The statements made by General Groves after the war … were probably intended to divert attention from the German isotope separation program. The idea was that if one concealed the existence of the German uranium enrichment program, then one could write a story that all efforts to create an atomic bomb in Germany were reduced to unsuccessful attempts to build a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium.
Carter P. Hydrick.
Critical Mass: A True Story
about the birth of the atomic bomb
and the onset of the nuclear age
Hydrik's meticulous and thorough research, his reconstruction of the detailed history of the end of the war, deserves close attention. I really want to believe that over time this important work will be published in print.
These are the basic facts, and the main question that tormented all post-war researchers dealing with the problem of German secret weapons sounds so really, how did it happen that Germany could not create an atomic bomb?
One of the theses is radical, namely: Germany in the course of the war created an atomic bomb … Rather, we need to look for an answer to the question why Germany, apparently, did not use the atomic bomb and other terrible types of weapons that it had, and if it did, why did we not hear about it. But, of course, in order to defend such a radical thesis, first it is necessary to prove that Germany had an atomic bomb.
It follows from this that one must look for fairly obvious proofs. If Germany had a uranium-based atomic bomb, the following should be determined:
1) The method or methods of separation and enrichment of the uranium-235 isotope, necessary for the creation of an atomic bomb, of high weapon quality and in quantities sufficient to accumulate a critical mass, and all this in the absence of an operating atomic reactor.
2) A complex or complexes where similar work was carried out in a significant amount, which, in turn, requires:
a) huge consumption of electricity;
b) sufficient supplies of water and developed transport;
c) a huge source of labor;
d) the presence of significant production capacity
nes, relatively well hidden from the bombing of the Allied and Soviet aviation.
3) The necessary theoretical basis for the development of the atomic bomb.
4) A sufficient supply of uranium required for enrichment is available.
5) A polygon or several polygons where you can assemble and test an atomic bomb.
Fortunately, in all these directions, an abundance of material opens up before the researcher, which convincingly proves, at least, that a large and successful program of enrichment and purification of uranium was carried out in Germany during the war years.
Let's start our search from the most seemingly unsuitable place, from Nuremberg.
At the post-war war criminals tribunal, several senior officials of the huge, incredibly powerful and well-known German chemical cartel “I. G. Farben L. G. I had to sit in the dock. The history of this first global corporation, its financial support for the Nazi regime, its key role in the German military-industrial complex, and its involvement in the production of the Zyklon-B poison gas for death camps are described in a variety of works.
Concern I. G. Farben”took an active part in the atrocities of Nazism, having created during the war years a huge plant for the production of synthetic rubber buna in Auschwitz (the German name for the Polish town of Auschwitz) in the Polish part of Silesia. The concentration camp inmates, who first worked on the construction of the complex and then served it, were subjected to unheard-of atrocities.
For Farben, the choice of Auschwitz as the site for the Buna plant was a logical one, driven by compelling practical considerations. A concentration camp nearby provided the huge complex with a guaranteed inexhaustible source of slave labor, and conveniently, prisoners exhausted from backbreaking work could be fired without hassle. Farben's director Karl Krauch commissioned Otto Ambros, a leading synthetic rubber specialist, to study the site of the proposed construction of the complex and give his recommendations. In the end, in a dispute with another possible location in Norway, preference was given to Auschwitz - "especially suitable for building a complex" and for one very important reason.
There was a coal mine nearby, and three rivers flowed together to provide an adequate supply of water. Combined with these three rivers, the state railway and excellent highway provided excellent transport links. However, these advantages were not decisive in comparison with the place in Norway: the SS leadership intended to expand the nearby concentration camp many times over. It was the promise of an inexhaustible source of slave labor that was the temptation that proved impossible to resist.
After the site was approved by Farben's board of directors, Krauch wrote a top secret message to Ambros:
Otto Ambros, specialist of the concern "I. G. Farben"
on synthetic rubber from Auschwitz.
However, at the hearings of the Nuremberg Tribunal on war criminals, it turned out that the buna production complex at Auschwitz is one of the greatest mysteries of the war, for despite the personal blessings of Hitler, Himmler, Goering and Keitel, despite the endless source of both qualified civilian personnel and slave labor from Auschwitz, “the work was constantly interfered with by disruptions, delays and sabotage … It seemed that bad luck was hanging over the whole project,” and to such an extent that Farben was on the verge of failure for the first time in its long history of business success. By 1942, most of the members and directors of the concern considered the project not just a failure, but a complete disaster.
However, in spite of everything, the construction of a huge complex for the production of synthetic rubber and gasoline was completed. Over three hundred thousand concentration camp prisoners passed through the construction site; of these, twenty-five thousand died of exhaustion, unable to withstand the exhausting labor. The complex turned out to be gigantic. So huge that "it consumed more electricity than the whole of Berlin."
