Without a doubt, readers interested in the current state of the Russian Navy have repeatedly met news and articles containing very negative reviews about existing projects of domestic ships in the near sea zone. We are talking about corvettes of projects 20380, 20385 and 20386, patrol ships of project 22160.
The first-borns of the domestic fleet, the "Steregushchy" type corvettes, got certain problems both with the chassis (domestic diesel engines did not differ in reliability), and with the quality of weapons, since the Redut air defense missile system installed on serial corvettes of the project 20380 could not fully use the capabilities of its anti-aircraft guided missiles with an active homing head. This was hampered by the weakness of the surveillance radar for corvettes of this type, the capabilities of which were not enough to bring the missile defense to the target at a distance that would allow the capture of the last active seeker of the rocket, and the specialized control radar "Redoubt" was not installed on the 20380 project.
Corvettes 20385 represented a kind of work on errors - instead of domestic diesels, they were going to install foreign ones, the general-view radar "Furke" was supposed to replace a more efficient and modern multifunctional radar complex (apparently, we are talking about the MF RLC "Zaslon"), which allowed to effectively control missiles of the Reduta air defense system, and eight X-35 anti-ship missiles were replaced by the UKSK with eight much more powerful and effective missiles of the Caliber family or the Onyx anti-ship missile system. As a result, the ships turned out to be good for everyone, except for the price - if the project 20380, according to some sources, as of 2011 cost about 10 billion rubles, then in February 2013 the cost of the corvettes of the project 20385 was already estimated at 14 billion rubles., with the prospect of increasing to 18 billion rubles. Even introducing an inflationary adjustment, with which the cost of the corvette 20380 at the beginning of 2013 should have amounted to 11, 15 billion rubles.
It turned out that the cost of the corvette 20385 exceeded that of the corvette 20380 by about 25-60%. Corvettes with "Redoubts" and "Calibers" in their power approached the frigates, but at the same time they were not frigates - and their cost corresponded to the ships of the "Admiral's" series, that is, Project 11356, with which they could not compete either in seaworthiness, nor by autonomy. And the idea of acquiring diesel engines from the Germans made life long after the long-awaited entry of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Accordingly, the Russian Navy needed a new type of corvette.
Such was designed - we are talking about project 20386, but then, again, the scythe found on the stone. On the one hand, it seems that it was possible to solve (at least theoretically) a number of painful issues. Thus, problematic domestic diesel engines are being replaced by a new power plant consisting of gas turbine and electric motors. The ship's displacement has been increased, which makes it possible to count on better seaworthiness and cruising range, the armament, which is surplus in the opinion of the fleet, has been sequestered to some extent. However, perhaps the most important parameter - the price of the ship could not be reduced. Due to a number of at least strange solutions, which, for example, include a modular weapons compartment with a helicopter lift, the lead ship of Project 20386 "Daring" in comparable prices is about 33% more expensive than serial corvettes of Project 20380.
What else do we have left? Oh, yes, the patrol ship of Project 22160, which is armed with a 76-mm AK-176MA, Igla MANPADS in the amount of 8 units (perhaps it means "Gibka", that is, a mini-SAM that fires with the same "needles"), a pair of grenade launchers, the same number of 14.5 mm machine guns and a helicopter. In other words, weapons more or less suitable for a coast guard ship, but not for a navy. Of course, there are also modular weapons, but what kind? According to the "Severny PKB", the project 22160 ship can be equipped with either the containerized Kalibr-NKE missile system plus the Shtil-1 air defense system, or the Vignette-EM GAS two 324-mm torpedo tubes and two anti-ship missile launchers "Uranus". You should forget about the complete set of "Caliber" & "Caliber-1" right away - firstly, so far not a single container installation "Caliber" has been ordered, and secondly, there have been no orders for modular "Calibers" either. Thirdly, and this is the main thing, as it became known, patrol ships of project 22160 are equipped with a subkeeping GAS MGK-335, which is a digitized "Platinum" with a detection range of submarines of 10-12 km and a towed "Vignette", which irrefutably testifies to the fact that what modification did the Navy choose. Which, in fact, is completely unsurprising - even if by some miracle it was possible to heap the Caliber and Caliber on the Project 22160 ship with all the equipment necessary for their effective operation, the ship would still remain completely defenseless against its main enemy - underwater boats. Simply because it had absolutely no anti-submarine weapons, and its underwater search means would be limited to the GAS, designed to search for combat swimmers.
