In the mid-1950s. In the context of the rapid development of supersonic aviation and the appearance of thermonuclear weapons, the task of creating a transportable long-range anti-aircraft missile system capable of intercepting high-speed high-altitude targets has acquired particular urgency. The mobile system S-75, which was put into service in 1957, in its first modifications had a range of only about 30 km, so that the formation of defense lines on probable routes of flight of a potential enemy's aviation to the most populated and industrialized regions of the USSR with the use of these complexes turned into into an extremely costly endeavor. It would be especially difficult to create such lines in the most dangerous northern direction, which was on the shortest route of the approach of American strategic bombers.
The northern regions, even the European part of our country, were distinguished by a sparse network of roads, a low density of settlements, separated by vast expanses of almost impenetrable forests and swamps. A new mobile anti-aircraft missile system was required. With a greater range and height of target interception.
In accordance with the Government Decisions of March 19, 1956 and of May 8, 1957 No. 501-250, many organizations and enterprises of the country were involved in the development of a long-range anti-aircraft missile system. Leading organizations were identified for the system as a whole and for ground-based radio equipment of the firing complex - KB-1 GKRE, and for an anti-aircraft guided missile, which at first had the designation V-200 - OKB-2 GKAT. General designers of the system as a whole and the missiles were assigned, respectively, A. A. Raspletin and P. D. Grushin.
The draft design for the V-860 (5V21) rocket was issued by OKB-2 at the end of December 1959. Particular attention during the design was paid to the adoption of special measures to protect the structural elements of the rocket from aerodynamic heating that occurs during a long (more than a minute) flight with hypersonic speed. For this purpose, the sections of the rocket body that were most heated in flight were covered with thermal protection.
In the design of the B-860, mainly non-scarce materials were used. To give the structural elements the required shapes and sizes, the most high-performance production processes were used - hot and cold stamping, large-size thin-walled casting of products from magnesium alloys, precision casting, various types of welding. A liquid-propellant rocket engine with a turbo-pumping system for supplying fuel components to a single-action combustion chamber (without restarting) ran on components that have already become traditional for domestic missiles. The oxidizing agent was nitric acid with the addition of nitrogen tetroxide, and the fuel was triethylaminexylidine (TG-02, "tonka"). The temperature of the gases in the combustion chamber reached 2500-3000 degrees C. The engine was made according to the "open" scheme - the combustion products of the gas generator, which ensured the operation of the turbopump unit, were thrown out through an elongated branch pipe into the atmosphere. The initial start-up of the turbopump unit was provided by a pyrostarter. For the B-860, the development of starting engines using mixed fuel was set. These works were carried out in relation to the formulation TFA-70, then TFA-53KD.
The indicators in terms of the target engagement range looked much more modest than the characteristics of the American Nike-Hercules complex, which had already entered service, or the 400 missile defense system for Dali. But a few months later, by the decision of the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues of September 12, 1960. No. 136, the developers were instructed to increase the range of destruction of the B-860 supersonic targets with the IL-28 EPR to 110-120 km, and subsonic targets to 160-180 km. using the "passive" section of the rocket by inertia after the completion of the operation of its main engine
Anti-aircraft guided missile 5V21
Based on the results of the consideration of the draft design, for further design, a system was adopted that combines the firing system, missiles and a technical position. In turn, the firing complex included:
• command post (CP), which controls the combat actions of the firing complex;
• radar for clarification of the situation (RLO);
• digital computer;
• up to five firing channels.
A radar for clarifying the situation was closed at the command post, which was used to determine the exact coordinates of the target with coarse target designation from external means and a single digital machine for the complex.
The firing channel of the firing complex included a target illumination radar (ROC), a launch position with six launchers, power supplies, and auxiliary equipment. The configuration of the channel made it possible, without reloading the launchers, to carry out sequential shelling of three air targets with the provision of simultaneous homing of two missiles to each target.
ROC SAM S-200
The target illumination radar (RPC) of the 4.5-cm range included an antenna post and a control room and could operate in the mode of coherent continuous radiation, which achieved a narrow spectrum of the probing signal, provided high noise immunity and the greatest target detection range. At the same time, the simplicity of execution and the reliability of the seeker were achieved. However, in this mode, the determination of the range to the target was not carried out, which was necessary to determine the moment of missile launch, as well as to build the optimal trajectory of the missile guidance to the target. Therefore, the ROC could also implement the phase-code modulation mode, which slightly broadens the signal spectrum, but ensures that the range to the target is obtained.
