The design of the mobile anti-aircraft guided missile system was carried out on the basis of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2838/1201 of November 20, 1953 "On the creation of a mobile anti-aircraft guided missile system to combat enemy aircraft." During this period, the Soviet Union was already testing the S-25 guided stationary anti-aircraft missile system, intended for air defense (air defense) of large administrative and industrial centers of the country, however, given the high cost of such complexes, it was not possible to provide all important objects with reliable anti-aircraft cover on the territory of the country, as well as areas of concentration of troops. The Soviet military leadership saw a way out in the creation of a highly maneuverable anti-aircraft missile system (SAM), albeit inferior in its capabilities to a stationary system, but allowing in a short time to regroup and concentrate air defense forces and means in threatened directions. The work on the creation of the complex was entrusted to the KB-1 team of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building under the leadership of the famous designer A. A. Raspletin. On the basis of KB-1 personnel for the design of the rocket, OKB-2 was created under the leadership of designer P. D. Grushina. In the process of designing the complex, the developments and engineering solutions found during the creation of the S-25, including those not implemented in the stationary complex, were widely used. The design of the missile guidance station (SNR) was directly carried out by a team of designers under the leadership of S. P. Zavorotishchev and V. D. Seleznev on the basis of the theoretical method of "half-straightening", which makes it possible to construct and select the most optimal trajectories of a rocket's flight.
Rocket 1D before the first launch, April 1955
The rocket, designated B-750 (product 1D), was created on the basis of a normal aerodynamic scheme, had two stages - a launch with a solid-propellant engine and a sustainer with a liquid engine, which ensured a high initial speed from an inclined launch.
Rocket scheme 1D:
1. Transmitting antenna RV; 2. Radio fuse (RV); 3. Warhead; 4. Receiving antenna RV; 5. Oxidizer tank; 6. Fuel tank; 7. Air bottle; 8. Block of an autopilot; 9. Radio control unit; 10. Ampoule battery; 11. Current converter; 12. Steering drive; 13. Tank "I"; 14. Main engine; 15. Transitional compartment; 16. Starting engine.
Specialists from NII-88 were involved in the development of the sustainer stage engine, the launch stage engine was created in KB-2 of plant No. 81. The SM-63 launcher was created at TsKB-34 (St. Petersburg) under the leadership of chief designer B. S. Korobov. At GSKB (Moscow), the PR-11 transport-loading vehicle was developed.
Preparing to load the launcher
The preliminary design of the air defense missile system, called the S-75, was basically ready by mid-May 1954 Flight tests of the B-750 rocket began on April 26, 1955 with a throw-in launch and ended in December 1956. space of the Soviet Union, in August 1956 the country's leadership made a decision on the all-round acceleration of work on the introduction of the S-75 complex. Although the field tests of the complex began only in August 1957, they were quite successful. By the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1382/638 of December 11, the SA-75 "Dvina" air defense missile system was put into service. Simultaneously with the organization of the serial production of the SA-75, the KB-1 design team continued to work on the creation of a complex operating in the 6 cm range. In May 1957, a prototype S-75 operating in the 6 cm range was sent to the Kapustin Yar test site for testing. In the new complex, the option of placing the elements of the SNR in three cabins, located in two-axle car trailers, was implemented, in contrast to the SA-75, where the equipment was located in five KUNGs of ZIS-151 or ZIL-157 vehicles. This decision was made in order to preserve the resources of the automotive part of the complex (trailer towing vehicles could be kept in stationary boxes, while the KUNG chassis were constantly outdoors at the starting positions).
SNR-75 missile guidance station S-75M4 "Volkhov" air defense missile system
In the design of the CHR-75, the originally envisaged principle of target selection was implemented, which was not applied in the SA-75. An automated launcher APP-75 was added to the SNR equipment set.
The new complex was equipped with SM-63-1 and SM-63-2 launchers, which ensured the use of modernized missiles (product 13D).
The layout of the elements of the S-75 air defense system in position
Especially for the S-75 air defense system, the V-750N missile was designed, later a more advanced modification of it V-750VN (product 13D) was developed, which entered the troops from the end of the 50s. After the completion of the field tests by the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 561/290 of May 22, 1959, the new complex was put into service under the name S-75N "Desna".
