In the previous articles, we examined the reasons why the Russian stationaries, the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets had no right, and physically they could not effectively prevent the Japanese landing in Chemulpo by force. Let us now consider a variant around which many copies were broken on the fields of Internet battles of amateur historians - the night breakthrough of the Varyag.
To do this, let us refresh in our memory the chronology of those distant events, from the moment the Koreyets left the raid, which took place in the second half of January 26 and the night of January 26-27:
15.40 - The gunboat "Koreets" is unanchored to sail to Port Arthur;
15.55 - A Japanese squadron is seen on the Koreyets;
4:35 p.m. The Korean turns around to return to Port Arthur, and is attacked by a torpedo while circulating. A combat alarm was sounded on the ship;
16:37 (roughly) A second torpedo was fired at the ship. The gunboat commander G. P. Belyaev ordered to open fire, but immediately canceled his order, nevertheless two shots were fired from the 37-mm cannon;
16.40-16.50 (tentatively) - Chiyoda and Takatiho entered the Chemulpo raid;
16.55 "Koreets" anchored in the roadstead of Chemulpo, in 2, 5 cables at the stern of the "Varyag";
16.55-17.05 (tentatively) four Japanese destroyers of the 9th detachment enter the raid and occupy positions - "Aotaka" and "Hari" 500 m from the "Varyag" and "Koreyets", respectively, "Hato" and "Tsubame" - covered by foreign ships, but in full readiness to attack. The Chiyoda took up a position closer to the city dock, where the transports were supposed to arrive. Unfortunately, the author of this article does not know where the Takachiho was, presumably his position was between the pier and the Varyag. At about the same time, G. P. Belyaev arrived to report on the Varyag. That is, V. F. Rudnev learned about the mine attack of the Koreyets almost simultaneously with the entry into the positions of the Japanese destroyers.
It must be said that the sources in the descriptions of how the ships stood on the Chemulpo roadstead have significant discrepancies. So, for example, in many cases it is indicated that two Japanese destroyers were hiding behind foreign stationary vehicles, but, for example, V. Kataev gives a diagram according to which all four Japanese destroyers of the 9th detachment were standing opposite the Varyag and Koreets.
On the other hand, the diagram shows "Naniwa", about which it is reliably known that on the night of January 26-27 she was not in the roadstead, but at Fr. Phalmido. I must say that usually the maneuvering of ships is one of the most controversial aspects of the history of war at sea - it often happens that when comparing the maneuvering schemes of one battle, which were drawn by the parties involved in it, it often seems that we are talking about two completely different battles, therefore, there is absolutely no need to be surprised at such discrepancies, or to look for some hidden meaning in this;
05.17-17.10 - The Asama, Naniwa, Niitaka, Akashi and transports with a landing party enter the Chemulpo raid. "Asama" took a position 27 cables south of the "Varyag", thereby controlling both Russian stations and the entrance to the Chemulpo raid. The other three cruisers make a "lap of honor", bypassing the roadstead along the entire perimeter of the anchorage;
A little remark: so, by the time the Japanese transports appeared on the roadstead, the Varyag and the Korean were already "under the supervision" of two destroyers located 2.5 cables from the Russian ships, and at any moment more could come to their aid two. The transports entered the roadstead accompanied by four cruisers and immediately went to the pier, where they found themselves under the cover of the Chiyoda and Takachiho. Three other armored Japanese cruisers, leaving their transports, moved along the raid, that is, in order to begin to act, they did not even need to unanchor or rivet the anchor chain. As the transports moved towards the dock, the main artillery "argument" of Sotokichi Uriu, the armored cruiser Asama, took an excellent position. It is not known whether this was a deliberate decision of the Japanese commander, but the distance of 27 cables separating the Russian station from the Asama was optimal for the armored cruiser. On the one hand, the Asama's gunners at such a distance would easily have shot at targets at anchor, and even if V. F. Rudnev gave a move, he could not quickly develop high speed, remaining a good target. At the same time, the high-explosive shells of the Japanese would inflict terrible damage on the Varyag and Koreyets, which did not have armor protection on the sides and guns. At the same time, all the vulnerable spots of the Asama (engine and boiler rooms, 152-mm and 203-mm guns, etc.) on 27 cables were perfectly protected from the Varyag and Koreyets armor-piercing shells: the main armor belt, the casemates and turrets of the Japanese ship were protected by 152-178 mm of Harvey's armor, which is equivalent in armor resistance to approximately 129-151 mm of Krupp's armor. At the same time, on 27 cables, the armor penetration of the 152-mm Russian projectile was at least 50-55 mm, 203-mm - hardly more than 100 mm. And from high-explosive shells "Asama" was very well protected, much better than Russian ships, and this is not to mention the fact that due to the scanty content of explosives in the shells, one can probably say that there were no high-explosive shells on the "Varyag" in general, but there were two types of armor-piercing … However, the latter is known to us, but the officers of the Russian Imperial Navy, alas, did not know it then.
