Combat aircraft. Difficult choice for the designer Ilyushin

2024 Author: Matthew Elmers | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 21:49

Another reflection inspired by questions from readers. What is the Il-10 and how much of it was needed by the Red Army Air Force, given the presence of the Il-2, a "flying tank" and so on?

It must be said right away that new aircraft in our Air Force after 1941-22-06 were extremely rare. Actually, there were only three of them. La-5, which was a radically altered LaGG-3, Tu-2, about which we can say that it was designed from scratch, and Il-10.

And around the latter, there are still quite heated debates about what it is: the modernization of the Il-2 or a new aircraft. There are enough arguments for both versions.

Let's take a look. As always - into history.

And history has saved us a bunch of documents (for example, order on NKAP No. 414 dated July 12, 1943), which testify that back in 1943 Ilyushin was ordered to a certain Il-1 aircraft with an AM-42 engine. And this plane had to be manufactured by the plant # 18 by 15.09.1943. But it did not work out due to the workload of the plant with the release of IL-2.

According to the GKO decree No. 4427 of October 26, 1943, Ilyushin, no later than October 15, 1943, had to submit … TWO cars for state tests. Single and double.

Why is that?

Because it was the end of 1943 in the yard. And the Soviet aviation, slowly but surely, overcoming the heroism of the German "aces" of the Hartmann type, who shot down hundreds and thousands of aircraft, won the advantage in the air.

What does advantage mean? This means that the nine of the Il-2, to which the eight Me.109 perked up, was covered not by a couple of four fighters, but at least 6-8. Hence, the Hartmans ceased to cope with the total annihilation of the Soviet Air Force, which directly (unpleasantly) reflected on the ground forces.

If we had so many aircraft that it became difficult for the Germans to get our attack aircraft, accordingly, they thought about such a maneuver: to strengthen the pilot's armor protection from fire from the rear hemisphere and remove the arrow.

The experience of 1941-43 showed that he was not so useful, comrade "backwards." According to the reporting statistics of the assault aviation regiments of the 8th and 17th air armies in the period 1943-45, the average consumption of the UBT machine gun ammunition in one Il-2 combat flight was 22 rounds, which corresponds to a firing duration of only 1.32 seconds.

It is clear that this average is very approximate, that is, someone could not shoot at the enemy at all due to his absence in 1945, and someone in 1943 from flight to flight landed all the ammunition. But in general, the statistics for the hospital are as follows.

Move on. There is one more figure. The probability of hitting the shooter with German fighters was 2-2.5 times higher than the probability that the attack aircraft would be shot down by the same fire.

At the same time, the probability of victory in a duel between a German pilot and a Soviet shooter was estimated as 4-4, 5 in favor of the German.

That is, for one IL-2 shot down by German fighters, there were at least 3-4 killed or wounded shooters. Usually killed. The calibers of the Germans in the second half of the war were such that there is no doubt about it: 13-mm, 15-mm, 20-mm, 30-mm. And with the armor protection of the shooter there were such nuances that he simply did not leave a chance.

It is not surprising that in conditions of good fighter cover, the pilots began to fly without gunners. There were such people, as an example I can cite the Hero of the Soviet Union, pilot-cosmonaut Georgy Beregovoy, who was noted in such flights.

That is why in 1943 they returned to the project of a one-seater attack aircraft. In general, not in vain, because as soon as the position of the gunner on the IL-2 was called, even a "sentence". The losses among the riflemen were indeed quite large.

Alas, the circumstances turned out so that it became clear that plant # 18 would not be able to handle two planes. Nobody removed the obligation to build the IL-2 from the plant, and every qualified worker was on the account.

Sergei Ilyushin faced a difficult choice. Obviously, one of the two planes had to be abandoned. Only the chief designer could make a choice which plane to leave. That's why he is in charge. Ilyushin preferred to leave the two-seater plane, which he wrote about in a letter to the People's Commissar of Aviation Shakhurin.

Why he did this will become clear a little later.

