publications. This is where, in part, many of the "sensational" articles, publications, brochures and books come from. Through them, confidential information became unclassified, convenient for transmission to customers. A process very similar to money laundering.
The method of publications on closed topics was quite tricky. The tactic "from the opposite" was used. Using specific methods, the Centers obtained the necessary objective data, then selected, in some approximation, open publications, and the existing "gaps" were filled with data allegedly obtained as a result of scientific analysis. This is the line of defense that the arrested "scientists" choose today.
The practice of the Russian counterintelligence service in cases of disclosure of classified information showed that the law “On the Mass Media” did not allow even in the criminal procedure to establish a specific source of information in the event that information constituting a state secret was published in the media. And the law "On state secrets" and even the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation did not allow guaranteeing the inviolability of any federal information resources.
The centers employed a whole contingent of full-time correspondents of domestic and foreign publications with their confidential sources. Such journalists were fed with specialized intelligence information obtained, including by technical means. During a search in one of the Centers, information reports were even found about the presence of Russian satellites in elliptical orbits and geostationary satellites of the missile attack warning system. The staff of the Centers created an extensive network of "consultants" from among the secret carriers, whose services were also paid for. However, informal relations according to the "information-money" scheme were reinforced, as is done in secret intelligence, by the selection of subscriptions. They were then attached to the accounting financial documents.
Publications of classified information in the media made it possible to raise the official status of specialists in this field and to be in demand in the rank of independent experts in the highest Russian legislative bodies. The latter, in turn, made it possible to expand the range of possibilities for accessing the information of interest. For example, one of these experts was involved in the preparation of parliamentary hearings on a radiation accident at a chemical plant and officially received access to information related to regulatory support, compliance with technological regulations, the functioning and sufficiency of protection systems at the special-mode facility of Minatom. The information he received was then used in the preparation of open informational articles.
Mandatory principles for the interaction of American and Russian researchers were developed in order to avoid possible problems with Russian counterintelligence when transferring information to the West. These principles, outlined in various reports, required all American participants to obtain US counterintelligence approval prior to any interaction with Russian counterparts. All interactions must be at an unclassified level, and the materials or information provided to them must be “cleaned up” by appropriate expert procedures. In addition, the Centers and creative groups collaborated emphatically "unofficially" as private companies or public organizations that did not represent the interests of US government agencies. Instructed by the Americans, Russian scientific teams to cover up their unseemly work, filed applications for the implementation of the state defense order for R&D, completely identical to those that they carried out for the Americans. And it turned out that according to the documents they worked for Russia, but in fact - for the United States.
The declared need to ensure the joint security of Russia and the United States against a common threat from the third world countries preaching international terrorism was taken as the ideological basis of unofficial cooperation. How familiar it is! Some joint conferences were based on the principle: "Official Russian-American relations are not a constant value, while unofficial and private exchanges most fully meet the interests of the world community on the problems of general security." This kind of blatant "mess" is now and then found in documents characterizing unofficial military-technical cooperation. Sometimes it just takes you by surprise: after all, some of our admirals and doctors of sciences were held for idiots, for Ivanushki the fools!
And in the future, the Americans continued the same policy. For example, the texts of the START II Treaty in English and Russian turned out to be non-identical. The Russian text refers to the "global protection system" - Global Protection System with reference to the joint statement of the presidents and is derived from the full name of the system in English: Global Protection Against Limited Ballistic Missile Stikes System. In Russian, this phrase is correctly translated as "a system of global defense against limited strikes of ballistic missiles." That is, we are talking about a "global protection system" and not a "global protection system", as it is in the Russian translation.
In the first case, everything is done on a legal basis: both sides agree to create a certain system capable of providing global protection against ballistic missile attacks. But no one obliged them to create a global system of protection for the rest of the world, but this is the ultimate strategic goal of the United States.
UNCLE SAM OF THE HONEST RULES
Today it seems wild and impossible, but a few years ago, on the basis of foreign-funded developments of "scientifically grounded" priorities of military-technical policy, neither more nor less the Concept of National Security and the Military Doctrine of Russia were formulated. The main components of these documents, prompted or imposed by the Americans, were, in particular, a decrease in the role of strategic nuclear weapons and, due to the geostrategic position of Russia, a significant increase in the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), the need to formulate a containment policy for one of the third countries with the right to conduct " demonstration "explosion of TNW. And, naturally, the transition to partnership relations between Russia and the United States.