Of course, under such conditions, the attempt of Russian stationers to engage in battle could not lead to any success - there is no doubt that if they tried to open fire, both the Varyag and the Korean would be instantly destroyed by torpedoes from destroyers and concentrated fire from Japanese cruisers. And there was no reason for the opening of fire - the incident with the "Koreyets" was resolved safely for the Russian sailors, but to use it as a "casus belli" or not, it was up to St. Petersburg to decide. It would seem that everything is clear here and there is no room for ambiguous interpretations: nevertheless, some dear readers of VO do not agree with this.
They reproach V. F. Rudnev that he did not rush to prepare the cruiser for battle, as soon as the Koreets reported the appearance of a Japanese squadron that the cruiser should have been kept under steam, that the Koreets should have immediately reported that the Japanese were attacking him, that a torpedo attack was declaration of war, and, if so, the "Varyag" immediately had to engage in battle with the Japanese ships entering the raid. Well, let's assume for a second that the Koreyets attack can be considered the beginning of a war (this is not true, but let's assume). What, in this case, should have been the actions of the "Varyag" if its commander decided to join the battle?
Unfortunately, those who hold the above point of view tend to forget one small detail. The fact is that the "Korean" was attacked outside neutral waters, and the cruiser "Varyag" was on a neutral roadstead. That is, even if a war broke out between the Russians and the Japanese, the Varyag still had no right to join the battle on the Chemulpo raid. It would violate Korea's neutrality, which would mean nothing, but it would endanger the foreign hospitals stationed there, which would mean a lot. The problem was that the Japanese, having attacked the Korean, were, in general, in their own right - if they were guilty of anything, it was only that they began hostilities without a declaration of war. However, they did not violate any maritime laws and customs concerning the neutrality of third countries. But if the "Varyag" opened fire, it would be a gross violation. Thus, if the "Varyag" considered it possible to start hostilities, he should not open fire on the Japanese until he left the raid. Is it necessary to explain that, having stepped out onto the fairway, the Varyag would have driven itself into a trap, since there it would have become an excellent target for destroyers who could have accompanied it from the moment the Varyag was de-anchored (neutral roadstead!) And that There was probably no better way to uselessly destroy a cruiser? This would be somehow justified if, having sunk the cruiser, it was possible to clog the fairway leading to Chemulpo. But it was not so narrow - the death of "Varyag" in the fairway, at best, would have impeded the movement of ships and vessels, but could not stop it in any way.