However, during the war criminals tribunal, the investigators of the victorious powers were not puzzled by this long list of macabre details. They were perplexed by the fact that, despite such a huge investment of money, materials and human lives, "not a single kilogram of synthetic rubber was ever produced." The directors and managers of Farben, who ended up in the dock, insisted on this, as if possessed. Consume more electricity than all of Berlin - at the time the eighth largest city in the world - to produce absolutely nothing? If this is true, then the unprecedented expenditure of money and labor and the enormous consumption of electricity did not make any significant contribution to the military efforts of Germany. Surely there is something wrong here.
There was no point in all this then and there is no point now, unless, of course, this complex was not engaged in the production of buna at all …
* * *
When the I. G. Farben”began to build a complex for the production of buna near Auschwitz, one of the strangest circumstances was the eviction from their homes of more than ten thousand Poles, whose place was taken by scientists, engineers and contract workers who moved from Germany with their families. In this respect, the parallel with the Manhattan Project is undeniable. It is simply incredible to the extreme that a corporation with an impeccable track record in mastering new technologies, with so much effort in scientific and technical terms, built a complex that consumed a monstrous amount of electricity and never released anything.
One modern researcher who has also been perplexed by the synthetic rubber complex scam is Carter P. Hydrick. He contacted Ed Landry, a synthetic rubber specialist in Houston, and told him about the I. G. Farben”, about the unprecedented consumption of electricity and the fact that, according to the management of the concern, the complex did not produce Buna. To which Landry replied: "This plant was not engaged in synthetic rubber - you can bet your last dollar on it." Landry simply does not believe that the main purpose of this complex was the production of synthetic rubber.
In this case, how can one explain the huge consumption of electricity and the statements of the Farben management that the complex has not yet started producing synthetic rubber? What other technologies could require electricity in such huge quantities, the presence of numerous skilled engineering and working personnel, and proximity to significant water sources? At that time, there was only one more technological process, which also required all of the above. Hydrik puts it this way:
There is definitely something wrong with this picture. It does not follow from the simple combination of the three basic common facts that have just been listed - electricity consumption, construction costs, and Farben's previous track record - that a synthetic rubber complex was built near Auschwitz. However, this combination allows for the sketching of another important manufacturing process of the wartime, which at the time was kept in the strictest confidence. It is about uranium enrichment.
Then why call the complex a buna plant? And why should the Allied investigators be assured with such fervor that the plant never produced a single kilogram of buna? One answer is that since the labor force for the complex was largely provided by inmates of a nearby SS-run concentration camp, the plant was subject to SS secrecy requirements, and therefore Farben's primary task was to create a "legend." For example, in the unlikely event that a prisoner manages to escape and the allies find out about the complex, a "synthetic rubber plant" is a plausible explanation. Since the process of isotope separation was so classified and expensive, "it is natural to assume that the so-called 'synthetic rubber plant' was really nothing more than a cover for a uranium enrichment plant." Indeed, as we shall see, Farm Hall's transcripts support this version. The "Synthetic Rubber Plant" was the "legend" that covered the concentration camp slaves - if they needed to explain anything at all! - as well as from the civilian employees of Farben, who enjoyed greater freedom.
In this case, all the delays caused by the difficulties encountered by Farbep also become easily explained by the fact that the isotope separation complex was an unusually complex engineering structure. Similar problems were faced during the Manhattan Project in the creation of a similar giant complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In America, the project was also hampered from the outset by all sorts of technical difficulties, as well as supply disruptions, and this despite the fact that the Oak Ridge complex was in a privileged position, like its Nazi counterpart.
Thus, the strange statements of the Farben leaders at the Nuremberg Tribunal are beginning to make sense. Faced with the nascent "Allied Legend" of Germany's incompetence in nuclear weapons, the directors and managers of Farben were probably trying to bring the issue to the surface in an indirect way - without openly challenging the "legend." Perhaps they were trying to leave indications about the true nature of the German atomic bomb program and the results achieved during its course, which could only be paid attention to after a lapse of time, after a careful study of the materials of the process.
Choosing a site - next to the concentration camp at Auschwitz with its hundreds of thousands of hapless inmates - ta kise has a strategically important, albeit dire sense. Like many subsequent dictatorships, the Third Reich appears to have placed the complex in the immediate vicinity of the concentration camp, deliberately using the prisoners as human shields to defend against Allied bombing. If so, the decision turned out to be correct, since not a single Allied bomb ever fell on Auschwitz. The complex was dismantled only in 1944 in connection with the offensive of the Soviet troops.
However, in order to assert that the "plant for the production of synthetic rubber" was in fact a complex for the separation of isotopes, it is necessary first of all to prove that Germany possessed the technical means for the separation of isotopes. In addition, if such technologies were indeed used in a "synthetic rubber plant", it appears that several projects to create an atomic bomb were carried out in Germany, for the "Heisenberg wing" and all the related debates are well known. So it is necessary not only to determine whether Germany possessed technologies for the separation of isotopes, but also to try to reconstruct the general picture of the relationship and connections between various German nuclear projects.
