After the conclusion of the armistice in March 1968, the combat capability of the North Vietnamese air defense forces was significantly increased. By the second half of 1968, the air defense forces of the DRV had 5 air defense divisions and 4 separate radio technical regiments. The Air Force formed 4 fighter regiments, which operated 59 MiG-17F / PF, 12 J-6 (Chinese version of the MiG-19S) and 77 MiG-21F-13 / PF / PFM. From 1965 to 1972, 95 SA-75M air defense systems and 7658 anti-aircraft missiles were delivered to the DRV. The role and intensity of the use of air defense systems in repelling American airstrikes can be judged on the basis of the fact that at the end of the war 6,800 missiles were used up or lost in battles.
Among the new products were the MiG-21PFM fighters with improved take-off and landing characteristics, more advanced avionics, a KM-1 ejection seat and a suspended gondola with a 23-mm GSh-23L cannon. Shortly before the end of the Vietnam War, the VNA Air Force received the MiG-21MF with more powerful engines, an integrated 23-mm cannon and RP-22 radar. These fighters already had the ability to suspend four air combat missiles, including those from a radar seeker, which increased combat capabilities in poor visibility conditions and at night.
Also, Vietnamese pilots have mastered the Chinese-made J-6 supersonic fighters. Compared to the MiG-17F, armed with two 30-mm cannons, the supersonic J-6 had great potential in intercepting American tactical and carrier-based attack aircraft. According to Western data, 54 J-6 fighters were sent to Vietnam by January 1972.
Vietnamese J-6s first entered combat on May 8, 1972. They climbed that day to intercept the F-4 Phantom. The Vietnamese said they won two aerial victories, but this is not confirmed by American data. According to the memoirs of American pilots who participated in hostilities in Southeast Asia, Chinese-made MiG-19s posed an even greater danger than more modern MiG-21s, armed only with missiles. In 1968-1969, Vietnam received 54 F-6s, which were armed with the 925th Fighter Aviation Regiment. During the hostilities, the air regiment suffered significant losses, and in 1974 China transferred another 24 F-6s to the DRV.
Until December 1972, the North Vietnamese radio engineering units underwent significant quantitative and qualitative strengthening. In 1970, the P-12MP radar appeared in the DRV air defense system, which could operate in a “blinking” mode to protect against Shrike-type anti-radar missiles. received surveillance radars P-35 and highly mobile P-15, designed to detect low-altitude targets.
At the end of 1972, the number of anti-aircraft artillery at the disposal of the Vietnamese People's Army and Viet Cong units reached 10,000 guns. About half of the Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns were 37-mm 61-K assault rifles and B-47 twin guns. Despite the fact that the 61-K entered service in 1939, and the B-47 shortly after the end of the Great Patriotic War, these anti-aircraft guns shot down more enemy aircraft and helicopters in Southeast Asia than all other anti-aircraft guns.
Judging by the available photographs, a number of open-top anti-aircraft guns with 37-mm twin guns were delivered to the DRV. Apparently, these were the 37-mm V-11M naval installations, which were mounted in stationary positions in North Vietnam.
Unlike the 61-K and B-47 guns, designed to be placed on the deck of the turret ship, the V-11M were protected by anti-splinter armor and equipped with a forced water cooling system for the barrels, which made it possible to fire for a long time.
Since the mid-60s, 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns have been used in North Vietnam to protect important objects. In terms of practical rate of fire, they were slightly inferior to 37-mm assault rifles, but had a large slant firing range and height reach.
The issuance of target designation to a six-gun battery was centrally carried out by PUAZO-6 in conjunction with the SON-9A gun aiming radar. Numerous fortified positions were built around Hanoi and Haiphong for anti-aircraft guns of 57 mm and above. Some of them have survived to this day.
During the years of the Vietnam War, almost all 85-mm anti-aircraft guns 52-K and KS-1 that were in storage were sent from the Soviet Union to the DRV. By the mid-60s, these guns were hopelessly outdated, but the warehouses had very significant stocks of shells for them. Although the 85-mm cannons did not have centralized gun aiming drives and conducted mainly defensive anti-aircraft fire, they played a certain role in repelling American air raids. At the same time, the consumption of anti-aircraft shells of all calibers was very high. During the period of intensive American air raids, at least one train with shells arrived in the DRV every day through Chinese territory.
