At the end of May 1941 I. F. Kuznetsov reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on the completion of the formation of anti-tank brigades and the VDK of the district. At the same time, the commander of the district noted with bitterness that the recruitment of airborne units was made from personnel who did not even undergo initial training, and part of the personnel of formations and units was recruited “from the indigenous peoples of the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, who had little or no command of speak Russian. The hull parts are completed with a wide replacement of specialties. As a result, the anti-tank brigades of the district were understaffed, and half of the personnel of the specialty were not trained. Besides…
In August 1940, three Baltic states became part of the USSR: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Leaving outside the brackets of this article the problems of the actual entry of these states into the USSR and the subsequent policy of the Soviet government in these countries, we only note that the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) was created on the territory of these countries in the same year, more precisely on August 17, 1940. began to be called that way, and was organized on July 11, 1940, the troops of which included the national armies of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.
Initially, Colonel-General of Aviation A. D. Loktionov, however, by the end of 1940 it became clear that Alexander Dmitrievich was not quite coping with the powers assigned to him to command the district. The commander of the district did not arrive at the meeting of the leadership of the Red Army on December 23 - 31, 1940, citing illness, and a member of the Military Council of the district, corps commissar I. Z. Susaykov. But the chief of staff of the PribOVO, Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov showed enviable activity at the meeting. After the end of such a landmark event, the commander of the PribOVO and a member of the Military Council of the district were relieved of their posts. Lieutenant General F. I. Kuznetsov (the rank of Colonel General received in February 1941), and a member of the Military Council - Corps Commissar P. A. Dibrov. The district chief of staff retained his position.
Upon arrival in the district, F. I. Kuznetsov inspected the troops entrusted to him, the situation turned out to be very deplorable: his predecessor did practically nothing to increase the combat capability of the district. Instead of equipping a new state border and combat training, the troops were mainly engaged in the arrangement of military camps, storage facilities for equipment and other household work. The situation was especially bad with the construction of fortified areas along the new state border. At the request of the district commander, a large number of construction battalions arrived from the central regions of the USSR in the spring of 1941, so, only in the defense zone of the 11th Army, 30 "foreign" sapper and engineer battalions were involved.
To cover the 300-kilometer section of the Soviet-German border, 7 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions were to be deployed in the district. The defense of the Baltic Sea coast was entrusted to the Baltic Fleet and the coastal defense units subordinate to it, in addition, for the same purpose, 2 rifle divisions were allocated from the district forces.
The total payroll of the PribOVO troops as of June 22, 1941 was 325,559 people. The district consisted of 19 rifle divisions, 4 tank and 2 motorized rifle divisions, 5 mixed air divisions (see "Combat and numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War" and Statistical collection No. 1 of the RF Ministry of Defense of 1994). As part of the same armies covering the state border were 11 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions. These formations included 183,500 personnel, 1,475 tanks in two mechanized corps of the district (3rd and 12th MK), 1,271 guns and 1,478 mortars, 1,632 anti-tank guns, 119 anti-aircraft guns, and 1,270 combat aircraft (21 June, 530 fighters and attack aircraft and 343 bombers are operational).
The balance of forces of the sides on June 22, 1941 in the PribOVO defense zone was the most depressing for the Soviet side. The enemy concentrated against the troops of the district two (!) Tank groups of four - the 3rd and 4th, 1062 and 635 tanks, respectively [1]. The enemy forces advancing in the Baltics included 21 infantry divisions, 7 tank divisions, 6 motorized divisions and 1 motorized brigade. A total of 562015 (18th Army - 184,249 people; 16th Army - 225,481 people; 4th Panzer Group - 152,285 people.) Personnel, 1,697 tanks, 3,045 guns, 4,140 mortars, 2,556 anti-tank guns. In the interests of this grouping, more than 1,000 aircraft operated (1st Air Fleet - 412 aircraft and 8 Air Corps of the 2nd Air Fleet - 560 aircraft).
