Before proceeding to the final article on the Varyag, it remains for us to clarify only some of the features of its lifting and exploitation by the Japanese.
It must be said that the Japanese started the ship-lifting work immediately - on January 27 (February 9, according to the new style), 1904, a battle took place, and already on January 30 (February 12), the Minister of the Navy ordered the formation of the headquarters of the ship-lifting expedition in Incheon from the specialists of the naval arsenal. which was headed by Rear Admiral Arai Yukan. Just 5 days later, on February 4 (February 17), the headquarters specialists arrived in Asanman Bay, and the next day they started to work.
However, the Japanese immediately faced serious problems. The cruiser lay down on the port side and sank significantly into the bottom silt (although the opinion of V. Kataev that the cruiser sat in it almost along the center plane looks like an exaggeration). Before lifting the ship, it had to be straightened (put on an even keel), and this was a difficult task that required maximum unloading of the cruiser.
Therefore, the Japanese began by making holes in the right side of the Varyag, in the area of coal pits, through which they began to unload coal and other cargo. The work was greatly complicated both by the cold weather and by the fact that the ship was completely submerged at high tide. Beginning in April 1904, the Japanese began to remove the cruiser's artillery, from June of the same year, they began to dismantle the superstructures, chimneys, fans and other above-deck structural elements of the cruiser.
In mid-July, these preparatory work entered a stage at which it was already possible to begin to straighten the hull. Pumps were brought to the "Varyag", the task of which was to wash out the sand from under the ship, so that it sank into the formed pit with a decrease in the roll. This led to partial success - the roll gradually straightened, although there is a discrepancy in the sources. R. M. Melnikov wrote that the roll decreased by 25 degrees. (that is, from 90 degrees to 65 degrees), but V. Kataev claims that the roll has reached 25 degrees, and, judging by the photographs, V. Kataev is right after all. Be that as it may, the left side of the cruiser was gradually freed from silt, and the Japanese were able to cut those structures and remove the artillery that had previously sunk into the silt and was inaccessible to them.
In early August, the Japanese felt they had done enough to lift the Varyag. Having sealed the ship to the best of their ability, and delivered pumps with a total capacity of 7,000 tons / hour, the Japanese attempted to lift, simultaneously pumping out water and pumping air into the cruiser's premises. This was not successful, and then by the middle of August additional pumps were delivered, so that their total capacity has already reached 9,000 t / h. But this did not help either. It became clear that a caisson was needed, but there was almost no time left for its construction, as the cold set in. Nevertheless, they tried to build hastily - but the third attempt with an impromptu caisson also failed. It was obvious to everyone that in 1904 it would not be possible to lift the cruiser in any case, so on October 17 (30), having previously secured the cruiser on the ground with ropes, the Japanese interrupted rescue operations and left the Varyag “until better times”.
In the next year, 1905, Japanese engineers decided to approach the matter much more thoroughly than the previous one. They started the construction of a grandiose caisson - the total displacement of it and the ship, according to V. Kataev, was supposed to reach 9,000 tons. At the same time, its height (as if continuing the sides of the ship) was supposed to be 6, 1 m.
The construction of this rather monstrous structure began at the end of March (April 9), 1905. After the wall on the starboard side of the cruiser was completed, the straightening of the ship was resumed. Gradually, things went smoothly - by the beginning of July, the cruiser was able to straighten to a bank of 3 degrees, that is, practically put it on an even keel, but it still remained on the ground, but after that, for another 40 days, the left wall of the caisson was completed and other work was carried out. … Since it was considered that the available pumps were not enough, 3 more powerful pumps were additionally ordered, and now they have been delivered to the cruiser.
And now, finally, after a lengthy preparation, on July 28 (August 8), the cruiser finally surfaced, but, of course, work on its restoration was just beginning.
The hull was being repaired in order to ensure water tightness, but the caisson, for uselessness, was dismantled. After the survey, Yukan Arai offered not to tow the Varyag, but to ensure its passage under their own vehicles - the proposal was accepted, and work on the ship began to boil. Boilers were cleaned and sorted out, equipment was put in order, temporary pipes were installed (instead of those cut off during the ascent).