The sounding signal of the target illumination radar reflected from the target was received by the seeker and a semi-active radio fuse coupled to the seeker, operating on the same echo signal reflected from the target as the seeker. A control transponder was also included in the complex of radio-technical on-board equipment of the rocket. The target illumination radar operated in the mode of continuous radiation of the probing signal in two main modes of operation: monochromatic radiation (MHI) and phase-code modulation (PCM).
In the mode of monochromatic radiation, the tracking of an air target was carried out in elevation, azimuth and speed. The range could be entered manually by target designation from the command post or attached radar equipment, after which the approximate target flight altitude was determined by the elevation angle. Capturing air targets in monochromatic radiation mode was possible at a range of up to 400-410 km, and the transition to auto-tracking of a target with a missile homing head was carried out at a range of 290-300 km.
To control the missile along the entire flight path, a "rocket-ROC" communication line with an on-board low-power transmitter on the rocket and a simple receiver with a wide-angle antenna at the ROC was used to the target. In case of failure or incorrect functioning of the missile defense system, the line stopped working. In the S-200 air defense missile system, for the first time, a digital computer TsVM "Flame" appeared, which was entrusted with the task of exchanging command and coordinate information with various controllers and before solving the launch problem.
Anti-aircraft guided missile of the S-200 system is two-stage, made according to the normal aerodynamic configuration, with four triangular wings of large aspect ratio. The first stage consists of four solid propellant boosters mounted on the sustainer stage between the wings. The cruising stage is equipped with a liquid-propellant two-component rocket engine 5D67 with a pumping system for supplying propellants to the engine. Structurally, the marching stage consists of a number of compartments in which a semi-active radar homing head, on-board equipment blocks, a high-explosive fragmentation warhead with a safety-actuating mechanism, tanks with fuel components, a liquid-propellant rocket engine, and rocket rudder control units are located. The rocket launch is inclined, with a constant elevation angle, from a launcher guided in azimuth. Warhead weighing about 200kg. high-explosive fragmentation with ready-made striking elements - 37 thousand pieces weighing 3-5 g. When a warhead is detonated, the scattering angle of the fragments is 120 °, which in most cases leads to a guaranteed defeat of an air target.
Missile flight control and targeting is carried out using a semi-active radar homing head (GOS) installed on it. For narrow-band filtering of echo signals in the receiver of the GOS, it is necessary to have a reference signal - a continuous monochromatic oscillation, which required the creation of an autonomous HF heterodyne on board the rocket.
The starting position equipment consisted of a K-3 missile preparation and launch control cabin, six 5P72 launchers, each of which could be equipped with two 5Yu24 automated charging machines moving along specially laid short rail tracks, and a power supply system. The use of charging machines ensured a fast, without a long mutual exhibition with the means of loading, the supply of heavy missiles to the launchers, which were too bulky for manual reloading like the S-75 complexes. However, it was also envisaged to replenish the spent ammunition with the delivery of missiles to the launcher from the technical division by road means - on the 5T83 transport and reloading machine. After that, with a favorable tactical situation, it was possible to transfer the missiles from the launcher to the 5Yu24 machines.
Anti-aircraft guided missile 5V21 on the transport-loading vehicle 5T83
Anti-aircraft guided missile 5V21 on an automated loading machine
Anti-aircraft guided missile 5V21 on the 5P72 launcher
Launching positions 5Zh51V and 5Zh51 for the S-200V and S-200 systems, respectively, were developed at the Design Bureau of Special Engineering (Leningrad), and are intended for prelaunch preparation and launch of 5V21V and 5V21A missiles. The launching positions were a system of launch sites for PU and ZM (loading vehicles) with a central platform for the launch preparation cabin, a power plant and a system of roads that provide automatic delivery of missiles and launcher loading at a safe distance. In addition, documentation was developed for the technical position (TP) 5Zh61, which was an integral part of the S-200A, S-200V anti-aircraft missile systems and was intended to store the 5V21V, 5V21A missiles, prepare them for combat use and replenish the launching positions of the firing complex with missiles. The TP complex included several dozen machines and devices that ensure all work during the operation of missiles. When changing the combat position, the elements dismantled from the ROC were transported on four two-axle low-loader trailers attached to the complex. The lower container of the antenna post was transported directly on its base after attaching the removable wheel passages and removing the side frames. Towing was carried out by an all-terrain vehicle KrAZ-214 (KrAZ-255), in which the body was loaded to increase tractive effort.