The ratio in the PribOVO defense zone was 3: 1 in personnel in favor of the enemy, in terms of tanks 1: 1, in artillery guns 2, 4: 1 in favor of the enemy, in mortars 2, 8: 1 in favor of the Wehrmacht, in anti-tank guns 1, 6: 1, for anti-aircraft 3: 1 in favor of the enemy, and only in terms of aircraft did the Soviet troops have an advantage of 1: 1, 2. And this is without taking into account the number of personnel of the 3rd TGr, and units of the 9th field army of GA "Center" also advancing in the PribOVO defense zone.
The mission of Army Group North in Directive # 21 (Barbarossa) was as follows:
“… To destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic States and seize ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Russian fleet of its bases.
[…]
In accordance with this task, Army Group North breaks through the enemy's front, delivering the main blow in the direction of Dvinsk, advances as quickly as possible with its strong right flank, sending forward mobile troops to cross the river. Western Dvina, in the area northeast of Opochka in order to prevent the retreat of combat-ready Russian forces from the Baltic to the east and create the preconditions for further successful advance to Leningrad.
The 4th Panzer Group, together with the 16th and 18th armies, breaks through the enemy's front between Lake Vishtitis and the Tilsit-Shauliai road, advances towards Dvina in the Dvinsk region and further south and captures a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dvina.
[…]
The 16th Army, in cooperation with the 4th Panzer Group, breaks through the front of the opposing enemy and, inflicting the main blow on both sides of the Ebenrode-Kaunas road, by rapidly advancing its strong right flank behind the tank corps, reaches the northern bank of the river. Western Dvina near Dvinsk and south of it.
[…]
The 18th Army breaks through the front of the opposing enemy and, striking the main blow along the Tilsit-Riga road and to the east, quickly crosses the river with its main forces. Western Dvina near Plavinas and to the south, cuts off enemy units located south-west of Riga and destroys them. In the future, she, quickly advancing in the direction of Pskov, Ostrov, prevents the withdrawal of Russian troops to the area south of Lake Peipsi …"
Based on the data of Soviet intelligence on the transfer of the 4th Tank Group of the Wehrmacht (TGr) to East Prussia, F. I. Kuznetsov began to constantly raise the issue of strengthening the district's anti-tank defense before the People's Commissar of Defense. Perseverance gave positive results: on April 20, 1941, the PribOVO Military Council received a directive from the USSR People's Commissar of Defense on the formation of the 9th and 10th anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK (reserve of the main command) in the district by June 1, 1941, in Siauliai and Kaunas, respectively … In addition, it was planned to form the 5th Airborne Corps (VDK) in Dvinsk (Daugavpils).
At the end of May 1941 I. F. Kuznetsov reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on the completion of the formation of anti-tank brigades and the VDK of the district. At the same time, the commander of the district noted with bitterness that the recruitment of airborne units was made from personnel who did not even undergo initial training, and part of the personnel of formations and units was recruited “from the indigenous peoples of the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, who had little or no command of speak Russian. The hull parts are completed with a wide replacement of specialties. " As a result, the anti-tank brigades of the district were understaffed, and half of the personnel of the specialty were not trained. In addition, the commander of the district emphasized that "the large shortage of commanding personnel in the brigades cannot be covered from the resources of the district."
As a result, the complaints of Fyodor Isidorovich led to the visit of another commission to check the combat readiness of the troops - this is, so to speak, instead of real help to the PribOVO command - but for the sake of justice it should be noted that there was simply nowhere to take trained specialists, command personnel and polls educated recruits.
In modern domestic historiography there is a kind of "sacred cow": they say, the command of the Odessa military district, contrary to the orders of the leadership of the Red Army, brought the district forces into combat readiness; and everything, and "the Wehrmacht did not pass." However, it turns out that not only the OdVO was engaged in "amateur performance". Documents recently introduced into scientific circulation show that the commander of the PribOVO estimated the likelihood of the start of a "big" war very, very high. Moreover, the enemy forces used against ODVO and PribOVO are even ridiculous to compare.