The car was supposed to have the following characteristics:

- maximum speed at the ground - 445 km / h;

- at an altitude of 2000 m - 450 km / h;

- the greatest flight range at normal take-off weight - 900 km;

- normal bomb load - 400 kg (overload - 600 kg);

- armament, consisting of two VYa cannons with 300 rounds of ammunition, two ShKAS machine guns with 1500 rounds of ammunition and one defensive 12, 7-mm machine gun M. Ye. Berezin UBK with 150 rounds of ammunition.

Now many will say: and how is this aircraft different from the Il-2? Except for a little more speed and increased ammunition for ShKAS?

These were preliminary requests. Of course, the AM-42, which had 200 horsepower more than the AM-38, could afford other improvements.

I will say a few more words about the one-seater attack aircraft.

In principle, if you reduce the armored capsule, remove the machine gun, arrow, ammunition, it turned out that the plane could lose weight from 600 to 800 kg. It's a lot. If converted to fuel, the range could be increased by 300 km, or the bomb load could be increased, bringing it to 1000 kg.

Or it became possible to strengthen the supporting structures and thereby provide the possibility of a steep dive. That is, in fact, it turned out to be a well-armored attack bomber capable of dive bombing. This would be a very serious help for the attacking ground units.

The project of such an aircraft existed. It was IL-8, variant # 2. However, it is worth talking about the development of the Il-8, the fact that it was possible to create such an aircraft.

But in 1943, the new aircraft did not work. Will you try to guess the reason? That's right, the engine. This is an eternal problem, and the AM-42 was no exception. The aircraft with actually working AM-42 could be submitted for evaluation only in February 1944.

And only in April the car began to fly. VK Kokkinaki, the legend of our aviation, became the "godfather" of the Il-10. He conducted several dozen flights under the test program and completed it successfully.

With a standard flight weight of 6300 kg (400 kg of bombs, RS were not suspended), the maximum speed of the new attack aircraft was 512 km / h at the ground and at an altitude of 2800 m - 555 km / h. The ascent time to a height of 1000 m - 1.6 minutes, to an altitude of 3000 m - 4.9 minutes. The flight range at an altitude of 2800 m at a cruising speed of 385 km / h was 850 km.

It was better than the IL-2. And much better.

But it's worth looking not at the numbers in general, but at the differences in general.

So, what did the test pilots Kokkinaki, Dolgov, Sinelnikov, Subbotin, Tinyakov and Painters report in their reports? And they reported the following about:

- the aircraft is easy to operate and will not require special retraining of pilots who have mastered the IL-2;

- stability and controllability are good;

- the rudder loads are normal in size and direction;

- the loads from the elevators are somewhat high;

- on taxiing, the stability of the aircraft is insufficient.

However, despite the deterioration in takeoff and landing properties, the IL-10 has a clear advantage in speed. Its maximum speed is greater:

- near the ground at 123 km / h;

- at the border of altitude at 147 km / h.

The time to climb 3000 m is 3 minutes less. The horizontal flight range at an altitude of 5000 m increased by 120 km.

The weapon remained almost the same, or rather, the composition of the weapon. The same two VYa-23 cannons, two ShKAS machine guns. But the ammunition load has changed. Each Il-2 cannon had 210 rounds, the Il-10 had 300. The ShKAS Il-2 had 750 rounds, the ShKAS on the Il-10 had 1,500 rounds.

The difference is already felt, isn't it?

But the main change was in the rear of the cockpit. According to the plans of the designers, the increased booking of German fighters, as well as the appearance of the Focke-Wulf 190 with additional protection in the form of a two-row air-cooled engine, demanded respect for oneself.

They decided to respect the achievements of German designers with the installation of a VU-7 and a 20-mm cannon. Installed and ShVAK, and Sh-20, and UB-20. With 150 rounds of ammunition.

On some machines, produced at plant # 18, VU-7 was replaced with a VU-8 installation with a UBK machine gun.

The Il-10 with the AM-42 engine in July-August 44th successfully passed state tests at the State Committee of the Air Force Research Institute of the Spacecraft and by the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 6246ss dated August 23, 1944, it was put into serial production at two aircraft factories, No. 1 and No. 18.

In state tests, the aircraft showed simply excellent performance. This was achieved not only by using a more powerful engine. A lot of work was done to improve the contours of the armored hull, develop faster wing profiles, meticulous surface treatment and seal the compartments.