In the 60s, the 100-mm KS-19 anti-aircraft guns available in the air defense forces of the DRV were considered quite modern. The fire of the six-gun battery was centrally controlled by the SON-4 gun aiming radar. This station was created in 1947 on the basis of the American SCR-584 radar, supplied during the Second World War under Lend-Lease. Although according to the performance characteristics, a 100-mm anti-aircraft gun battery could fire at air targets flying at an altitude of 15,000 m at a speed of up to 1,200 km / h, active jamming generators available on American aircraft, which have been actively used since 1968, often paralyzed the operation of gun guidance stations and the guns fired defensive anti-aircraft fire or according to data obtained from optical rangefinders. That significantly reduced the effectiveness of shooting. However, the same applied to the SON-9A, used in conjunction with the 57-mm S-60 guns.
At the final stage of the war, low-altitude air defense systems S-125, used mainly to cover airfields, self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" and towed twin anti-aircraft guns ZU-23, appeared in the VNA. However, there is practically no information in the open press on how this modern weapon proved to be effective by the standards of those years in the conditions of Southeast Asia.
If the S-125, Shilki and 23-mm towed twin systems appeared in North Vietnam many years earlier, the losses of American and South Vietnamese aviation could be significantly greater, which, of course, could have an impact on the timing of the end of the conflict. Many historians writing about the Vietnam War draw attention to the fact that the USSR at about the same time interval supplied the Arabs with much more modern technology and weapons of the air defense forces. So, for example, the export version of the Kub - Kvadrat air defense system appeared in Vietnam only in the late 70s, the same applies to the RPK-1 Vaza radar instrument complex, which had significantly greater capabilities compared to the gun aiming station SON-9A and SON-4. This was due to the fact that the Soviet leadership rightly feared that modern high-tech weapons would end up in China, which in the late 1960s was in many ways openly hostile to the Soviet Union. Soviet representatives in the DRV, responsible for the delivery of equipment, weapons and ammunition, have repeatedly recorded cases of the loss of goods sent from the USSR when they passed by rail through the territory of the PRC. This primarily concerned the guidance stations of anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-aircraft missiles, surveillance radars, radio altimeters, gun aiming radars and MiG-21 fighters. Thus, China, not disdaining outright theft, after the termination of military-technical cooperation with the USSR, tried to raise its own air force and air defense forces to the current level. In this regard, many samples of equipment and weapons were delivered to North Vietnam by sea, which was associated with great risk. American aviation regularly bombed Haiphong, mined the port waters, and underwater saboteurs also operated there.
The VNA leadership, which itself had experience in guerrilla warfare, devoted great importance to increasing the air defense capabilities of small detachments operating in isolation from the main forces. In the mid-60s, the Vietnamese side asked the leadership of the USSR to provide them with a light anti-aircraft gun capable of effectively fighting American aircraft in a guerrilla war in the jungle and suitable for carrying in the form of separate packs. After receiving the Vietnamese order, the 14.5-mm anti-aircraft mining installation ZGU-1 was urgently put into production in 1967, which successfully passed field tests back in 1956. With a mass in the combat position of 220 kg, the installation was disassembled into five parts weighing no more than 40 kg. It is also possible to transport ZGU-1 in the back of a truck. As the experience of the combat use of the ZGU-1 has shown, it can fire directly from the vehicle. The Vietnamese very often used improvised ZSU to escort transport and military convoys and anti-aircraft cover in places of concentration of troops.
Simultaneously with the collapsible and suitable for long-distance transport ZGU-1, several hundred quadruple 14.5-mm ZPU Type 56 were delivered to North Vietnam from the PRC. This installation was a complete copy of the Soviet towed ZPU-4, which were also available in the air defense units VNA. The Chinese analogue of the 14.5-mm "twin" ZPU-2 supplied to Vietnam is known as the Type 58.