Having defined the question in this way, we again have to face the post-war "legend of the allies":
In the official account of the history of the atomic bomb, [General Leslie, head of the Manhattan Project] Groves claims that the plutonium bomb development program was the only one in Germany. This false information, lying on the feather bed of half-truths, he inflated to incredible proportions - so huge that they completely overshadowed the efforts of Germany to enrich uranium. Thus, Groves concealed from the whole world the fact that the Nazis were only a stone's throw from success.
Did Germany have isotope enrichment technology? And could she have used this technology in sufficient quantities to obtain the significant amount of enriched uranium needed to create an atomic bomb?
Undoubtedly, Hydrik himself is not ready to go all the way and admit that the Germans managed to test their atomic bomb before the Americans, within the framework of the Manhattan Project, manufactured and tested theirs.
There can be no doubt that Germany possessed a sufficient source of uranium ore, for the Sudetenland, annexed after the infamous Munich Conference of 1938, is renowned for its rich reserves of the purest uranium ore in the world. By coincidence, this area is also close to the "Three Corners" region in Thuringia in southern Germany and, therefore, close to Silesia and various factories and complexes, which will be discussed in detail in the second and third parts of this book. Therefore, the Farben leadership may have had another reason for choosing Auschwitz as the site for the construction of the uranium enrichment complex. Auschwitz was located not only close to water, transport routes and a source of labor, it was conveniently close to the uranium mines of the Czech Sudetenland, occupied by Germany.
All these circumstances allow us to put forward another hypothesis. It is well known that the statement of the German nuclear chemist Otto Hahn on the discovery of the phenomenon of nuclear fission was made after the Munich conference and the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany by Chamberlain and Daladier. Couldn't it have been a little different in reality? What if, in fact, the discovery of the phenomenon of nuclear fission was made before the conference, but the rulers of the Third Reich kept silent about it and made it public after the only source of uranium in Europe was in Germany's hands? It is noteworthy that Adolf Hitler was ready to fight for the sake of the Sudetenland.
In any case, before embarking on a study of the technology that Germany possessed, it is first necessary to find an answer to the question of why the Germans, apparently, focused almost exclusively on the problem of creating a uranium atomic bomb. In the end, within the framework of the American "Manhattan Project", the issues of creating both uranium and plutonium bombs were studied.
The theoretical possibility of creating a bomb based on plutonium - "element 94", as it was officially called in German documents of that period, was known to the Nazis. And, as it follows from the memorandum of the Department of Armaments and Ammunition, prepared in early 1942, the Germans also knew that this element can only be obtained by fusion in a nuclear reactor.
So why has Germany focused almost exclusively on isotope separation and uranium enrichment? After the Allied sabotage group destroyed a heavy water plant in the Norwegian city of Rjukan in 1942, the Germans, who were unable to obtain sufficiently pure graphite to use as a stabilizer in the reactor, were left without a second stabilizer available to them - heavy water. Thus, according to legend, the creation of an operating nuclear reactor in the foreseeable future to obtain "element 94" in the quantities required for the critical mass, turned out to be impossible.
But let's assume for a moment that there was no Allied raid. By this time, the Germans had already broken off their teeth, trying to create a reactor with a stabilizer based on graphite, and it was obvious to them that significant technological and engineering barriers await them on the way to creating an operating reactor. On the other hand, Germany already possessed the technology needed to enrich U235 into weapons-grade raw materials. Consequently, uranium enrichment was for the Germans the best, most direct and technically feasible way to create a bomb in the foreseeable future. More details about this technology will be discussed below.
In the meantime, we need to deal with one more component of the “legend of the allies”. The creation of the American plutonium bomb from the very moment Fermi built and successfully tested a nuclear reactor at the sports ground of the University of Chicago, proceeded quite smoothly, but only until a certain point, closer to the end of the war, when it was found that to obtain a bomb from plutonium, the critical mass it is necessary to collect much faster than all the fuze production technologies at the disposal of the Allies allowed. Moreover, the error could not go beyond a very narrow framework, since the detonators of the explosive device had to be triggered as synchronously as possible. As a result, there were fears that it would not be possible to create a plutonium bomb.
Thus, a rather amusing picture emerges, which seriously contradicts the official history of the creation of the atomic bomb. If the Germans did succeed in carrying out a successful large-scale uranium enrichment program around 1941-1944, and if their atomic project was aimed almost exclusively at creating a uranium atomic bomb, and if at the same time the Allies realized what problems stood in the way of creating a plutonium bomb, this means at least that the Germans did not waste time and energy on solving a more complex problem, namely on a plutonium bomb. As will be seen in the next chapter, this circumstance raises serious doubts about how successful the Manhattan Project was in late 1944 and early 1945.
So what kind of isotope separation and enrichment technologies did Nazi Germany have, and how efficient and productive were they compared to similar technologies used at Oak Ridge?