The partners also "helped" to substantiate the main directions and priorities of the military-technical policy of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Various public centers, together with similar foreign structures, have developed mathematical models that supposedly make it possible to calculate strategic equilibrium in a multipolar world in the field of nuclear weapons. The Russian top political leadership was “prompted” in a Jesuitical manner: they say, you mistakenly do not take into account the factor of high-precision weapons (WTO). It is much more important in ensuring strategic parity than the potential capabilities of the future US national missile defense system, which in the foreseeable future will not be able to prevent a Russian nuclear retaliation strike. This is the usual way of shifting attention from a more significant topic to a less important one. And in the documents defining the level of the country's national security, appropriate adjustments were made, often harmful to the Russian Federation.
Within the framework of a scientific project (code "ALPHA"), proposals were developed to create an information infrastructure (databases, computer systems, etc.) on the problem of global protection of the world community from ballistic missiles. As a result, the current regulatory framework related to ensuring the safety of state secrets was questioned. In particular, the law of the Russian Federation "On state secrets" and lists of information classified as state secrets. The amendments made to them led to a direct, purposeful undermining of the country's information security.
Directions of scientific and industrial policy that were disadvantageous to Russia were imposed, which, of course, weakened our fundamental science - a resource of national security. The US intelligence services legally, from the standpoint of various kinds of Centers on the territory of Russia, created real conditions for their military departments and military-industrial companies for the penetration of high technologies into the Russian market. Moreover, for the long term and without significant financial costs. The US intelligence services were able to organize on an unofficial basis on the territory of Russia research and development work (R&D) to create their own offensive and defensive weapons of a new generation.
Counterintelligence officers seized the correspondence between customers and executors. From it we can conclude: on the territory of Russia, within the framework of the Concept for the creation and joint operation of a global defense system (GSS) developed by the Americans, the military-strategic tasks of the United States were systematically implemented. This is a decrease in the military-political status of Russia, obtaining information about its military-strategic potential, exerting a negative impact on the pace and focus of the most important Russian defense programs. The Americans unexpectedly came up with such unique Russian scientific and technical developments that they experienced difficulties in forming technical specifications for our specialists for their further improvement and applied application.
In particular, the project "Study of the damageability of manpower" provided for the analysis of data obtained as a result of weapons tests and military operations in order to predict the situation (pressure, time, momentum) outside the volume-detonating cloud. It was also proposed to determine what physiological effects (damage to the lungs, rupture of the tympanic septum, hearing loss, etc.) are used to create safety standards, what level of trauma affects the deterioration of the performance of combat missions. No money can pay for such an experience, but the price was named, and it is simply embarrassing to quote it because of the scantiness.
Using the latest Russian military technologies, the United States solved its scientific, technical, economic and organizational problems. For example, they created and then inscribed into the architecture of their national missile defense strategic systems for controlling outer space, technical means of reliable assessment and classification of the rocket and space situation, and detection of Russian ICBMs. This "cooperation" has brought the United States colossal political and economic dividends to the detriment of Russia's defense capability.
The circumvention of legislative restrictions by various Centers, groups and public organizations under the auspices of the United States has led to a shift in the center of gravity of solving the problems of military development in the non-governmental sphere and in the interests of a foreign state. In addition, unofficial military-technical cooperation on the territory of Russia took on a massive character and involved hundreds of officials from many dozens of special-regime and security facilities into its orbit, which caused a massive violation of criminal legislation.
In this situation, it was quite possible to expect that with the appearance in the near future of funded federal defense programs, ready-made, but obsolete technologies and weapons would come from the Russian defense industry, and the most unique developments would be patented in the United States. Alas, it is impossible to say that today everything is different.
ATTENDANCE ON THE NUCLEAR SHIELD
The USA, among other things, funded joint scientific projects in the field of studying the effects of nuclear explosions. They especially needed this in the context of a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. And they wanted to solve the problems with someone else's hands. And the problems are very serious. For example, what is the impact of high-altitude nuclear explosions on Russian power transmission and telecommunication networks, on structures and materials located at great depths underground, on land and air military systems. They were interested in the work of radars and the propagation of radio waves, the exposure of people to doses of high and low levels of radiation, and many others.
Ways to improve conventional warheads were also under close scrutiny. In particular, to increase their armor-piercing and other destructive capabilities, depending on the classification of targets - underground bunkers, armored vehicles, mobile launchers and "soft" targets distributed over the area. Attempts were made to improve guidance systems with an increase in the accuracy of delivery of warheads and resistance to interference, to modernize the launch platforms of high-precision weapons.
