December 7 will mark 69 years since Japanese forces attacked the US naval base at Pearl Narbor. In connection with this event, several conspiracy theories appeared, claiming that the US administration knew in advance about the plans of the Japanese, but did not take any action to prevent the tragedy, allegedly so that the United States had a reason to start a war with Japan.
Few events in US history have sparked as much controversy as the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Rumors abounded during the war, and even the publication of the Congressional Investigation Report on July 26, 1946, despite the fact that it contained information that refuted most of them, did not put an end to speculation. The Pearl Harbor Attack Investigation Report (PHA for short) was in 40 parts and about 23 volumes. Getting answers to bizarre stories that were spreading quickly was challenging even for the most serious of researchers.
Today, however, with the help of a computer search, it is possible to find information about events and people that has been buried in the stacks and attics of the university for decades. Of course, no one can convince die-hard Roosevelt haters that he did not arrange, or at least allowed the attack, but for those of us who just want answers to questions such as "Why did the Opana Point radar signal not reach Admiral Kimmel? ", the testimony of the participants will clarify the situation in the most satisfactory manner.
Each link points to a document that explains why a particular myth is either a lie or a misrepresentation.
MYTH: The US hastily withdrawn aircraft carriers from the port just before the attack to "save" them for the war, Roosevelt already knew then that the aircraft carriers would dominate.
FACT: Two aircraft carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor, Enterprise and Lexington at the time, were seconded to deliver additional fighters to Wake and Midway. See document. These carriers were sent west towards Japan and the IJN, far apart and with light escort.
On December 7, Enterprise was approximately 200 miles west of Pearl and entering Pearl. Lexington was 400 miles west and in front of Midway. See Admiral Kimmel's report on these missions.
"Okay, but they're still out of port!" Yes, but Enterprise is doing everything it can to get back to Pearl. Her first ETA (Estimated Time of Arrival) was Saturday night, but the storm delayed her. The next time was 7 am, 55 minutes before the attack started, but that turned out to be too optimistic as well. She was, however, close enough to Pearl to send her plane forward to land at Ford Island, and several of them were shot down by "friendly fire". See the first document in this section.
The fact that the withdrawal of "aircraft carriers in a hurry from the port" is a myth proves that Enterprise's arrival at the port was scheduled for December 6 and 7, as shown in the Schedule released in August, 41. There were no orders to change this.
MYTH: Pearl Harbor did not receive an urgent message on the morning of December 7th. Options include using a commercial telegraph instead of military radio in order to delay the message.
FACT: Atmospheric conditions interfered with radio communications between D. C. (District of Columbia - District of Columbia) and Pearl Harbor. The choice of commercial telegraph, perhaps not the best means of communication, was chosen for reasons cited in the investigation.
See Congressional investigation.
The army committee was much more critical of the choice made.
Importantly, the DID (Direct Dial) message arrived in Hawaii at 7:33 am local time and was delayed due to the attack.
MYTH: U. S. N. (United States Navy) thought Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a torpedo attack.
FACTA: The document has a message from the chief of naval operations stating that no harbor should be considered safe from torpedo attack. However, at Pearl Harbor, it was envisaged that the fleet should be ready to leave the harbor at short notice and the removal of the anti-torpedo network could slow down the exit of units from the harbor. See document.
MYTH: The "fourteen parts" message that the Japanese ambassador was supposed to deliver to the US Secretary of State 1/2 hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor was a declaration of war, or at least a break in diplomatic relations, which would have made it clear that war had begun.
FACT: the message is not a declaration of war, or even a severance of diplomatic relations. It seems that the repetition of the Japanese accusations against the US, and the UK and the Netherlands was not the real purpose of the message. See document.
So when did the Japanese government prepare a declaration of war? Was it just not delivered on time? Recording from Japanese sources indicates that the meeting that was called to compose this message did not take place until 12:44 pm, December 7, Pearl Harbor time. See document.
The Japanese delivered a 2-line message to Ambassador Grew on the afternoon of December 8th Tokyo Time (late morning, December 7th, THTime.) An Imperial Rescript that told the Japanese people that they were at war could be heard in the United States at 4pm. December 7, District of Columbia time.
MYTH: Captain of USS WARD, an anti-submarine patrol at the entrance to Pearl Harbor, sent a message that he had sunk a submarine an hour before the start of the air attack.
FACT: See the actual report file in the ComFOURTEENTH message center. Captain Outerbridge reported an attacking submarine, but did not sink it. (Time permitting, we will follow the message through the systems of Admiral Kimmel, who would not play golf while this is happening.) document.]
Playback of Bishop's Point Radio recordings.
which shows reports in Com 14th. Another important message is 1810Z when a coded confirmation request came to WARD. It took a while to decode the message and encode the response, and by the time everything was ready, bombs were already falling.
MYTH: Opana Point radar reported the Japanese attack 1 hour before the planes arrived at the harbor, but Admiral Kimmel refused to do anything.
FACT: Eliot and Locard were members of the radar crew at Opana Point. They noticed a large-scale spike and called the not yet fully operational fighter information center. Private MacDonald took the call and informed the only employee at the Center who asked him to call the operators. Lt. Kermit Tyler, who is completing his first training tour at the newly created Fighter Control Center, received the report and, thinking it was a B-17 flight from the mainland, told the operators to "forget it." The report did not go above.
There are only a few people who have actually participated in any work or creation and the Figher Information Center (FIC). Privates Locard and Elliot were at Opana Point, Pvt. MacDonald and Lieutenant Tyler were at the FIC. Other "stakeholders" were Colonel Bergqvist, who created the FIC with Colonel Tyndall, and US Navy Commander Taylor, who was in Hawaii to teach sailors how to use radar. All of their readings are now available. See docs.
At the beginning of the article, the authors write that they have access to a huge number of documents related to these events, and are going to publish the refutation of the myths further. In addition, they give their e-mail address, where anyone can ask a question about a specific event. If you are fluent in English, you can ask a question directly, and if not, you can ask your question in the form of a comment, I will translate this question into English, send it to the authors, and as soon as I receive an answer, I will post it here.