The warhead is a high-explosive fragmentation mass of 196 kg (for 20D missiles) and 190-197 kg (for 5Ya23). The radius of destruction of the warhead can reach 240 m against targets such as U-2. For small targets such as a fighter, the radius of destruction is reduced to 60 m.
It should be noted that the designation S-75 is common for the name of all modifications of the complex, and there were quite a few of them for the long service of the famous air defense system:
- SA-75 "Dvina" with V-750 SAM - the first serial complex operating in 10 cm
range (1957);
- SA-75M "Dvina" with V-750V, V-750VM, V-750VK missiles (1957);
- SA-75MK "Dvina" with SAM V-750V - export version of the SA-75M (1960)
- S-75 "Desna" with V-750VN missiles - with electric vacuum equipment of 6 cm range (1959);
- S-75M "Volkhov" with V-755 missiles (product 20D), V-755U (product 20DU) - a complex with an increased target engagement zone (1961);
- S-75M "Volkhov" with V-760 SAM (product 15D) - a complex with a missile with a special warhead (1964);
- S-75D "Desna" with V-755 and V-755U missiles (1969);
- S-75M "Desna" with V-755 missiles - export version (1965);
- S-75M1 "Volkhov" (1965);
- S-75M2 "Volkhov" with V-759 missiles (product 5Ya23) (1971);
- S-75M3 "Volkhov" with the V-760V missile defense system (product 5V29) - a complex with a missile with a special warhead (1975);
- S-75M4 "Volkhov" with a television optical sight and simulator of the SNR (1978)
In the mid-seventies, the complexes began to be equipped with a 9Sh33A television-optical sighting device with the introduction of an optical target tracking channel, which made it possible, under conditions of visual observation of an air target, to conduct its tracking and shelling without using radar air defense systems in radiation mode. The stations of the later release also use a new design of the "narrow" beam antennas. The minimum height of the affected area was reduced to 200 (100) m. The flight speed of the targets hit was increased to 3600 km / h. The mode of shooting at a ground target has been introduced. Joint tests of a new version of the system were completed in November 1978. In the course of the planned overhaul, the S-75M "Volkhov" complexes of early models were brought up to the level of the latest modifications of the C-75M4 "Volkhov" supplied to the troops.
Optical sighting device SNR C-75M4 "Volkhov"
The C-75 complex was produced under license in China (HQ-1, HQ-2). It was exported to the countries - participants of the Warsaw Pact, as well as to Algeria, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, China, Cuba, Libya, DPRK, Mozambique, Mongolia, Syria, Yugoslavia and some others.
The S-75 complex includes: SNR-75 missile guidance station (antenna post, U command cabin, A control cabin, RD-75 Amazonka radio range finder, support and towing equipment), launchers (SM- 63, SM-90) - 6 pcs., Transport-charging vehicles PR-11 - 6 pcs.
RD-75 "Amazon"
The complex is in service with the anti-aircraft missile battalion (zrn) of the anti-aircraft missile brigade (zrbr). In the case when the air defense station performs tasks as a separate one, it can be attached to the P-12 Yenisei reconnaissance and target designation radar and the PRV-13 radio altimeter from the radio engineering division (RTDN) of the brigade.
Radar P-12
Radio altimeter PRV-13
Terrestrial radio interrogators "Silicon-2M", "Password-1", and since the mid-1980s - "Password-3" (75E6), "Password-4", interface and communication cab 5F20 (later 5F24, 5X56), reception targeting from automated control systems.
Additionally, the division could be equipped with radio relay communication equipment 5Ya61 "Cycloid".
When creating the S-75M "Volkhov" complex and during its operation, hardware modifications of the missile guidance station were carried out, which made it possible to reduce the minimum height of the affected area to 1 km.
Launcher SM-90
To defeat group targets in conditions of enemy interference, a missile with a special warhead (nuclear) was developed.