On August 23 (September 5), the Russo-Japanese War ended - the cruiser, although it was raised, still remained in the water area of Chemulpo. For the first time after its sinking, the Varyag launched on October 15 (28), developed 10 knots, steering, vehicles and boilers operated normally. On October 20 (November 2), 1905, the Japanese naval flag flew over the Varyag and after 3 days left for Japan. The cruiser was supposed to go to Yokosuka, but on the way had to go to Sasebo, where it had to be docked, as water was entering the ship's hull. As a result, the cruiser arrived in Yokosuku on November 17 (30), 1905.
Here, the ship was awaiting refurbishment, which lasted exactly two years: the cruiser entered the factory and then sea trials in November 1907. As a result, with a power of 17,126 hp. and 155 revolutions the cruiser reached a speed of 22, 71 knots.
As a result of tests on November 8 (21), 1907, the Varyag (under the name Soya) was admitted to the Japanese Imperial Navy as a 2nd class cruiser. Nine months later, on August 15 (28), 1908, Soyu was transferred to the Training Squadron of the Naval Academy in Yokosuka as a training ship, in which capacity he served until March 22 (April 4) 1916, when the cruiser, after moving to Vladivostok, lowered the Japanese flag and returned to the ownership of the Russian Empire. I must say that as a training ship, the cruiser was operated very intensively: in 1908 she took part in large fleet maneuvers, in 1909 and 1910. went on long sea voyages with cadets on board. This was followed by an almost eight-month overhaul (from 4 (17) April 1910 to 25 February (10 March) 1911), after which in the period 1911-1913. "Soya" makes two more four-month training voyages in the Pacific Ocean, but on November 18 (December 1), 1913 it is withdrawn from the Training Squadron and, a day later, again gets up for overhaul, which lasted almost exactly a year - the cruiser returns to the Training Squadron also on November 18 (December 1), but already in 1914. In 1915, the cruiser makes its last training cruise under the Japanese flag, and at the beginning of 1916, the procedure for transferring it to Russia follows.
It seems to be a continuous routine, and nothing interesting - but many revisionists use the fact of service in the Japanese navy as evidence that domestic claims to the Varyag power plant are far-fetched. At the same time, there are two "revisionist" points of view: that in fact the power plant of the Russian ship was in perfect order, or (the second option) it really had problems, but only due to the "curvature" of domestic operators, but in skillful Japanese hands the cruiser served excellently.
Let's try to understand all this with an open mind.
The first thing that is usually paid attention to is those 22.71 knots of speed that Soya managed to develop on tests. But this is not surprising at all: analyzing in detail the misadventures of the Varyag power plant, we came to the conclusion that the main problem of the ship was in the steam engines, which were high steam pressure, which was simply dangerous to be given by the boilers of the Nikloss system, which resulted in a vicious circle - either to give high pressure, risking the lives of the stokers, or to put up with the fact that the machines are slowly spreading themselves. At the same time, the author of this article (following the engineer Gippius) believes that a similar situation arose thanks to the firm of Ch. Crump, which "optimized" the machines only to achieve the high speeds required to fulfill the terms of the contract. But in the comments, another thought was repeatedly expressed that the main damage to the power plant was inflicted in the initial period of the ship's operation, when its crew tried to solve the arising problems by half-measures that were only possible on the ship, far from the shipyards, but which were absolutely not eliminated the true causes of malfunctions, fought with the consequences, not the causes, and from this they did not really help, leading only to the fact that things with the car were getting worse and worse. Regardless of who is right, all this led to the fact that in Port Arthur the cruiser's cars came to such a state that they could only be "reanimated" by a major overhaul at a specialized enterprise, which was nowhere to be found in the Far East. Well, without a professional "capital", and with those scanty production capabilities that our compatriots had in Port Arthur, "Varyag" somehow gave 17 knots in tests after the last repair, but when trying to raise the speed higher, the bearings began to knock.