As hard as it is to admit, the crux of the matter is that Nazi Germany had "at least five, and possibly seven, serious isotope separation programs." One is the "isotope washing" method developed by Drs. Bagte and Korsching (two of the scientists imprisoned at Farm Hall), brought to such an efficiency by mid-1944 that in just one pass, uranium was enriched more than four times compared with one pass through the Oak Ridge gas diffusion gate!
Compare this to the difficulties faced by the Manhattan Project at the end of the war. Back in March 1945, despite the huge gas diffusion plant at Oak Ridge, stocks of uranium suitable for chain fission reactions were catastrophically far from the required critical mass. Several passes through the Oak Ridge plant enriched uranium from a concentration of about 0.7% to about 10-12%, which led to the decision to use the output of the Oak Ridge plant as a feedstock for a more efficient and efficient electromagnetic beta separator (beta -calutron) Ernsg O. Lawrence, which is essentially a cyclotron with separator tanks, in which isotopes are enriched and separated by means of electromagnetic methods of mass spectrography1. Therefore, it can be assumed that if Bagte's and Korsching's isotope washing method, similar in efficiency, was used widely enough, this led to a rapid accumulation of enriched uranium reserves. At the same time, more efficient German technology made it possible to locate production facilities for the separation of isotopes on significantly smaller areas.
However, as good as the isotope washing method was, it was not the most efficient and technologically advanced method available in Germany. That method was the centrifuge and its derivative, developed by nuclear chemist Paul Hartek, the supercentrifuge. Of course, American engineers were aware of this method, but they had to face a serious problem: highly active gaseous uranium compounds quickly destroyed the material from which the centrifuge was made, and, therefore, this method remained impracticable in a practical sense. However, the Germans managed to solve this problem. A special alloy called cooper was developed, exclusively for use in centrifuges. Still, not even a centrifuge was the best method that Germany had at its disposal.
This technology was captured by the Soviet Union and subsequently used in its own atomic bomb program. In post-war Germany, similar supercentrifuges were produced by Siemens and other firms and supplied to South Africa, where work was carried out to create their atomic bomb (see Rogers and Cervenka, Nuclear Axis: West Germany and South Africa, pp. 299-310). In other words, this technology was not born in Germany, but it is sophisticated enough to be used today. It should be avenged that back in the mid-1970s, among those who participated in the development of enrichment centrifuges in West Germany, there were specialists associated with the atomic bomb project in the Third Reich, in particular, Professor Karl Winnaker, a former member of the board of the I. G. Farben.
Baron Manfred von Ardenne, an eccentric rich man, an inventor and an uneducated nuclear physicist, and his associate physicist Fritz Houtermans, back in 1941 correctly calculated the critical mass of an atomic bomb based on U235 and with the funds of Dr. Baron Lichterfelde on the eastern outskirts of Berlin, a huge underground laboratory. In particular, this laboratory had an electrostatic generator with a voltage of 2,000,000 volts and one of the two cyclotrons available in the Third Reich - the second was the cyclotron in the Curie laboratory in France. The existence of this cyclotron is recognized by the post-war "Allied Legend".
It should be recalled once again, however, that already at the beginning of 1942, the Department of Armaments and Ammunition of Nazi Germany had inherently correct estimates of the critical mass of uranium needed to create an atomic bomb, and that Heisenberg himself after the war suddenly regained his dominance by correctly describing the design the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, allegedly based solely on information heard from the BBC news release!
We will linger in this place to take a closer look at the German atomic program, because now we already have evidence of the existence of at least three different and, apparently, not related to each other technologies:
1) The program of Heisenberg and the army, centered around Heisenberg himself and his associates in the institutes of Kaiser Wilhelm and Max Planck, purely laboratory efforts, limited by the hustle and bustle of creating a reactor. It is on this program that the "legend of the allies" focuses, and it is it that comes to the mind of most people when they mention the German atomic program. This program is deliberately included in the "legend" as proof of the stupidity and incompetence of German scientists.
2) Plant for the production of synthetic rubber of the concern I. G. Farben”in Auschwitz, whose connection with other programs and with the SS is not completely clear.
3) Circle of Bagge, Korsching and von Ardennes, who developed a whole range of perfect methods for separating isotopes and, through von Ardennes, somehow connected - just think! - with the German postal service.
But what does the Reichspost have to do with it? To begin with, it provided effective cover for the atomic program, which, like its American counterpart, was distributed among several government departments, many of which had nothing to do with the grandiose work of creating secret types of weapons. Secondly, and this is much more important, the Reichspost was simply bathed in money and, therefore, could provide at least partial funding for the project, in every sense of the "black hole" in the budget. And, finally, the head of the German postal service, perhaps not by chance, was an engineer, doctor-engineer Onezorge. From the point of view of the Germans, this was a perfectly logical choice. Even the surname of the leader, Onezorge, which in translation means “not knowing remorse and regret,” is just as appropriate.