In 1971, small infantry units of the VNA, in addition to 14.5-mm ZGU-1 and 12, 7-mm DShK, received Strela-2 MANPADS with a launch range of up to 3400 m and an altitude reach of 1500 m, which sharply increased their capabilities to combat low-altitude air targets.
The heavily strengthened air defense system of North Vietnam underwent a severe test in the second half of December 1972. In connection with the breakdown of the peace talks, the delegation of North Vietnam left Paris on December 13, 1972. The main reason for the termination of the dialogue was the unacceptable demands put forward by the leadership of South Vietnam and supported by the United States. In order to force the government of the DRV to return to negotiations on favorable terms for themselves, the Americans launched an air operation Linebacker II (English Linebacker - midfielder). 188 B-52 strategic bombers, 48 F-111A fighter-bombers capable of carrying out low-altitude throws and more than 800 other types of aircraft were involved in it. That is, almost the entire grouping of strategic, tactical and aircraft carrier aviation of the United States, based on this theater of operations. The operation began on the evening of December 18, 1972, with a simultaneous attack on the main airfields of the North Vietnamese fighters and the known positions of the air defense missile system. Subsequently, the main efforts of the American military aviation were focused on the destruction of important industrial facilities, the capital of the DRV, Hanoi, the main seaport of Haiphong and the industrial region of Thaingguyen were subjected to especially intense raids. The air operation lasted 12 days. During this time, 33 massive strikes were made: 17 - by strategic aviation, 16 - by tactical and aircraft carrier, 2814 sorties were carried out, including 594 - by strategic bombers.
For the first time, the US Air Force used the B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers to attack the territory of the DRV in April 1966. Then they struck two strikes on the section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail bordering Laos. Until 1972, B-52s regularly bombed supply routes and Viet Cong positions in South Vietnam. The bombers operated from the Andersen bases in Guam and the Upatao bases in Thailand. The main burden of the fight against the "Stratospheric Fortresses" fell precisely on the calculations of the air defense system. By that time, the DRV had about 40 anti-aircraft missile battalions armed with the SA-75M.
Already at the end of the 60s, the main combat work on the SA-75M was performed by Vietnamese calculations, who studied the complex equipment well, learned how to mask their complexes in the jungle and set up ambushes on the flight routes of American aviation. Often, the Vietnamese, almost on their hands, dragged the complexes along the clearings, laid in dense tropical vegetation. At the same time, the missile defense forces often acted with a cut-down composition: 1-2 launchers and a SNR-75 guidance station. The search for the target was carried out visually, since the P-12 radar unmasked the position with its radiation and was too burdensome when moving off-road.
Unmanned aerial vehicles, single tactical reconnaissance aircraft, or strike vehicles that broke away from the main group, often became victims of the North Vietnamese air defense systems leading the "free hunt". During one of these raids, on November 22, in the area between the demilitarized zone and the 20th parallel, the first American strategic bomber was shot down. The B-52D received critical damage as a result of a close rupture of the warhead of the B-750B missile, the crew managed to reach Thailand and parachute.
The largest number of sorties in Southeast Asia was carried out by B-52D bombers. This bomb carrier was capable of carrying 108 227 kg Mk.82 bombs with a total mass of 24516 kg. Usually bombing was carried out from a height of 10-12 km. At the same time, a zone of continuous destruction with the size of 1000 by 2800 m was formed on the ground. Taking into account the fact that up to a hundred bombers were simultaneously involved in the raids, they were capable of inflicting colossal damage to the economy and defense potential of North Vietnam.
In order to eliminate losses from fighter aircraft of the VNA Air Force and minimize the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery fire, the B-52 raids against the DRV were carried out exclusively at night. However, this did not allow to completely avoid losses. On the night of December 19-20, while repelling the raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, anti-aircraft missile divisions launched about 200 missiles at American bombers. At the same time, there were cases when 10-12 missiles were used almost simultaneously on one bomber. By the end of 1972, most of the American "strategists" had very powerful broadband jamming stations, and the targeting operators, often unable to track the target, aimed missiles at the center of the jamming. As a result, six B-52s were shot down that night, and several more were damaged. It turned out that when a significant number of missiles were used for one aircraft, the electronic warfare stations did not guarantee its invulnerability. Significant losses incurred by the bombing wings of the strategic air command caused a break in the bombing, during two days the American command hastily developed new tactics, specialists modified the electronic warfare equipment, and radio intelligence aircraft identified the positions of the air defense missile systems and radars with the aim of further suppressing or destroying them. The Americans temporarily refused to act in large groups, sending 9-30 bombers on missions. The next massive air raid took place on December 26. A group and 78 B-52G bombers rose from the Andersen airbase, they were also joined by 42 B-52Ds from the Utapao airbase. Ten objects located in the vicinity of Hanoi were bombed. This time, a new tactic was tested - seven waves of five or six triplets each went to the targets along different routes and at different altitudes.