As a rule, a concrete structure with an earthen bulk shelter was erected at the prepared stationary position of the firing divisions to accommodate part of the combat equipment of the radio-technical battery. Such concrete structures were built in several typical versions. The structure made it possible to protect equipment (except for antennas) from ammunition fragments, small and medium-caliber bombs, aircraft cannon shells during an enemy aircraft raid directly on a combat position. In separate rooms of the structure, equipped with sealed doors, life support and air purification systems, there was a room for a combat shift of a radio technical battery, a recreation room, a classroom, a shelter, a toilet, a vestibule and a shower room for disinfecting the battery personnel.
The composition of the S-200V air defense system:
System-wide tools:
control and target designation point K-9M
diesel power plant 5E97
distribution booth K21M
control tower K7
Anti-aircraft missile division
antenna post K-1V with target illumination radar 5N62V
equipment cabin K-2V
K-3V launch preparation booth
distribution booth K21M
diesel power plant 5E97
Starting position 5Ж51В (5Ж51) composed of:
six 5P72V launchers with 5V28 (5V21) missiles
charging machine 5Yu24
transport and loading vehicle 5T82 (5T82M) on the KrAZ-255 or KrAZ-260 chassis
Road train - 5T23 (5T23M), transport and reloading machine 5T83 (5T83M), mechanized racks 5Ya83
However, there are other schemes for placing the elements of the air defense missile system, for example, Iran has adopted a scheme of 2 launchers at launch positions, which, in general, is justified given the single-channel targeting scheme, next to the launcher, highly protected bunkers with spare missiles are placed.
Satellite image of Google Earth: S-200V air defense system of Iran
The North Korean scheme for replacing the elements of the S-200 air defense system also differs from that adopted in the USSR.
Satellite image of Google Earth: C-200V air defense system of the DPRK
The mobile fire complex 5Zh53 of the S-200 system consisted of a command post, firing channels and a power supply system. The firing channel included a target illumination radar and a launch position with six launchers and 12 charging machines.
The command post of the firing complex included:
K-9 (K-9M) target distribution cockpit;
power supply system consisting of three diesel-electric
stations 5E97 and switchgear - cab K-21.
The command post was mated with a higher command post to receive target designation and transmit reports on its work. The K-9 cockpit mated with the automated control system of the ASURK-1MA brigade, "Vector-2", "Senezh", with the automated control system of the air defense corps (division).
The command post could be given the P-14 radar or its later modification P-14F ("Van"), the P-80 "Altai" radar, the PRV-11 or PRV-13 radio altimeter.
Later, on the basis of the S-200A air defense system, improved versions of the C-200V and C-200D air defense systems were created.
S-200 "Angara" S-200V "Vega" S-200D "Dubna"
Year of adoption. 1967. 1970. 1975.
SAM type. 5V21V. 5V28M. B-880M.
The number of channels for the target. 1.1.1.1.
The number of channels on the rocket. 2.2.2.
Max. speed of targets hit (km / h): 1100.2300.2300.
The number of targets fired: 6. 6. 6.
Maximum target destruction height (km): 20.35.40.
Minimum target destruction height (km): 0, 5. 0, 3.0, 3.
Maximum target destruction range (km): 180.240.300.
Minimum target destruction range (km): 17.17.17.
Rocket length, mm 10600 10800 10800.
Launch mass of the rocket, kg 7100.7100.8000.
Warhead weight, kg. 217.217.217.
Caliber of the rocket (sustainer stage), mm 860 860 860
The probability of hitting targets: 0, 45-0, 98.0, 66-0, 99.0, 72-0, 99.
To increase the combat stability of the S-200 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, on the recommendation of the joint test commission, it was found expedient to combine them under a single command with the S-125 low-altitude complexes. Anti-aircraft missile brigades of mixed composition began to form, including a command post with 2-3 S-200 firing channels, six launchers each and two or three S-125 anti-aircraft missile battalions equipped with four launchers.