However, the Japanese, during the two-year restoration work after the rise of the Varyag, naturally did everything necessary. The cruiser machines were disassembled and examined, many parts and mechanisms (including bearings in high and medium pressure cylinders) were replaced. That is, "Soya" received the repair that it needed, but which the "Varyag" did not get - it is not surprising that after that the ship was able to give about 23 knots of speed. And of course, the test results of November 1907 can in no way indicate that the Varyag could develop similar speeds in Port Arthur or during the battle in Chemulpo.
But the further operation of the cruiser … to put it mildly, raises a lot of questions that, apparently, the "revisionists" do not come to mind at all. Let's look at what happened in the Japanese Imperial Navy during the time when the Soya was in its composition, that is, in the interval between the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War.
I must say that during the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese armored cruisers have proven themselves very well. Not that they won any major victories, but the services of numerous "flying" units made up of these ships provided Admiral Heihachiro Togo with invaluable advantages in terms of reconnaissance and monitoring the movements of Russian ships. The Russians were especially troubled by the so-called "dogs" - a detachment of high-speed armored cruisers, with which only the newest Russian "six-thousanders", that is, "Askold", "Bogatyr" and "Varyag", could compete in speed. "Bayan" was slower, and "Boyarin" and "Novik" were too weak to count on success in an artillery battle with the "dogs". And, in fact, the same "Askold", although it was larger and stronger than any "dog" (if you do not take into account the quality of the shells, of course), but its advantage in artillery was not so great to guarantee victory - but the pair "Dogs" he was already seriously inferior.
But H. That was not much, only one combat detachment, which necessitated the widespread use of weaker or outdated cruisers (often both at the same time), up to the old women - "Itsukushim". The fighting qualities of such ships, of course, did not give them much chance of success in a collision with a detachment of Russian cruisers of a comparable size, and their speed was too low to escape. Accordingly, to give such units combat stability, the Japanese were forced to use armored cruisers, and this was not always a good decision. So, for example, H. Togo, in the tie-up of the squadron battle at Shantung, was able to put in line only two armored cruisers out of the four available, and one more managed to join in the second phase of the battle. It was easier for the "dogs" in this respect, because they (at least theoretically) had sufficient speed to avoid the undue "attention" of Russian cruisers. However, the Japanese also preferred to support their actions with heavier ships.
In general, it can be stated that the armored cruisers of Japan became the "eyes and ears" of the United Fleet in the Russo-Japanese war, and their large number played a large role in this. However, after the war, the capabilities of this class of ships began to rapidly decline.
The combined fleet entered the war with 15 armored cruisers. But of the four dogs, only Kasagi and Chitose survived the war: Yoshino sank, rammed by Kasuga, and Takasago sank the next day after being blown up by a Russian mine. As for the remaining 11, a significant part of them were very outdated, some were of an unsuccessful construction, and by 1907, when the Soya entered service, many of these ships had lost their combat significance. In fact, only two Tsushima-class cruisers and the Otova, which entered service during the war, retained some kind of combat value.
In 1908, the core of the Japanese fleet, which previously consisted of 6 squadron battleships and 8 armored cruisers, increased significantly. In exchange for the lost Yashima and Hatsuse, they received quite modern Hizen and Iwami (Retvizan and Eagle, respectively) and two new English-built battleships, Kasima and Katori. The one who died in the explosion of the Mikasa was also repaired and put into the fleet, and much more powerful Satsuma and Aki were being built at Japanese shipyards with might and main. Of course, the Japanese also got other Russian battleships, but they were counted as coastal defense ships almost immediately after the repair work. As for the armored cruisers, none of them died in the Russo-Japanese, and after that the Japanese introduced the repaired Russian Bayan into the fleet and built two Tsukuba-class cruisers themselves. Thus, in the Russo-Japanese War, at the peak of power, the Japanese had a fleet of 6 battleships and 8 armored cruisers with 15 armored cruisers. In 1908, the United Fleet had 8 battleships and 11 armored cruisers, but only 5 armored cruisers could provide them with intelligence, of which only two were fast. All this forced the Japanese to keep in the fleet both the frankly unsuccessful ships of the Akashi type and the older cruisers (the Akashi, Suma and five older cruisers "survived" in one form or another until the First World War). As for the Russian trophies, here, in addition to the Soy, the Japanese "got hold of" only the Tsugaru - that is, the former Russian Pallada, which, by its tactical and technical characteristics, of course, could not be considered a full-fledged reconnaissance cruiser. and it was introduced into the fleet only in 1910, almost immediately retraining it into a training ship. And Japan almost never built or ordered new armored cruisers - in fact, in 1908 there was only Tone in the building, which entered service only in 1910.