So what method of isotope separation and enrichment did von Ardenne and Houtermans develop? Very simple: it was the cyclotron itself. Von Ardenne added to the cyclotron an improvement of his own invention - electromagnetic separation tanks, very similar to Ernst O. Lawrence's beta calitron in the United States. It should be noted, however, that von Ardenne's improvements were ready in April 1942, while General Groves, the head of the Manhattan Project, received Lawrence's beta calutron for use at Oak Ridge only a year and a half after that! that the source of ionic plasma for the sublimation of uranium-containing raw materials, developed by Ardennes for his isotope separator, was significantly superior to that used in calutrons. Moreover, it turned out to be so effective that the source of radiation of charged particles, invented by von Ardennes, is known to this day as the "Ardennes source".
The figure of von Ardenne himself is very mysterious, because after the war he became one of the few German scientists who voluntarily chose to cooperate not with the Western powers, but with the Soviet Union. For his participation in the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb, von Ardenne received the Stalin Prize in 1955, the Soviet equivalent of the Nobel Prize. He became the only foreign national to ever receive this award.
In any case, the work of von Ardenne, as well as the work of other German scientists involved in the problems of enrichment and isotope separation - Bagge, Korsching, Harteck and Haugermans - indicate the following: the Allies' assessments of the progress of work on the atomic bomb made during the war in Nazi Germany were completely justified, because by mid-1942 the Germans were significantly ahead of the "Manhattan Project", and not hopelessly lagging behind, as the legend born after the war assured us.
At one time, the participation of Samuel Gudsmith in a sabotage group, whose task was precisely the abduction or elimination of Heisenberg, was considered.
So what is the most likely scenario, given all the facts presented? And what conclusions can be drawn?
1) In Germany, there were several programs for uranium enrichment and the creation of an atomic bomb, for security reasons, divided between different departments, which, perhaps, were coordinated by a single body, the existence of which is still unknown. In any event, it appears that one such serious program was at least nominally led by the German postal service and its head, Dr. Engineer Wilhelm Ohnesorge.
2) The most significant enrichment and isotope separation projects were not led by Heisenberg and his circle; none of the most prominent German scientists took part in them, with the exception of Harteck and Diebner. This suggests that perhaps the most famous scientists were used as a cover, for reasons of secrecy, not being involved in the most serious and technically advanced work. If they took part in such works and the allies kidnapped or liquidated them - and such an idea undoubtedly crossed the mind of the German leadership - then the program for creating an atomic bomb would become known to the Allies or it would be dealt a tangible blow.
3) At least three technologies available to Germany were presumably more efficient and technically advanced than those of the Americans:
a) the method of “washing isotopes of Bagge and Korshing;
b) Hartek centrifuges and supercentrifuges;
c) improved von Ardenne cyclotron, "Source of the Ardennes".
4) At least one of the well-known complexes is the plant for the production of synthetic rubber of the I. G. Farben”in Auschwitz - was large enough in terms of the territory occupied, the labor force used and the consumption of electricity, to be an industrial complex for the separation of isotopes. Such a statement looks quite reasonable, since:
a) despite the fact that the complex employed thousands of scientists and engineers and tens of thousands of civilian workers and concentration camp prisoners, not a single kilogram of buna was produced;
b) the complex, located in Polish Silesia, was located near the uranium mines of the Czech and German Sudetenlands;
c) the complex was located near significant sources of water, which is also necessary for isotope enrichment;
d) a railway and a highway passed nearby;
e) there was a practically unlimited source of labor nearby;
f) and, finally, although this point has not yet been discussed, the complex was located not far from several large underground centers for the development and production of secret weapons located in Lower Silesia, and close to one of two test sites, where during the war the German atomic bombs.
5) There is every reason to believe that in addition to the "plant for the production of synthetic rubber" the Germans built in that area several smaller plants for the separation and enrichment of isotopes, using the products of the Auschwitz complex as raw materials for them.
Power also mentions another problem with the Clusius-Dickel method of thermal diffusion, which we will encounter in Chapter 7: “One pound of U-235 is not such an unattainable figure, and Frisch calculated that Clusius - Dickel for thermal diffusion of uranium isotopes, such an amount can be obtained in just a few weeks. Of course, the creation of such a production will not be cheap, but Frisch summed up the following: "Even if such a plant costs the same as the cost of a battleship, it is better to have one."
To complete this picture, two more interesting facts should also be mentioned.
The specialty of von Ardenne's close associate and theoretical mentor, Dr. Fritz Houtermans, was thermonuclear fusion. Indeed, as an astrophysicist, he made a name for himself in science by describing the nuclear processes taking place in stars. Interestingly enough, there is a patent issued in Austria in 1938 for a device called a "molecular bomb," which on closer inspection turns out to be nothing more than a prototype thermonuclear bomb. Of course, in order to force the hydrogen atoms to collide and release the much more enormous and terrible energy of a hydrogen fusion bomb, heat and pressure are needed, which can only be obtained from the explosion of a conventional atomic bomb.