The vulnerability of strategic bombers of various modifications was different. So, experts note that the B-52D, equipped with the ALT-28ESM jamming equipment, turned out to be much less vulnerable than the D-52G, which did not have such equipment. For self-cover, tactical and carrier-based aircraft were forced to carry suspended containers with electronic warfare equipment, which reduced the bomb load.
Quite often, electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft B-66 Destroyer were allocated to cover the fighter bombers, loaded to the eyeballs with bombs. In addition, tens of tons of aluminum foil were dropped on the routes of the percussion vehicles. Dipole reflectors formed a curtain that made it difficult for surveillance radars to detect American aircraft and track them with missile guidance stations.
Interception of American "strategists" by fighter aircraft also proved to be very difficult. It would seem that the slow cumbersome "Stratospheric Fortresses" moving in large groups should have been easy targets for the MiG-21 supersonic fighters. However, the MiG pilots failed to achieve results that would have forced the American command to abandon the use of the B-52.
The first attempts to intercept the B-52 using the MiG-21PF were made in March 1969. But the Americans quickly found North Vietnamese fighters at a field airfield near the demilitarized zone and bombed them. In the first half of 1971, the MiGs launched unsuccessful attacks several times. However, the interception of the "Stratospheric Fortresses" at night was extremely complicated by strong electronic countermeasures. The Americans not only interfered with the P-35 ground surveillance radars, but also jammed the fighter guidance radio channels. Attempts to use the MiG-21PF onboard radars were also unsuccessful. When the RP-21 radar was turned on, its indicator was completely illuminated due to a high level of interference. In addition, the radiation of the MiG radar was recorded by warning stations installed on bombers, which unmasked the interceptor. After that, the B-52 airborne gunners and American escort fighters immediately became active. For the first time, the MiG-21PF successfully attacked the B-52 on October 20, 1971. The fighter, aimed at the bombers on commands from the ground, after a short-term activation of the RP-21, having clarified the position of the target, fired the R-3S missile from the maximum distance. The IR seeker of the missile captured the B-52 engine radiating heat, but one hit of a relatively light melee missile launcher designed to defeat tactical aircraft was not enough for a heavy "strategist" and the damaged American bomber was able to reach its airfield.
During Operation Linebacker II, interceptor fighters managed to shoot down two American strategic bombers. This time, the more advanced MiG-21MF operated. Luck smiled at the pilot of the 921st Fighter Aviation Regiment Pham Tuan on the night of December 27. Thanks to the well-coordinated actions of the guidance service, the Vietnamese pilot missed the escort fighters and accurately went to the three B-52s, going with the aeronautical lights on. With a salvo of two missiles launched from 2000 m, he destroyed the bomber and managed to safely return to his airfield. After one B-52 was shot down, other bombers following in the group hastily got rid of the bombs and laid down on the opposite course. For this feat, Pham Thuan, who later became the first Vietnamese cosmonaut, was awarded the gold Star of the Hero of Vietnam.
Vietnamese interceptors managed to shoot down the second B-52 the next night. Unfortunately, Vietnamese pilot Wu Haun Thieu did not return from a combat mission. What actually happened is not known for certain. But on the ground next to the wreckage of the downed B-52, fragments of a MiG were found. Most likely, the pilot of the MiG-21MF fighter during the attack collided with a bomber or fired missiles from too close a distance and was killed by a bomb explosion.
