Oil in the Far East (then not yet completely Soviet) Japan took possession of in 1920. It was not about concessions or leases of deposits. Then our aggressive neighbor occupied, in addition to southern, also northern Sakhalin. The Japanese did not waste time. For five years the oilmen of the Land of the Rising Sun have been conducting intensive geological research on the eastern coast of the island, clearly hoping to make Sakhalin their oil appendage. In such a short period of time they have created all the industrial conditions for the active start of exploration and production drilling.
Of course, the young Soviet state also began to show interest in the natural resources of Siberia and the Far East. However, given the difficult political situation in the region, he did not have the strength and capabilities in the 1920s. Even at the X Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in March 1921 it was indicated that "the objects of concessions may be those sectors of the national economy, the development of which will clearly raise the level of development of the productive forces of Russia."
And it was not yet possible to expel the Japanese from northern Sakhalin. The situation seemed hopeless. And then the Russian leadership decided to turn to the United States for help. On May 14, 1921, representatives of the Far Eastern Republic signed a preliminary agreement on a concession for oil production in the north of Sakhalin with the American oil company Sinclair Oil.
Already on May 31, the US Secretary of State sent a note to the Mikado government with a firm statement that the United States could not agree to the adoption of any measures by the Japanese authorities that would violate the territorial integrity of Russia.
The American company, in accordance with the concession agreement, received two plots with an area of 1000 sq. km for gas and oil production for a period of 36 years. Sinclair Oil pledged to spend at least $ 200,000 on exploration and production, and to launch two drilling rigs within two years. The rent was set at 5% of the annual gross production, but not less than $ 50 thousand. But, unfortunately, the Americans did not take any steps to "squeeze" the Japanese out of northern Sakhalin. On the contrary, through the United States, Tokyo offered Russia, only, to sell the island and thereby solve all political and economic problems in the region. Of course, this kind of proposal was rejected.
On January 20, 1925, the "Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and Japan" was signed in Beijing. It put an end to the occupation of the northern part of Sakhalin by Japanese troops and restored the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905 in force. The famous American historian D. Stephen called this Convention “a brilliant victory for Soviet diplomacy. The Russians achieved the withdrawal of Japanese troops from northern Sakhalin without the use of force, although as early as 1924 many politicians believed that Japan would either annex or buy the territory. Moreover, they officially confirmed the sovereign right of the USSR to this part of the island. This step dispelled the hope of some Japanese circles that someday the entire Sakhalin island, like a ripe persimmon, will fall into the empire's basket."
At the same time, in the "A" protocol, article IV of the document signed in Beijing, it says exploitation of mineral, forest and other natural resources throughout the USSR”.
Protocol B dealt with all issues of concession relations between the two countries, which must be implemented within five months from the date of the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin.
The Japanese were not satisfied with everything in the Beijing document - it was not in vain that they invested so much in the exploration and development of the natural resources of the occupied territory. They demanded to transfer to them the concession for almost all or at least 60% of the oil wells. After lengthy negotiations, on December 14, 1925, Russia and Japan signed a concession agreement - Japan received 50% of oil and coal deposits for a period of 40 to 50 years.
The Japanese were obliged to deduct to the councils as payment for the concession from five to 45% of gross income. Also, the concessionaire was obliged to pay local and state taxes, rent. The Japanese could also import labor from their country, in the ratio of 25% unskilled and 50% skilled workers.
In 1926, within the framework of a concession, the Japanese established the Joint Stock Company of the North Sakhalin Oil Entrepreneurs, whose fixed capital was 10 million yen (200 thousand shares of 50 yen each), the paid-in capital was four million yen. The largest companies in the country, up to Mitsubishi Gooshi, became the main shareholders. The Americans, on the other hand, missed their chance to get cheap oil and gas - they had many energy donors in the world. In 1925, the contract with Sinclair Oil was terminated by the Russian authorities.
By the 1930s, oil production at the North Sakhalin concession had stabilized at the level of 160-180 thousand tons per year.
The fulfillment of the concession conditions was controlled by a special commission, which included representatives of the Sakhalin Revolutionary Committee, the Sakhalin Mining District, and members of various People's Commissariats. The People's Commissariat of Labor brought to the attention of the Dalkonzeskom the provision on the organization of strict control over the execution of the Soviet labor legislation by the concession, but, at the same time, pointed out the need for a cautious approach to the concessionaires. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks explained to the local authorities that sanctions against concessionaires and foreign workers could only be implemented with the consent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and that the arrest of Japanese employees could be made, if necessary, only with the permission of the USSR Prosecutor or the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.