Secondly, and it will soon become clear why this circumstance is so important, of all the German scientists who worked on the creation of the atomic bomb, it was Manfred von Ardenne who was the one whom Adolf Hitler most often personally visited.
Rose notes that von Ardenne wrote him a letter in which he emphasized that he never tried to convince the Nazis to improve the proposed process and use it in significant volumes and also added that Siemens did not develop this process. From von Ardenne's point of view, this looks like an attempt to confuse, for not Siemens, but I. G. Farben”developed this process and widely applied it in Auschwitz.
In any case, all the evidence points to the fact that Nazi Germany during the war years was carrying out a significant, very well-funded top secret isotope enrichment program, a program that the Germans managed to successfully hide during the war, and after the war it was covered by the "legend of the allies". However, new questions arise here. How close was this program to stockpiling weapons-grade uranium sufficient to make a bomb (or bombs)? And, secondly, why did the Allies spend so much energy after the war to keep it a secret?
The final chord of this chapter, and a breathtaking hint of other mysteries to be explored later in this book, will be a report that was only declassified by the National Security Agency in 1978. This report appears to be a decryption of an intercepted message transmitted from the Japanese embassy in Stockholm to Tokyo. It is entitled "Atomic Fission Bomb Report." It is best to cite this striking document in its entirety, with the omissions that resulted from the decryption of the original message.
The National Security Agency (NSA) is an agency within the US Department of Defense that protects government and military communications and computer systems, as well as electronic surveillance.
This bomb, revolutionary in its effect, will completely overturn all established concepts of conventional warfare. I am sending you, put together, all the reports on what is called a fission bomb:
It is reliably known that in June 1943, the German army at a point 150 kilometers southeast of Kursk tested a completely new type of weapon against the Russians. Although the Russians' chain 19th Rifle Regiment was hit, only a few bombs (each with a warhead of less than 5 kilograms) were enough to destroy it completely, down to the last man.
Part 2. The following material is cited according to the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Ue (?) Kenji, an attache advisor in Hungary and in the past (worked?) In this country, who accidentally saw the consequences of what happened immediately after it happened:
Moreover, it is reliably known that the same type of weapon was also tested in the Crimea. Then the Russians accused the Germans of using poisonous gases and threatened that if this happens again, they will also use military poisonous substances in response.
Part 3- It is also necessary to take into account the fact that in recent years in London - and the period between the beginning of October and 15 November - fires of unknown origin have caused large casualties and serious destruction of industrial buildings. If we also take into account the articles about new weapons of this type, which not so long ago began to appear from time to time in British and American magazines, it becomes obvious that even our enemy has already begun to deal with them.
To summarize the essence of all these messages: I am convinced that the most important breakthrough in a real war will be the implementation of the bomb project based on the fission of the atom. Consequently, the authorities of all countries are striving to accelerate research in order to get a practical implementation of these weapons as soon as possible. For my part, I am convinced of the need to take the most decisive steps in this direction.
Part 4. The following is what I was able to find out regarding the technical characteristics:
Recently, the UK government has warned citizens of possible German fission bomb strikes. The American military leadership also warned that the east coast of the United States could be targeted for indirect strikes by some German flying bombs. They were named "V-3". More precisely, this device is based on the principle of the explosion of nuclei of heavy hydrogen atoms, obtained from heavy water. (Germany has a large plant (for its production?) In the vicinity of the Norwegian city of Ryu-kan, which is bombed from time to time by British aircraft.) Naturally, there have long been enough examples of successful attempts to split individual atoms. But, Part 5.
as far as practical results are concerned, no one seems to have succeeded in splitting a large number of atoms at once. That is, for the splitting of each atom, a force is required that destroys the electron's orbit.
On the other hand, the substance that the Germans use, apparently, has a very high specific gravity, which is much superior to that which has been used so far.
since. In this connection, SIRIUS and the stars of the group of "white dwarfs" were mentioned. Their specific gravity is (6?) 1 thousand, and only one cubic inch weighs a whole ton.
Under normal conditions, atoms cannot be compressed to the density of nuclei. However, the enormous pressure and incredibly high temperatures in the body of the "white dwarfs" lead to the explosive destruction of atoms; and
Part 6.
moreover, radiation emanates from the hearts of these stars, consisting of what remains of atoms, that is, only nuclei, very small in volume.
According to an article in an English newspaper, the German atom fission device is a NEUMAN separator. Enormous energy is directed to the central part of the atom, creating a pressure of several tons of thousands of tons (sic. -D. F.) per square inch. This device is capable of fissioning relatively unstable atoms of elements such as uranium. Moreover, it can serve as a source of explosive atomic energy.
A-GENSHI HAKAI DAN.
That is, a bomb that draws its power from the release of atomic energy.