At the beginning of June 1941, based on the results of the work of the commission of the People's Commissariat of Defense, a special order of the commander of the district under the number 0052 was drawn up. In particular, it said the following:
"The check of the combat readiness of the district units showed that some commanders of the units until now criminally do not pay due attention to ensuring combat readiness and do not know how to manage their subunits and units." [2]
The order noted: poor knowledge of the commanders of their areas of combat use of units; in peacetime, units are sent to work tens of kilometers from their places of permanent deployment without weapons and ammunition; disgusting notification and collection on alarm; slow advance to assembly areas and huge traffic jams of troops on the roads due to the inability to control troops on the march, poor interaction of the combat arms; poor command and control of troops, especially at the division-regiment level. It is especially noted that "… the command staff do not know how to navigate the terrain, at night they fornicate [so in the document - V_P], do not know how to manage, they run around the battlefield instead of messengers." [2]
In the order of this document, it is noted:
1. The commander of the 8th Army personally with the commanders of the divisions to conduct exercises on the ground … By June 29, each division commander must work out a decision on the ground, which the army commander will approve ….
2. For the corps commanders, conduct an on-site exercise with each regiment commander by 24.6.
3. To the commanders of the divisions to conduct exercises on the ground with each commander of the battalion - division by 28.6
4. The task of the exercise is, according to the decision of the senior commander, to prepare the occupation of the terrain for stubborn defense. The main thing is to destroy enemy tanks and infantry, to shelter your troops from enemy aircraft, tanks and artillery fire.
5. wire barriers to start installing immediately, as well as prepare for the installation of minefields and the formation of blockages. " [2]
Further, the commander of the district emphasized:
"The commanders of battalions, divisions, companies, batteries must know exactly their positions and the ways of a covert approach to them, and as soon as the positions are taken, pay special attention to burying all types of weapons and personnel deep into the ground." [2]
It was necessary to prepare in advance two firing positions for each machine gun, mortar and gun - the main and the spare. It was recommended to pay special attention to the organization of artillery fire in order to massage its fire in any direction where one could expect the appearance of enemy tanks, for which it was necessary to prepare in advance for a maneuver with fire and wheels.
The district commander pointedly paid attention to management issues. He demanded from all commanders to ensure reliable control in battle through the advance preparation of the main and reserve command posts, from the battalion to the division, inclusive, as well as the main and reserve communication lines. In addition, the commander listed all the methods by which the enemy will try to disorganize control. He directly warned:
“It should be borne in mind that poorly verified people work at communication centers, including spies working for the enemy. Therefore, from the first day of the division's entry into the area of its operations, all communication centers on the territory of the division's strip - corps must be occupied by signalmen of military units. It is necessary to firmly establish the identification signal of the senior boss for the junior and the junior for the senior. Only the direct and immediate superior has the right to give oral orders. Do not give any verbal orders over the phone … Written orders should be written briefly and clearly … "[2]
The order established a 40-minute deadline for the alert to raise units of all combat arms. Some lines of the pre-war order of the commander of the PribOVO turned out to be truly prophetic:
"We must firmly understand that mistakes in the actions of one person, especially when this person is a commander, can cost a lot of blood." [2]
And finally:
“The order is to fully know the command personnel up to and including the division commander. The army commander, corps and division commander should draw up a calendar plan for the execution of the order, which will be fully fulfilled by June 25, 1941”. [2]
Isn't that a very remarkable document? It clearly shows that, unlike the Western Special Military District, where the expectation of "orders from above" reigned, Fyodor Isidorovich took measures to prepare for the invasion, however, unfortunately, all these measures were hopelessly late. Looking ahead, I will say that despite the incompleteness of measures to bring the troops of the district to combat readiness and the worst possible ratio of forces of the parties on June 22, 1941, F. I. Kuznetsov managed to prevent the complete defeat of the forces of his district in the border battle.
This order was signed by the commander, a member of the Military Council and the chief of staff of the district, printed in 41 copies and sent to the addressees on June 15, 1941. That is, a week before the start of the Second World War!
But the commander of PribOVO did not stop there! On June 14, the redeployment of four rifle divisions (SD) and the command of the 65th rifle corps (SK) to the border zone began. Closer to the border, 4 corps artillery regiments and 1 howitzer regiment (GAP) of the RGK were deployed. All these formations and units were to concentrate in the indicated areas by 23.06.41.