The distrust of local authorities in the concessionaires affected the practical activities of Japanese enterprises. The administration of the concessions turned to their government for help, wrote letters to the NKID and other authorities. In this regard, in March 1932, a telegram was received from the Center to Sakhalin in which it was noted that “the executive committee and other representatives of the authorities … are behaving defiantly towards the Japanese concessionaires … conflicts. Not to inflate the case with issues of labor protection, to severely punish those guilty of violating the directives of the Soviet government and agreements with the Japanese."
Strong ties were established between the Japanese government and the concession enterprises, which were expressed in the government's right to monitor the progress of industrial and commercial operations through its delegates. Every year, starting in 1926, representatives of a number of Japanese departments came to Okha, and the consul closely followed the work of concessions and the relationship between Soviet institutions and concession enterprises.
Tokyo even had plans to organize a visit to the north of Sakhalin by the young emperor Hirohito, who, being the crown prince, managed to visit only the southern Japanese part of the island in 1925.
But in the USSR, this could already be regarded as an open claim to annexation, and then all the concession benefits could then be forgotten forever. The government of the country received royalties from the activities of the oil company if the profit exceeded 15% of the paid-in capital. All oil produced was handed over to the Japanese Maritime Ministry, which controlled business activities in northern Sakhalin.
Oil production by the concessionaires was growing - during the existence of the concession, the Japanese exported more than two million tons of oil from northern Sakhalin, mainly for the needs of their Navy. But it cannot be said that the Sakhalin concession was beneficial only to our overseas neighbors. The implementation of the concession showed the Soviet side the possibility and expediency of oil production in northern Sakhalin.
The importance of oil concessions for the Soviet side was determined by the fact that their activities proved the possibility and expediency of oil production in Northern Sakhalin. Prompted the creation and deployment of work by the Soviet Sakhalinneft trust (organized in 1928), to which the concessionaire rendered significant assistance in organizing production and establishing household and storage of oil, to provide loans for the purchase of equipment abroad, the population of the fields were supplied with goods and products.
Japan, which occupied Korea and Manchuria in 1941, actually dominated the Far East. The center of industrial production, which included both the extraction of minerals and gigantic production at that time, was with the Japanese in this region, and with the USSR - far in the European part. From the point of view of military power, both sea and land, it was possible to proceed only from the fact that in the event of Japanese aggression the Red Army would only be able to hold out until reinforcements from the western part of our country arrived.
It is widely believed that our victories at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol prevented the samurai from unleashing a war. This is partly true, intoxicated by the chain of continuous military triumphs, our neighbors for the first time knew then the bitterness of defeat. Nevertheless, Japan was forced in 1941 to conclude a pact of neutrality with the USSR. What prompted the Japanese to take such a step?
Ironically, the reason was economic interests. Tokyo and its main ally Berlin were in dire need of natural resources. Metals were more or less enough, but the situation with oil was extremely difficult. Germany was somehow rescued by the Romanian oil fields, but the Yamato empire ran out of oil by the 1920s, and no “black gold” was found at that time either on the subordinate lands of Korea and Manchuria.
The main suppliers were American corporations - it was they who supplied up to 80-90 percent of all the volumes of oil that Tokyo needed. Oil was sorely lacking. As an alternative, they considered the supply of oil from the southern territories, then under the rule of the Netherlands and Great Britain. But the pursuit of it meant an armed conflict with these European countries. The Japanese understood that the formation of the Rome - Berlin - Tokyo axis and the war with the United States would completely block the American "oil well". Berlin's repeated demands on the Japanese to unleash a war against the USSR would mean inevitable defeat for the Far Eastern ally.
Where to get oil? There was only one option - in the Soviet Union, on Sakhalin … That is why in the fall of 1940 the Japanese ambassador offered V. Molotov a neutrality treaty in exchange for preserving the Sakhalin concessions. And the consent was received.
However, the war changed the plans of politicians. When signing a neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan in 1941, the Japanese side assured that all concessions would be liquidated by 1941. The German attack on the USSR delayed the resolution of this issue until 1944. Only then was a protocol signed in Moscow, according to which Japanese oil and coal concessions were transferred to the ownership of the USSR. Among the reasons that forced Japan not to drag out the process even further, one cannot but single out one - under the blows of the American fleet, the Japanese Navy was practically unable to ensure the safe transportation of oil produced on Sakhalin to the metropolis.
The concession that brought Japan's proximity to energy sources largely influenced the Mikado government's decision not to cooperate with Germany in its June 1941 offensive against the Soviet Union. It turned out to be very beneficial for the USSR, and not only in monetary terms, but also in terms of the experience of developing remote regions. But during the war, the most important thing was the political benefit - by restraining Japan, the Soviet Union avoided a war on two fronts. The long-term neutrality of its eastern neighbor allowed the USSR to concentrate its military efforts on the Western Front for several years, which largely predetermined the outcome of the war.