However, from the wide range of intelligence and information aspirations of the US special services, as follows from the available materials, the priority plane was the problem of improving its own arsenals of nuclear weapons. They have succeeded in this, having obtained a lot of valuable information from "colleagues" from Russian military research institutes and research centers. The Americans then learned that, for example, the structure of an almost two-meter thick armor plate covering the missile silo was multi-layered. It uses materials that are more resistant to the impact of a projectile with high kinetic energy and cumulative jet. In combination with layers of steel, the resistance of uranium ceramics can be 2.5 times higher than that of steel under kinetic action, and 4 times higher under cumulative action.
As a result, as a "zero approximation", the researchers suggested that the protection of the cover of a silo launcher (silo) in case of a direct hit is equivalent to the strength of a plate of rolled armor no more than 2-3 m thick. that the wall thickness of the transport and launch container does not exceed 70 mm. That is, everything that was accumulated over the years by the work of many people and with huge expenses, the United States received for nothing.
By that time, the US Department of Defense was running about 30 programs to develop and improve the WTO. It was planned then (and is being carried out today) to deploy more than 100 thousand cruise missiles to destroy various types of targets: underground bunkers, fortified structures, bridges, buildings, industrial enterprises, roads, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, radar stations.
According to calculations, with sufficient kinetic energy of the warhead, the power of the cumulative jet or their combined effect, through penetration of the protective roof of the silo is possible. This will damage the ICBM container and the missile itself, so that it will no longer be possible to launch. The mine can also be disabled if a warhead hits critical components. For example, jam the cover, which will also lead to the impossibility of launching the rocket.
Our scientists also helped in carrying out R&D aimed at deploying conventional warheads on strategic ICBMs. This was also needed to break through the silo defense. Experiments carried out in the USA showed that a warhead with a speed of 1.2 km / s and a mass of about 270 kg passed through a layer of granite 13 m thick. To reliably defeat silos with one or two warheads, an accuracy of at least 1-2 meters is required. The existing types of high-precision weapons did not provide such high accuracy. And then they settled on laser-guided air bombs (UAB) - they had the greatest accuracy. The UAB can hit the Topol-M mobile ground-based missile system (PGRK) with an accuracy of 40 meters when used from a height of 6-7 km. That is, the probability of hitting a PGRK here is close to unity, since each bomb contains 40 combat elements. So today we must bear in mind that Russia may be left without nuclear weapons even before the start of a nuclear war. These conclusions were made by Russian experts who know what they are talking about.
Thanks to the well-wishers, the Americans had at their disposal information about the throw weight on deployed ICBMs of each type. The exact geographic coordinates of 47 launch control silos and 366 silo launchers of ICBMs, 353 deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs with coordinates, 10 locations and deployment areas were indicated. Similar information was passed on about Russian submarines and heavy bombers equipped with nuclear weapons. The organizational structure of the Strategic Missile Forces grouping, the procedure for using strategic aviation and air defense and missile defense systems, and much more were revealed.
Let's take a closer look at the project "Preventing the Potential Seizure of Nuclear Weapons". According to legend, of course, terrorists. But once you read the questions posed to Russian scientists, it becomes obvious that the “colleagues” are interested in intelligence information for themselves. Employees of secret Russian research institutes were asked to talk about the creation of positional areas of missile divisions, taking into account the deployment of the district's ground forces, about the size of the combat positions of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles of the "single launch" type. Customers were interested in both mobile missile systems and nuclear weapons storage sites (objects "C"). The questions were posed very professionally: criteria for choosing routes for combat deployment and combat patrols, guards on routes, and so on.
Or such a "modest" research problem: "Moscow's missile defense system and its capabilities." As a result, the Russian executors conducted an evaluative analysis of such capabilities in comparison with the similar American system "Safeguard" and formulated this in the work "Assessment of the height of interception of the missile defense system". They "just" explored the capabilities of Russian Gazelle-type interceptor missiles (and few people in Russia knew about them), which have the ability to achieve very high accelerations and are designed to intercept ballistic targets. They also answered questions about the architecture, characteristics and parameters of the components of the Moscow missile defense system - they described the operating modes of radar stations, the speed of anti-missile missiles, methods of separating enemy ICBM warheads from the cloud of false targets, means of overcoming missile defense.
From the information thrown into the open press, it was possible to learn a lot of curious things. For example, a description of the starting position and a capacitive perimeter technical control system, which, when approaching it, issues an alarm. It is said that there is an electrified grid with a voltage of about 800 volts, and when a signal arrives, the voltage rises to 1500-1600 volts. Mine-explosive barrage, depths of underground bunkers, food supplies - the Americans were aware of everything. Even the fact that for cooling diesel engines, a reserve of ice frozen in the throat of the mine is used.