However, the anti-submarine version of Project 22160 is also flawed - having received any means of searching for submarines, the patrol ship has no means of destroying them - even the 324-mm "Packet-NK" "was not delivered", and this complex, by and large, not so much against enemy submarines, how many against their torpedoes … In general, the only hope for a helicopter, and this is not very good. Generally speaking, in the case of an anti-submarine operation, the rotorcraft must, loaded with buoys, "sow" them in a given area, but if you use it as the main weapon, that is, keep it on the deck with small-sized torpedoes suspended from it, while the patrol ship looks for the enemy submarine with its own GAS, then the efficiency of using the helicopter will tend to 0.
Perhaps, we can safely assume that none of the four above-mentioned projects are suitable for the role of a near sea zone warship for the Russian Navy. But, as the saying goes: "if you criticize - offer" and in this article we will try to present the appearance of a promising corvette of the Russian Navy. What should it be?
In order to do this, it is necessary to determine the key tasks that this ship will solve. According to the author of this article, a modern corvette is a ship capable of operating independently in the coastal zone (200 miles or 370 km from the coastline) and as part of the formations of larger "brothers" - in the near sea zone, that is, at a distance of up to 500 miles (roughly 930 km) from the coast. That is, a corvette at a distance of up to 930 km from the coast should be able to:
1. Search and destroy enemy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines.
2. To accompany civilian ships or landing ships, participating in the provision of air defense / anti-aircraft defense of such a formation;
And … as a matter of fact, everything.
But what about the multitude of other problems, the indignant reader will ask? Well, take, for example, the fire support of the landing - what to do with it? Well, let's see what the domestic ships of the "corvette" and "patrol ship" classes have at their disposal today. The most powerful artillery system is the 100-mm A-190 cannon, installed on the corvettes of projects 20380/20385.
But in its ammunition there are no armor-piercing shells, but even if they were, then from a reasonable distance of battle such a shell will not "take" the protection of a modern tank. But these armored ground vehicles pose a terrible threat to the landing force - they can, having made a march, quickly reach the coast, and mix the landing force that did not manage to land with the coastal silt. Alas, "hundreds" of several corvettes will not interfere with them. Counter-battery fight? It would seem - yes, especially since naval guns are traditionally famous for their rate of fire, and arranging a fire raid on the position of some self-propelled guns is the nicest thing, but …
Firstly, the “hundred” is not so long range - 21 kilometers, modern self-propelled guns can throw their projectile, even not active-reactive, at a distance of up to 30 km, and shoot our troops from an unattainable distance. And secondly, counter-battery warfare includes, for example, such absolutely necessary equipment as, for example, an artillery reconnaissance radar, but where can one get it on a corvette?
In general, it turns out that formally, our small ships in terms of fire support seem to be able to do something, but in practice … In practice, in the USSR, to support the landing, it was planned to create a specialized ship carrying two 130-mm "sparks" (later this the ship became the destroyer of project 956), and before that they counted on light cruisers with a dozen 152-mm guns and artillery destroyers, again, with 130-mm artillery. It is precisely this caliber, today, perhaps, the minimum in order to be able to seriously support the landing, and, again, there should be at least a couple of guns on the ship, and specialized equipment for it … And these are completely different weights: if the mass of a single gun is 100 -mm installation A-190 is 15 tons, then the weight of the two-gun 130-mm - 98 tons, not counting the automated storage of ammunition in 40 tons. That is, these are no longer "corvette" calibers - probably, to place such an artillery system on a ship with a standard displacement of less 2,000 tons, all the same it is possible, but what will be left for other types of weapons?