At the same time, the Varyag commander was prohibited from hindering the landing of Japanese troops. Accordingly, V. F. Rudnev, having accepted the report of GB Belyaev, ordered "Varyag" and "Koreyets" to be ready to repel a mine attack, which he limited himself to - and was absolutely right in this. Realizing that the Japanese would not attack his ships on a neutral roadstead, Vsevolod Fedorovich tried to act diplomatically. We will still consider what came of this, but now we will return to the chronology:
17.30 - The landing of the troops began. I must say that the depths did not allow the troops to land directly on the pier, so three Japanese transports (and not four, as indicated in some sources) stopped about two miles from the coastline. Each transport had on board specially prepared barges, with the help of which the soldiers were transported to the shore. In this they were assisted by steam boats, brought beforehand to Chemulpo, and the floating craft of the Japanese who lived in this city. Around the same time (or, perhaps, a little later), three Japanese armored cruisers completed their "circle of honor" in the raid and split up - the Akashi joined the Chiyoda and Takachiho, guarding the transports, and the Naniwa and "Niitaka" left the raid and went to the east of about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), thus standing between the islands of Phalmido and Harido;
In addition, I would like to note some discrepancy in the sources: for example, in the "Work of the Historical Commission" it is indicated that the landing of troops began only at 19.20. Perhaps this should be explained by the fact that 17.30 is the time of the beginning of preparations for the landing, that is, the launching of barges, the approach of steam boats, etc., while 19.20 is the beginning of the actual crossing of troops. We can also assume something else - the fact is that the Japanese in their sources give time along the Kyoto meridian, that is, their own Japanese, while the Russians use local time - in the case of Chemulpo, the difference is 34 minutes. Because of this, confusion is possible in some works, if suddenly someone would mistakenly use Japanese and Russian time to describe events;
18.40 - “Naniwa” and “Takachiho” met at Fr. Phalmido with destroyers of the 14th detachment;
The armored cruiser Asama left the Chemulpo raid after sunset and joined the Naniwa and Niitake. Unfortunately, the exact time of his departure from the raid is unknown;
02.30 (January 27) - The landing of the airborne detachment is completed. A total of 3,000 soldiers landed;
05.45 - Two of the three Japanese transports, Dayren-maru and Otaru-maru, have finished loading the landing craft;
06.00 - "Dayren-maru" and "Otaru-maru" weighed anchor and went to Asanman Bay. (Again, "The Work of the Historical Commission" indicates that this happened at 05.15). The third transport, "Heidze-maru", was delayed, settling economic affairs, and left the raid only at 10.00;
07.00 - "Takachiho", "Akashi" and the 9th destroyer detachment left the Chemulpo raid and went to about. Phalmido. At the same time, the commander of the last remaining Japanese warship Chiyoda arrived on the British cruiser Talbot to notify its commander, Commodore Bailey, of the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan;
09.23 Chiyoda left the Chemulpo raid. After just a few hours, "Varyag" and "Koreets" will engage the Japanese squadron.
As a matter of fact, the above data alone perfectly characterize the complete impossibility of a night breakthrough by the Varyag and the Koreyets, or, if you like, one Varyag without the Koreyets. It would be possible to discuss this as a kind of theoretical version based on afterthought, but only on one condition - that on the night of the breakthrough, the Japanese squadron would concentrate somewhere near the entrance to the fairway to the Chemulpo raid - well, for example, near the island of Harido, or Palmido. But the fact is that the "Varyag" and "Koreets" essentially stood all night under the supervision of Japanese destroyers, which could easily torpedo them while still standing, when trying to un-anchor (which could not be done at once), and what kind of breakthrough is there? can you talk at all? Nevertheless, and in order to avoid any understatement, we will now analyze in detail the information that Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev had on the evening of January 26 and on the night of January 27, and consider whether he, or any other commander in his place, could accept breakout decision.