The combination of the command post and two or three S-200 firing channels became known as a group of divisions.
The new organization scheme with a relatively small number of S-200 launchers in the brigade made it possible to deploy long-range anti-aircraft missile systems in a greater number of regions of the country.
Actively promoted in the late 1950s. American programs for the creation of ultra-high-speed high-altitude bombers and cruise missiles were not completed due to the high cost of deploying new weapons systems and their obvious vulnerability to anti-aircraft missile systems. Taking into account the experience of the Vietnam war and a series of conflicts in the Middle East in the United States, even the heavy transonic B-52s were modified for operations at low altitudes. Of the real specific targets for the S-200 system, only really high-speed and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft SR-71 remained, as well as long-range radar patrol aircraft and active jammers operating from a greater distance, but within radar visibility. All of these objects were not massive targets and 12-18 launchers in the anti-aircraft missile unit of the air defense should have been quite enough to solve combat missions, both in peacetime and in wartime.
The high efficiency of domestic missiles with semi-active radar guidance was confirmed by the extremely successful use of the Kvadrat air defense system (an export version developed for the air defense of the Ground Forces by the Cube air defense system) during the war in the Middle East in October 1973.
The deployment of the S-200 complex turned out to be expedient, taking into account the subsequent adoption in the US of an air-to-surface guided missile SRAM (AGM-69A, Short Range Attack Missile) with a launch range of 160 km. when launched from low altitudes and 320 km - from high altitudes. This missile was just intended to combat medium and short-range air defense systems, as well as to strike at other previously detected targets and objects. B-52G and B-52H bombers could be used as missile carriers, carrying 20 missiles each (eight of them in drum-type launchers, 12 on underwing pylons), FB-111, equipped with six missiles, and later B- 1B, which housed up to 32 missiles. When assigning the S-200 positions forward from the defended object, the means of this system made it possible to destroy the carrier aircraft of SRAM missiles even before their launch, which made it possible to count on an increase in the survivability of the entire air defense system.
Despite their spectacular appearance, the S-200 missiles have never been demonstrated at parades in the USSR. A small number of publications of photographs of the rocket and launcher appeared by the end of the 1980s. However, with the availability of space reconnaissance means, it was not possible to hide the fact and scale of the massive deployment of the new complex. The S-200 system received the symbol SA-5 in the USA. But for many years in foreign reference books under this designation, photographs of the Dal missiles were published, which were repeatedly filmed on the Red and Palace Squares of the two capitals of the state.
For the first time for his fellow citizens the presence of such a long-range air defense system in the country was announced on September 9, 1983 by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the USSR N. V. Ogarkov. This happened at one of the press conferences held shortly after the incident with the Korean Boeing-747, shot down on the night of September 1, 1983, when it was announced that this plane could have been shot down a little earlier over Kamchatka, where they were " anti-aircraft missiles, called SAM-5 in the United States, with a range of over 200 kilometers."
Indeed, by that time, long-range air defense systems were already well known in the West. US space reconnaissance assets continuously recorded all stages of its deployment. According to American data, in 1970 the number of S-200 launchers was 1100, in 1975 - 1600, in 1980 - 1900. The deployment of this system reached its peak in the mid-1980s, when the number of launchers was 2030 units.
From the very beginning of the deployment of the S-200, the very fact of its existence became a compelling argument that determined the transition of the potential enemy's aviation to operations at low altitudes, where they were exposed to the fire of more massive anti-aircraft missile and artillery weapons. In addition, the indisputable advantage of the complex was the use of missile homing. At the same time, without even realizing its range capabilities, the S-200 supplemented the S-75 and S-125 complexes with radio command guidance, significantly complicating the task of conducting both electronic warfare and high-altitude reconnaissance for the enemy. The advantages of the S-200 over the aforementioned systems could be especially evident when the active jammers were fired upon, which served as an almost ideal target for the S-200 homing missiles. As a result, for many years, reconnaissance aircraft of the United States and NATO countries were forced to make reconnaissance flights only along the borders of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. The presence in the USSR air defense system of long-range anti-aircraft missile systems S-200 of various modifications made it possible to reliably block the airspace at the close and distant approaches to the country's air border, including from the famous SR-71 "Black Bird" reconnaissance aircraft.