Despite the strictest warning from the People's Commissar of Defense regarding written documents to bring the troops of the border districts into a state of increased combat readiness, the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation retained a telephone message from the Military Council of the PribOVO dated June 13, sent to the commander of the 48th SD (a copy to the commander of army 8):
1. The 48th rifle division should be withdrawn and parked in the forests to the south and north of Nemakshchay. The exact areas for the regiments should be rectified and determined during June 14 and 15.
2. Withdraw all units of the division and take with you all the supplies intended for the first mobilization echelon.
3. In winter quarters, leave the minimum number of people necessary to mobilize the 2nd echelon of the division and guard the warehouses with the property left for the 2nd mobilization echelon.
4. Set out on the night of June 16-17 and move to the new area only by night crossings. Concentration of the division will be completed completely by 23 June.
5. During the day, settle on halts, carefully masking parts and carts in the forests.
6. The plan for the division's transition to a new area and an application for the necessary vehicles will be provided to me by 1.00 June 16, 1941.
7. [handwritten - auth.] Pay special attention to the full combat readiness of the division. " [3]
2 days later, on June 15, the Military Council of the district sent a coded message to the chief of the AU (artillery department) of the district. By the end of June 23, both corps artillery regiments (AP) were ordered to be "withdrawn from the Riga camp and transported to winter camps" by this document. By June 26, the 402nd High Power Howitzer Artillery Regiment (GAP BM) should be withdrawn and deployed in the forest area of the Uzhpelkiai station. At the end of the order it is written by hand: “Carry out the transportation at night. Loading - before dark. Unload at dawn. " [4]
June 16 F. I. Kuznetsov sends a directive to the troops on the procedure for notifying the district troops in case of violation of the state border by the enemy:
“The division commanders, having received a message about the border crossing from the commanders of the border units, their reconnaissance units or from the VNOS posts and having checked it, report to the commander of the district troops or the chief of staff of the district in the first place, and then to the corps commander or the army commander, while taking measures to reflection.
On the same days, the commander of the PribOVO bombards the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff with constant reports on the concentration of German troops near the Soviet border, but Moscow stubbornly keeps silent.
Finally, on June 18, Moscow permits, under the guise of conducting exercises, the withdrawal of the first echelon of the PribOVO headquarters (250 generals and officers), which by 12.00 June 20 occupied a previously prepared command post in the forest 18 km north-east of Panevezys. The second echelon of the headquarters was withdrawn on June 21.
On the same day, the commander of the PribOVO Colonel-General Fyodor Isidorovich Kuznetsov gave order No. 00229, in which, in order to quickly bring the district troops into combat readiness, it was ordered by the end of the day on June 18 to withdraw the army formations to the cover zones of the state border, as well as bring the entire air defense and communications on the territory of the district - and to carry out a number of other measures to repel possible enemy aggression. But immediately followed by "pulling" from Moscow. Bringing air defense systems to full combat readiness by June 21, 1941 was canceled by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G. K. Zhukov: “Without the sanction of the People's Commissar, you gave an order on the air defense to enact regulation No. 2, which means to carry out a blackout in the Baltics, thereby causing damage to the industry. Such actions can only be carried out with the permission of the government. Your order provokes various rumors and irritates the public. I demand to immediately cancel the illegally given order and give an encrypted explanation for the report to the People's Commissar. " Alas, Kuznetsov's explanation has not yet been found.
Despite this, the commander of the PribOVO continues to put the district troops on alert. On June 18, the district headquarters issued an order to the subordinate troops as follows:
“In order to bring the theater of military operations into combat readiness as quickly as possible [even this is how - author] of the district, I order:
To the commander of the 8th and 11th armies:
[…]
c) to start procurement of improvised materials (rafts, barges, etc.) for the construction of crossings across the rivers Viliya, Nevyazha, Dubissa. Crossing points should be established in conjunction with the operational department of the district headquarters.