After the successful completion of the tests, the V-760 (15D) missile with a special warhead for the S-75M system was put into service.
Decree of May 15, 1964. N421-166 and Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense N0066 of 1964. In terms of its characteristics, it practically corresponded to the B-755, differing from it in the greater minimum height of the affected area, adopted on the basis of the safety conditions of the covered objects. In 1964, 15D (V-760) missiles with a special warhead were supplied for the S-75M complex, which could also be used in complexes of later modifications.
The S-75 complexes defined an entire era in the development of the country's air defense forces. With their creation, missile weapons went beyond the Moscow region, providing cover for the most important facilities and industrial areas throughout almost the entire territory of the USSR.
The first combat systems were deployed on the western border near Brest. In 1960, the air defense already included 80 C-75 regiments of various modifications - one and a half times more than was included in the C-25 grouping. A year later, the number of C-75 regiments almost doubled, in addition, 22 C-75 brigades and 12 mixed brigades (C-75 together with C-125) were deployed.
During the formation of anti-aircraft missile brigades in the Air Defense Forces of the country, the question arose about the organization of automated control of the complexes. In 1963, the automated control system for missile systems ASURK-1 was adopted, which provided control of the combat actions of eight divisions of the S-75 system.
Information about the combat use of the S-75 air defense system is still not completely complete and objective.
Little known to a wide range of facts, but the first aircraft destroyed by the air defense system was shot down over China. In the 50s, reconnaissance aircraft of the United States and Kuomintang Taiwan flew over the territory of the PRC with impunity for a long time.
At the personal request of Mao Zedong, two sets of SA-75M "Dvina" air defense systems were handed over to the Chinese and training of calculations was organized.
Satellite image of Google Earth: Positions of the C-75 air defense system in the PRC
On October 7, 1959, an RB-57D high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft of the Taiwanese Air Force was shot down by an S-75 complex near Beijing, at an altitude of 20,600 m. It was the first aircraft in the world to be destroyed by a missile defense system. For secrecy reasons, it was officially announced that he was shot down by an interceptor aircraft. Subsequently, several more aircraft were shot down over the PRC, including 3 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2 Lockheed. Several pilots were captured. Only after this did reconnaissance flights over the territory of mainland China cease.
On November 16 of the same year, near Stalingrad, the S-75 air defense system was destroyed by an American reconnaissance balloon flying at an altitude of 28,000 m.
On May 1, 1960, a US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Sverdlovsk, pilot Gary Powers was captured.
At that time, there was still no experience in firing at real enemy aircraft, so the cloud of U-2 wreckage falling to the ground was initially taken by the missilemen for passive interference supplied by the aircraft, and the knocked-out U-2 was re-fired with a salvo of three missiles. However, there was nothing wrong with that. More sadly, the fact that the intruder was destroyed for almost half an hour was never recorded, and at that time there were several Soviet planes in the air, trying in vain to intercept the intruder. As a result, half an hour after the defeat of the U-2 due to confusion at the level of the local command, a pair of MiG-19s was fired upon by another three-missile salvo, which had been raised to intercept the intruder almost an hour before. One of the pilots, Ayvazyan, promptly dived under the lower border of the affected area, and the other pilot, Safronov, died along with the plane.
Nevertheless, despite this tragic episode, the anti-aircraft missile forces for the first time confirmed their high efficiency. The victory of the missilemen looked especially impressive against the background of repeated unsuccessful attempts by fighter aircraft to intercept the U-2.
Another politically significant use of the SA-75 was the destruction of U-2 over Cuba on October 27, 1962. In this case, pilot Rudolph Anderson died, and this "first blood" added fuel to the fire of the "Cuban missile crisis". At that time on the "island of freedom" were two Soviet divisions with anti-aircraft missile systems, which were armed with a total of 144 launchers and twice as many missiles. However, in all these cases, as in the use of anti-aircraft missiles at U-2 over China in 1962, low-speed and non-maneuverable unarmed aircraft were subjected to fire, although flying at very high altitudes. In general, the conditions for combat firing differed little from the range, and therefore the ability of the SA-75 to hit tactical aircraft was rated by the Americans as low.