For fifteen years, the S-200 system, regularly guarding the sky over the USSR, was considered especially secret and practically did not leave the borders of the Fatherland: fraternal Mongolia in those years was not seriously considered "abroad". After the air war over southern Lebanon ended in the summer of 1982 with a depressing result for the Syrians, the Soviet leadership decided to send two S-200M anti-aircraft missile regiments of a two-division composition with 96 5В28 missiles to the Middle East. In early 1983, the 231st anti-aircraft missile regiment was deployed in Syria, 40 km east of Damascus near the city of Demeira, and the 220th regiment in the north of the country, 5 km west of the city of Homs.
The equipment of the complexes was urgently "modified" for the possibility of using 5V28 missiles. The technical documentation for the equipment and the complex as a whole was also revised in the corresponding way in the design bureaus and at the manufacturing plants.
The short flight time of the Israeli aviation determined the need to carry out combat duty on the S-200 systems in a "hot" state during tense periods. The conditions for the deployment and operation of the S-200 system in Syria somewhat changed the norms of functioning and the composition of the technical position adopted in the USSR. For example, the storage of missiles was carried out in an assembled state on special carts, road trains, transport and reloading machines. Refueling facilities were represented by mobile tanks and tankers.
There is a legend that in the winter of 1983, an S-200 complex with Soviet military personnel shot down an Israeli E-2C. performing a patrol flight at a distance of 190 km from the starting position of the "dvuhsotka". However, there is no evidence of this. Most likely, the E-2C Hawkeye disappeared from the screens of the Syrian radars after the Israeli plane quickly descended, recording with the help of its equipment the characteristic radiation of the target illumination radar of the C-200VE complex. In the future, the E-2S did not approach the Syrian shores closer than 150 km, which significantly limited their ability to control hostilities.
After being deployed in Syria, the S-200 system lost its "innocence" in terms of top secrecy. They began to offer it to both foreign customers and allies. On the basis of the S-200M system, an export modification was created with a changed composition of equipment. The system received the designation S-200VE, the export version of the 5V28 missile with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead was called 5V28E (V-880E).
In subsequent years, remaining before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact organization, and then the USSR, the S-200VE complexes managed to be delivered to Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia, where combat assets were deployed near the Czech city of Pilsen. In addition to the Warsaw Pact countries, Syria and Libya, the C-200VE system has been supplied to Iran (since 1992) and North Korea.
One of the first buyers of the C-200VE was the leader of the Libyan revolution, Muammar Gaddafi. Having received such a "long" arm in 1984, he soon stretched it out over the Gulf of Sirte, declaring the territorial waters of Libya a water area slightly smaller in area than Greece. With the gloomy poetics characteristic of the leaders of developing countries, Gaddafi declared the 32nd parallel that bound the Gulf as the "death line". In March 1986, in order to exercise their declared rights, the Libyans fired S-200VE missiles at three attack aircraft from the American aircraft carrier Saratoga, which "defiantly" patrolled over traditionally international waters.
According to the Libyans, they shot down all three American planes, as evidenced by both electronic data and intensive radio traffic between the aircraft carrier and, presumably, rescue helicopters sent to evacuate the crews of the downed planes. The same result was demonstrated by the mathematical modeling carried out shortly after this combat episode, independently by the Almaz Scientific and Production Association, by the specialists of the test site and the Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. Their calculations showed a high (0, 96-0, 99) probability of hitting targets. First of all, the reason for such a successful strike could be the excessive self-confidence of the Americans, who made their provocative flight "like on a parade", without preliminary reconnaissance and without cover with electronic interference.
What happened in Sirte Gulf was the reason for the Eldorado Canyon operation, during which on the night of April 15, 1986, several dozen American aircraft struck Libya, and first of all, the residences of the leader of the Libyan revolution, as well as the positions of the C-200VE air defense missile system and S-75M. It should be noted that when organizing the supply of the S-200VE system to Libya, Muammar Gaddafi proposed organizing the maintenance of technical positions by Soviet troops.
During the recent events in Libya, all the S-200 air defense systems in this country were destroyed.