The end of this striking document is “Intercept 12 Dec 44 (1, 2) Japanese; Receive 12 Dec 44; Before 14 Dec 44 (3020-B) . This appears to be a reference to when the message was intercepted by the Americans, in the original language (Japanese), when it was received and when it was transmitted (14 Dec 44), and by whom (3020-B).
The date of this document - after the test of the atomic bomb was allegedly observed by Hans Zinsser, and two days before the start of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes - should have caused the Allied intelligence to sound the alarm both during the war and after its end. While it is clear that the Japanese attache in Stockholm is very vague about the nature of nuclear fission, this document highlights several striking points:
Cited from Stockholm to Tokyo, no. 232.9 December 1944 (Department of War), National Archives, RG 457, sra 14628-32, declassified October 1, 1978.
1) according to the report, the Germans used some kind of weapon of mass destruction on the Eastern Front, but for some reason refrained from using it against the Western allies;
a) the places are precisely indicated - the Kursk Bulge, the southern component of the German offensive directed from both sides, which took place in July, not June 1943, and the Crimean Peninsula;
b) 1943 is indicated as the time, although, since large-scale hostilities were conducted in the Crimea only in 1942, when the Germans subjected Sevastopol to massive artillery fire, it should be concluded that the time interval actually stretches until 1942.
At this point, it is a good idea to make a small digression and consider briefly the German siege of the Russian fortress of Sevastopol, the site of the most massive artillery shelling in the entire war, since this is directly related to the correct understanding of the meaning of the intercepted message.
The siege was led by the 11th Army under the command of Colonel General (later Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein. Von Manstein collected 1,300 artillery pieces - the largest concentration of heavy and super-heavy artillery by any power during the war - and for five days, twenty-four hours a day, struck Sevastopol. But these were not ordinary large-caliber field guns.
Two artillery regiments - the 1st heavy mortar regiment and the 70th mortar regiment, as well as the 1st and 4th mortar battalions under the special command of Colonel Niemann - were concentrated in front of the Russian fortifications - only twenty-one batteries with a total of 576 barrels, including the batteries of the 1st regiment of heavy mortars, firing eleven- and twelve- and half-inch high-explosive and incendiary oil shells …
But even these monsters were not the largest weapons among those that were placed near Sevastopol. The shelling of the Russian positions was conducted by several "Big Bert" Krupp caliber 16, 5 "and their old brothers Austrian" Skoda ", as well as even more colossal mortars" Karl "and" Thor ", giant self-propelled mortars with a caliber of 24", firing shells weighing more than two tons.
But even "Karl" was not the last word of artillery. The most powerful weapon was placed in Bakhchisarai, in the Palace of Gardens, the ancient residence of the Crimean khans, and was called "Dora" or less often - "Heavy Gustav". It was the largest caliber gun used in this war. Its caliber was 31.5 inches. To transport this monster by rail, 60 cargo platforms were required. The barrel, 107 feet long, fired a high-explosive projectile weighing 4,800 kilograms - that is, almost five tons - over 29 miles. The gun could also fire even heavier armor-piercing shells weighing seven tons at targets located up to 24 miles away. The combined length of the projectile, including the cartridge case, was nearly twenty-six feet. Stacked on top of each other, they would have heights) 'of a two-story house.
These data are enough to show that we have before us a conventional weapon, increased to a huge, simply unimaginable size, so that the question of the economic feasibility of such a weapon may arise. However, a single projectile fired from the Dora destroyed an entire artillery depot in the Northern Bay near Sevastopol, although the tog was set at a depth of one hundred feet underground.
The artillery shelling from these heavy and super-heavy guns was so monstrous that, according to the estimates of the German headquarters, during five days of continuous shelling and aerial bombardment, more than five hundred shells and bombs fell on Russian positions every second. The downpour of steel hitting the positions of the Soviet troops tore the fighting spirit of the Russians to shreds; the roar was so unbearable that the eardrums burst. By the end of the battle, the city of Sevastopol and its surroundings were completely destroyed, two Soviet armies were destroyed and over 90,000 people were taken prisoner.
Why are these details so important? First, let's pay attention to the mention of “incendiary oil shells”. This is evidence that at Sevastopol the Germans used some kind of unusual weapon, the means of delivery for which were ordinary, albeit very large artillery pieces. The German army did possess such shells and often used them with high efficiency on the Eastern Front.
But what if, in fact, we are talking about an even more terrible weapon? In the future, we will present evidence that the Germans really managed to develop a prototype of a modern vacuum bomb, made on the basis of conventional explosives, a device comparable in destructive power to a tactical nuclear charge. Taking into account the significant weight of such shells and the fact that the Germans did not have a sufficient number of heavy bombers, it seems quite possible and even probable that super-heavy artillery was used to deliver them. This will also explain another strange fact in the report of the Japanese military attaché: apparently, the Germans did not use weapons of mass destruction to strike large populated areas, but used them only against military targets located within the range of such systems. Now you can continue to analyze the report of the Japanese diplomat.