Well, what about anti-ship warfare? I will answer the question with a question: with whom, in fact, are we planning to fight? Sending corvettes into battle against the AUG is not even funny, not their tasks and not their capabilities. The US ship groups, even aircraft carrier ones, though not, if they come directly to our shores, so only after they smash our defenses from the sea, that is, crush the land-based aviation, the BRAV formations and the few large ships we have left. But in such a situation, the corvettes will not solve anything, even if by this moment it will be possible to “hide” several pieces from destruction.
Well, if not the American Navy, then who? In the USSR, small attack ships were considered, among other things, as a means of dealing with a similar "trifle" of NATO countries. But the fact is that today such a clash looks very far-fetched, and for this reason. It's no secret that in modern combat surface ships, especially those of small displacement, will easily lose to enemy aircraft. Even large ocean-going destroyers and missile cruisers with their most powerful air defense are not able to repel a properly organized air raid on their own, what can we say about ships of the "frigate" or "corvette" classes!
And this, in turn, means that the enemy will not send his ships into the zone of operation of our aviation - but, on the other hand, our corvettes also have no missions where enemy aviation dominates and his light forces are present. Let's illustrate all of the above with a small example.
Imagine a hypothetical situation in which we managed to get involved in a large-scale military conflict with Turkey, which has a very large surface fleet: there are 24 frigates and corvettes in their navy. Will they send these ships to our shores? In the opinion of the author of this article - in no case, because it will be almost guaranteed suicide. After all, there they will not be provided with cover for their own aircraft, but they will be within the reach of our naval aviation regiment, the Aerospace Forces, and the BRAV missile systems: "Bastion" and "Ball". Needless to say, the air defense of even the best Turkish ships is simply not designed to counter such an enemy. And what would Turkish frigates do near the Crimea? Have you tried to shell Sevastopol with 127-mm fluffs?
A completely different matter is the actions of submarines, of which Turkey has 13 units. They cannot be knocked out by the Bala missile, the Su-30SM cannot be destroyed, and they can indeed cause certain damage to our warships and coastal shipping. At the same time, the Turks know that we also have submarines, and from here their strategy is easily visible - to keep their corvettes and frigates off their shores, ensuring the actions of their own submarines and hindering ours, and to advance into the area of operation of our aviation and BRAV with their own aviation and submarines. But the same is true for us - we also cannot afford to send our corvettes and frigates to the distant Turkish shores, under the Turkish Air Force planes, which number 260 F-16s of various modifications alone. It would also be better for us to conduct offensive operations with submarines and aircraft, long-range missiles, and use corvettes and frigates to defend bases, the coast and sea routes along it.
But the same is true for almost any theater. It is extremely difficult to imagine that the same Germany, in the event of a military conflict, would try to break through to Kronstadt in the style of the memorable Operation Albion of 1917, the same can be said about the Norwegians in the north, and, in fact, about the Japanese in the Far East. And this suggests that the fight of a corvette against an equal, or stronger surface enemy will not be the rule, but the exception to it.
Well, let's imagine that we have invested in patrol ships of Project 22160 in the strike version, with "Caliber" and "Calm". A war began, with some powerful regional power, at the level of Turkey. So what? Send these ships to the enemy shores so that the enemy aircraft would destroy them there with practically no losses for themselves? Leave them to look for enemy submarines operating off our shores, using the old-fashioned old-fashioned method - a signalman looking out for a periscope above the water? Of course not. And throughout the war, such corvettes will stand in bases where they are not threatened by submarines, under the cover of native aviation and coastal air defense. Well, they will shoot a couple of times at some Turkish headquarters with "Caliber". Was it worth building a garden for this, if a pair of "Buyanov-M" class river-sea could easily cope with such "combat activities"?
The author of this article is well aware that a considerable number of readers have the idea that domestic corvettes are not required to carry anti-ship weapons will cause … let's say, the strongest rejection. But the fact is that a corvette is, first of all, an anti-submarine ship and its main enemy is a submarine. At the same time, you need to understand that both diesel and nuclear submarines are an extremely dangerous enemy, which is very difficult to destroy - all the more so for a ship of relatively small displacement, often even less than its underwater target.