As a result, the frontal resistance of the Il-10 compared to the Il-2 was almost halved.

Combat aircraft. Difficult choice for the designer Ilyushin

But even the not improved aerodynamics, in my opinion, became a more useful rework. In the design of the Il-10, the shooter's protection was finally thought out and (most importantly) correctly implemented. I will not compare it with the Il-2, everything was done there according to the principle "I blinded him from what was," the defense seemed to take place, but the arrows died like flies. On the IL-10, everything was done initially. Both the experience of using the IL-2 and the death of a huge number of riflemen played a role.

From bullets and shells from the side of the rear hemisphere, the shooter was protected by an armored partition formed by two adjacent armor plates 8 mm thick each with a gap between them. This protection successfully withstood hits from 20 mm cannon shells. Ours, ShVAK, which were more efficient than the German ones.

By the way, the pilot was protected in the same way, he was protected by an armored wall and a headrest, which were made of two armor plates 8 mm thick.

There was, of course, the likelihood for the shooter of getting hit in the open part, but, alas, there was nothing to be done about it.

Move on.

In the front windows of the pilot's lantern, transparent armor 64 mm thick with a metal edging was placed. The transparent armor was made in two layers: raw silicate glass was glued onto a plexiglass base. The reclining side covers of the cockpit canopy were made of metal armor (6 mm thick) and plexiglass. From above, the pilot's head was covered with 6-mm armor mounted on the canopy.

The separate opening of the canopy covers allowed the pilot to get out of the cockpit with a full hood of the aircraft. There were sliding vents on the side of the lantern.

There were places where the armor was reduced. For example, the thickness of the side walls of the cockpit and the arrow is reduced to 4 and 5 mm, and the lower part and the floor of the cockpit are reduced to 6 mm. The thickness of the upper hood armor was also reduced (to 4 mm), and the lower side, on the contrary, increased from 6 to 8 mm.

This is already based on the results of the analysis of damage to the IL-2. As the experience of its combat use has shown, the front upper part of the aircraft was practically not affected in air battles - it is inaccessible for fire from the ground, the shooter protected it from the fire of fighters from the tail of the aircraft, and in front of the German pilots generally preferred not to get involved with the Il-2, having estimated the damaging factor of the shells of the VYa-23 cannons.

The authors of the improvements to the Il-10 armor are worth mentioning and once again thank them. These are specialists from NII-48, which were headed by the director of the institute, Professor Zavyalov.

The shape of the new Il-10 armored hull made it possible to improve engine cooling due to a new arrangement of water and oil coolers for the engine cooling and lubrication systems, which were now completely housed in the armored hull behind the front spar of the center section under the cockpit floor. Air was supplied through tunnels on the sides of the motor. The temperature could be controlled using armored dampers (5-6 mm thick) from the cockpit.

The tunnels were covered from below with 6 mm armor, and from the sides - with 4 mm armored body. From the side of the rear spar, the tunnels were covered with 8 mm armor.

Thanks to this layout solution, the contours of the armored hull were made smoother than those of the Il-2, and the more aerodynamically advantageous scheme for blowing the radiators made it possible to reduce their size and resistance.

The total weight of the armor of the production Il-10 aircraft (without attachments) was 914 kg.

The weapon control system has been redesigned. The cannons and machine guns were controlled using an electric button on the aircraft control stick and two switches on a dashboard in the cockpit.

When firing, it was necessary to first turn on the toggle switch of machine guns or cannons, and then fire by pressing the combat button placed on the control handle. When both toggle switches were turned on, fire was fired from all barrels at once. The machine guns still had a separate descent with a cable.

Reloading was pneumatic, controlled by four buttons on the pilot's panel.

I duplicate the photo, but just here four reload buttons and two toggle switches for choosing weapons to the left of the sight are perfectly visible.

The attack aircraft provided for (but not necessarily mounted) the installation of 4 beams (two for each console) for rockets of three types: RS-132, ROFS-132 and RS-82.

In addition to bombs, the external bomb racks were originally planned to be suspended for chemical pouring devices UKHAP-250. By 1943, the UHAP-250 was not at all planned for use as a device for spraying toxic substances, but it proved itself to be a device for setting smoke screens.

