In the previous article, we compared the capabilities of the modernized TARKR "Nakhimov" and three frigates, which could probably be built for the funds spent on modernizing the nuclear-powered giant cruiser. Briefly, the conclusions can be summarized as follows.
In comparison with three frigates, the TARKR "Admiral Nakhimov" is a real floating arsenal. The thing is that the cruiser will have 80 UKSK cells, 92 (probably) mines of the S-300FM air defense missile system and 20 533-mm torpedoes or PLUR "Waterfall". In other words, the TARKR ammunition load includes 192 cruise and anti-ship missiles, heavy missiles and PLUR, while three Project 22350 frigates can carry only 48 such ammunition in UKSK installations (according to data from the Almaz-Antey corporation website, UKSK can be used for the use of heavy missiles). At the same time, the ammunition load of the Redut air defense missile system, and it will most likely be installed on the TARKR, will most likely correspond to that on all three frigates of the type "Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Gorshkov".
As for the missile guidance channels, then, taking into account the possible modernization of the control radar of the S-300FN air defense missile system, it can be assumed that the TARKR will have an advantage over 3 frigates when repelling an attack from one side, approximately equal to them when attacking from two directions and will yield to them, if the attack consists of different 3-4 sectors. The anti-submarine capabilities of the three frigates will probably still be higher due to the fact that there are three of them, and they can cover a large area. But the hydroacoustic complex TARKR, most likely, is nevertheless individually more powerful, the number of helicopters is the same, despite the fact that the cruiser still has a preference as an "airfield" - if only due to less susceptibility to rolling.
But three frigates of Project 22350 are roughly equivalent to the cost of the serial MAPL of Project 885 Yasen-M. Perhaps it made sense, instead of modernizing the TARKR, to order another modern nuclear-powered submarine for the industry?
It must be said that if a direct comparison of the tactical and technical characteristics of the TARKR with 3 frigates still has some meaning, then a similar comparison of a surface ship with an underwater one, apparently, does not have one. Yes, these ships can be assigned the same tasks, for example, search and destruction of enemy submarines, or a missile attack on a group of enemy surface ships, but the methods of their implementation will be very different. Therefore, below we will consider some of the main tasks that can be solved by the fleet in peacetime and wartime, and how 3 frigates, a TARKR or a multipurpose nuclear submarine can cope with them.
Demonstration of the flag
Of course, a gigantic nuclear cruiser will make a much bigger impression than one or two frigates. On the other hand, the presence of three frigates ensures that at least one of them will always be on the move, more often there will be two, and sometimes all three. In other words, the TARKR is more noticeable and "more significant", but still it must undergo current and average repairs from time to time, and it may turn out that at the right time it will not be on the move, but this will not happen with frigates. In addition, the TARKR is atomic, that is, it may not enter all ports, and this may also impose certain restrictions.
As for the MAPL, it is of little use for displaying the flag, and, as a rule, is not used.
Force projection
Here we are talking about the application of political pressure by military means, and for this all three types of ships are equally suitable. We only note that the TARKR, being a large ocean-going ship with a much greater autonomy than a frigate, is better suited for this task in the distant sea and ocean zones. At the same time, an MPS like the Yasen-M in solving this problem is limited in its effectiveness, for the simple reason that an undetected nuclear submarine poses a real danger to a potential enemy's navy. But if the nuclear submarine is not detected, then the threat from it is not felt, and if it reported itself, then it turns from a hunter into a game.
On the other hand, there are a number of specific situations when MAPL will be preferred. For example, the NATO navy did not like it very much when our Pike surfaced in the area of their anti-submarine exercises, the presence of which was not known until it specifically unmasked itself. Yes, and our submariners serving on SSBNs were clearly not too pleased to hear when, during training preparations for the launch of ballistic missiles, the covers of torpedo tubes of a foreign submarine were opened.
Combat service
By it, the author means a projection of force, in the implementation of which there is a likelihood of its real use. In other words, this is a situation in which our warship accompanies the target in readiness for its immediate destruction - upon receipt of an order, of course.