So what actually happened on January 26, 1904? The Japanese, obviously, were going to make a landing in Chemulpo, it was, if freelance, then in any case the situation provided for by the order. V. F. Rudnev had clear instructions on this matter: do not interfere. However, at the same time an extraordinary event happened - the "Korean" was attacked, however, the Japanese did not achieve anything and did not try to continue the hostilities. In this situation, the commander of "Varyag" orders to be ready to repel the attack, and he himself is trying to figure out what happened - through diplomatic channels. In other words, Vsevolod Fedorovich goes to the senior Chemulpo on the raid - Commodore Bailey, commander of the Talbot cruiser and has a conversation with him. As a result of the negotiations, the Englishman immediately goes to negotiate with the Japanese, and then visits the cruiser Varyag, where he tells V. F. Rudnev about their results. And here there is one … let's say, a very controversial episode. The first question is - to whom did the British commodore go? The Historical Commission Report indicates that Bailey visited the Naniwa and had a conversation with Rear Admiral Uriu, while Japanese sources irrefutably testify that Bailey arrived on the Takachiho and spoke to its commander, Mori Ichibee. Apparently, such a discrepancy occurred due to an incorrect interpretation: we will re-read it again, as V. F. Rudnev describes the words of Commodore Bailey:
“I came, as the senior of the commanders of the ships in the roadstead, to you, as the senior of the Japanese commanders, to warn:
1. We are standing on a raid of a nation that has declared neutrality, therefore, the raid is absolutely neutral and no one has the right either to shoot or throw mines at anyone. I am announcing to you that at the vessel that does this, no matter what nation, I will be the first to start shooting. (The Japanese was extremely surprised, even asked: "How, will you shoot at us? - Yes, I will, since I am completely ready to open fire");
2. You must make an order for your squad and make what is said known. (The Japanese agreed, but asked: “What if the Russians start shooting?” The English commander repeated his commitment to take responsibility for the ships of the international squadron);
3. You must allow all boats to land where there should be no obstacles to disembarkation;
4. You can land troops, since this is your business and does not concern us;
5. In case of misunderstanding with any nation, I ask you to come to my ship, I will invite the commander of the same nation and I myself will deal with the case;
In conclusion, to the commander's question about firing mines at the "Korean", the Japanese replied that he did not know about the case, that this was a misunderstanding and, probably, there was even nothing."
That is, Vsevolod Fedorovich writes about the visit of the Englishman to the senior Japanese commander, and, probably, one of the members of the Commission decided that since S. Uriu was the oldest among the Japanese, then Bailey visited him. But "Naniwa" was not in the Chemulpo raid in the evening, and besides, even if by some miracle he returned there, Commodore Bailey could not refer to Sotokichi Uriu as "the senior of the commanders of the ships stationed in the roads", because in this case, the senior would be the Japanese rear admiral.
Now let's see how the conversation with the British Commodore went, according to the Japanese side. To do this, let's study the report of Captain 1st Rank Mori Ichibee to his immediate commander Sotokichi Uriu, which was written by the commander of "Takachiho":
“At 21.00 on February 8 (January 26, old style, approx. Author), the commander of the English cruiser Talbot arrived on the Takachiho, who, as the senior foreign ships on the roadstead, told me the following:“I am sure that you respect the neutrality of the port Incheon (Chemulpo) and you will not open fire here or take any other actions that would pose a threat to the ships of foreign powers located here. " In response, I assured him that as long as the Russian ships did not undertake hostile actions against us on the roadstead, there would be no threat to foreign ships. The English commander asked me: "For what reason today did your torpedo boats carry out a torpedo attack on the Russian ship Koreets, and is this information true?" I replied that I still do not have accurate information on this matter and cannot confirm whether it was or not in reality. He did not say a word or ask about the landing of our troops, but only expressed the hope that the presence of our troops in Incheon would not cause any disturbances or misunderstandings. At the end of the conversation, the commander of the British cruiser stressed that there are close friendly relations between Japan and England, which must continue to be strengthened. After that, he left our ship and went to the Varyag to meet with its commander, after which he conveyed through the officer sent to him from Takachiho the following: “The Varyag commander categorically stated that in order to avoid any incidents, he does not intend in any way to hinder the landing of Japanese troops."
As we can see, the report of Mori Ichibee differs greatly from the description of this conversation by V. F. Rudnev. Consequently, someone here is clearly disingenuous, but who exactly? To do this, let us recall the famous Latin dictum "Is fecit cui prodest" ("He made the one who benefits"). So, was there any point in the commander of the Takachiho to somehow alter the words of Commodore Bailey? Yes, it did not happen at all, because Japan's relations with England were extremely important, and therefore Mori Ichibee should have conveyed the meaning of his conversation with the British commander to Sotokichi Uriu as accurately as possible. Therefore, we can safely assume that the Japanese captain of the 1st rank does not lie. Remain V. F. Rudnev and Commodore Bailey: but the question is, why would Vsevolod Fedorovich distort the words of the British commander?