So, we have decided on the priority enemy at sea, but what about in the air? The answer is again not obvious: oddly enough, the main enemy here will not be airplanes or helicopters, but guided missile weapons, that is, anti-ship missiles and gliding bombs. Why is that?
The essence of the corvette, as a means of combating enemy submarines, is that it is a relatively cheap and numerous class of ships that, in a threatening period, can and should be dispersed over the water area in order to ensure maximum coverage by shipborne submarine detection equipment, including including helicopters. It makes no sense to line up the corvettes in a proud wake formation of the battle - they must act autonomously, dispersed at a distance at which their underwater search means do not overlap each other. But what will we have in the end? That's right - a network of small and relatively weak ships. Can a single corvette, even if equipped with the Redut air defense system, independently repel the attack of two or three combat aircraft equipped with modern weapons and electronic warfare? With the highest degree of probability, no. No matter how good his air defense system is - he is alone, and with limited ammunition. The first plane, briefly leaving from behind the radio horizon, by an attack will force the OMS of the ship's anti-aircraft weapons to "turn on", the second will start their electronic suppression, releasing at the same time
anti-radar ammunition, and the third will deal the main blow to the battle-bound corvette. After such an attack, if the ship survives, then, most likely, already in the form of a blazing and incapacitated piece of metal, barely holding on to the surface of the sea.
You can, of course, expand the air defense of corvettes - add missile launchers, provide more powerful radars, install additional air defense systems, etc …. Yes, only all this will end with the fact that the corvette will eventually turn out to be a frigate, both in size and in value. And we need just a cheap and massive ship: if instead we build expensive ones, and in small batches, then the task of this class of ships will simply cease to be fulfilled. In other words, it would be great to solve the problems of corvettes with ships of the "frigate" class (missile cruisers are even better!) - the only problem is that we will never build enough frigates to solve such problems. In general, as Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev said, the economy should be economical.
The conclusion from all of the above is simple: there is no need to set tasks unusual for them before the ships. The corvette is, in principle, unable to repel a properly organized raid of enemy aircraft, even with the "Redoubt", even without it, and this suggests that the "Redoubt" air defense system is redundant on it. Of course, it is good when he is (there are never enough weapons), but he cannot solve the air defense problems of the "network" of corvettes. So why spend money on it then? Perhaps it would be better to use the funds saved on the Redut air defense system to purchase multifunctional fighters that can really provide air defense for corvettes in the coastal and, to some extent, in the near sea zone?
The peculiarity of military construction is that the money that we can allocate for it is finite, but there are many options for their use. And by putting "Caliber" or "Redoubts" on corvettes, we actually take away the cost of these very expensive weapons systems from other forces and branches of the armed forces: that is, as a result of excess armament of the same corvettes, the fleet will receive less of the same corvettes or other ships and aircraft. Realizing this, let’s still leave God to God, and Caesar’s Caesar’s: let the corvettes catch the enemy's submarines, and let ours deal with the enemy aircraft. And if we take this approach, then it turns out that we should not prepare corvettes to counter enemy aircraft.
But, since, even in the zone of domination of our aviation, no one has canceled the possibility of individual single attacks, it is still necessary to be able to defend oneself from guided weapons. This is all the more important with the advent of long-range anti-ship missiles LRASM (the distance that these missiles can cover is close to 1,000 km), and one should not think that they will remain the prerogative of the United States for a long time: within a reasonable time frame, one should expect such ammunition to "spread" across the world.
LRASM are "good" already in that the enemy, provided with such missiles, can, after opening the location of our ship group with the help of satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, deliver a terrible blow. It is quite realistic to bring reinforced air patrols with fighters, AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft to the area covered by our fleet and fire LRASM ships from a safe distance, adjusting their flight according to AWACS data. Yes, LRASM is not a cheap pleasure, but even a dozen of such missiles are several times cheaper than one corvette.
Well, now, when we have been explaining for so much time why we need a corvette, and why we need it just like that, and not some other, we will go directly to the ship.