The 8th Directorate of the Russian General Staff admitted that all this information constitutes a state secret. But even these are trifles, considering that the development of "mathematical and software for scientific analysis, describing the course and results of a hypothetical clash between Russia and the United States with the use of precision weapons, including nuclear" was carried out.
ROCKET BERLOG
In the northern regions near the Russian borders, the Americans have created a universal integrated monitoring system that works in combination with space-based elements. The system is aimed at collecting detailed information about Russian ICBMs during their tests at launch from the North Sea, Plesetsk (Arkhangelsk Oblast), and Tatishchevo (Saratov Oblast). Data were collected from the entire flight trajectory, including the maneuvering areas of the deployment platform and the very separation of MIRVs (MIRVs), the means of overcoming missile defense, the entry of warheads into the atmosphere in the area of the Kamchatka range. In addition, this complex could simultaneously direct high-precision weapons systems to strike at strategic targets in Russia - both with nuclear warheads and with conventional weapons.
This system is the result of joint development of elements of a US strategic missile defense system within the framework of US-Russian cooperation in the military space field under the RAMOS program. It was organized with the mediation of non-governmental scientific and public structures in Russia. The political rationale for such cooperation was the argument about the alleged inability of the Russian missile attack warning system (EWS) to accurately identify the attacking enemy. And this can lead to an inadequate retaliatory strike. The Americans believed that this situation allowed them to take control of the Russian communication systems and combat command and control of strategic forces - with the possibility of duplication or blocking.
The main goal of developing a strategic missile defense of the United States is not exactly what is being declared today. The true, main goal is to protect our own Armed Forces during operations in various regions of the world. However, practically all the weapons systems of a fundamentally new generation being developed by the Americans are not defensive, but clearly offensive in nature. Therefore, the US missile defense system being built in a priority order solves the tasks of guidance and target designation.
The most effective hunt for a bear is when it leaves the den, when the animal is awakened from hibernation. So it is easier to intercept an ICBM in the initial phase of flight: the speed is lower, the area irradiated by the radar is larger, since the first stage has not separated either. Therefore, the American anti-missile "umbrella" will be deployed in outer space not at all over the territory of the United States, as they are trying to convince the international community, but over the territories of their potential adversary! And the US Department of Defense under the flag of a joint fight against international terrorism and in direct interaction with the developers of Russian missile defense systems in the same design bureaus and research institutes have created modern systems for their effective combat suppression. This, alas, is so.
In the event of an aggravation of Russian-American relations, the United States, without violating international obligations, has the opportunity to quickly deploy a mobile missile defense system near the borders of the Russian Federation. In addition, to send warships and aircraft to the waters of the Barents and Okhotsk Seas and to block the areas of combat patrolling of Russian RPLSN, which are not capable of sufficiently secretively, and in significant numbers, to be at sea.
WEAPON EXOTIC
In one of the projects imposed by the United States, it was about the creation of technologies for the active protection of armored vehicles from modern projectiles with high penetrating kinetic energy, as well as cumulative weapons and high-tech submunitions with self-forming fragments during an air attack. The problem is so subtle that two independent Russian sources were used to compare technical solutions and use the best indicators of each of them.
A lot of attention was paid to high-precision weapons (WTO). Including in the study of the survivability of a grouping of strategic forces in the event of a preemptive strike by a non-nuclear WTO. Then the Americans proceeded from the following point. Taking into account the current trends, by 2010 Russia will be able to deploy no more than 500-600 ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). And then they did not miss. Perhaps, they believed that the number of ICBMs would be even smaller due to reductions in strategic offensive arms (START) in accordance with the new agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States.
The combat readiness of a significant part of the strategic complexes will be reduced, and thus the latter will become more vulnerable to high-precision non-nuclear weapons. The WTO will be improved, and, possibly, in the future, will have even more counter-force potential than US nuclear weapons, since the development and deployment of the WTO is not regulated by any international agreements. By the way, until today.
The deteriorating state of the Russian general-purpose forces, most likely, will not allow an adequate response to the increase in the strategic counterforce capabilities of the United States. If Washington were given the opportunity to deliver first a disarming strike with the help of a conventional WTO, such a step would be very attractive for the Americans, since it would not have caused the negative consequences that would inevitably occur as a result of the use of nuclear weapons. The calculation of the effectiveness of the WTO against Russian ground-based ICBMs was built taking into account the following factors: the great destructive capacity of these weapons, the declassification of the positions of the ICBMs at the time of the strike, the ability to strike at once on the entire grouping.