In essence, the following is evident from M. Ichibee's report - the Japanese commander assures Bailey that unless the Russians open fire first, no battle will take place, and that the incident with the Korean is some kind of mistake. Such a statement underlines the correctness of V. F. Rudnev - in accordance with the orders he received, not to interfere with the landing of the Japanese in Chemulpo and not to succumb to the provocations of the Japanese. In other words, if Bailey had accurately conveyed V. F. Rudnev the content of the conversation, then Vsevolod Fedorovich did not have a single reason to somehow embellish its content.
But Commodore Bailey … oh, that's another matter entirely. As a matter of fact, the Briton had many interests in this matter. First, England, in fact, was a tacit ally of Japan, so Bailey tried to help the Japanese. If someone doubts this thesis, then it is enough to read the text of an urgent message to the Naniva, which was made by Captain 1st Rank Murakami after visiting the Talbot at 22.30 on January 26: “According to the information received from the commander of the British cruiser, on February 8 (January 26) Russian ships "Koreets" left the anchorage in order to go to Port Arthur. In addition, the British commander reported that there is information that the secret documents of the Russian diplomatic mission in Korea were loaded on the Sungari steamer and at 10 am on February 9 (January 27) this steamer should leave the raid and head to Port Arthur ". That is, in fact, the gallant commodore spied in favor of the Japanese.
Second, of course, the Talbot commander was extremely interested in the Japanese not causing any damage to British interests, and not spoiling relations with the powers, whose stationers were present at the Chemulpo raid. The British saw Japan as a force capable of crushing the Russian naval power in the Far East, and the British did not need at all for this force to somehow interfere with the scandals with the United States, France or Italy. Accordingly, Bailey's tasks were as follows:
1. To assist S. Uriu in achieving his goals (unimpeded landing of troops), provided that they do nothing wrong to the Europeans in Korea;
2. Avoid shooting in the roadstead, during which one of the foreign inpatients could be injured.
At the same time, of course, Bailey could not be aware of the orders of V. F. Rudnev, forbidding the latter to interfere with the Japanese landing. Now let's see what exactly turned out to be embellished in the presentation of the conversation between Bailey and the commander of "Takachiho" in the presentation of V. F. Rudneva:
1. Bailey appears in it as an indomitable champion of the neutrality of the Chemulpo raid, ready to shoot anyone who violates it. That is, he will not even regret his Japanese ally (a hint: what can we say about the Russian cruiser!);
2. Bailey allegedly made a special reservation with the Japanese commander that he did not consider the landing of Japanese troops to be a violation and would not accept a reason for opening fire (“You can land troops, since this is your business and does not concern us”).
Another interesting aspect is that no exaggeration was made regarding the Koreyets' torpedo attack. But the fact is that, having communicated exactly to Vsevolod Fedorovich the words of the Japanese commander, Bailey thereby also demonstrated his position regarding this incident: they say, all this needs clarification, and in general it is a dark matter, or maybe nothing like that happened at all. That is, the English commodore made it clear to V. F. Rudnev that he does not consider the actions of the Japanese against the "Koreyets" to be any kind of "Belli incident" and will not accept them as an excuse for any aggressive actions of the Russian inmates. With all this, of course, Commodore Bailey did not express his own, personal position, but spoke as a full-fledged representative of "Foggy Albion" - that is, in fact, he brought to the attention of the Russian commander the official position of England, which she would take in the unfolding events …
Of course, we cannot say for sure that it was Bailey who perverted the negotiations with the Takachiho commander. But we see that the "exaggerations" that V. F. Rudnev, in his report and in his memoirs, fit perfectly into the goals that the Talbot commander could and should have pursued. And therefore, such a hypothesis looks the closest to the truth.