In most cases, when solving such a problem, the TARKR here will have an advantage over frigates and over a nuclear-powered submarine. Consider, for example, a classic case of tracking the US AUG - and at least in the same Mediterranean Sea. Of course, if you look at the globe, then this sea looks very small, in comparison with the endless expanses of the Atlantic, Pacific or Indian Ocean. But in fact the Mediterranean is very, very large - for example, the distance from Malta to Crete is about 500 miles, and in order to come from Gibraltar to Turkish Izmir, you will have to overcome about 2,000 miles. Of course, the cruising range of the Project 22350 frigate is much longer and amounts to 4,500 miles. But the fact is that a frigate can overcome such a distance only by following at an economic speed of 14 knots, and if you need to go faster, then the cruising range will drop sharply. At the same time, the American destroyer Arlie Burke, with a cruising range of 6,000 miles at 18 knots, will naturally be able to travel much longer at high speed than the Admiral Gorshkov. The Project 22350 frigate is quite capable of escorting a single Arlie Burke or a group of such destroyers for some time, or even a full-fledged AUG, following at high speed, but then it will simply start to run out of fuel, so it will have to stop chasing.
In other words, if the Americans plan to strike first, they may well, after undertaking a series of energetic maneuvers and moving for a long time at a speed of 25 knots or more, break away from the tracking of our frigates and at the moment of the start of the attack get out from under the "cap" of Soviet ships. But with the TARKR, for obvious reasons, such a "number" will not work in any case: its YSU is able to report the maximum speed to the ship for almost unlimited time.
In principle, a multipurpose nuclear submarine, possessing an equally unlimited power reserve, in theory can also control the movement of enemy ships. But in this case, the problem of secrecy of movements arises for the submarine. The fact is that the 3rd generation nuclear submarines were relatively quiet only at speeds of 6-7 knots (roughly), for the 4th generation atomarins, that is, Sivulf, Virginia and Yasen-M this figure was increased up to about 20 knots, but all the same, the squadron of surface ships can move much faster for some time. Accordingly, the submarine controlling their movement will also have to give a big move and thereby unmask itself. This, perhaps, will not be decisive in the event that our ship receives the order to use weapons first. But if the Americans receive such an order, the nuclear submarine will hardly have a chance to strike, it will most likely be destroyed before the use of weapons.
During the Cold War, our sailors often used this method - since the routes for the advancement of SSBNs from bases to areas of combat training were well known to the command, anti-submarine aviation rose into the air, placing a line of hydroacoustic buoys on the route, or "ambushed" on the way of SSBNs a multi-purpose Submarine. As a result of such actions, American nuclear submarines were often identified, following our "strategists" - even despite the best low-noise indicators of the atomarins of our "sworn friends". And if suddenly the leadership of the USSR at some point decided to inflict a preemptive nuclear strike, then the American "hunters" could well have been destroyed before they had time to cause harm to the SSBNs taking up positions. Alas, the same is true for our MAPLs tracking the AUG.
TARKR here will have an advantage due to significantly greater combat stability. To "overwhelm" a surface ship under 25 thousand tons of displacement is far from a trivial task, even if there is an advantage of the first strike. Here, even tactical nuclear weapons do not guarantee success (it is possible that the ammunition with nuclear warheads will be shot down). So, with a high degree of probability, the TARKR, even being attacked and dying, will still be able to inflict a fatal blow on the aircraft carrier of our "sworn friends".
Covering areas of SSBN deployment
Very often we come across the point of view that such a cover is completely unnecessary: they say, the presence of surface or submarine ships or aircraft in guarding our strategic missile carriers only unmasks the latter. With this point of view, one should unconditionally … agree.
As it was absolutely rightly noted by a number of respected “members of the VO commonwealth”, SSBNs are not a flock of sheep, but MAPLs, or other warships are not shepherds, and such their use can really unmask strategic submarine missile carriers. Nevertheless, it is necessary to cover the areas of SSBN deployment, only this is done in other ways.
The easiest way to make this analogy. For a long time, during the Second World War, the anti-submarine defense of the British was reduced to improving the protection of convoys of transport ships - they were assigned a greater number of PLO ships, later escort aircraft carriers began to be included in the convoys, etc. But at the same time, as the military production of Britain and the United States grew, starting in 1942, the so-called "support groups" began to form. They were separate detachments, consisting of patrolmen, frigates and destroyers, whose task was the free hunt for German submarines. In other words, these hunting groups were not burdened with the duty to protect one or another slow-moving convoy, but had to independently, and in cooperation with the deck and base aviation, search for and destroy enemy submarines.
So, approximately, our SSBN cover should be built, which does not consist at all in the fact that we will attach several nuclear submarines and surface ships to each missile carrier, but in the fact that we should be able to clear the Barents and Okhotsk seas of anti-submarine aviation and submarines of our potential adversaries. Thus, SSBN coverage will be achieved.
