The construction of a centralized air defense system in the PRC began in the mid-50s of the last century, simultaneously with the beginning of massive deliveries from the USSR of jet fighters, radar stations, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns. Thousands of Chinese specialists were trained in the Soviet Union, who later formed the backbone of national technical personnel.
In the 1950s, the aviation of the United States and Kuomintang Taiwan often violated the air border of the PRC. Chinese fighters MiG-15 and MiG-17 repeatedly rose to intercept intruders. A real air war was going on over the Taiwan Strait. In 1958 alone, PLA aircraft shot down 17 and damaged 25 enemy aircraft, while their own losses amounted to 15 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters.
Intruder aircraft invaded the country's airspace, taking advantage of the presence of high mountain ranges on the southeastern coast of the PRC, which interfered with the operation of ground-based radar stations.
The situation became even more complicated after the delivery of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft RB-57D and U-2 to Taiwan from the USA. Already in the first three months of 1959, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft made ten hours-long flights over the PRC, and in June of the same year, reconnaissance aircraft flew over Beijing twice. The celebration of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the PRC was approaching, and the forecasts of a possible disruption of the anniversary celebrations looked quite real. The then Chinese leadership took these flights very painfully.
In this situation, Mao Zedong made a personal request to Khrushchev for the delivery of the latest SA-75 Dvina air defense systems to the PRC. Despite the beginning of a cooling in relations between the PRC and the USSR, Mao Zedong's personal request was granted, and in the spring of 1959, in an atmosphere of deep secrecy, five SA-75 fire and one technical divisions, including 62 11D anti-aircraft missiles, were delivered to the PRC.
At the same time, a group of Soviet specialists was sent to China to service these anti-aircraft missile systems, who, in addition to preparing Chinese calculations, began organizing air defense of large cities: Beijing, Xian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Shenyang.
This was a very serious step on the part of the Soviet leadership. Anti-aircraft missile systems had just begun to enter service with Soviet air defense units, and in the conditions of the Cold War, which at any moment could turn into a hot one, there was an acute shortage of them.
Soon, several intruder aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles of Soviet anti-aircraft systems over the territory of the PRC. Moreover, the first successful case of combat use occurred earlier than in the USSR. Under the leadership of Soviet military adviser Colonel Viktor Slyusar, on October 7, 1959, near Beijing at an altitude of 20,600 m, the Taiwanese RB-57D, a twin-engine long-range reconnaissance aircraft, was for the first time shot down, which is a copy of the reconnaissance version of the British Canberra.
The high combat qualities of the Soviet SA-75 air defense system at that time prompted the Chinese leadership to acquire a license for its production, about which all the necessary agreements were soon reached.
However, the Soviet-Chinese differences that began to intensify in the late 1950s became the reason that in 1960 the USSR announced the withdrawal of all military advisers from the PRC, which was the beginning of the practical curtailment of military-technical cooperation between the USSR and the PRC for a long time.
Despite the termination of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the defense field, the Chinese managed to start independent production of air defense systems. In China, it was named HQ-1 (HongQi-1, "Hongqi-1", "Red Banner-1").
Simultaneously with the start of mastering the production of the HQ-1 air defense system in 1965, the development of its more advanced version under the designation HQ-2 was started. The new Chinese air defense system was distinguished by an increased range of action, as well as higher performance when working in conditions of using electronic countermeasures. The first version of the HQ-2 entered service in July 1967.
In the creation of the "Chinese air defense system" HQ-2, the war that was raging then in Southeast Asia was very much promoted. Despite sharp political differences, a significant part of Soviet military aid to Vietnam went by rail through the territory of the PRC. Soviet specialists have repeatedly recorded cases of loss of samples of aviation and rocket equipment during their transportation through the territory of the PRC. Thus, the Chinese, not disdaining banal theft, got the opportunity to get acquainted with modern Soviet developments.
The HQ-2 air defense system of various modifications for a long time became the main and only anti-aircraft missile system that covered the skies of China. Its improvement and creation of new options continued until the end of the 80s. In general, the Chinese analogue of the Soviet S-75 air defense system repeated the path traveled in the USSR with a delay of 10-15 years.