Satellite image of Google Earth: the position of the C-200V air defense system of Libya after the air strike
On October 4, 2001, Tu-154, tail number 85693, of Siberia Airlines, performing flight 1812 on the Tel Aviv-Novosibirsk route, crashed over the Black Sea. According to the conclusion of the Interstate Aviation Committee, the plane was inadvertently shot down by a Ukrainian missile fired into the air as part of a military exercise on the Crimean peninsula. All 66 passengers and 12 crew members were killed. It is most likely that during the training firing with the participation of the Ukrainian air defense, which was carried out on October 4, 2001 at Cape Opuk in the Crimea, the Ty-154 plane accidentally found itself in the center of the alleged firing sector of the training target and had a radial speed close to it, as a result of which it was detected by the S-200 system radar and taken as a training target. In conditions of lack of time and nervousness caused by the presence of high command and foreign guests, the S-200 operator did not determine the range to the target and "highlighted" the Tu-154 (located at a distance of 250-300 km) instead of an inconspicuous training target (launched from a range of 60 km).
The defeat of the Tu-154 by an anti-aircraft missile was, most likely, the result not of a missile missing a training target (as is sometimes stated), but of the explicit guidance of the missile by the S-200 operator at an erroneously identified target.
The calculation of the complex did not assume the possibility of such an outcome of the shooting and did not take measures to prevent it. The size of the range did not ensure the safety of firing such a range of air defense systems. The organizers of the shooting did not take the necessary measures to free the airspace.
Satellite image of Google Earth: S-200 air defense system of Ukraine
With the transition of the country's Air Defense Forces to the new S-300P systems, which began in the eighties, the S-200 air defense systems began to be gradually removed from service. By the early 2000s, the S-200 (Angara) and S-200 (Vega) complexes were completely decommissioned by the Russian Air Defense Forces. To date, the S-200 air defense system is in the armed forces: Kazakhstan, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Ukraine.
On the basis of the 5V28 anti-aircraft missile of the S-200V complex, a hypersonic flying laboratory "Kholod" was created for testing hypersonic ramjet engines (scramjet engines). The choice of this rocket was dictated by the fact that its flight trajectory parameters were close to those necessary for scramjet flight tests. It was also considered important that this missile was removed from service, and its cost was low. The warhead of the rocket was replaced by the head compartments of the "Kholod" GLL, which housed a flight control system, a container for liquid hydrogen with a displacement system, a hydrogen flow control system with measuring devices and, finally, an experimental E-57 scramjet engine of an asymmetric configuration.
Hypersonic flying laboratory "Cold"
On November 27, 1991, the world's first flight test of a hypersonic ramjet engine was carried out at the Kholod flying laboratory at the test site in Kazakhstan. During the test, the speed of sound was exceeded six times at an altitude of 35 km.
Unfortunately, the bulk of the work on the topic "Cold" fell on those times when much less attention was paid to science than it should have been. Therefore, for the first time GLL "Kholod" flew only on November 28, 1991. In this and the next flights, it should be noted, instead of the head unit with fuel equipment and an engine, its mass and size model was installed. The fact is that during the first two flights, the missile control system and the exit to the calculated trajectory were worked out. Starting from the third flight, "Cold" was tested fully loaded, but two more attempts were needed to tune the fuel system of the experimental unit. Finally, the last three test flights took place with liquid hydrogen injected into the combustion chamber. As a result, until 1999, only seven launches were carried out, but it was possible to bring the operating time of the E-57 scramjet engine to 77 seconds - in fact, the maximum flight time of the 5V28 rocket. The maximum speed reached by the flying laboratory was 1855 m / s (~ 6.5M). Post-flight work on the equipment showed that the combustion chamber of the engine, after draining the fuel tank, retained its operability. Obviously, such indicators were achieved thanks to the constant improvements of the systems based on the results of each previous flight.
Tests of the GL "Kholod" were carried out at the Sary-Shagan test site in Kazakhstan. Due to problems with financing the project in the 90s, that is, during the period when the tests and refinements of "Kholod" were underway, in exchange for scientific data, foreign scientific organizations, Kazakh and French, had to be attracted. As a result of seven test launches, all the necessary information was collected to continue practical work on hydrogen scramjet engines, the mathematical models of the operation of ramjet engines at hypersonic speeds were corrected, etc. At the moment, the "Cold" program is closed, but its results have not disappeared and are used in new projects.