To solve this problem, depending on the area and other conditions, somewhere frigates will be more needed, somewhere - nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, and in general, joint efforts of aviation, surface and submarine ships will be required. According to the author, frigates and MAPL "Yasen-M" will be the most effective for solving this problem, but the TARKR for such work is still excessively large and excessively armed. He is simply not optimal for such tasks, although he can, of course, take part in solving it. Even before its modernization, the TARKR possessed all the advantages of the Project 1155 BOD, which had the same Polynom sonar system and 2 helicopters, but at the same time it also had long-range missiles capable of pretty annoying anti-submarine aviation.
Participation in a global conflict
In the event of a global conflict, the most dangerous surface enemy of our fleet will be the US aircraft carrier strike forces. Alas, the capabilities of our surface ships to resist them are extremely limited.
In essence, more or less acceptable chances of destroying the AUG by a missile strike of TARKR or frigates are achieved only from the position of tracking it in peacetime. That is, if at the beginning of the war our ships control the location of the AUG and manage to use their strike missile arsenal, then with the highest degree of probability the US aircraft carrier will be destroyed, or at least completely lose its combat effectiveness. If in this way the TARKR is used, which is armed with hypersonic anti-ship missiles, most likely, the aircraft carrier will be destroyed along with the escort ships.
But in all other situations, there will be very few chances of hitting the AUG at surface ships - either the TARKR or the frigates. The Americans will not necessarily have to go to our shores; they may well achieve the goals they need by deploying aircraft carriers off the coast of Norway and Turkey, in the Norwegian and Mediterranean seas, without entering the Black or Barents Seas. It will be extremely difficult to reach them there by surface ships.
Soviet missile cruisers and destroyers, for all their advantages, had two fundamental shortcomings. Firstly, the flight range of anti-ship missiles, even heavy ones, as a rule was less than the range of American carrier-based aircraft, so that Soviet surface ships would have to go for a rapprochement for many hours under the threat of destruction from the air. The second is the lack of reliable means of target designation for over-the-horizon firing of anti-ship missiles, and not even in missile cruisers, but in the USSR Navy in principle.
Unfortunately, the range of the hypersonic "Zircons" in the anti-ship missile version is currently unknown. But even if we assume that it is 1000 km, and this is extremely doubtful, then the problem of obtaining target designation still remains. Detection, identification and tracking of enemy ships located in the zone of absolute enemy air domination is today an extremely difficult, if not solvable, task today. Theoretically, in the absence of an appropriate aviation deck, this could be done using satellites or over-the-horizon radars, but we chronically lack the former, and the latter require additional reconnaissance.
Of course, the submarine will face the same difficulties as the surface ship, but the MPS will have advantages due to its stealth: despite all modern means of detecting submarines, they still, in this parameter, have a significant advantage over the surface ones. At the same time, miracles should not be expected from a single submarine.
Today, the US aircraft carrier strike group is clearly the top of the "food pyramid" at sea. This does not mean at all that the AUG cannot be defeated, but this requires a developed system of naval reconnaissance and target designation, as well as the joint efforts of highly trained and sufficiently numerous diverse forces, including surface and submarine ships and aviation. In connection with the landslide reduction in the number of ships and naval aviation, unfortunately, we do not have anything of this today, and neither single TARKR or Yasen-M, nor a trio of frigates are able to correct this situation.
And again, all of the above does not mean that these forces will be completely useless for us. In certain circumstances, thanks to the competent actions of the commanders and the professionalism of the crews, it will be possible to achieve success even with obviously weaker forces. Thus, in the course of the Anglo-American exercises in 1981, the British destroyer Glamorgan under the flag of S. Woodward managed, undetected, to approach the "heart" of the American order - the aircraft carrier "Coral Sea" and "hit" it with a salvo of anti-ship "Exocets" from a distance of only 11 nautical miles. Despite all the escort ships, 80 attack and reconnaissance aircraft of the air wing, including AWACS aircraft.
"Trophy" of Admiral S. Woodward - aircraft carrier "Coral Sea"
However, one should not forget that S. Woodward, in addition to "Glamorgan", had at his disposal 3 more frigates and 3 auxiliary ships, which he used to "attack" the AUG from various sides. Despite the fact that the attack began from 250 miles (hardly in a real combat situation British ships would have been "allowed" to approach the AUG so close) and the undoubtedly high professionalism of British sailors, out of 7 ships and vessels involved in the attack, luck smiled only at one …
In general, we can state the following - in terms of confronting the US AUG, the chances of the above ships are low, but, probably, the Ash M is still higher, followed by the TARKR and in last place - the three frigates.
Local conflicts
However, you need to understand that global war is not the only form of conflict for which the Russian Navy should be prepared. The USSR, and, later on, the Russian Federation had earlier and still has the USA and NATO as their main geopolitical adversaries. However, we had to fight in Afghanistan, then in Chechnya, then in Georgia, then in Syria … In other words, we should not ignore the possibility of our fleet's participation in some local conflicts, like what happened among the British and Argentines in 1982 for the Falkland Islands.