Unlike the Il-2, the Il-10 had two bomb compartments instead of four. In the bomb bays of the Il-10, with a normal bomb load, it was placed:

- PTAB-2, 5-1, 5 - 144 pcs. / 230 kg by weight;

- AO-2, 5sch (steel cast iron) - 136 pcs / 400 kg;

- AO-2, 5-2 (bomb from a 45-mm projectile) - 182 pcs. / 400 kg;

- AO-8M4 - 56 pcs. / 400 kg;

- AO-10sch - 40 pcs. / 392 kg;

- AZh-2 (chemical ampoule) - 166 pcs. / 230 kg.

Bombs from 100 to 250 kg were hung on the locks located on the center section.

The dropping of aerial bombs, the setting of the smoke screen was carried out electrically, using a combat button located on the aircraft control stick, an ESBR-ZP electric bomb release device installed on the right side of the pilot's cabin, and a temporary mechanism of the VMSh-10 attack aircraft located on the right side of the instrument panel.

The attack aircraft had an alarm for suspended bombs on the outer locks of the DER-21 and DZ-42, as well as the open position of the bomb bay doors and the fallout of small bombs. At the same time, the signal lamps responsible for the bombs on the DER-21 and DZ-42 in the operating position (that is, when the bomb is suspended) burned and went out as the aircraft was released from the bombs. On the other hand, the warning lights of the hatch doors came on only when the hatches were open.

A DAG-10 aircraft grenade holder was installed in the aft fuselage. The holder held 10 AG-2 grenades.

The only thing that remains at the level of the beginning of the century is the sights. Aiming during bombing was carried out using aiming lines and pins on the hood and crosshairs on the front glass of the lantern.

Since October 1944, the first serial IL-10 produced by factories # 1 and # 18 without preliminary control tests at the State Corporation of the Air Force Research Institute of the spacecraft began to be handed over to military acceptance for rearmament of combat units. By January 5, 1945, 45 Il-10s were delivered to the 1st reserve air brigade for the rearmament of marching regiments.

The first regiment in the Air Force to receive the Il-10 attack aircraft was the 108th Guards Assault Aviation Orders of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment of the 3rd Assault Aviation Division (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel O. V. Topilin). The regiment received the aircraft directly from the plant number 18 in Kuibyshev.

In the process of retraining the flight personnel of the regiment and working out the flight test program for production vehicles, a number of serious design and manufacturing defects were revealed both in the aircraft itself and in the AM-42 engine.

Cases of aircraft fires in the air and even the death of a pilot (Captain Ivanov) during a training flight have been recorded.

It must be said that neither the Il-10 aircraft, which was tested at the Air Force Research Institute of the Air Force, nor the machines flown around by the test pilot of the 18th plant K. K. Rykov, never had fires.

A state commission arrived from Moscow to investigate the incident. As a result of its work, it was decided to temporarily suspend the serial production of the Il-10. In December 1944, production was resumed. The disadvantages have been eliminated.

Combat operations of the 108th Guardsman began on April 16, 1945 in the Berlin direction. For 15 days of fighting (from April 16 to April 30), the pilots of the 108th Guards Air Force flew 450 sorties, in which they continued to study the capabilities of the attack aircraft.

The conclusions of the report on the results of military tests of the Il-10 aircraft indicated that:

- The bomb load of the aircraft in terms of weight, purpose and caliber of suspended bombs ensures the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the attack aircraft.

- The armament of the Il-10 aircraft does not differ from the armament of the Il-2 in terms of the number of combat points, caliber and ammunition for them.

- When operating against targets covered by enemy fighters, the Il-10 aircraft requires escort to the same extent as the Il-2 aircraft. The presence of a larger range of speeds and better maneuverability facilitates the task of escort fighters and allows the Il-10 to engage in active air combat with the enemy.

- The survivability of the structure (booking the crew and the propeller group) is better than on the Il-2 aircraft, and in general it is sufficient. Water and oil coolers can be weak points. In general, the effectiveness of the armor protection of the crew and VMG against small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft during the period of military tests has not been sufficiently identified and require additional verification by analyzing damage on aircraft in other active units of the Air Force.