Thus, in 1908, the United Fleet began to experience an obvious shortage of reconnaissance cruisers with the main forces. Here, in theory, the Soya that had just been admitted to the fleet should have come in handy - fast and well-armed, it was quite capable of supplementing the Kasagi and Chitose with a third ship: its presence made it possible to form a full-fledged combat detachment of three ships with fairly similar performance characteristics.
But instead, the cruiser that has just undergone repair is sent … to the training ships.
Why is that?
Perhaps the Japanese were not satisfied with the speed of the Soya? This could not be, because the "passport" (achieved during the tests in 1907) cruiser speed almost corresponded to the delivery speed of the fastest Japanese "Chitose" and "Kasagi", and in 1907, at the time of their tests, most likely, " Soya "surpassed any Japanese cruiser in speed.
Armament? But the dozen six-inch guns that were on the Soy were quite consistent and even, perhaps, surpassed in firepower the 2 * 203-mm and 10 * 120-mm guns, which were carried by the "dogs", and they had the most powerful weapons among the Japanese armored cruisers. In addition, the cruiser was easy to re-equip to Japanese standards.
Perhaps the Varyag somehow did not fit into the new tactical doctrines of the Japanese fleet? And this question should be answered in the negative. If we look at the "Tone", which was just under construction at that time, then we will see a ship somewhat smaller than the "Soya" in size (total displacement of 4,900 tons), with a maximum speed of 23 knots and an armament of 2 * 152 -mm and 10 * 120-mm. There was no armored belt, the deck had the same thickness as that of the Soya - 76-38 mm. In this case, in the case of the "Tone", the Japanese, almost for the first time, finally paid attention to the seaworthiness of the cruiser - well, after all, the "Soya" was distinguished by good seaworthiness, surpassing the old Japanese cruisers in this! In other words, the Japanese were building a cruiser for their fleet, whose capabilities were extremely similar to those possessed by Soya, so it is impossible to talk about any tactical unsuitability of the former Russian ship.
What else remains? Perhaps the Japanese had a prejudice towards Russian-built ships? This is clearly not the case - the battleship Eagle remained in the Japanese battleship for a long time. And in general, the Soyu was built not by the Russians, but by Kramp, while the Kasagi, the brainchild of the shipyards of the same shipbuilder, went in the United Fleet.
Maybe the Japanese felt some kind of hatred for Nikloss's boilers? Again - no, if only because the former "Retvizan", which had boilers of the same design, not only participated in the military operations of the First World War, but later remained in the linear forces of the Japanese fleet right up to 1921.
What else have we not mentioned? Oh, yes, of course - maybe in connection with the expansion of the fleet, Japan felt an urgent need for training ships? Alas, this version also does not stand up to criticism, because the United Fleet received a huge number of ships of dubious combat value, which had previously flown under the St. Andrew's flag. The Japanese fleet included "battleships-cruisers" "Peresvet" and "Pobeda", "Poltava" and "Emperor Nicholas I", two battleships of coastal defense, "Pallada", finally …
All these ships were commissioned by the Japanese either initially as training ships, or as coastal defense ships, which practically did not differ from the training one. And this is not counting, of course, many Japanese armored cruisers, which have practically lost their combat significance. In other words, the Japanese had quite enough (and, as it were, not in abundance) training ships, so that there was a need to withdraw for these purposes one of the most well-armed, fast and seaworthy reconnaissance cruisers, such as the Soya in 1908.