The project "Methods of Combating Precision Weapons" proposed by Russian scientists was justified by "concern about the spread of the WTO in the world market", the threat to the world community, and the increased activity of terrorists. All this dictated the need to develop special (including non-lethal) weapons of selective action, equipped with high-precision guidance and target designation means. Hence (this is already the next step) the need for advanced technologies related to microwave ammunition to effectively combat precision weapons. This technology should be compared with other anti-WTO measures to determine advantages and disadvantages.
An American-Russian conference was immediately planned, where it was supposed to discuss, among other things, tandem high-power anti-tank warheads, "smart" (smart) ammunition, semi-active lasers, portable WTO launch systems, equipment of Russian anti-tank guided projectiles with armor-piercing or thermobaric warheads. Countermeasures were also considered: reactive armor, active tank protection, electro-optical countermeasures - "blinding" and "stealth" technologies. The problem of converting conventional weapons with submunitions into special weapons was also investigated. In the field of non-lethal weapons, they were going to use electromagnetic and optical technologies.
Russian scientists were also engaged in the development of neural network algorithms for tracking a variety of targets, neurocomputers for processing aerospace information, neural networks for pattern recognition. It was planned to use neural methods to process optical images and create systems for processing speech information. When developing precision weapon guidance systems, the Americans showed interest in the automatic extraction of information from radars, infrared and optical imaging devices using neural networks. They allow you to improve the resolution and compression of the image in real time.
There was even a project called "Keyword recognition in a continuous speech stream in a telephone channel using transputer neural networks." Russian specialists were asked to create transputer complexes, the basis of which is made up of storage devices from a multitude of parallel-connected neural-like elements. They allow to build up the dictionary of standards, increase the number of speaker groups, and increase the number of channels.
The research and engineering center of one of the commands of the US Army was interested in a light shoulder individual portable disposable weapon system for hitting a variety of targets when firing in an urban setting. The project "Thermobaric explosives" assumed the defeat of the fortified complex underground structures intended for the production and storage of special weapons. This meant underground structures of various configurations. The condition is a small destructive effect on the structures themselves.
All this seems exotic even today. Nevertheless, many promising developments were merged to the Americans practically free of charge. Apparently, someday they will emerge - directed against Russia.
HOW TO BLOW UP THE MOSCOW METRO
It is clear that there is no point in talking about morality and decency in the cooperation we are describing. But the height of cynicism in the history of foreign grants can be considered a contract with the Russians of the US Department of Defense's Office for Special Types of Weapons to carry out scientific work on the Metro problem. The total cost is $ 34,500. Russian specialists had to simulate the possible consequences of a terrorist nuclear explosion in a system of long tunnels and obtain quantitative estimates of "the effects of the emergence and propagation of seismic shock waves in the geological massif, the propagation of gas flows and destruction zones as a result of a nuclear explosion."
At the request of the customer, “thermodynamic and mechanical characteristics of soft water-saturated soils of sedimentary origin” in which the structures of the Moscow metro lie, as well as its underground geometry, were taken as the initial data. Russian specialists had to perform “six simulations for three power releases with a capacity of 1, 10 and 50 kilotons of TNT equivalent and two explosion positions” as agreed with the customer. The work was recognized as unique, since the consequences of a nuclear explosion were simulated "in close approximation to reality."
Our experts worked hard and came to the conclusion: the places where the explosive device was laid are one of the central stations within the circular line and a peripheral station on one of the radial lines. For obvious reasons, we do not name them. But the American side received a calculation method using a computer for a variety of options for choosing an optimal warhead in terms of power and determining the most vulnerable places in terms of sabotage.
Counterintelligence officers reported to their leadership: “Due to the fact that scientific work was initiated and funded by the US military department, it is obvious that in this case the problem of possible destruction by low-yield nuclear weapons (knapsack type) of underground military-strategic facilities organically included in the system is being solved. Moscow Metro. Due to the complex geological structure, the presence, in addition to the metro, of an extensive network of communication underground facilities, a significant part of which is in disrepair, carrying out a real terrorist act in the situations under consideration can lead to unpredictable catastrophic consequences for the central part of Moscow."
To this we add - the problem of Metro organically fits into the mainstream of the concept adopted by the US military: to prevent a nuclear retaliation strike, the most effective and cheapest is the neutralization of the command and control system. The Lubyanka now has reason to believe: it is possible that on the territory of Russia the Americans carried out the scientific development of nuclear weapons with a capacity of less than 5 kilotons, prohibited in the United States.