And now let's try to take the place of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, when he had to decide on the actions of his ships for the next night. The Japanese attacked the Korean with torpedoes, but why and why? There was no declaration of war, and the Japanese did not report anything of the kind. The Takachiho commander also did not clarify this issue. It is possible that this was an attempt to destroy the "Korean" while no one sees it. But maybe this is really some kind of mistake, for example, caused by the fact that the Korean and the Japanese transports with the landing force were too close to each other?
In other words, the situation was completely unclear. Either the Japanese had already decided to go to war with Russia, and now they were just waiting for an opportunity to destroy the Russian ships, not daring, however, to do it on a neutral roadstead. Either the Japanese were not looking at all for an open conflict with the Russian Empire, and the situation with the attack of the "Koreyets" is just a consequence of the performers' nervousness. They had something to worry about: if, for example, S. Uriu received an order to land troops in Korea, then he could not help but understand that this was a violation of her neutrality, and who knows how the Russians would behave in this situation? The situation was tense, and maybe the Japanese destroyers just lost their nerves?
Of course, this kind of "mistakes" cannot be simply "put on the brakes", it is impossible to allow foreign ships to fire torpedoes at our ships with impunity. But, as we said earlier, the "measure of punishment" in such cases should have been determined not by the cruiser commander, but by the country's leadership.
So, either the Japanese are landing troops in Korea, but they do not want war with us, or they are already at war with us, we just do not know this yet. If the first is true, and the Japanese only want to protect their transports from possible Russian encroachments, then no special actions from V. F. Rudnev is not required, because nothing threatened his ships in the roadstead and he had an order to the Japanese not to interfere. But an attempt to escape could lead to an unnecessary collision, because the movement of the Russian ships could be misinterpreted by the Japanese and provoke them to attack. But even if it were possible to leave, how would it look from the outside? The Japanese were not looking for a fight with the Russians, but the station commanders were so scared of just the sight of Japanese warships that they fled in panic at night, abandoning their diplomatic mission?
In other words, if we assume (we are still in the place of Vsevolod Fedorovich) that the Japanese were only going to land troops, but not to fight with Russia, then V. F. Rudnev won absolutely nothing, making an attempt to leave the Chemulpo raid at night. Well, what if this is still a war, and the only thing that still keeps Sotokichi Uriu from attacking by open force is the presence of foreign stationers on the raid?
Well, then the position of the Russian ships should have been described as hopeless. "Varyag" and "Koreyets" are anchored at gunpoint by Japanese destroyers, which not only were located at a distance that did not allow them to miss the ship at anchor, but at nightfall they pointed their torpedo tubes at the Russian stationers. This fact is confirmed by Japanese memoirs, one of the officers of S. Uriu's headquarters, captain of the 3rd rank Moriyama Keisaburo, recalled: in anxiety, not closing his eyes. " In this case, any attempt to anchor at night will result in an immediate attack. But what if the Japanese commanders still decide to respect the "neutrality of the Chemulpo raid" and do not open fire first? And here's what - the four destroyers of the 9th detachment noticed on the roadstead will simply go along with the Varyag and Koreyets side-by-side to the exit from the roadstead, and there, outside neutral waters, at the exit from the fairway, they will immediately destroy them torpedoes. And if after this attack someone does not go to the bottom as quickly as the loyal subjects of the Mikado would like, then the artillery of the Asama Naniwa and Niitaki, of course, will quickly complete the job.