Combat raids of the B-52 continued until January 28, 1973 and stopped just a few hours before the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements. During Operation Linebacker II, B-52 bombers dropped approximately 85,000 bombs with a total mass of more than 15,000 tons on 34 targets. During the bombing of North Vietnam, American strategic bomber aircraft destroyed and seriously damaged 1,600 various engineering objects, buildings and structures. Storage facilities for oil products with a total capacity of 11.36 million liters were destroyed, ten airfields and 80% of power plants were put out of action. According to official Vietnamese figures, civilian casualties amounted to 1,318 killed and 1,260 wounded.
According to Soviet sources, during the repulsion of the "New Year's air offensive", 81 enemy aircraft were destroyed, of which 34 were B-52 strategic bombers. Anti-aircraft missile forces of the VNA shot down 32 aircraft of this type, fighter aircraft recorded two B-52s at their own expense. The Americans cite different statistics: according to their data, they irretrievably lost 31 aircraft, of which 17 are considered shot down in the course of hostilities, 1 bomber was decommissioned due to combat damage as unrecoverable, 11 crashed in flight accidents, 1 was decommissioned due to failure combat damage and 1 burned down at the airfield. However, among the "crashed in flight accidents" there are probably cars damaged by missiles or anti-aircraft guns. There is a known case when, during landing at an airfield in Thailand, the B-52 missile guided missile defense system, which was severely damaged by a close rupture of the warhead, rolled out of the runway and was blown up by mines installed around the airfield to protect against partisans, only the side gunner, who was in the tail section, survived from the crew. … Subsequently, this aircraft was counted as "crashed in a flight accident." In total, the United States believes that the SA-75M air defense system in Southeast Asia shot down 205 American aircraft.
After the end of the raids on the territory of the DRV, the air war in Southeast Asia did not stop. Although the Americans withdrew their ground forces as part of the "Vietnamization" of the conflict, the US Air Force and Navy continued to bomb and assault the advancing combat formations of the North Vietnamese army and transport communications. In the late 1960s, South Vietnamese partisan detachments actually joined the regular units of the Vietnamese People's Army. Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, along which, in addition to trucks, columns of tanks and artillery marched southward, batteries of anti-aircraft guns and even positions of anti-aircraft missile battalions appeared.
However, from the very beginning of the liberation movement of the Vietnamese people, even flintlock rifles were fired at French and then American combat aircraft. The episode was even featured in the 1990 feature film Air America, starring Mel Gibson and Robert Downey Jr.
All South Vietnamese guerrillas and servicemen of the North Vietnamese army were obliged to practice the skills of firing at air targets. For this, even special handicraft "simulators" were created.
The guerrillas operating in the jungle, as a rule, did not miss the opportunity to fire at planes and helicopters that were in the range. For this, the most diverse small arms of Soviet, American and even German production were used.
Oddly enough, until the overthrow of the South Vietnamese regime, the VNA used MG-34 anti-aircraft machine guns supplied from the USSR in the 50s. This is confirmed by numerous photographs of those years.
But at the same time, it was not possible to find references to the use in hostilities and photographs of Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners with captured Japanese 13, 2-mm anti-aircraft machine guns 13, 2-mm Type 93 and 20-mm artillery machine guns Type 98. The same applies to 13, 2-mm Hotchkiss M1929 and M1930 machine guns, although they were supposed to go to the Vietnamese as trophies from the French contingent.
But there are a lot of photos of anti-aircraft crews with 12, 7-mm DShK and DShKM machine guns of military and post-war production and their Chinese copies of the Type 54, which outwardly differ in muzzle flash suppressors and sighting devices.
Very often Vietcong and VNA fighters fired at air targets from Soviet and Chinese-made rifle-caliber machine guns. Of the Soviet machine guns, these were most often the SG-43 and SGM. In the early 70s, the Chinese Type 67 appeared in service with the Vietnamese, which structurally had much in common with the Goryunov machine gun.
However, in North Vietnam there were also very rare anti-aircraft machine gun mounts. So, for the air defense of stationary objects, the installation mod. 1928 under the machine gun of the Maxim system arr. 1910 g.