ANOTHER VERSION OF THE KURSK DEATH
According to the reports of the Americans to their leadership, the content of which was received by the Russian counterintelligence, large-scale military-strategic, operational-tactical and technological projects were implemented on a large scale in Russia within the framework of the program “Using Russian experience and technologies to improve the effectiveness of the actions of US submarine forces in the coastal zone of the probable enemy ". On the territory of Russia, this program, with the support of one of the Russian academies, was implemented as the "Program for the creation of an Interstate Multinational Standing Committee for the Study of the Problems of Fighting in Shallow Waters with Diesel Submarines of Third Countries."
The program provided for a two-year plan for experimental testing and selective selection of the results of research and development projects in real conditions. At the same time, the use of both American and Russian submarines was envisaged as a "target". In general, the joint military-technical projects imposed by the Americans necessarily provided for testing in real conditions. Based on the results of such tests, an analysis of the obtained technical and operational assessment of Russian developments and their potential when used in American systems was carried out.
Moreover, according to Russian counterintelligence officers, the latest models of military equipment and weapons developed for the needs of the American army could be tested unofficially during training and combat operations of the Russian Armed Forces. In other words, during exercises. For example, according to one of the joint projects, it was envisaged to conduct a valid anti-submarine exercise to find and “destroy” a submarine in a shallow area. Against the background of such exercises, one can consider the reasons for the tragic incident in the Black Sea, when the S-200 anti-aircraft missile system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces shot down a civilian plane from Israel, as well as the disaster of the Kursk nuclear submarine missile cruiser (APRK) in the Barents Sea in August 2000 G.
Shortly before the Kursk tragedy, the US Navy's activity in the Barents Sea increased significantly, becoming dangerous and provocative. The studied materials contain analytical information that there were prerequisites for such incidents with serious consequences before.
On December 2-3, 1997, the Russian Navy was going to launch 20 SS-N-20 naval ballistic missiles with Typhoon-type missile launchers. As part of the inspection agreements (START I), American observers from the On-Site Inspection Agency were invited to observe and register. During preparation for launch, an American Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine maneuvered at a very close distance from the Typhoon. Conditions then made it difficult to use hydroacoustic equipment. The American woman ran parallel to the Typhoon's course, and then crossed it. This extremely dangerous maneuver, considered a violation by the operational doctrine of the US Navy, could lead to a collision.
The American boat was observed and pursued by Russian surface ships and helicopters. They used active and passive detection methods for more than five hours, trying to communicate with the American submarine by means of underwater acoustic communication. When she refused to leave the launch site to highlight Russian concerns, grenades were dropped. Only then did the American nuclear submarine leave the area at a speed of 20 knots. Since she left the area at the speed prescribed by the US Navy for a certain type of action, it can be assumed that her commander was not aware of the actions of the Russian anti-submarine defense forces before the grenades were used. If this explanation is correct, it emphasizes the high likelihood of a collision and a serious accident. However, it is difficult to assume that the competent submarine commander believed that his submarine remained unnoticed for several hours in a limited area, moreover, surrounded by Russian ships and anti-submarine aircraft at a distance of several kilometers from them.
Typhoon is a relatively old type of submarine. It was one of the first to use advanced noise reduction technologies. The potential capabilities of Western intelligence services to obtain acoustic information on this type of submarine existed by that time for almost fifteen years. Therefore, the military value of acoustic and electronic data obtained during such an operation is very limited and short-lived, and in no way justifies dangerous maneuvering. Not to mention the political risk. This means that the main goal of the American nuclear submarine was to receive electronic information from the ships of the Russian Navy, which accompanies the preparation for launch and the launch itself of sea-based ballistic missiles.
In March 1993, the American submarine Grayling collided with a relatively noisy Delta-4 type RPLSN and severely damaged its bow of the hull. However, as well as its body. The Russian boat was moving forward at the time of the collision. Had the impact occurred 10-20 seconds later, one or both missile compartments would have been inevitably damaged. Such a collision would ignite the rocket fuel, which would lead to the death of a Russian submarine, and possibly an American one.
Since 1996, the Stallworth-class hydroacoustic observation ships have been operating in the Barents Sea. Prior to that, their activities were limited to the water area of the Norwegian Sea. The target designation that such ships can issue was regarded as critical information for the US Navy's anti-submarine operations in the Barents Sea. Such information can be used by American multipurpose nuclear submarines in operations against Russian submarines. As in anti-submarine operations to ensure the defense of aircraft carrier groups from attacks by Russian nuclear submarines. It is obvious that such reconnaissance operations are aimed at preparing for the actions of American aircraft carrier groups near the coast of Russia.
Proceeding from the above, the specialists of the Navy considered it possible: in August 2000, the crew of the Russian missile submarine Kursk in the Barents Sea could perform, unknowingly, a "blind" combat training mission in the interests of the US Navy as a "target", which predetermined his natural doom.