Subordinate the 30th and 4th pontoon regiments to the military council of the 11th army. The regiments should be in full readiness to build bridges over the Neman River. A number of exercises to check the condition of laying bridges with these regiments, having achieved the minimum deadlines;
[…]
f) the commander of the 8th and 11th armies - with the aim of destroying the most important bridges in the strip: the state border and the rear line of Siauliai, Kaunas, r. Neman to foresee these bridges, to determine for each of them the number of explosives, demolition teams, and in the nearest points from them to concentrate all means for demolition. The plan for the destruction of bridges shall be approved by the Military Council of the Army. Deadline 21.6.41 "[5]
On June 19, Kuznetsov sends a four-point directive to all army commanders in the district:
1. Supervise the equipment of the defense strip. A blow to the preparation of positions on the main strip of the UR, the work on which should be strengthened.
2. In the foreground, finish the work. But the positions of the foreground should be occupied by troops only in case of violation of the state border by the enemy.
3. To ensure quick occupation of positions both in the foreground and in the main defensive zone, the corresponding units must be completely on alert.
4. In the area behind their positions, check the reliability and speed of communication with border units. " [6]
Dear reader, one should not assume that F. I. Kuznetsov was the only person in the PribOVO who considered the imminent attack of the German troops to be a fact. Intelligent commanders of formations, and especially those whose units were located directly near the border, understood that this was a matter of several days - a maximum of a week or two. For example, the encryption of the commander of the 125th SD of the 11th SK of the 8th Army from June 19, 1941 has been preserved. Major General P. P. Bogaychuk writes to the commander of the district:
“According to intelligence information and data from deserters, up to seven divisions of German troops are concentrated in the Tilsit area.
On our side, no defensive measures have been taken to guarantee against an attack by mechanized units, and it is enough for the Germans to let in one tank battalion, as the held garrison can remain taken by surprise. Interior patrols and patrols can only alert units, not provide. The zone of the foreground without garrisons will not detain the Germans, and the border guards may not warn the field troops in time. The front line of the division is closer to the state border than to the units of the division, and without preliminary measures to calculate the time, the Germans will be captured before the withdrawal of our units there.
Reporting on the situation at the border, please:
1. Give instructions on what measures I can now carry out, guaranteeing against an unexpected invasion of motorized equipment of the Germans, or give me the right to develop an action plan myself, but the division's funds are not enough for this ….
4. Allow me to withdraw not two battalions, provided for by the directive of the district number 00211, but four battalions for work in the front line."
The reaction to the report of Major General Bogaychuk of higher authorities is very interesting. The commander of the PribOVO imposed the following resolution on it: “Do not hand out live ammunition, but prepare their delivery. To complete the work of the foreground, three battalions should be nominated. More support. You have the strength and means. Manage tightly, use everything boldly and skillfully. Not to be nervous, but to be really in full combat readiness."
A completely different reaction, bordering on hysteria, was caused by another initiative of the commander of the 125th SD in Moscow. Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G. K. Zhukov urgently sends the following encryption code to the PribOVO Military Council:
“To order the division commander Bogaychuk to give in code a PERSONAL explanation to the People's Commissar of Defense on what grounds he evacuated the families of the commanding staff of the division. The People's Commissar considers this an act of cowardice, contributing to the spread of panic among the population and provoking conclusions that are extremely undesirable for us. " [7]
But the most decisive step of the commander of the PribOVO was the withdrawal of the troops of the 8th army of the district to the areas provided for by the plan of covering the state border. Unfortunately, this order was given orally. However, this is confirmed by the surviving documents of the 8th Army formations. So, in the combat order of the headquarters of the same 125th SD from 16.30 on June 19, 1941 (g. Taurogen) it is stated that “in pursuance of the verbal order of the commander of the 11th rifle corps, the 125th rifle division today is 19.6.41. It leaves and occupies a defensive line at the front…. Defense readiness by 4.00 20.6.41, fire systems by 21.00 19.6.41. The withdrawal of units to the main defensive zone should be started immediately, carried out in dismembered formations and completed by 18.00 19.6.41…. Ready pillboxes immediately accept and occupy them with garrisons with appropriate weapons …"
This combat order was carried out. Already on June 20, Major General Bogaychuk reported to the district headquarters: “The units of the division have arrived in the area of the pre-field. I am asking for instructions on whether it is possible to hand out NZ chemical protection products."
