The "Arab Spring" for the Arabs themselves, at least in those countries that are under it, has become a complete disaster. But as a result of this process, the Kurds have a chance to finally get their statehood. When this issue of "VPK" was being prepared for publication, it was still unknown what the result of the promised referendum on September 25 in Iraqi Kurdistan would be. But the Kurds can force themselves to be reckoned with in any political scenario.
Once at the forefront of the Kurdish independence movement, the Turkish Kurds have largely gone into the shadows. Their fighting units voluntarily moved to Iraq and Syria in 2013, so their actions on the territory of Turkey itself are now sporadic. At the same time, the increasingly authoritarian regime of Erdogan is rapidly curtailing the liberalization that began in the late 2000s in relation to the Kurds, returning to the policy of harsh suppression by force. Moreover, now this policy extends to the territories of neighboring countries.
The Iranian Kurds still do not see any particular prospects: the regime in Tehran in general and the Iranian Armed Forces in particular is still too strong. But great prospects, as it seems at the moment, have appeared for the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds.
In Iraq - Peshmerga
The Iraqi Kurds gained "almost independence", and at the same time the status of the closest allies of the United States back in 1991, immediately after "Desert Storm". In 2003, after the final defeat of Iraq and the overthrow of Hussein, Kurdish de facto independence became complete, while the Americans “unsubscribed” the post of president of the entire Iraq to the Kurds, albeit with rather limited powers. One of the most important attributes of this de facto independence was the armed Peshmerga units, which are essentially a full-fledged army. The exact number of armored vehicles and artillery at the Peshmerga is unknown, but the count certainly goes to hundreds of units.
The arsenal of the Iraqi Kurds was based on the weapons and equipment of Saddam Hussein's army. In the 80s, the Iraqi Armed Forces had up to ten thousand armored vehicles and up to five thousand artillery systems. Significant losses in the war with Iran were largely offset by no less significant trophies. Moreover, a considerable part of the equipment seized from Iran was of the same types as the Iraqi army had, since during the war, China and, to a lesser extent, the USSR supplied the same weapons to both belligerents. All this extremely numerous equipment was seemingly lost in the two wars between Iraq and the United States. But oddly enough, the exact figures of these losses have not yet been made public. Apparently, a very large part of "Saddam's luxury" went to the Kurds in a fully operational state, even then the expense of Soviet and Chinese tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and guns from the Peshmerga went to hundreds.
The current Iraqi army has become the second source of replenishment of the Kurdish arsenals. The Kurds have never fought with it directly, but in 2014, as you know, the divisions of the Iraqi Armed Forces, stationed in the north of the country, simply collapsed and fled under the onslaught of the Islamic Caliphate, abandoning weapons and equipment. Some of this equipment managed to intercept the Kurds, the other part they captured already in the battles with the "Caliphate", because until 2015, in fact, only the Kurds fought in Iraq against Sunni radicals. In addition, there were direct supplies of weapons and equipment to the Kurds from the United States and Germany. These are small arms, ATGM "Milan", armored vehicles "Dingo" (20 units), "Cayman", "Badger".
Currently, the peshmerga is actively fighting against the "caliphate", in particular, it participated in the liberation of Mosul. But this is by no means a war for a united Iraq, but only for the expansion of its own influence. The idea of turning independence from de facto to de jure (through a popular referendum) is becoming dominant in Iraqi Kurdistan. Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara are very active against this. Washington is in an extremely delicate position. Both the current Iraqi government and the Kurds are considered its strategic allies, in whose favor to make the choice is still unclear. Apparently, the United States will do its utmost to achieve the abolition of the referendum and preserve the status quo.
And in Syria - "moderate"
Before the start of the civil war in Syria, the local Kurds practically did not claim anything simply because of their small number. The war radically changed the situation, allowing the Kurds to occupy most of the northern and northeastern regions of Syria. The Kurds never declared themselves supporters of Assad, but there were almost no clashes between their troops and government forces throughout the war. This "silent truce" is explained by the commonality of opponents - Sunni radicals of all varieties. For the same reason, Moscow is on good terms with the Kurds, which even supplied them with a certain amount of weapons, mainly small arms.
However, Russian supplies were very limited, and the Syrian Kurds could not have fought at their expense. At the same time, to all appearances, although they are not as rich in technology as their Iraqi compatriots, they do not experience any particular shortage of it. As mentioned above, the Kurds hardly fought against Assad's troops, but they could capture some of the equipment that the Syrian Armed Forces simply abandoned in the early years of the war. Another part of the equipment was captured in battles with Islamic radicals. In addition, there is a transfer of arms to the Syrian Kurds from their Iraqi tribesmen. At least the fact of the loss of the American M1117 armored personnel carrier by the Syrian Kurds was recorded, which, of course, was never in service with the Syrian army, but the Iraqi army has such vehicles.
Finally, the Syrian Kurds are now receiving a lot of weapons from the United States. From the beginning of the civil war until mid-2016, Washington, in search of the mythical "moderate opposition" in Syria, very well armed those very Sunni radicals. The realization of this sad fact came to the Americans under the late Obama, as well as the understanding that the only moderate opposition in Syria is precisely the Kurds. Under Trump, the American-Kurdish alliance took shape completely. To create the appearance of a "common Syrian" coalition, the Americans dragged several small Arab groups into an alliance with the Kurds.
Although Moscow did not break off relations with the Syrian Kurds, it certainly did not like their close alliance with Washington. Damascus liked him even less. Therefore, Moscow and Damascus did not really object to the operation that the Turkish Armed Forces conducted in northern Syria in late 2016 - early 2017. Ankara's goal was to prevent the creation of a continuous belt of Kurdish territories along the entire Turkish-Syrian border. The Turks, at the cost of heavy losses, managed to prevent the union of the "Afri" (Western) and "Rozhava" (Eastern) Kurds. After that, their further advance into the interior of Syria was blocked by Syrian-Russian troops from the west and Kurdish-American troops from the east.
Having removed Ankara so skillfully from the game, Moscow and Washington with their local allies joined the struggle for the "Caliphate inheritance." The Kurds, with the active support of the Americans, began the assault on Raqqa, the "capital" of the Syrian part of the "Caliphate."Syrian troops, without interfering in this process, flowed around the Kurds from the south, reaching the right bank of the Euphrates and blocking the further advance of the Kurds to the south, as they had previously blocked the Turks together with the Kurds. In turn, the Kurds made a rush along the left bank of the Euphrates to Deir ez-Zor, which was unblocked by the Syrian troops. The goal of the Kurds is clearly to prevent the Syrian army from crossing the Euphrates. And this may well lead to a direct conflict between the Syrian troops and the Kurds when the "caliphate" is still not finished.
It is extremely difficult to say what will happen next. If the "caliphate" is liquidated, Washington will have to decide. It will be very difficult for him to provoke the Syrian Kurds to create their own state. First, this is a violation of international law, even for the United States. Secondly, this is an obvious precedent for the Iraqi Kurds, whom Washington, on the contrary, is trying to keep from declaring independence. Thirdly, this is an almost complete break with Ankara, which will be the strongest blow to the US positions in the region. On the other hand, leaving the Kurds to deal with Assad themselves - on the one hand and Erdogan - on the other, was too cynical even for Washington. And Trump will not just give up positions in Syria. Maybe he will sell the Kurds to Damascus or Ankara, but for some decent price from his point of view.
As a result, the "Arab Spring" can really become a "Kurdish spring". Or drag the Kurds after the Arabs into complete disaster.