The following circumstance also works for this version. The Americans obtained various databases formed in the USSR and Russia over the decades. They made it possible to effectively isolate background disturbances introduced by Russian submarines, to determine the degree of environmental impact on acoustic and non-acoustic remote sensing systems, and much more.
The Americans showed interest in the Russian forces to combat submarines, carefully studying the effectiveness of the submarine detection system, a database for the design of submarine sonar subsystems. All this was needed to create an underwater observation and tracking system for Russian nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea. This kind of "anti-submarine umbrella" is a network of forecasting stations that continuously illuminate the underwater situation.
The project "Investigation of the nature of a future war at sea in the course of regional conflicts" solved the problem of localizing, or even reducing to zero, the possibility of combat employment of the Russian strategic nuclear submarine fleet. It was decided by our own hands. The goal is to create a modern, highly efficient integrated system for the detection, tracking and destruction of Russian nuclear submarines in crisis situations in the Barents Sea. The Russian scientists who received the grants helpfully suggested: the absence of great depths facilitates the use of anti-submarine weapons and makes it possible to block the exit routes from the permanent bases of Russian nuclear submarines to the deep-water areas of the open ocean for combat patrols.
The project “Study of the degree of radioactive contamination of the water area of the Arctic (as in the text - NP) and the northern part of the Pacific Ocean in the Russian coastal zone” continues the maritime theme. Here the Americans were already interested in the actions of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet in ice-covered waters, where the above methods and means of detection are either limited or generally unacceptable. Therefore, means were actively developed that could probe the "radioactive emission of nuclear power plants" of Russian nuclear submarines. For this, the United States created a network of special sensors. To which our scientists were attracted.
At the same time, against the background of the artificially aggravated problem of the ozone layer in the Arctic zone, the United States carried out large-scale studies of the Arctic Ocean, which interested them from a military-strategic point of view. Part of this program was the flights of balloons with instruments and equipment from the ESRANGE training ground in the Swedish city of Kiruna. Obviously, the American military received comprehensive information about the possible places of temporary combat positions of Russian nuclear submarines, depending on the configuration of the bottom and the thickness of the ice cover, the Russian counterintelligence officers conclude.
MINAT - MINAT UNDER ATOM
Extensive information was obtained by the American specialized departments in direct cooperation with the then Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. It developed, including in such delicate areas: the design and development of nuclear charges, the creation of super-powerful thermonuclear charges and their testing, military exercises and nuclear tests, specialized nuclear tests in the interests of studying the damaging factors of nuclear explosions. In development, the Americans presented questions from their area of interest. Among them, the effect of nuclear explosions on the operation of radars and the propagation of radio waves, the joint effect on structures of shock waves in the soil and the atmosphere, the zone of occurrence of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), the effect of EMP on typical systems (for example, power lines), the impact on land and air systems at peak radiation level.
X-ray and plasma radiation, ion beams, the correlation between aboveground and underground tests, the exposure of people to high and low doses of radiation - it can be listed for a long time. One Russian federal nuclear center even received a proposal on the possible conduct of research work on the topic “High-altitude effects of a nuclear explosion”.
The Americans, presumably, offered our people to work on something in which they themselves were not very strong. And the missing information was easily obtained. In particular, about the formation of a magnetic trap during an air nuclear explosion, the seismic effect of an underground nuclear explosion, the possibility of accelerated covert production of plutonium, communication with missiles in a nuclear explosion, over-the-horizon radar and so on.
It is curious that such cooperation between Minatom and the United States was facilitated by some high-ranking officials from the then Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Minatom itself. All of them adhered to the position that "the process of improving nuclear technologies is irreversible, in the interests of maintaining a moratorium on testing and agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, any cooperation of the nuclear powers under appropriate international control is advisable."
There was only one person who thinks differently - Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov. He blocked the conclusion of direct agreements between the Russian top-secret institution and the Americans, with subsequent negative consequences for its initiators from among the subordinates. In Russian, he fired someone without benefits. It is clear from the e-mail correspondence between customers and contractors that the decision of General of the Army Rodionov was the subject of detailed discussion. The parties were looking for options for coordinated actions of the interested parties on the nuclear program outside the Russian federal jurisdiction and control by the RF Ministry of Defense. The format of cooperation and the composition of its participants were also determined.