It is noteworthy that by 1944, almost all anti-aircraft installations of this type in the Red Army were supplanted by the DShK heavy machine guns. And until the end of the Second World War, the ZPU arr. 1928 lived very little.
Anti-aircraft fire from small arms and anti-aircraft machine gun mounts was especially disastrous for helicopters, which were widely used by the American and South Vietnamese armed forces. Since 1972, the Strela-2 MANPADS have appeared at the disposal of the North Vietnamese military and partisans operating in South Vietnam.
According to information voiced in domestic sources, in the period from 1972 to 1975, 589 MANPADS launches were made in Vietnam and 204 American and South Vietnamese aircraft and helicopters were shot down. However, this information is most likely grossly overestimated. According to American data, Strela-2 missiles in reality destroyed no more than 50 aircraft, which, in general, is consistent with the statistics of the use of Soviet first-generation MANPADS in other conflicts. At the same time, in the book by Chris Hobson "Air Loss in Vietnam", taking into account the actions in Cambodia and Laos, about a hundred aircraft and helicopters could have been hit by the "Strela-2" portable complexes. At the same time, many observers noted that the missile warhead of the portable complex was relatively weak. Its power was enough to destroy the UH-1 Iroquois and AN-1 Cobra helicopters, as well as the light attack aircraft A-1 Skyraider and A-37 Dragonfly. But larger vehicles, often getting hit, returned safely to their airfields. In addition to helicopters and attack aircraft, gunships and military transport aircraft, which were involved in supplying the besieged South Vietnamese garrisons, were often hit by "arrows" in Southeast Asia.
Among the survivors of the Strela-2 strike were even two South Vietnamese F-5E Tiger II fighters. At the same time, the Strela-2 MANPADS, despite not always having sufficient warhead power, together with anti-aircraft guns, played a very noticeable role at the final stage of the Vietnam War, preventing the South Vietnamese Air Force from slowing down the offensive of the VNA units. So on April 29, 1975, on the penultimate day of the war over Saigon, the A-1 Skyraider attack aircraft and the AS-119K Stinger gunship were shot down from MANPADS.
Regarding the losses incurred by the Air Force, Navy, Army and Air Force of the USMC during the Vietnam War, disputes continue to this day. As the history of wars shows, calculating losses is always hampered by incomplete information, mistakes by officials when compiling documents or researchers in the course of collecting and analyzing material, and sometimes by deliberate distortions of objective data. A detailed consideration of this topic requires a separate publication, but based on an analysis of various sources, it can be concluded that the Americans in Southeast Asia lost about 10,000 aircraft: approximately 4,000 aircraft, more than 5,500 helicopters and 578 reconnaissance drones.shot down over the territory of North Vietnam and China. To this should also be added the losses of the American allies: 13 planes and helicopters of the Australian Air Force and more than 1,300 South Vietnamese aircraft. Of course, not all of the planes and helicopters lost by the United States and its allies were shot down in action. Some of them crashed during flight accidents or were destroyed at airfields by partisans. In addition, North Vietnam in 1975 managed to capture 877 aircraft and helicopters at South Vietnamese air bases. Trophies of the DRV army also became the American-made ZSU M42 Duster, armed with a 40-mm twin and towed quad 12.7-mm ZPU M55, which at the final stage of the war were actively used for firing at ground targets. In 1965, the Americans, fearing the raids of the North Vietnamese Il-28 bombers, deployed MIM-23 HAWK anti-aircraft missile systems around their air bases, but the South Vietnamese army did not transfer them and all the Hawks returned to the United States after the withdrawal of American troops.
In turn, the Air Force of the DRV lost 154 fighters, including during air battles: 63 MiG-17, 8 J-6 and 60 MiG-21. Also, the radio technical units and anti-aircraft missile troops of the Vietnamese People's Army lost more than 70% of the available radar and air defense systems. Nevertheless, it can be stated that the air defense forces of the DRV, relying on the assistance provided by the USSR and the PRC, managed to inflict the American military aviation, which was the main strike force of the United States in the Vietnam War, losses that were unacceptable for the Americans. As a result, the American leadership forced the American leadership to look for ways out of the conflict and led to the unification of North and South Vietnam into a single state.