2) Perhaps the Germans seriously studied the possibility of creating a hydrogen bomb, since the interaction of the nuclei of heavy water atoms containing deuterium and tritium is the essence of the thermonuclear fusion reaction, which the Japanese attache noted (although he confuses such a reaction with the nuclear fission reaction in an ordinary atomic bomb) … This assumption is supported by the pre-war works of Fritz Houtermans, devoted to thermonuclear processes taking place in stars;
3) the enormous temperature and pressure resulting from the explosion of an ordinary atomic bomb are used as a detonator for a hydrogen bomb;
4) in despair, the Russians were ready to use chemical warfare agents against the Germans if they continued to use their new weapons;
5) the Russians considered this weapon to be some kind of "poisonous gas": in this case, we are talking either about a legend composed by the Russians, or about an error that arose as a result of eyewitness accounts, ordinary Russian soldiers who had no idea what kind of weapon was against them applied; and finally, the most sensational fact, Charred corpses and detonated ammunition definitely indicate that a non-conventional weapon was used. The charring of corpses can be explained by a vacuum bomb. It is possible that the huge amount of heat released during the explosion of such a device could lead to detonation of ammunition. Similarly, radiation burns with characteristic blistering of Russian soldiers and officers, most likely with no knowledge of nuclear energy, could be mistaken for the effects of exposure to poisonous gas.
6) according to the Japanese cipher, the Germans apparently received this knowledge through communication with the Sirius star system, and some unprecedented form of very dense matter played an essential role. This statement is not easy to believe, even today.
It is the last point that directs our attention to the most fantastic and mysterious part of the research on the creation of secret weapons carried out during the war years in Nazi Germany, for if this statement is at least partially true, this indicates that work was carried out in the Third Reich in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy. in completely unexplored areas of physics and esotericism. In this regard, it is important to note that the extraordinary density of matter, described by the Japanese envoy, most of all resembles the concept of post-war theoretical physics, called "black matter". In all likelihood, in his report, the Japanese diplomat significantly overestimates the specific gravity of the substance - if there was any at all - and yet it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that it is still many times higher than the specific gravity of ordinary matter.
Oddly enough, the connection between Germany and Sirius surfaced again many years after the war, and in a completely unexpected context. In my book "The War Machine of Giza" I mentioned the research of Robert Temple, who was engaged in the secret of the African Dogon tribe, which is at a primitive level of development, but nevertheless retains accurate knowledge about the star system (Sirius for many generations, since that distant time, when modern astronomy did not yet exist. In this book I noted that
For those familiar with the abundance of materials from alternative studies of the Giza complex in Egypt, the reference to Sirius immediately brings to mind the images of the Egyptian religion closely associated with the Death Star, the myth of Osiris and the Sirius star system.
Temple also claims that the Soviet KGB, as well as the American CIA and NSA, showed serious interest in his book … after her. Temple claims that Baron Jesko von Puttkamer sent him a revelatory letter, written on official NASA letterhead, but later retracted it, stating that the letter did not reflect NASA's official position. Temple believes that Puttkamer was one of the German scientists flown to the United States as part of Operation Paperclip immediately after the surrender of Nazi Germany.
As I later said in my book, Karl Jesko von Puttkamer was not a simple German. During the war years, he was a member of the military council of Adolf Hitler, adjutant for the Navy. Having started the war with the rank of captain, he became an admiral by the end of the war. Subsequently, Puttkamer worked at NASA.
Thus, the study of the problems of the German atomic bomb through this recently declassified Japanese encrypted message took us far away, into the realm of frightening hypotheses, into the world of vacuum bombs, giant artillery pieces, superdense matter, hydrogen bomb and a mysterious mixture of esoteric mysticism, Egyptology and physics.
Did Germany have an atomic bomb? In light of the above material, the answer to this question seems simple and unambiguous. But if this is really the case, then. Taking into account the incredible reports that came from time to time from the Eastern Front, a new mystery arises: what even more secret research was hidden behind the atomic project, for, undoubtedly, such research was carried out?
However, let's leave aside exotic superdense matter. According to some versions of the "Allied Legend", the Germans never managed to accumulate enough fissionable weapons-grade uranium to create a bomb.
Literature:
Carter Hydrick, Critical Mass: the Real Stoty of the Atomic Bomb and the Birth of the Nuclear Age, Internet published manuscript, uww3dshortxom / nazibornb2 / CRmCALAlASS.txt, 1998, p.
Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of l. G. Farben; Anthony S Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler.
Carter P. Hydrick, op. cit, p. 34.
Sapieg P. Hyctrick, op. cit., p. 38.
Paul Carrell, Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (Ballantine Books, 1971) pp. 501-503
Joseph P. Farrell, The Giza Death Star Deployed (Kempton, Illinois: Adventures Unlimited Press, 2003, p. 81).