The most favorable option for the Americans was the option of direct scientific contacts with the approval of the leadership of the RF Ministry of Defense. In the absence of intermediaries, this would reduce the cost of ongoing joint scientific and technical projects and would place them in an invulnerable position from the current legislation of the partners - Russian military scientists. To resolve the problem, the Americans took steps to put pressure on Russia's top leadership. This partly explains both the imminent removal from office of Igor Nikolaevich Rodionov, and the subsequent long-term confrontation between the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
And then the customers and performers were simultaneously developing alternative ways of organizing cooperation. Particularly interested Russian partners, including those from the leadership of military science, obsequiously sent recommendations of a tactical plan. One of them wrote: the main reason for the delay in the conclusion of contracts is the lack of an agreement at the government level. And he advised how to draw up a version of such an agreement, including in it a clause on joint work "to verify the reliability of the calculation and theoretical apparatus used to predict the consequences of a nuclear explosion in all environments", to develop a set of international standards for the protection of civilian objects from an electromagnetic pulse explosion. Again - "to exclude the threat of nuclear blackmail from third countries."
In addition, he wrote, it is extremely useful to organize a series of publications in the Russian mass media about the need for military-technical cooperation in the field of nuclear security and non-proliferation of nuclear technologies, prevention of nuclear terrorism, and the use of the scientific and technical potential of the Ministry of Defense for solving non-military tasks. Everything is fine if you do not know what forms this cooperation took in reality when it came to the strike force and the Russian nuclear umbrella - the Strategic Missile Forces.
Let us turn to the conclusions of counterintelligence: it should be assumed that on the basis of the previously produced domestic scientific and intellectual product in the military field, Russian scientists and specialists on the territory of Russia, outside the jurisdiction of the competent federal bodies, under the control of the US special services have created a fundamentally new weapon, comparable in efficiency with nuclear weapons … It is possible that samples of new generation special weapons, created in Russian research institutes and design bureaus, may be located on the territory of the Moscow region and, under certain conditions, may be used to carry out terrorist and other actions.
DISARMAMENT LINED
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev wrote to his US counterpart Richard Cheney not to worry "about the re-equipment of 90 silos of the destroyed RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) heavy missiles to install monoblock missiles in them." Firstly, Grachev convinced the American, a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters would be installed in the upper part of each mine, which would not allow loading a heavy ICBM. Secondly, each shaft will be filled with concrete to a depth of 5 meters. Thirdly, the refurbishment will be supervised by specialists from the United States.
In response to the guaranteed destruction of our heavy, non-intercepted missile defense missiles with MIRVs, the Americans pledged to facilitate the armament of their strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. After the aforementioned letter, they promised to hold … a "one-off show" of strategic bombers with weapons on their hardpoints. At the same time, they were convinced: by the number of suspension units, one cannot judge the possible armament of the aircraft. Are American aircraft designers completely fools to install equipment on their consoles that will never be used? Political guarantees and assurances not to equip aircraft with more than promised, the number of nuclear weapons in such a situation are worthless. The Russian inspectors have left - hang under the plane of weapons, including nuclear, twice. This is another example of an inadequate partnership in disarmament.
Today it has been accurately calculated: on the whole, under the START-2 Treaty, Russia has been infringed on its rights. Non-governmental scientific centers were involved in the preparation of the Russian-language version of the text of the Treaty, whose staff translated the text of the document from Russian into English and vice versa. Line-by-line identification of the document in Russian and English revealed gross spelling, punctuation and semantic errors in the English-language text, which could lead to different interpretations by the parties of the provisions of such a serious Agreement. And this is not the only such, in fact, fateful agreement, in the creation of which the Centers participated.
The materials confiscated by counterintelligence found draft packages of documents on the bilateral interstate disarmament process, prepared by non-governmental structures. Variants of official interstate documents reveal a mechanism for modeling the adoption of significant political decisions at the level of the governments of the two countries, suggested by the so-called independent experts from nongovernmental research centers in the United States and Russia. Naturally, not in favor of the latter. It should be noted that “independent” specialists were also involved in the preparation of specialized laws “On space activities in the Russian Federation”, “On state policy in the field of radioactive waste management”, “On the use of nuclear energy in Russia”, “On ratification of the START Treaty -2 and others. Most of these documents are still valid.
"Independent" experts were involved in the preparation of specialized laws "On space activities in the Russian Federation", "On state policy in the field of radioactive waste management", "On the use of nuclear energy in Russia", "On ratification of the START-2 Treaty" and others
Another example of the fake justification by the Americans of their actions. The United States said it must help Russia maintain the organizational capacity to operate the early warning system that its nuclear forces need during the economic crisis. If this organizational capacity is lost, then for decades Russia will be left without an adequate early warning system and with thousands of nuclear warheads ready for rapid launch. A semi-blind Russian missile attack warning system (missile attack warning system), if a combination of technical and human fact occurs