The main armament of the ship … will be its hydroacoustic complex, but here the author, alas, has a certain gap in his knowledge. As a matter of fact, modern GAS use stationary subkeeping, lowered, or towed antennas, and, apparently, towed antennas show the best results in opening the underwater environment, simply because of their large geometric dimensions (which, for an antenna, is very important). The real usefulness of the lowered GAS is unclear: it is known that US destroyers prefer to use subkeys and towed antennas.
So, you need to understand that the keen GAS corvette, by definition, will have very modest properties in relation to the capabilities of the GAK submarines. The latter are often built "around their own GAK", but this will not work with a corvette, and it is several times smaller than a nuclear submarine. As we know, in the USSR, they tried to radically solve this issue by creating a titanic "Polynom", the total weight of the equipment of which reached 800 tons, but … with all its advantages, the issue was still not resolved, and the GAK weighed about half of the corvette.
Thus, it is possible (we will repeat it once again - it is possible!) And there is no point in trying to embrace the immensity, trying to shove a powerful under-keel GAS into the corvette, but confine it to a small one, focused primarily on anti-torpedo warfare - but at the same time, of course, to install the newest towed GAS. On the other hand, towed antennas may have their limitations, while the subtle GUS is "always with us", in general … let's leave it to the professionals to figure it out. However, we note that, perhaps, the absence on the corvette of a relatively powerful subkeeping GAS like "Zarya-2", taking into account the presence of the newest towed GAS "Minotaur-ISPN-M", is not an erroneous decision.
In other words, a promising corvette could either repeat the scheme of the "Daring" - "Minotaur-ISPN-M" with a subkeeping antenna based on the MGK 335 EM-03, or, nevertheless, in addition to the absolutely necessary "Minotaur", it should also be installed GAS "Zarya-2". These options should be assessed from the standpoint of "cost-effectiveness", but this, alas, is completely beyond the competence of the author.
As for the anti-submarine armament of a promising corvette, it must include at least 8 "pipes" for modern 533-mm torpedoes, and in addition, of course, at least 8 pipes of the 324-mm complex "Packet-NK". Why is that?
The modern ammunition load of a foreign nuclear submarine can be 50 torpedoes and missiles launched through torpedo tubes, and even small diesel submarines have a dozen or more large torpedoes. The modern submarine is a formidable enemy that is not so easy to hit. For a full-fledged battle, the corvette will need long-range 533-mm torpedoes, simulators, and anti-torpedoes, taking into account all this, the ammunition load of 8 533-mm and 8 324-mm "cigars" does not look excessive for a corvette. True, there is a nuance: "Packet-NK" in the basic delivery has its own GAS for controlling weapons and this looks like a blatant excess - the torpedoes and counter-torpedoes of "Paket-NK" should be "trained" to interact with the ship's existing GAS.
Apparently, our corvette does not need and is redundant, installed on the "Daring" MF, the Zaslon radar, apparently, it will be enough for a regular high-quality surveillance radar. Is it possible to do with something like "Furke-2", or should more powerful stations be used, like those installed on patrol ships of Project 22160? Again, only professionals who thoroughly know the capabilities of both systems can answer this question. Air defense, or rather, the anti-missile defense of the corvette should be made up of two Pantsir-M ZRAK, located in such a way that each point of the horizon is fired upon by at least one ZRAK. The capabilities of such equipment should not be underestimated - the Pantsir missiles have a firing range of up to 20 km, in height - up to 15 km, which, for example, exceeds the capabilities of the 9M100 missile defense system, which is part of the Redut air defense system (although, of course, it is inferior to missiles with AGSN of the same complex). In addition, without a doubt, the corvette should be equipped with a high-quality electronic warfare system and traps of all kinds - it was they, and not fire weapons, that demonstrated consistently high efficiency in countering enemy guided missile weapons.
Of course, the corvette must be equipped with a helicopter hangar. It would be ideal to place not even one, but two rotary-wing machines on the corvette, but nevertheless the realism of such a solution is somewhat doubtful. After all, the main PLO helicopter will be the Ka-27 and its modifications for a long time to come, and this is a very heavy aircraft, and it will hardly be possible to "land" on the deck of a ship whose standard displacement should not exceed 1,600 - 1,700 tons. Maybe. Yes, American LCSs carry 2 helicopters, but American helicopters are smaller and lighter, and LCSs are larger.