- The view from the cockpit, due to the lack of backward view and shading of the front glass in bad weather conditions (rain, snow), is worse in comparison with the view on the IL-2 aircraft.

The main method of bombing in combat conditions on the Il-10 aircraft is the same as for the Il-2, with the only difference that:

- the planning angles have increased from 30 to 50 degrees;

- the speed of entering the dive has increased from 320 to 350 km / h;

- the speed of withdrawal from the dive increased to 500-600 km / h;

- improved maneuverability of the aircraft.

In addition, it was noted that the aircraft is simple in terms of piloting technique. Having better stability, good controllability and higher maneuverability, the IL-10, in comparison with the IL-2, willingly forgives the flight crew for mistakes and does not tire the pilot when flying into a turbulence.

The retraining of the flight and engineering personnel who worked on the IL-2 with the AM-38f does not present any difficulties when switching to the IL-10 from the AM-42. The flight crews need 10-15 training flights with a total flight time of 3-4 hours. The engineering staff can easily master and study the materiel of the aircraft and the engine directly during operation.

But there were also negative aspects. The state commission noted the following as the main defects of the IL-10.

- Unsatisfactory design of the cockpit canopy (it is difficult to open on the ground, taxiing and flight in adverse weather conditions with an open canopy are impossible).

- There is no backward view from the cockpit (it is necessary to make an insert of transparent bulletproof glass in the armored backrest, similar to the IL-2 aircraft).

- Efforts on the handle of the landing gear wheels during taxiing and landing on soft ground and in winter burrow into the snow, deform and slow down the movement of the aircraft.

- The cables break everywhere: both the restrictive cables of the canopy and emergency landing gear, and the control system, as well as the cables of the crutch stopper.

- The durability of the 800x260 mm wheel tires, as well as the braking performance, is insufficient.

- In case of emergency landings, the power frame of the chassis assemblies breaks and the tail wheel stops are destroyed when landing with the crutch removed, and the frame No.14 of the fuselage also breaks.

- Aircraft landing gear with air pressure in the system 38 atm. not available at speeds over 260 km / h.

- Insufficient reliability of the AM-42 motor and its short service life.

- Lack of a dust filter on airplanes in the air intake system.

In conclusion of the report on military tests, the state commission concluded that the Il-10 AM-42 passed military tests satisfactorily and is a completely modern armored attack aircraft of the Space Force Air Force.

During the military trials, the pilots of the 108th regiment destroyed and damaged 6 units of armored vehicles, 60 cars, 100 enemy carts with cargo.

So, on April 18, 12 Il-10 (the leading squadron commander, Pyalipets), accompanied by 4 La-5s, bombed enemy vehicles and tanks in the area of the Gross-Osning point, the Cottbus-Spremberg road.

In five rounds, the group destroyed and damaged up to 14 vehicles, one gun and a tank.

On April 20, a seven Il-10 (leading - the navigator of the regiment, Mr. Zhigarin) inflicted an assault attack on suitable enemy reserves on the roads Grosskeris-Troinitz, Erodorf-Topkhin. Finding a large column of German tanks and vehicles, covered with anti-aircraft artillery, the group with a swift attack suppressed anti-aircraft fire, and then set fire to 15 vehicles and one tank in 12 approaches.

On April 30, the regiment suffered its first loss. While retreating from the target of a group of attack aircraft of the squadron commander Zheleznyakov, a large-caliber anti-aircraft shell hit the Il-10 pilot Gorodetsky … The crew died.

An analysis of the combat capabilities of the Il-10 attack aircraft shows that the effectiveness of the Il-10 against German medium tanks, compared to the Il-2, has increased significantly, even despite the reduced bomb load with anti-tank bombs and chemical ampoules. However, piloting and aiming in this case demanded increased attention from the pilots and were beyond the power of young pilots. But for an experienced and trained attack pilot, the Il-10 was a more effective weapon.

However, if we analyze the qualitative composition of the German tank forces at the final stage of the war, then we have to admit that the adoption of the Il-10 attack aircraft still did not sufficiently increase the anti-tank properties of the Red Army's assault aviation. The power of 23-mm guns to defeat medium tanks of the Wehrmacht was clearly not enough.