A completely different situation developed in Vietnam during the hostilities in 1965-1973. After the first "rehearsal" that took place during the "Tonkin Crisis" in August 1964, the United States from the beginning of 1965 began systematic bombing of the DRV (North Vietnam). Soon the DRV was visited by a Soviet delegation headed by A. N. Kosygin. The visit resulted in the start of large-scale deliveries of weapons to the DRV, including the SA-75 air defense system. By the summer of 1965, two SA-75 anti-aircraft missile regiments, manned by Soviet military specialists, were deployed in Vietnam. The Americans, who had recorded the preparation of positions for new weapons as early as April 5, 1965, rightly assumed the presence of "Russians" on them and, fearing international complications, did not bomb them. They did not show heightened concern even after July 23, 1965, an RB-66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft recorded the first activation of the SA-75 radar.
The situation changed radically the very next day, when, on July 24, three missiles fired by a Soviet crew under the command of Major F. Ilinykh fired at a group of four F-4Cs flying at an altitude of about 7 km. One of the missiles hit the Phantom, which was piloted by Captains R. Fobair and R. Keirn, and fragments of two other missiles damaged three other Phantoms. The pilots of the downed Phantom ejected and were captured, from which only R. Keirn was released on February 12, 1973, the fate of the co-pilot remained unknown.
So, it is extremely bad for the Americans, the events unfolded the first time after the start of the use of the air defense system. And this despite the fact that the Americans began to prepare for a meeting with Soviet anti-aircraft missiles immediately after the destruction of Powers' plane. In 1964, in the California desert, they conducted a special exercise "Dessert Strike", during which they evaluated the capabilities of aviation in the area of operation of air defense missile systems. And immediately after receiving information about the first downed Phantom missiles, the Hopkins Institute was involved in the study of possible anti-air defense systems.
Following the first recommendations received on countering air defense systems, the Americans significantly increased their reconnaissance activities, assessing in detail the capabilities of each detected air defense system, taking into account the surrounding terrain and, using non-projectile areas at the joints and at low altitudes, plotted their flight routes. According to the testimony of Soviet specialists, the quality of reconnaissance was very high, and it was carried out with such thoroughness that any movement of missilemen in the shortest possible time became known to the Americans.
Other recommendations for countering air defense missile systems were reduced to the implementation of tactical and technical techniques - the implementation of an approach to bombing targets at low altitude, maneuvering in the area of the air defense missile system, setting up radio interference cover from EB-66 aircraft. The main option for avoiding missiles during 1965-1966. became an intense reversal. A few seconds before the arrival of the rocket, the pilot put the plane into a dive under the rocket with a turn, change in altitude and course with the maximum possible overload. With a successful execution of this maneuver, the limited speed of the missile guidance and control system did not allow compensating for the newly arisen miss, and it flew by. In case of the slightest inaccuracy in the construction of the maneuver, fragments of the missile warhead, as a rule, hit the cockpit.
During the first month of the SA-75's combat use, according to Soviet estimates, 14 American aircraft were shot down, while only 18 missiles were used up. In turn, according to American data, only three aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles during the same period - in addition to the previously mentioned F-4C (Soviet specialists counted the destruction of three Phantoms in that battle at once) on the night of August 11, one A- 4E (according to Soviet data - four at once) and on August 24 another F-4B. Such a mismatch in losses and victories, however, characteristic of any war, over the next seven and a half years of hostilities became an indispensable companion of the confrontation between Vietnam's air defense and American aviation.
Satellite image of Google Earth: the position of the C-75 air defense system in Vietnam
According to American data, only about 200 vehicles were lost from the SAM fire. One of the pilots shot down by an anti-aircraft missile was future presidential candidate John McCain. It can be assumed that, in addition to the in principle possible deliberate misinformation, the reason for the Americans' underreporting of the data on losses from the air defense missile systems may be their lack of objective data on the specific reasons for the death of their aircraft - the pilot could not always inform the command that he was fired upon by the air defense missile system. On the other hand, the history of all wars testifies to the inevitable and often unintentional overestimation of the number of their victories by the combatants. Yes, and a comparison of the reports of the missilemen, who judged the effectiveness of the firing by the marks on the screens, with a more primitive method of accounting for the downed American planes by the Vietnamese by the serial numbers on the wreckage, in a number of cases indicated an overestimation of the number of planes destroyed by missiles by 3-5 times.