So, oddly enough, but in such conflicts, the modernized TARKR can prove itself much better than a multipurpose nuclear submarine. This thesis perfectly illustrates the experience of the British in their war for the Falkland Islands, where the British nuclear submarines demonstrated literally blatant uselessness.
Let us briefly recall how events developed. After the capture of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, the British, having decided on a military solution to the conflict, had to solve 3 problems:
1. Establish supremacy at sea and in the air in the area of the disputed territories.
2. Ensure the landing of the required number of troops.
3. Defeat and surrender the Argentine land forces that have captured the Falkland Islands.
Let's face it, the British had little strength for this. Argentina could use about 113 combat aircraft against the British squadron, of which 80 Mirages, Daggers, Super Etandars and Skyhawks had real combat value. By the beginning of the operation, the British had as many as 20 Sea Harriers FRS.1, the only advantage of which was that they were located on two aircraft carriers, which could, at the request of the commander, approach the Falkland Islands as close as desired, while the Argentine pilots had to act from the mainland, and almost at the maximum range. However, this did not apply to the air group of the only Argentine aircraft carrier.
In other words, the Royal Navy did not have anything even remotely similar to air superiority. He also did not have a noticeable superiority in surface forces, because, apart from aircraft carriers, the Argentine fleet included 8 surface ships, including a light cruiser, 4 destroyers and 3 corvettes, and the British - 9 ships of the class "destroyer" or "frigate ". The number of cruise missile launchers for the British and Argentines was the same, 20 each, and they both used the Exocet anti-ship missile system.
In other words, it turned out that the Argentines had an advantage in the air, and an approximate equality in strength over the water. Thus, the only "trump card" of the Royal Navy remained submarines, in which the British had absolute superiority: three nuclear submarines of Great Britain could withstand one single diesel submarine (German project 209) "San Luis".
I would like to note that out of the three British nuclear submarines, two - Spartan and Splendit, belonged to the Swiftshur class and were the most modern ships that entered the fleet in 1979 and 1981, respectively.
Nuclear submarine "Spartan"
These were nuclear submarines of moderate displacement 4 400/4 900 tons (standard / underwater), with a crew of 116 people, and armed with 5 * 533-mm torpedo tubes with an ammunition load of 20 units, which, in addition to torpedoes and mines, could also include cruise missiles "Sub-Harpoon" or "Tomahawk". Although the missiles, most likely, were not on them during the Falklands conflict. In a submerged position, nuclear submarines could develop up to 30 knots, but their main advantage was the use of a jet propulsion unit instead of classic propellers, which made it possible to seriously reduce their low noise. The third atomarina - "Concarror", although it belonged to the previous type of nuclear submarine "Churchill", but, as of 1982, was also a completely modern warship.
What were these three British submarines supposed to do? The Argentine fleet's plan was simple enough - in anticipation of the British attack, it went to sea, deploying three tactical groups, and was ready to attack as soon as the British began to land. Thus, the British submariners had to intercept these groups in the 400-mile interval between the coast of Argentina and the Falkland Islands and destroy as many Argentine ships as possible.
What did the British submarine manage? Of the three tactical groups, the British could not find a single one. Yes, Concarror managed to get in touch with TG-79.3 with the light cruiser Admiral Belgrano and two destroyers, but the location of the Argentine squad was told by US space intelligence. Of course, it was not too difficult for a modern atomarine to escort three warships still of military construction, which did not have modern acoustic equipment, and to sink the Belgrano when such an order was received. But the black humor of the situation lies in the fact that the Argentines set TG-79.3 purely demonstration tasks: in other words, this group was supposed to divert the attention of the British, while the carrier-based aircraft of the only Argentine aircraft carrier, together with land-based aircraft and San Luis Would have dealt the main blow. And even the British submariners managed to find a demonstration group only with the help of the Americans!
At the same time, "Splendid" and "Spartan", deployed to the north, could not find the main forces of the Argentine fleet and they did not cause any damage to it. The result is all the more sad because the Splendid received information about the contact of the British Sea Harrier with the Argentine destroyer Santisimo Trinidad, which, together with its sister ship Hercules and the aircraft carrier Veintisinko de Mayo, formed the TG-79.1 tactical group. …
Subsequently, all three atomarins were sent to the coast of Argentina, in the hope of finding enemy warships there, but nothing came of this venture. They could not find anyone, but one of the nuclear submarines itself was discovered and attacked by Argentine aviation, and they were recalled, assigning them patrol areas in the immediate vicinity of the Falkland Islands.