But under the pressure of Moscow, the commander of the PribOVO begins to be overcome with doubts - is he doing everything this way when he is told one thing from the capital, but he sees something completely different in the district. Nevertheless, on the telephone message of the restless Bogaychuk, he writes an instruction to the chief of staff of the district: “Make sure that no one gets into the foreground prematurely. It is impossible to create a pretext for provocations”. And the chief of staff angrily telegraphed to the 125th SD: “What is this? Do you know that it is forbidden to occupy the foreground? Find out urgently. Major General Bogaychuk can only be pitied - it's hard to imagine what he felt on the morning of June 22, 1941 …
Despite all doubts, Kuznetsov is withdrawing the troops of the 8th Army to the areas provided for by the plan to cover the state border. Nevertheless, there is a strong feeling that the PribOVO command was playing a kind of "double game". On the one hand, the district was clearly preparing to repel the enemy's aggression, on the other, it carefully concealed it from its own higher command, and hindered the initiative “from below”. It is impossible not to note this paradoxical situation. But let's pay tribute to Colonel-General F. I. Kuznetsov: he did much more than the same commander of the ZAPOVO, although he limited himself to half measures.
June 22, at 0 hours 25 minutes, the chief of staff of the PribOVO P. S. Klenov sends a report to the General Staff of the RKKA (copies to the head of the RKKA Intelligence Directorate, chiefs of staff of the 8th, 11th and 27th armies, and the chief of staff of the Western Military District). In the report, he reports that the concentration of German troops in East Prussia continues. Also, parts of the Wehrmacht are withdrawn to the Soviet-German border. Completed the construction of pontoon bridges across the Neman River in a number of areas. The protection of the border from the German side is entrusted to the field units of the Wehrmacht. In the Klaipeda region, the civilian population was offered to evacuate 20 km inland from the border. In Suvalka district, residents were evicted 5 km from the border. On June 16, 1941, in the Suwalki area, a record was made of horses that were to be taken into the army on June 20. [eight]
At 1.30 a telegram from the General Staff of the Red Army was received, and at 2.15 it was duplicated by the Military Council of the district in the 8th and 11th armies.
On the morning of June 22, 1941, the troops of the German Army Group "North", after massive bombing strikes and artillery preparation (carried out at 5.30 am Moscow time), went on the offensive.
The beginning of hostilities in the PribOVO defense zone for the engineering battalions that were engaged in equipping the border defense zone was completely unexpected. These battalions did not even have small arms. Therefore, as the chief of the engineering troops of the 1st Army, Colonel Firsov, recalls, they “crumbled and immediately lost any military organization, turning into crowds of people fleeing death, as best they could … … The Western Dvina and only intensified the incipient panic. " [nine]
In the very first hours of the invasion, the PribOVO headquarters tried in vain to organize the command and control of subordinate troops. Wire communication lines were partially destroyed by German aircraft, but to a greater extent were cut by saboteurs and local residents, from among the agents of German intelligence. Therefore, the first combat report of the PribOVO headquarters to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, sent at 10.00 am on June 22, was of a general nature. It spoke about the beginning of the offensive of the enemy troops and about the entry into battle with him of individual formations of the district.
Meanwhile, the situation from the very beginning of the fighting was very difficult. By 12.00, one of the regiments of the 10th SD in the Kulei area was surrounded, which forced this division to withdraw to the line of the Minya River. Parts of the 125th SD fought heavy battles in a semi-encirclement in the Taurogen area. The 33rd SD came under a concentrated blow from the 28th and 2nd army corps of the Germans and withdrew to the east. Also, under the pressure of the enemy, the 128th and 188th SDs retreated to the east. There was no communication with the district headquarters and neighbors; each unit commander acted at his own discretion.
After 2, 5 hours, at 14.30, the headquarters of the North-Western Front (as the PribOVO was now called), a new combat report was sent to the General Staff of the Red Army. And again, only general phrases sound in it. The same report mentions the losses among the aviation of the district, which are recognized as "significant".
The first day of the war was ending, but there was still no contact between the headquarters of the North-Western Front and the troops. But already liaison delegates began to arrive on airplanes, cars and motorcycles.
The news was disappointing.
The front chief of staff realized that it would be impossible to get off with vague wordings.