The final phase of the war with Germany can be called a testing ground for the Il-10. Then there was a war with Japan, in which the 26th Shad of the 12th Shad of the Pacific Fleet Air Force took part. It was the only air assault regiment in the grouping of the Air Force of the Spacecraft and the Navy in the Far East (9th, 10th and 12th VA, Air Force of the Pacific Fleet), armed with Il-10.

Basically, the planes attacked ships and transports and worked to suppress enemy anti-aircraft points. Here it turned out that Japanese 25-mm anti-aircraft guns pose a real danger to attack aircraft.

On July 9, 1945, the regiment's attack aircraft attacked ships in the port of Racine. According to reports from aircraft crews, one transport was sunk, one was damaged.

The Japanese shot down 2 Il-10s directly during the attack and damaged two so that the planes fell before reaching the airfield at sea. During the second strike on the same day, another Il-10 was shot down.

Such large losses of attack aircraft came as a complete surprise to the Soviet command.

A superficial analysis of past battles shows that, using standard methods of strikes against ground targets with a dive angle of 25-30 degrees, the Il-10 attack aircraft actually did not have clear advantages over the slower and less maneuverable Il-2.

Unfortunately, due to insufficient training, the attack pilots did not use all the capabilities of the new attack aircraft (performing dive strikes at angles of 45-50 degrees), which could significantly reduce the firing accuracy of Japanese anti-aircraft gunners, while ensuring high accuracy of bombing and shooting.

Since August 1945, a VU-9 mobile unit with a B-20T-E cannon began to be installed on serial Il-10s, which successfully passed state tests at the Air Force Research Institute.

In just 5 years of serial production, three aircraft factories (No. 1, No. 18 and No. 64) produced 4600 combat Il-10 and 280 training Il-10U.

In general, the operation of the aircraft was very much hampered by the quality of the AM-42 engine. Numerous failures were noted, caused by both unsatisfactory service in parts and defects in production at factories. But all the time the Il-10 was in service was accompanied by constant aircraft failures and accidents.

IL-10 was in service not only in the USSR, but also in socialist countries. In 1949, 40 Il-10s were received by the Polish Air Force (4th, 5th and 6th assault aviation regiments). In addition, the Il-10 entered service with the Yugoslav and Czech air forces.

From the end of December 1951 in Czechoslovakia at the Avia aircraft plant in Sokovitsa, according to the drawings of the Voronezh aircraft plant No. 64, serial production of the licensed version of the Il-10 under the designation B-33 was launched.

On its basis, the Czechs also produced a training version of the SV-33. In the period 1953-54. Czech attack aircraft were supplied to Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

Serial production of the B-33 ended in 1955 after the release of 1200 aircraft of this type.

Unlike the Soviet Il-10, the Czech attack aircraft were armed with 4 NS-23RM cannons (150 rounds per barrel).

The third and last war for the Il-10 was the war in Korea, where it was used by the Korean Air Force, and as an attack aircraft it was very effective.

But heavy losses from the actions of jet fighters actually bled the assault units of North Korea, and out of 90 aircraft by the end of the war, no more than 20 remained.

So how can you call the Il-10: the modernization of the Il-2 or is it a new aircraft?

If we go by analogy with the LaGG-3 / La-5 pair, then the Il-10 was still a different machine. You can use the words "deep modernization", but you don't want to. Complete alteration of the armored hull, electrification of control, a different wing, improved aerodynamics - everything suggests that it was a very painstaking work, taking into account all the identified shortcomings of the IL-2.

And the plane turned out to be quite good. It was spoiled only by the frankly capricious and unreliable AM-42 engine, but engine building has never been our strong point. So don't be surprised.

How not to be indignant at the fact that the IL-10 so quickly left the race. The reason for this was not even AM-42, but jet engines that conquered the sky.

But in general it was an attack aircraft, to which I would like to apply such an epithet as "competent". Indeed, the plane was not something so outstanding, or, as it is customary to broadcast today, "unparalleled in the world." It was a competent work of people who perfectly understood what and why they were doing.