It is not known for certain, but it seems that only low-quality ammunition saved the British from a heavy and extremely offensive loss. The fact is that on May 8, an Argentine submarine recorded an unknown target moving at a speed of 8 knots, attacked it with an anti-submarine torpedo. The acoustician recorded the noise of metal hitting metal, but there was no explosion. Most likely, the San Luis torpedoed the newest British Splendid, because there were no other British ships in that area, and besides, according to some reports, immediately after that, the Splendid left the combat area. Although, of course, perhaps all this was dreamed up by the Argentine sailors - in war, it also happens not like that.
In other words, the atomarines of the Royal Navy could not inflict defeat on the enemy's surface forces, could not provide the PLO of the British formation, neutralizing the San Luis, and the newest Splendid, perhaps, itself almost became a victim of the Argentine submarine. The British tried to use them as VNOS posts, that is, air observation, warning and communication. The idea was that the British atomarines, surfacing in the immediate vicinity of the airfields on which the Argentine aviation was based, visually tracked strike air groups heading for the Falklands … naturally, nothing good could come from such an extravagant use of nuclear submarines. At the same time, the British forces, not being able to establish air supremacy over the area of operation, experienced an extreme shortage of modern air defense systems to repel Argentine raids. In this, their atomarines, of course, could do nothing to help.
Undoubtedly, the best option for strengthening the British naval group would be a catapult aircraft carrier carrying classic deck aircraft (not VTOL aircraft). But, if the British had a choice between one additional nuclear submarine "Ash M", or three frigates of Project 22350, or the modernized TARKR "Admiral Nakhimov", then the British commander would most certainly have preferred a nuclear cruiser or frigates.
It can be assumed that in an operation like the Falklands conflict, it would be the nuclear cruiser that would be most useful - due to the large ammunition load, which would be enough not only to destroy the Argentine fleet, but also to attack ground targets with cruise missiles, as well as high combat stability - to withdraw out of action by free-fall bombs or even the RCC "Exocet" such a ship as the TARKR is very difficult. According to some reports, our TARKR had to withstand up to 10 hits by "Harpoons", while maintaining combat effectiveness. And in addition, the TARKR would ideally fit the role of the leader of the air defense order, since it has sufficient capabilities for the operational coordination of the actions of a group of warships.
From all of the above, the following conclusion can be drawn. The return to service of "Admiral Nakhimov" with the subsequent modernization of "Peter the Great" in his "image and likeness" is an unconditional benefit for our fleet, and one can only regret that "Admiral Lazarev" was not saved. The price for the revived TARKR - three frigates of Project 22350 or one Yasen-M submarine does not look excessive, because it has its own tactical niche, tasks with which it can cope better than frigates or submarines.
In the event of a threat of a global conflict, such a ship as part of the Northern Fleet could go into combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, where a salvo of 80 Zircons, if successful, could inflict decisive losses on the US 6th Fleet. In the Pacific Ocean, such a ship, operating under the cover of ground-based aviation, would pose a noticeable threat to the AUG, wishing to strike at our Far Eastern targets, and would seriously complicate their actions. In a local conflict, the TARKR is capable of being a flagship and a real "fulcrum" of a small ship group (we simply cannot assemble a large one), because, with rare exceptions, third world countries do not have the means and / or sufficient professionalism to destroy a ship of this class … And, of course, the Andreevsky flag over the twenty-five thousand ton steel giant, bristling with radars, missiles and artillery pieces, and capable of single-handedly dealing with the navy of other regional powers, looks … proudly.
So maybe the idea of building Leader-class nuclear destroyers is not so out of touch with reality?
Alas, this is just extremely doubtful. The fact is that during the modernization of the TARKR of the era of the Soviet Union, we use ready-made huge buildings, and also preserve the existing nuclear power plant. In this case, we are talking not only about the reactor, but, as far as the author knows, also about turbines, shafts, etc. - all this makes up a significant share of the cost of a nuclear warship. It is known that on the Arleigh Burke destroyers the cost of the hull together with the suspension is about 30% of the total cost of the ship, the rest is weapons systems, radars, bios, etc. But YSU is much more expensive, and it can be assumed that in the case of domestic "Leaders", the indicated costs will be correlated as 50 to 50. In turn, this suggests that the real cost of a domestic nuclear "destroyer" of 20 thousand tons with a displacement may well comparable to six Project 22350 frigates or two multipurpose nuclear submarines, and this is a completely different arithmetic …