Well, what happens if the Varyag, disregarding Bailey's warning, starts the battle first? Raise pairs, in the hope that the Japanese destroyers will not attack immediately, but will wait until the Russians give a move. Rivet the anchor chains to give this very move as quickly as possible. And - even before the "Varyag" and "Koreets" move from their place, to unleash a hail of shells from all guns on the two destroyers standing next to each other. "Aotaka" and "Hari" were relatively small destroyers, with a normal displacement of 152 tons - theoretically, point-blank dagger fire (500 meters!) Could suppress them and send them to the bottom so quickly that the latter would not have time to use torpedo that would be very small. And then … Then all that remained was to pray to Nicholas the Wonderworker so that the second pair of Japanese destroyers would not have time to catch up with the Russian ships going to the exit from the raid, or to sink these two destroyers by shooting them on the way out, while managing to avoid hitting foreign stations with an accidental shell, against which the Japanese will attack. Pray that the Asam's gunners (the Varyag did not know that this cruiser left after sunset) would sleep through everything and not open fire on the desperately shooting Russians - and that alone would be enough to stop both Russian ship. In general, even if a uniform miracle happened, and the Varyag and Koreets could somehow deal with the Japanese destroyers of the 9th detachment, then they would not have a chance to break through the Asama, and even if this all of a sudden they succeeded - then at the exit from the fairway the "Naniwa" and "Niitaka" would surely have been waiting for them, and who knows how many destroyers would be with them? These Japanese ships did not even have to compete with the "Varyag" in the power of artillery - it was enough, having heard the cacophony in the roadstead, send several destroyers into the channel from about. Pkhalmido, who would have destroyed the Varyag and the Korean with torpedoes while they walked in the dark and in the narrows.
In general, in short, there was no chance of a night breakthrough (based on the information that V. F. Rudnev had). Considering what we know today, it was not even more so. Yes, "Asama" actually left the raid, joining the "Naniwa" and "Niitake" between the islands of Harido and Pkhalmido, but the 14th destroyer detachment also arrived there, which was quite capable of "taking warm" and "Varyag", and "Korean" right in the fairway. Usually the alternatives to the Varyag's night breakthrough come down to the recipe to quietly separate the vapors, enter the fairway, give full speed there to 23 knots, and then rush past the peacefully sleeping Japanese squadron - and then look for the wind in the field. Usually, after voicing the above, the calculations of the speed with which the "Varyag" could go along the fairway begin, disputes over what maximum speed it can develop …
But in fact, there are two completely immutable facts that kill such an alternative in the bud. Fact one: the Varyag could not leave the raid of Chemulpo without firing except under the escort of four Japanese destroyers, and this is only if the latter did not attack the Russians immediately, that is, due to circumstances beyond the control of the Russian sailors. But in this case, the "Varyag" and "Koreets" would have been destroyed when leaving the fairway, or maybe right on it, because the flooding of both Russian ships would not have blocked access to Chemulpo, but only made it difficult to a certain extent. The second fact is that the Japanese did not doze at all - in fact, Sotokichi Uriu feared not only the "Varyag" with the "Korean", but also the approach of additional Russian forces from Port Arthur. Therefore, the ships he had taken out of the raid to the Phalmido Island were not so much locking up our stationers in Chemulpo as preparing to fight with possible Russian reinforcements. It is clear that with such initial data, there were no "peacefully sleeping Japanese crews" on ships "with undisturbed fire in the cauldrons" and "not ready to immediately weaken anchor" were not and could not be.
And, finally, in the event of the start of shooting in the roadstead, Russian ships would be accused of violating neutrality. Of course, the launch of torpedoes is not silent - in the torpedo tubes of those years they were thrown out with a special powder expelling charge, but it gave much less noise than a gun shot and almost did not give a flash. So even if the "Varyag" actually opened fire after it was attacked by a Japanese destroyer (for example, during shooting from anchor), then, with almost one hundred percent probability, the senior officer on the road, Commodore Bailey Would “appoint” V. F. Rudnev. And if at the same time, God forbid, someone from the hospital would suffer, then the actions of the Varyag commander could lead to extreme diplomatic complications (up to a war) with the affected power.
Thus, we see that the attempt at night breakthrough:
1. Couldn't be successful;
2. It could easily lead to a completely useless death of Russian ships with minimal damage to the Japanese, or without it at all;
3. With the highest degree of probability would lead to diplomatic complications.
Thus, the night breakthrough had no advantages over the day breakthrough, and was, in fact, the worst alternative, because during the day, at least, it was possible to leave the raid and not be afraid of an international incident.
Articles in this series:
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo January 27, 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 3. Boilers Nikloss
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 4. Steam machines
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 6. Across the Oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Ch. 7. Port Arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 8. Korean neutrality
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Ch. 9. The release of the "Korean"