Power plant … strictly speaking, the corvette must have a high speed in order, for example, to quickly reach the area where an enemy submarine was detected, and on the other hand, to be as quiet as possible while searching for submarines. Presumably, the mixed power plant, where the full speed is provided by gas turbines, and the economic speed are provided by electric motors, best of all meets the specified requirements. But it should be borne in mind that we have not done this before, so there is a danger of building a series of ships with problematic EIs, and this we cannot afford now. Perhaps it makes sense for the first series of our corvettes to create "gas-gas" power plants where both the economic and full speed would be ensured by the GTZA, which we are quite good at, and to work out the promising electric propulsion on one, some, experimental ship (the Daring "?) And only after we are convinced of the efficiency of this scheme - to switch to it en masse.
The hull … no kata or trimaran is needed - the usual displacement. The fact is that a catamaran will always have a lower payload in comparison with a ship of equal displacement (the need for a rigid "bundle" of its hulls), in addition, such ships are more expensive to manufacture and unnecessarily wide, which complicates their maintenance. Their advantages - the ability to accommodate a wide deck and lower energy costs to achieve ultra-high speeds (the effect makes itself felt when approaching 40 knots and above) are not significant for corvettes - unless only in terms of accommodating two helicopters, but even here, according to the author, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of this solution.
Stealth technologies are useful and highly recommended for implementation. Of course, the corvette cannot be made invisible, but lowering its RCS will have a very positive effect on the detection range of AWACS aircraft and the range of anti-ship missiles by AGSN. The main thing is to remember the Pareto rule: "20% of the efforts give 80% of the result, and the remaining 80% of the efforts - only 20% of the result." That is, you need to use relatively inexpensive solutions, such as the structure of the hull and superstructures, consisting of planes that scatter the radiation of the enemy radar, as was implemented on the F-117 and Swedish corvettes "Visby", "recessed" in the hull weapons, etc., but the latest coatings, materials, etc. Excessively expensive ship designs should be ignored whenever possible. In general, in the "stealth" part, we need the same "80% of the result for 20% of the effort" - and nothing more.
And where do we end up with? A small and relatively stealth boat with a gas-gas power plant (or partial electric propulsion) and a speed of up to 30 knots. Standard displacement - no more than 1,600-1,700 tons. Armament - 2 ZRAK "Pantsir-M", 8 * 533-mm and 8 * 324-mm torpedo tubes, a helicopter in the hangar. A developed hydroacoustic complex, an inexpensive radar, a high-quality electronic warfare and jamming system - yes, in general, that's all. It can be assumed that such a ship in its cost will be comparable, or even cheaper than the corvettes of project 20380, and certainly much cheaper than projects 20385 and 20386, but at the same time its anti-submarine capabilities will be higher.
What can such a corvette be able to do? Oddly enough, a lot. Fighting submarines, protecting coastal shipping, and, oddly enough, participating in amphibious operations and stabilizing our AMG (led by the Kuznetsov TAVKR) and ship groups, if the latter are deployed in the near sea zone. The corvette we have described cannot, of course, provide, but it is quite capable of supplementing the cover of the amphibious forces on the transition route, and, oddly enough, is capable of supporting the landing with fire if its anti-submarine helicopter is replaced by the Ka-29 transport and strike helicopter during the operation. Modern air defense is multi-layered, and two ZRAK "Pantsir-M" of the corvette described above will serve as an excellent addition to any air defense order built on the basis of air defense systems of larger and heavier ships. And if the deck helicopters of the corvettes will be able to use relatively medium-sized anti-ship missiles, for example, something like the Kh-38MAE (starting weight up to 520 kg), they will also receive certain anti-ship capabilities.
Thus, the fleet will receive a ship that will not amaze the imagination with its power and, of course, not a universal one, but a cheap one that fully meets its tasks.