Perhaps dear readers will be able to come up with some more reasons, but the author of this article no longer has them. And the most probable version of the "deduction" of "Soi" in training ships looks like … continuing problems with the power plant, which, according to the author, continued to haunt the cruiser after the repairs in 1905-1907.
In support of this hypothesis, one can cite the state of the boilers and machines of the Soi, or rather, the Varyag again after the cruiser was handed over to the Russian Empire: as we have already said, it happened in 1916 on February 4 (17), 1916 to Japan the commission for the acceptance of the ships arrived (together with the Varyag, the battleships Poltava and Peresvet were bought out). Her conclusion on the power plant was quite negative. The cruiser's boilers, according to the commission, could have served for another year and a half or two, and rivets in four boilers were eroded, as well as pipe bending and cracks in the collectors of several other boilers (alas, the author does not know the exact number of damaged boilers). There was also "some subsidence of the propeller shafts."
The transfer procedure was pretty crumpled, the Russians were simply not given the opportunity to properly delve into the ships. But when they arrived in Vladivostok and got serious about them, it turned out that almost all systems of the cruiser require repair, including, of course, the power plant. The fittings of boilers, machines and refrigerators were again removed, the pipes and headers of the boilers were put in order, the cylinders of machines were opened, etc. etc., and it seems to have given a result - during the trials on May 3 (15), using 22 boilers out of 30, the Varyag developed 16 knots. But already at the third sailing out to sea, held on May 29 (June 11) 1916, the ship had to give a "stop machine" - the bearings knocked again … Interestingly, they did not even try to test the cruiser at full speed - even a cursory examination of the commission that accepted " Varyag ", revealed that in the current state of speed close to the contract, the ship is unattainable.
And all would be fine, but the cruiser was in such a state only a year and four months after undergoing a year-long overhaul by the Japanese! At the same time, as we said above, they did not at all "chase him into the tail and into the mane" - during these year and 4 months the ship made only one four-month training voyage.
Therefore, the author's version is as follows - the Japanese, after a two-year repair of the Varyag in 1905-1907, brought it into the fleet, but they still could not ensure the stable operation of the power plant - during the tests the cruiser showed its 22, 71 knots, but then everything started to run wild again. And if the real speed of the Soy was not too different from that of the Varyag (that is, about 17 knots without the risk of breaking a car or boiling someone alive), then, of course, such a ship was not any valuable acquisition for the United Fleet, so they quickly sent him off to school.
It is noteworthy that Japan, generally speaking, "yielded" ships to the Russian Empire according to the principle "On you, God, that we do not want." And the fact that they agreed to sell us the Varyag, without trying to concede the seemingly inferior Pallada in all respects, speaks volumes. Although it is possible that in fact there were such attempts, it is just that the author of this article does not know about them.
It is interesting that later, after the cruiser returned to Russia, assessing the condition of the cruiser before sending it to England for repairs, it was considered possible, based on the results of this repair, to provide the ship with a speed of 20 knots for several years without the danger of breakdowns.
Thus, we can state that the 22, 71 knots that the Varyag developed after a two-year repair in 1905-1907 does not at all indicate that it was able to develop the same, or at least a comparable speed during battle in Chemulpo. In addition, there is no evidence that the Varyag retained the ability to develop such a speed for any length of time while serving in the Japanese fleet, and indirect signs indicate thatthat this cruiser had problems with the power plant and under the canopy of the Mikado flag. And all this allows us to assume that the main culprit of this cruiser's troubles was its designer and builder Ch. Crump.
With this article we end the description of the history of the cruiser "Varyag" - we just have to summarize all the assumptions that we made during the cycle dedicated to it, and draw conclusions, which will be devoted to the last, final article.
The end follows …