In 1986, the "mobile version" - HQ-2B entered service. As part of the HQ-2V complex, a launcher on a tracked chassis was used, as well as a modified rocket equipped with a new radio fuse, the operation of which depended on the position of the rocket relative to the target. Also, a new warhead was created (or rather, copied from Soviet missiles), increasing the likelihood of hitting a target.
However, the HQ-2B complex did not become truly mobile; the rocket, fueled with fuel and an oxidizer, could not be transported over a significant distance on a tracked chassis. It could only be about increasing the mobility of launchers and their independence from towing facilities.
Simultaneously with the HQ-2V, the HQ-2J air defense system was adopted, in which a stationary launcher was used to launch the rocket.
In total, over 600 launchers and 5000 missiles were produced in the PRC over the years of production of the HQ-2 air defense system. About 100 anti-aircraft missile battalions HQ-2 of various modifications for a long time formed the basis of the PRC's air defense.
Google Earth snapshot: the position of the HQ-2 air defense system north of Beijing
Complexes of modifications HQ-2B and HQ-2J are still in service with the PLA air defense units. But every year the number of them in the ranks is steadily decreasing. Areas and objects requiring special attention in the field of cover from air attack are currently protected by modern air defense systems of Russian or Chinese production.
Google Earth snapshot: a passenger airliner flies over the HQ-2 air defense system, somewhere in the vicinity of Urumqi
Honored HQ-2 are used as backup next to modern air defense systems or in secondary hinterland. But even here they do not have to serve for long, in 4-5 years the Chinese S-75 can only be seen in the museum. SAM HQ-2 outlived its progenitor C-75 by more than 20 years. In Russia, the last complexes of this type stopped being on alert at the beginning of the 90s.
For a long time, the PLA air force was based on the J-6 (MiG-19) and J-7 (MiG-21) fighters, the production of which was established in the PRC. But they did not fully meet the requirements for an air defense interceptor fighter. On these front-line fighters, which were not bad for their time, there were no radars and automated guidance systems, the range, flight altitude and acceleration characteristics were clearly insufficient for the requirements for the interceptor. But in the conditions of aggravated relations on the Soviet aid it was not necessary to count. And so I had to start developing a fighter-interceptor myself.
The fighter-interceptor, designated J-8, made its first flight on July 5, 1969. Outwardly, it resembled the MiG-21, but was much larger and had two engines. Due to the "Cultural Revolution" raging in the PRC, the refinement of the aircraft was greatly delayed, and it entered service only in 1980.
Interceptor J-8
The aircraft was equipped with two WP-7A TRDFs and an SR-4 radio range finder. The fighter-interceptor's armament consisted of two Type 30-I 30-mm cannons and two PL-2 short-range air-to-air missiles (the Chinese version of the Soviet K-13 melee missile) with infrared guidance.
Naturally, with such avionics and weapons, even taking into account good acceleration characteristics, the aircraft could not be a full-fledged interceptor. And therefore it was released in a limited edition.
In 1985, an improved version of the J-8I was adopted with an SL-7A radar (range of 40 km), a Type 23-III double-barreled 23-mm cannon. The aircraft had four rockets. However, due to the low characteristics of the radar, this interceptor model also did not receive wide distribution.
A J-8I interceptor next to a J-7 fighter. There is a noticeable difference in size
At the beginning of the 90s, a new modification of the interceptor, the J-8II, entered service. Since the new powerful radar did not fit into the air intake cone, the nose of the aircraft was radically redesigned. The J-8II has a foldable ventral fin and side air intakes. While developing the J-8 family of interceptors, the Chinese engineers conceptually repeated the evolution of the Soviet interceptors: Su-9, Su-11, Su-15.
J-8II
The aircraft had an advanced SL-8A radar with a detection range of up to 70 km. The interceptor received improved WP-13AII engines. Armament included a Type 23-III double-barreled 23 mm cannon (a copy of the GSh-23L) and up to four PL-5 or PL-8 air-to-air missiles.
The Chinese J-8II interceptor fighter has characteristics typical of a 3rd generation aircraft:
Dimensions: wingspan - 9.34 m, length - 21.59 m, height - 5.41 m.
Wing area - 42, 2 sq. m.
Normal take-off weight of the aircraft - 14,300 kg.
The fuel supply in the internal tanks is 5400 liters.