The average missile consumption per shot down aircraft accounted for 2-3 missiles at the initial stage of use and 7-10 missiles at the time of the end of hostilities. This is due to the development of countermeasures by the enemy and the use of Shrike anti-radar missiles. In addition, it should be remembered that Dvina fought in extremely difficult conditions. It was not supported by air defense systems of other classes, the air defense missile systems fought in combat conditions with the enemy constantly adapting to the changing situation, free to change the tactics of the raid. There was no continuous anti-aircraft missile fire zone in Vietnam at that time.
However, despite the fact that, even according to Soviet experts, the air defense system shot down less than a third of the destroyed American aircraft, the most important result of their use was the need for a radical change in aviation combat tactics, its forced transition to flights at low altitudes, where it suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and small arms, as a result of which the effectiveness of the use of aviation was significantly reduced.
In addition to Vietnam, air defense systems of the C-75 type were also massively used in conflicts in the Middle East. The first experience of using them in the "Six Day War" can hardly be attributed to successful ones. According to Western data, the Egyptians, with 18 complexes, were able to launch only 22 missiles, shooting down two Mirage-IIICJ fighters. According to Soviet data, the Egyptians had 25 S-75 divisions, and the number of aircraft shot down by missiles was 9. However, the most unpleasant event of that war was the capture by the Israelis in the Sinai Peninsula of some components of the S-75, including missiles.
More successfully anti-aircraft missiles were used in the so-called "war of attrition". On July 20, 1969, the Egyptians shot down an Israeli Piper Cub and before the start of the 1973 war brought the number of S-75 victories to 10. One of them was highly rated by the Egyptians when the S-75 on September 17, 1971 "took off" at a distance of 30 km radio reconnaissance aircraft S-97.
From the traveler image of Google Earth: the position of the C-75 air defense system in Egypt
Judging by foreign data, during the "October War" of 1973, another 14 Israeli aircraft were shot down by the Egyptians and Syrians using the S-75 air defense system.
Israeli pilots condescendingly called the S-75 air defense missile systems "flying telegraph poles." However, the use of this air defense system forced to abandon flights at altitude and move to low-altitude flights, which made it difficult to perform a combat mission and led to large losses from low-altitude air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery. To be fair, it is worth noting that the use of the S-75 in Vietnam was more successful. This was affected by the general low motivation of the Arabs to fight, sloppiness, stereotyped actions and outright betrayal.
These complexes were also used in Lebanon by the Syrians in 1982. In addition to the most large-scale wars in Vietnam and the Middle East, complexes of the C-75 type were used in many other conflicts, starting with the Indo-Pakistani clash of 1965, when their first victim in the "third the world "became the Indian An-12, mistakenly mistaken for the Pakistani S-130.
During the 1991 Gulf War, 38 S-75 air defense systems were in service with Iraq. However, they were all suppressed or destroyed as a result of the operation of various electronic warfare systems and a massive attack by cruise missiles.
The S-75 was used in a large number of armed conflicts and is still used by some countries. In our country, it was withdrawn from service in the early 90s.
On the basis of two-stage missiles of the S-75 system (20D of various modifications, 5Ya23), the RM-75 target rocket has been developed in two main modifications. RM-75MV is a low-altitude target used to simulate air targets in the altitude range of 50-500 m at a flight speed of 200-650 m / s, a flight range of 40 km. RM-75V is a high-altitude target missile with a flight range of 40-100 km that allows simulating air targets at altitudes from 1000 to 20,000 m with flight speeds of 350-1200 m / s.
Target missiles are used as part of the standard modified S-75MZ complexes. The modified target complex allows for: maintaining a high level of air defense combat readiness; training of combat crews in conditions close to real; testing of air defense systems; conditions of group raid targets.