At 22.00, an operational summary of the headquarters of the North-Western Front (NWF) was sent to the General Staff of the Red Army, which, in particular, said: “The defense front of the 8th Army was broken through in the direction of Kryting by enemy tanks and motorcycle units. The formations of the 11th Army are retreating under the onslaught of the enemy. Communication with individual connections has been lost. " [10] It should be noted right away that the report of the NWF headquarters turned out to be the most realistic and honest of all reports of all fronts received by the General Staff of the Red Army during the day on June 22, 1941.
On the night of June 22-23, the NWF headquarters did not manage to restore wire communication with any of the army headquarters. Therefore, on June 23, it was decided to prepare the command and control of the front troops from a spare communications center (Dvinsk), where on the morning of June 24, part of the units of the 17th separate front communications regiment was sent. In the evening of the same day, the front headquarters left Ponevezhes and in the morning of June 25 arrived in Dvinsk, which at that time was already approaching the enemy troops.
But Dvinsk was the largest railway junction, and was constantly bombarded by enemy aircraft. German planes literally "hung" over the city. In addition, numerous groups of saboteurs acted on the railway and in the vicinity of Dvinsk. Under these conditions, the front headquarters began to move out of Dvinsk along the road to Rezekne. On the 44th kilometer of this road in the afternoon, the front headquarters finally managed to communicate by radio with the 8th and 11th armies, and by telegraph - with Riga and Moscow.
Thus, despite the measures taken by the district command, none of the PribOVO formations was able to detain the enemy on the state border line. Moreover, for the first three days after the start of the war, the troops of the first echelon of the front conducted defensive actions according to the decisions of their own commanders, without having control from the front headquarters and a general plan for conducting combat operations.
It is interesting to see how the hostile actions were perceived. From the military operations log of GA "Sever" it follows that this army group, having taken its initial positions at 3:05 a.m. (Berlin time) on June 22, 1941, launched an offensive and crossed the border in the Vistitis - Baltic Sea sector. The resistance of the Soviet troops directly on the border is assessed as "insignificant". It is emphasized that the enemy was taken by surprise, and all the bridges in the offensive zone of GA "Sever" fell into the hands of the Germans intact.
Acting through the gaps in the battle formations of the Soviet troops, by the evening of June 22, GA "Sever" broke through the line of border fortifications and along the entire front advanced to a depth of 20 km. In the area west of Siauliai, German aircraft destroyed and burned from 150 to 200 Soviet tanks and trucks.
Further in this magazine it is written that “based on the testimony of prisoners of war and local residents, as well as the documents found, it can be assumed that the enemy pulled back large border forces about 4 days ago, leaving only a small rearguard cover. Where his main forces are now is unknown. Therefore, it is necessary to establish contact with them as soon as possible in order to engage them in battle and destroy them even before reaching the Western Dvina. [eleven]
On June 23, the offensive of the German troops continued, practically without encountering resistance. There was a significant movement of the columns of Soviet troops along the road to Kaunas, Dvinsk (Daugavpils) and along the road from Vilnius to the northeast. This gave the German command reason to believe that the enemy was retreating in the direction of the Western Dvina. The 16th field army of the Wehrmacht, with its forward units, on the right flank made its way to the Kaunas region (18 km south-west). But by the end of that day, there is strong opposition from the enemy.
Records dated June 24 indicate that Soviet troops launched counterattacks in a number of sectors, and in the evening, a counterattack was carried out against units of the 18th Field Army with significant forces of tanks. It was immediately noted that counterattacks were carried out separately, carried out frontally, as a result of which they did not achieve success, or achieved short-term success, while Soviet tank units suffered heavy losses. [eleven]
From all of the above, it can be concluded that the North-Western Front lost the border battle, but, despite the fact that the offensive of German troops against the troops of the North-Western Front was developing successfully and at a fairly high pace, the enemy was unable to completely defeat the Soviet troops on the territory of the Baltic States and conduct at least one an operation to encircle our armies. The Baltic Special Military District, which, by the way, is the weakest of the special districts of the USSR, managed to avoid a catastrophic development of events according to the Belarusian scenario. Despite this, at the beginning of July, the command of the NWF in full force was removed from their posts with the wording "for inept command of the troops."