Engine type - two TRDF 13A II, unrated thrust - 2x42, 66 kN, forced - 2x65, 9 kN.
The maximum speed is 2300 km / h.
Combat radius of action at an altitude of 800 km, with refueling 1200 km.
Practical range - 1,500 km.
Service ceiling - 19,000 m
Crew - 1 person.
Subsequently, on the basis of the J-8II, more advanced modifications were developed, equipped with new engines, an air refueling system and a new multifunctional pulse Doppler radar. J-8II fighters can use suspended electronic warfare containers, as well as containers with target designation and navigation systems. The armament may include medium-range air-to-air missiles R-27 and PL-11 and anti-radar missile YJ-91.
On the whole, the J-8II characterizes well enough the level of aircraft construction of the PRC in the late 80s, combining Soviet technology of the 60s with elements of modern Western and Russian avionics and aviation weapons "grafted" into it. Despite attempts to modernize the J-8II by introducing modern systems and weapons on new modifications, this aircraft as a whole does not meet the requirements of the time. In service in the PRC there are about 200 fighters of this type, in the future they will be replaced by J-11 fighters and the 5th generation fighters being developed in the PRC.
The most high-profile incident involving the J-8II interceptor was a mid-air collision on April 1, 2001 with an American EP-3E Airis II electronic reconnaissance aircraft. According to the representatives of the People's Republic of China, early in the morning of April 1, two PLA Air Force fighters were taken into the air "to displace" the American reconnaissance aircraft, which turned out to be over Chinese territorial waters. From the reports of world news agencies, it can be concluded that the EP-3E aircraft was tracking the newest ships of the Chinese Navy - the destroyers of Project 956E built in Russia.
According to Chinese officials, 104 kilometers from Hainan Island, an American plane made an unexpected maneuver towards Chinese vehicles, ramming one of them. As a result, the J-8II interceptor fell into the sea, killing its pilot. After that, the crew of the American car, under the threat of the use of weapons, made an emergency landing at the Lingshui airfield on the Chinese island of Hainan.
EP-3E at the Chinese airfield
China blamed the United States for the incident with the American military aircraft. The Americans had to apologize for the incident and pay monetary compensation to the widow of the deceased Chinese pilot.
As a result of the incident, the US defense was severely damaged. After a forced landing, the American crew did not manage to destroy all cryptographic and reconnaissance equipment. The vehicle was disassembled by the Chinese for detailed examination and subsequently returned to the United States (in July 2001). EP-3E arrived "to its historical homeland" after being disassembled into parts in the belly of the An-124-100 Ruslan transport aircraft of the Russian airline Polet.
In the early 90s of the last century, the general state of China's air defense system did not correspond to modern realities. Ground radio engineering units responsible for lighting the air situation, for the most part, were equipped with outdated equipment with "Soviet roots". For example, the most massive Chinese mobile two-coordinate standby radar, YLC-8, was created on the basis of the Soviet radar - P-12. This station has been produced in the USSR since 1956.
Radar YLC-8
An attempt to independently create AWACS and U aircraft on the basis of Tu-4 bombers supplied by the Soviet Union in the 60s was unsuccessful. The Chinese industry was unable to achieve the required level of reliability and stability of the characteristics of a complex electronic complex and the construction of the first Chinese AWACS aircraft was limited to a single copy.
Aircraft AWACS KJ-1
The basis of the PLA Air Force was 3 thousand fighters J-6 (copy of the MiG-19) and J-7 (copy of the MiG-21). A small number of J-8 interceptors by China's standards, which, lacking a centralized guidance system and long-range missiles, did not meet modern requirements.
The HQ-2 air defense systems available in the PRC by the beginning of the 90s could no longer effectively deal with modern air attack weapons. They had low immunity to interference, were single-channel, and took a long time to relocate. Several thousand Chinese anti-aircraft guns of caliber 85 mm and 100 mm could only conduct ineffective barrage anti-aircraft fire.
In terms of their technical equipment in the Chinese air defense units by the beginning of the 90s, at best, they corresponded to the indicators of the USSR air defense of the early 70s. Realizing this, the Chinese military and political leadership has made great efforts and spent significant funds to remedy the situation. In a relatively short time interval, Chinese air defense units received new modern equipment of foreign and domestic production. But this will be discussed in the second part.
